| Conteúdo |
Table of Cases <br/>Table of International Legislation and Agreements <br/>List of Abbreviations <br/>A Note on the GATT 1994/WTO <br/>Introduction <br/><br/>PART I. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF DUMPING AND OTHER RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES <br/><br/>1. Economic, Legal, and Strategic Considerations on Dumping Practices and Anti-Dumping Laws <br/><br/>1. Introduction <br/>2. The Economics of Dumping <br/>2.1. The Classic Definition Dumping: Ransnational Price Discrimination Practice <br/>2.2. A Pragmatic Definition of Dumping: Ti.ansnational Sale Below Cost <br/>3. Welfare Impacts of Dumping for the Importing and Exporting Countries <br/>3.1. The Impact of Dumping in the Importing Country <br/>3.2. The Impact of Dumping in the Exporting Country <br/>4. Existing Tests Proposed to Domestic Courts to Identify Predatory Behaviour <br/>4.1. Short-Run Cost-Based Rules <br/>4.2. Long-Term Cost-Based Rules <br/>4.3. Output Expansion Rules <br/>4.4. Rules Governing Price Rises <br/>4.5. The Rule-of-Reason Test <br/>4,6. Tests Suggested by European Commentators <br/>4.7. 'No-Tier' Rules <br/>4.8. No Rule <br/>4.9. Conclusion on Tests of Predation <br/>5. International Predation <br/>6. The Law on Dumping <br/>6.1. The GATT and National Anti-Dumping Laws <br/>6.2. What the GATT Authorizes <br/>6.3. Circumstances Where a Response to Dumping is Permitted: Injury Caused to Domestic Industry <br/>6.4. Anti-Dumping Duties <br/>6.5. Conclusions on Anti-Dumping Laws <br/>7. The Impact of Anti-Dumping Actions <br/>8. Strategic, Political, and Social Considerations on Dumping <br/>8.1. The Interface Theory <br/>8.2. The Possibility of a Threat to Security and Proposals for Dealing with it <br/>8.3. Industrial Policy and Social Considerations <br/>9. Alternatives to the Use of Anti-Dumping Actions <br/>10. Conclusions <br/><br/>2. The International Control of Business Practices other than Dumping <br/><br/>1. Introduction <br/>2. Attempts by Various Organizations to Co-ordinate Actions against Restrictive Business Practices <br/>2.1. The League of Nations <br/>2.2. The International Labour Organization <br/>2.3. The International Trade Organization <br/>2.4. Attempts by the OEEC <br/>2.5. Attempts by the ECOSOC <br/>2.6. New Zealand's Proposal to Amend GATT Article VI <br/>2.7. An Attempt by the Contracting Parties to the GATT, 1958-60 <br/>3. The Extraterritorial Application of National Laws on Restrictive Business Practices <br/>3.1. The Position Taken by the US Authorities <br/>3.2. The Position Taken by the Canadian Authorities <br/>3.3. The Position Taken by the Mexican Authorities <br/>3.4. The Position Taken by the European Authorities <br/>3.5. Jurisdictional Defences and Exceptions to the Extraterritorial Reach of Anti-Trust and Competition Laws <br/>3.6. Conclusions on the Issue of Extraterritoriality <br/>4. Increased Collaboration and Co-operation <br/>4.1. Recommendations of the Council of the OECD <br/>4.2. Bilateral Arrangements for Co-operation in Competition Matters <br/>4.3. OECD Declaration on Multinationals <br/>4.4. The UNCTAD Code on Restrictive Business Practices <br/>4.5. The ICC Code on Investment <br/>4.6. Other Codes of Conduct <br/>5. The Legal Value of these UNCTAD, OECD, and ICC Instruments <br/>6. The European Proposal for Positive Comity <br/>7. Conclusion and Proposals <br/><br/><br/>PART II. DICHOTOMIES OF TREATMENTS BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES AND NATIONAL ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE AND CO-ORDINATE THESE DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS <br/><br/>3. Anti-Dumping Regulation Contravenes the Obligation of National Treatment of the GATT and the NAFTA <br/><br/>1. Introduction <br/>2. The Obligations of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment of the GAIT and the Right to Impose Discriminatory Anti-Dumping Measures <br/>2.1. 