Game Theory/ (Registro n. 1402)

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007 - Campo Fixo - Descrição Física
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Campo fixo de controle local 190617s1999 -us gr 000 0 por u
020 ## - ISBN
ISBN 9780262061414
040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação
Fonte de catalogação BR-BrCADE
090 ## - Número de Chamada
Localização na estante 330.1543 F952g
Cutter F952g
100 10 - Autor
Autor FUDENBERG, Drew
245 10 - Titulo Principal
Título principal Game Theory/
260 ## - Editora
Cidade Inglaterra:
Editora MIT Press,
Data 1991.
300 ## - Descrição Física
Número de páginas 579 p.
505 ## - Conteúdo
Conteúdo Contents<br/>Acknowledgments<br/>Introduction <br/><br/>Static Games of Complete Information <br/>Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium <br/>Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated<br/>Strict Dominance<br/>1.1.1 Strategic-Form Games <br/>1.1.2 Dominated Strategies <br/>1.1.3 Applications of the Elimina tion of Dominated Strategies<br/>1.2 Nash Equilibrium<br/>1.2.1 Definition of Nash Equilibrium<br/>1.2.2 Examples of Pure-Strategy Equilibria<br/>1.2.3 Nonexistence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium<br/>1.2.4 Multiple Nash Equilibria, Focal Points, and Pareto Optimality<br/>1.2.5 Nash Equilibrium as the Result of Learning or Evolution <br/>1.3 Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria <br/>1.3.1 Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium <br/>1.3.2 The Nash-Equilibrium Correspondence Has a Closed Graph <br/>1.3.3 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Games with Continuous Payoffs <br/>Exercises <br/>References <br/>Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and<br/>Correlated Equilibrium <br/>Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability <br/>2.1.1 Iterated Strict Dominance: Definition and Properties <br/>2.1.2 An Application of Iterated Strict Dominance <br/>2.1.3 Rationalizability <br/>2.1.4 Rationalizability and Iterated Strict Dominance <br/>2.1.5 Discussion <br/>Correlated Equilibrium <br/>Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria <br/>Exercises <br/>References <br/><br/>II Dynamic Games of Complete information <br/>3 Extensive-Form Games <br/>3.1 Introduction <br/>3.2 Commítment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions <br/>3.2.1 What Is a Multi-Stage Game? <br/>3.2.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection <br/>3.2.3 The Value of Commitment and 'Time Consistency" <br/>3.3 The Extensive Form <br/>3.3.1 Definition <br/>3.3.2 Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions <br/>3.4 Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games <br/>3.4.1 Behavior Strategies <br/>3.4.2 The Strategic-Form Representation of Extensive- Form Games <br/>3.4.3 The Equivalence between Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Games of Perfect Recali <br/>3.4.4 Iterated Strict Dominance and Nash Equilibrium <br/>3.5 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection <br/>3.6 Critiques of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection <br/>3.6.1 Critiques of Backward Induction <br/>3.6.2 Critiques of Subgame Perfection <br/>Exercises <br/>References <br/>4 Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions <br/>4.1 Introduction <br/>4.2 The Principie of Optimality and Subgame Perfection <br/>4.3 A First Look at Repeated Games <br/>4.3.1 The Repeated Prisoner's Diiemma <br/>4.3.2 A Finitely Repeated Game with Several Static Equilibria <br/>4.4 The Rubinstein-Stáhi Bargaining Model <br/>4.4.1 A Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium <br/>4.4.2 Uniqueness of the Infïnite-Horizon Equilibrium <br/>4.4.3 Comparative Statics <br/>4.5 Simple Timing Games <br/>4.5.1 Defínition of Simple Timing Games <br/>4.5.2 The War of Attrition <br/>4.5.3 Preemption Games <br/>4.6 Iterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubinstein Bargaining Game <br/>4.7 Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria <br/>4.7.1 Definitions <br/>4.7.2 A Two-Period Example <br/>4.7.3 Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Games with Many Players <br/>4.8 Finite-Horizon and Infinite-horizon Equilibria <br/>Exercises <br/>References <br/>5 Repeated Games <br/>5.1 Repeated Games with Observable Actions <br/>5.1.1 The Model <br/>5.1.2 The Folk Theorem for Inlinitely Repeated Games <br/>5.1.