Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: (Registro n. 1852)

006 - Campo Fixo - Material Adicional
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007 - Campo Fixo - Descrição Física
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Campo fixo de controle local 190617s1993 -us gr 000 0 eng u
020 ## - ISBN
ISBN 813316197
040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação
Fonte de catalogação BR-BrCADE
090 ## - Número de Chamada
Localização na estante 338.9 O85i
Cutter O85i
100 1# - Autor
Autor OSTROM, Elinor
245 10 - Titulo Principal
Título principal Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development:
Subtítulo Infrastructure Policies in Perspective/
260 ## - Editora
Cidade Colorado, EUA:
Editora Westview Press,
Data 1993.
300 ## - Descrição Física
Número de páginas 266 p.
490 ## - Indicação de Série
Série Theoretical Lenses on Public Policy
505 ## - Conteúdo
Conteúdo Contents<br/>List of Illustrations <br/>Preface<br/>Acknowledginents <br/>Introduction, Paul A. Sabatier, Series Editor <br/><br/>1 The Role of Inírastructuxe in Development <br/>Postwar Development Initiatives, <br/>Foreign Assistance Strategies, <br/>The Role of Social Infrastructure, <br/>An Institutional Approach to Explaining<br/>Development Outcoines,<br/>The Importance of Physical Infrastructure, <br/>What Do We Mean by Infrastructure Sustainabiity? <br/>A Definition, <br/>Evaluative Criteria, <br/>An Overview of Our Approach<br/>Conclusion,<br/>Notes<br/><br/>2 The Problem of Sustainable Infrastructure <br/>Infrastructure Maintenance and Its Finance, <br/>Phases of Infrastructure Development, <br/>Design, <br/>Finance, <br/>Construction, <br/>Operation and Maintenance, <br/>Use<br/>Factors Influencing Maintenance Decisions of a Single Owner-User of Private Capital<br/>Conclusion<br/>Notes<br/><br/>3 Individuais, Incentives, and Transaction Costs <br/>Assumptions About the Individual,<br/>Problems of Contractual Uncertainty and Transaction Costs,<br/>Information Asymmetries as Sources of Contractual Uncertainty<br/>Time and Place Information and Scientific Knowledge<br/>Other Types of Information Asymmetries<br/>Kinship Networks as Counteracting Institutions<br/>Nepotism and Corruption<br/>Conclusion<br/>Notes<br/><br/>4 Provision and Production of Rural Infrastructure<br/>Distinction Between Provision and Production<br/>Attributes of Rural Infrastructure Primarily<br/>Affecting Provision<br/>Nonexcludability and the Free-Rider Problem<br/>Problems of Joint Use<br/>Problems of Measurement<br/>Problems of Rent Seeking<br/>Attributes of Rural Infrastructure Primarily<br/>Affecting Production,<br/>Economies of Scale,<br/>Asset Specificity<br/>Rate of Deterioration<br/>Public-Private Industry Structure<br/>Conclusion<br/>Notes<br/><br/>5 Evaluating Institutional Performance<br/>Overail Performance Criteria,<br/>Economic Efficiency<br/>Equity<br/>Accountabiity<br/>Adaptability<br/>Trade-offs Among Criteria<br/>Intermediate Perforniance Criteria, <br/>Costs of Provision<br/>Costs of Production<br/>Conclusion, <br/>Notes<br/><br/>6 Analyzing Institutional Arrangements<br/>Institutional Arrangements for Private Infrastructure<br/>Development, <br/>A Simple Market<br/>A Differentiated Market for Infrastructure<br/>Development<br/>Comparative Evaluation<br/>Institutional Arrangements for Public Infrastructure<br/>Development<br/>User Groups<br/>Comparative Performance<br/>Conclusion<br/>Notes<br/><br/>7 Centralized Institutional Arrangemente<br/>Centralized Infrastructure Development<br/>Anticipated Performance on the Production Side<br/>Anticipated Performance on the Provision Side<br/>Anticipated Overail Performance<br/>The Problem of Truncated Analyses<br/>The Role of Donor Agencies<br/>Conclusion<br/>Notes<br/><br/>8 Decentralized Institutional Arrangements<br/>Decentralization Efforts<br/>The Evolving Meaning of Decentralization<br/>Multiple Dimensions of Decentralization<br/>Does Administrative Decentralization Improve the Performance of Centralized National<br/>Governments? <br/>Conclusion<br/>Notes<br/><br/>9 Poiycentric Institutional Arrangements <br/>The Concept of Polycentricity, <br/>Economic Rationale for Polycentricity<br/>The Possibiity of Polycentricity in Developing<br/>Countries<br/>Sources of Polycentricity<br/>Principies Versus Blueprints<br/>Some Common Concerns About Polycentric<br/>Arrangements<br/>Governance Issues<br/>Finance Issues<br/>Privatization as a Form of Decentralization<br/>Pubiic Concessions as a Buttress for Centralization<br/>Monopolies Versus Competitive Markets<br/>Privatization Is Not a Panacea<br/>Conclusion<br/>Notes<br/><br/>10 Implications of an Institutional Approach to Sustainable Development<br/>The Proposed Analytical Approach<br/>General Policy Implications of Our Approach<br/>llmmediate Policy Implications of Our Approach<br/>Sustaining Small-scale Infrastructure<br/>Sustaining Large-scale Infrastructure<br/>Conclusion<br/>Notes<br/>References<br/>About the Book and Authors<br/>index <br/><br/><br/>
700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal
9 (RLIN) 499
Nome pessoa SCHROEDER, Larry
Relação Autor
700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal
9 (RLIN) 500
Nome pessoa WYNNE, Susan
Relação Autor
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