'Treatment no Less Favourable than that Accorded to Like Products of National Origin' <br/>3. Evidence of the Different Treatments in Standards between Anti-Dumping Laws, and Anti-Discrimination and Anti-Predation Laws <br/>3.1. Comparison of 'Substantive' Standards of Anti-Dumping Regulation with those of Domestic Laws on Predation and Price Discrimination <br/>3.2. Comparison between the 'Procedural' Elements of Anti-Dumping and Competition Laws <br/>3.3. Conclusion <br/>4. Differences between National Systems <br/>4.1. Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions <br/>4.2. Common Law vs. Civil Law <br/>4.3. Different Schools of Thought in the USA <br/>4.4. The European Conception of the Role of Competition <br/>5. The Different Policy Objectives of Anti-Dumping and Anti-Trust Laws <br/>5.1. Interest-Group Politics <br/>6. Conclusion <br/><br/>4. Co-ordination of Anti-Dumping and Competition Considerations at the Domestic Level <br/><br/>1. Introduction <br/>2. The Context for the Consideration of Competition Variables in Anti-Dumping Determinations and the work of the OECD <br/>3. Pressures to Reduce Anti-Dumping Duties <br/>3.1. The EEC System <br/>3.2. The Canadian System <br/>3.3. The US System<br/>3.4. The Mexican System <br/>4. Anti-Trust Liability in Anti-Dumping Actions <br/>5. Trade Measures for Competition Purposes <br/>6. Conclusion <br/><br/>PART III. EFFORTS AT CO-ORDINATION OF ANTI-TRUST AND ANTI-DUMPING ACTIONS WITHIN FREE-TRADE AREAS <br/><br/>5. Political, Economic, and Legal Aspects of Free-Trade Areas <br/>1. Introduction<br/>2. Definitions <br/>3. Political Reasons for Regional Arrangements <br/>4. The Political Impact of Regional Arrangements on International Relations <br/>5. The Economics of Regional Integration <br/>5.1. The Free-Trade Area, Customs Union, Common Market, Economic Union, and Political Union Compared <br/>6. International Law on Free-Trade Areas <br/>6.1. International Customary Law on Free-Trade Areas <br/>6.2. Preparatory Work for the Havana Charter and the GATT 180 GATT Law on Free-Trade Areas <br/>7.1. The Place of Article XXIV in the GATT <br/>7.2. Article XXIV(4) <br/>7.3. Article XXIV(5) <br/>7.4. Article XXIV(7) <br/>7.5. Article XXIV(8)(b) <br/>7.6. Article XXIV(10) <br/>8. Interpretation of the GATT Practice <br/>9. Conclusion <br/><br/>6. Experiences of Other Free-Trade Areas in Dealing with Internal 'Dade Measures <br/><br/>1. Introduction <br/>2. Provisions on Restrictive Business Practices (Competition) <br/>Cotnained in Agreements of Free-Trade Areas <br/>2.1. The European Free Rade Agreement, EFTA <br/>2.2. The Free-Trade Agreements between the European Economic Community and the Member Countries of the European Free Trade Association <br/>2.3. The European Economic Area, EEA <br/>2.4. The So-Called Europe Agreements <br/>2.5. The Australia-New Zealand Agreement for Closer Economic Relations <br/>3. Provisions on Restrictive Business Practices in the Common Market of the EEC <br/>3.1. The Functioning of the EEC Competition System Supplementing Anti-Dumping Actions <br/>4. Conclusion <br/><br/>PART IV. PHASING OUT ANTI-DUMPING LAWS WITHIN THE NAFTA <br/><br/>7. The Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices within the NAFFA <br/><br/>1. Introduction <br/>2. Existing National Anti-Dumping Laws and their Similar