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium Set <br/>5.2 Finitely Repeated Games <br/>5.3 Repeated Games with Varying Opponents <br/>5.3.1 Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players <br/>5.3.2 Games with Overlapping Generations of Players <br/>5.3.3 Randomly Matched Opponents <br/>5.4 Pareto Perfection and Renego tia tion-Proofness in Repeated Games <br/>5.4.1 Introduction <br/>5.4.2 Pareto Perfection in Finitely Repeated Games <br/>5.4.3 Renegotiation-Proofness in lnfinitely Repeated Games <br/>5.5 Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information <br/>5.5.1 The Model <br/>5.5.2 Trigger-Price Strategies <br/>5.5.3 Public Strategies and Public Equilibria <br/>5.5.4 Dynamic Programming and Self-Generation <br/>5.6 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information <br/>5.7 Changing the Information Structure with the Time Period <br/>Exercises <br/>References <br/><br/>III Static Games of Incomplete Information <br/>6 Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium <br/>6.1 Incomplete Information <br/>6.2 Example<br/>6.1: Providing a Public Good under Incomplete Information <br/>6.3 The Notions of Type and Strategy<br/>6.4 Bayesian Equilibrium <br/>6.5 Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibria <br/>6.6 Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies <br/>6.6.1 Interim vs. Ex Ante Dominance <br/>6.6.2 Examples of lterated Strict Dominance <br/>6.7 Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria <br/>6.7.1 Examples <br/>6.7.2 Purification Theorem <br/>6.8 The Distributional Approach <br/>Exercises <br/>References <br/>7 Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design <br/>7.1 Examples of Mechanism Design <br/>7.1.1 Nonlinear Pricing <br/>7.1.2 Auctions <br/>7.2 Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principie <br/>7.3 Mechanism Design with a Single Agent <br/>7.3.1 Implementable Decisions and Aliocations <br/>7.3.2 Optimal Mechanisms <br/>7.4 Mechanisms with Several Agents: Feasible Aliocations, Budget Balance, and Efficiency <br/>7.4.1 Feasibility under Budget Balance <br/>7.4.2 Dominant Strategy vs. Bayesian Mechanisms <br/>7.4.3 Efficiency Theorems <br/>7.4.4 lnefficiency Theorems <br/>7.4.5 Efficiency Limit Theorems <br/>7.4.6 Strong lnefficiency Limit Theorems <br/>7.5 Mechanism Design with Several Agents: Optimization <br/>7.5.1 Auctions <br/>7.5.2 Efficient Bargaining Processes <br/>7.6 Further Topics in Mechanism Design <br/>7.6.1 Correlated Types <br/>7.6.2 Risk Aversion <br/>7.6.3 Informed Principal <br/>7.6.4 Dynamic Mechanism Design <br/>7.6.5 Common Agency <br/>Appendix <br/>Exercises <br/>References <br/><br/>IV Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information <br/>8 Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling-Hand Perfection <br/>8.1 Introduction <br/>8.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games of Incomplete Information <br/>8.2.1 The Basic Signaling Game<br/>8.2.2 Examples of Signaling Games <br/>8.2.3 Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions and Incomplete Information <br/>8.3 Extensive-Form Refinements <br/>8.3.1 Review of Game Trees <br/>8.3.2 Sequential Equilibrium <br/>8.3.3 Properties of Sequential Equilibrium <br/>8.3.4 Sequential Equilibrium Compared with Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium <br/>8.4 Strategic-Form Refinements <br/>8.4.1 Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium <br/>8.4.2 Proper Equilibrium <br/>Appendix <br/>Exercises <br/>References <br/>9 Reputation Effects <br/>9.1 Introduction <br/>9.2 Games with a Single Long-Run Player <br/>9.2.1 The Chain-Store Game <br/>9.2.2 Reputation Effects with a Single Long-Run Player: The General Case <br/>9.2.3 Extensive-Form Stage Games <br/>9.3 Games with Many Long-Run Players <br/>9.3.1 General Stage Games and General Reputations <br/>9.3.2 Common-lnterest Games and Bounded-Recall Reputations <br/>9.4 A Single "Big" Player agaínst Many Simultaneous Long-Lived Opponents <br/>Exercises <br/>References <br/>10 Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information <br/>10.1 Introduction <br/>10.2 Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Single-Sale Model <br/>10.2.1 The Framework <br/>10.2.2 A Two-Period Introduction to Coasian Dynamics <br/>10.2.3 An Infinite-Horizon Example of the Coase Conjecture <br/>10.2.4 The Skimming Property <br/>10.2.5 The Gap Case <br/>10.2.6 The No-Gap Case <br/>10.2.7 Gap vs. No Gap and Extensions of the Single-Sale Model<br/>10.3 Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Rental or Repeated-Sale Model <br/>10.3.1 Short-Term Contracts <br/>10.3.2 Long-Term Contracts and Renegotiation <br/>10.4 Price Offers by an Informed Buyer <br/>10.4.1 One-Sided Offers and Bilateral Asyrnmetric Information <br/>10.4.2 Alternating OfTers and One-Sided Asymmetric Information <br/>10.4.3 Mechanism Design and Bargaining <br/>Exercises <br/>References <br/><br/>V Advanced Topics <br/>11 More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance <br/>11.1 Strategic Stability<br/>11.2 Signaling Games <br/>11.3 Forward Induction, Iterated Weak Dominance, and "Burning Money" <br/>11.4 Robust Predictions under Payoff Uncertainty <br/>Exercises <br/>References <br/>12 Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games <br/>12.1 Generic Properties of Nash Equilibria <br/>12.1.1 Number ofNash Equilibria <br/>12.1.2 Robustness of Equilibria to Payoff Perturbations <br/>12.2 Existence ofNash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Action Spaces and Discontinuous Payoffs <br/>12.2.1 Existence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium <br/>12.2.2 Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium <br/>12.3 Supermodular Games <br/>Exercises <br/>References <br/>13 Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium <br/>131 Markov Equilibria in Specific Classes of Games <br/>13.1.1 Stochastic Games: Definition and Existence of MPE <br/>13.1.2 Separable Sequential Games <br/>13.1.3 Examples from Economics <br/>13.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General Games: Definition and Properties <br/>13.2.1 Definition <br/>13.2.2 Existence <br/>13.2.3 Robustness to Payoff Perturbations <br/>13.3 Differential Games <br/>13.3.1 Definition <br/>13.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions<br/>13.3.3 Linear-Quadratic Differential Games<br/>13.3.4 Technical Issues <br/>13.3.5 Zero-Sum Differential Games <br/>13.4 Capital-Accumulation Games <br/>13.4.1 Open-Loop, Closed-Loop, and Markov Strategies <br/>13.4.2 Differential-Game Strategies <br/>Exercises <br/>References <br/>14 Common Knowledge and Games <br/>14.1 Introduction <br/>14.2 Knowledge and Common Knowledge <br/>14.3 Common Knowledge and Equilibrium <br/>14.3.1 The Dirty Faces and the Sage <br/>14.3.2 Agreemg to Disagree <br/>14.3.3 No-Speculation Theorems <br/>14.3.4 Interim Efficiency and Incomplete Contracts <br/>14.4 Common Knowledge, Almost Common Knowledge, and the Sensitivity of Equilibria to the Information Structure <br/>14.4.1 The Lack of Lower Hemi-Continuity <br/>14.4.2 Lower Hemi-Continuity and Almost Common Knowledge <br/>Exercises <br/>References <br/>Index <br/><br/><br/>
700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal
9 (RLIN) 788
Nome pessoa TIROLE, Jean
Relação Autor
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