Impact <br/>2.1. Differences in the Determination of Injury <br/>2.2, Differences in the Agencies Enforcing the Law <br/>2.3. Legal Standing and Quasi-Judicial Process <br/>2.4. Imposition of Duties <br/>2.5. A Public Interest Clause <br/>2.6. The Lesser Duty Principle <br/>3. The NAFTA Binational Tribunal <br/>3.1. Criteria for Judicial Review <br/>4. New Provisions on Competition and Monopolies in the NAFTA <br/>5. Proposals for Phasing Out Anti-Dumping Enforcement <br/>6. Proposals for a System of Conflicts of Laws <br/>6.1. The First Model: The Law of the Territory Where the Restrictive Business Take Place <br/>6.2. The Second Model: Allocation of Jurisdiction Based on the Criterion of 33 per cent more of the Turnover of the Firms Concerned <br/>7. Conclusion <br/><br/>8. Implementation of the Chosen Model for Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices within the NAFTA <br/>1. Introduction <br/>2. US, Canadian, and Mexican Domestic Legislation on Competition <br/>2.1. Background and Policies of the Three Competition Laws <br/>2.2. Standing, Procedure, Enforcement, Costs, and Delay <br/>2.3. The Treatment of Price Discrimination <br/>2.4. The Treatment of Predatory Pricing <br/>2.5. Other Abusive Conduct by Firms with Market Power <br/>2.6. Vertical Restraints <br/>2.7. Horizontal Agreements <br/>2.8. Joint Ventures and Mergers <br/>2.9. Intellectual Property Rights <br/>2.10. Conclusion on the Comparision of Domestic Laws <br/>3. Application of the Models Proposed in Chapter 7 <br/>3.1. 'The Law of the Territory Where the Restrictive Practice Takes Place' <br/>4. Amendments to Existing Competition and Anti-Trust Laws <br/>5. Abolishing Export Cartels <br/>6. Parallel Amendments to Anti-Dumping Laws <br/>7. Proposals for a Transition Period <br/>7.1. Regional or Product-by-Product Reduction of Duties <br/>8. Conclusion <br/><br/>PART V. TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT <br/><br/>9. Parameters, Issues. and Comments on an International Code n Competition <br/><br/>1. Introduction <br/>2. Attempts to Move towards an International Code on Competition <br/>3. New Proposals <br/>3.1. The GATT Trade Report Mechanism <br/>3.2. The American Bar Association <br/>3.3. European Positive Comity <br/>3.4. The Continuous Work of UNCLAD, the World Bank, i and the OECD <br/>3.5. The NAFTA Laboratory <br/>3.6. US—Japan Structural Impediment Initiative, SlI <br/>4. Fundamental Social Differences <br/>4.1. Anti-Trust vs. Competition <br/>4.2. Industrial Policies <br/>5. An International Code on Competition: General Issues and Proposals <br/>5.1. Should the Agreement be Binding? <br/>5.2. Rule of Reason or per se <br/>5.3. Dominance vs. Market Power <br/>5.4. Practices which Would Constitute 'Abusive' Behaviour <br/>5.5. A Single Infraction of Abuse of a Dominant Position <br/>5.6. The Best Institution: GATT, MTO, UNCTAD, OECD, or a New Forum? <br/>6. Proposed Alternatives to Introduce Competition Considerations into International Trade Litigation <br/>6.1. Private Positive Comity <br/>6.2. The Non-Violation Procedure of the GATT <br/>6.3. An ICSID Type of Tribunal <br/>6.4. A NAFTA Type of Tribunal <br/>7. Domaine Reserve <br/>8. Conclusion <br/><br/>Conclusion <br/><br/>1. How do Anti-Dumping and Anti-Trust Provisions Interact within a Free-Trade Area <br/>2. Does the Law Require Anti-Dumping Measures within Free-Trade Areas to be Phased Out? <br/>3. How Should Anti-Dumping Measures be Phased Out within the NAFTA <br/>4. Should (Could) Anti-Dumping Measures be Phased Out Multilaterally in Favour of an International Code on Competition <br/>5. Concluding Comments <br/><br/> |
