The Theory of Industrial Organization/ (Registro n. 2847)
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Campo fixo de controle local | 191121b1988 us ld||gr|||| 00| 0 eng u |
020 ## - ISBN | |
ISBN | 0262200716 |
040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
Localização na estante | 338.7 T597t |
Cutter | T597t |
100 1# - Autor | |
Autor | TIROLE, Jean |
245 14 - Titulo Principal | |
Título principal | The Theory of Industrial Organization/ |
260 ## - Editora | |
Cidade | Cambridge, Estados Unidos: |
Editora | The MIT Press, |
Data | 1988. |
300 ## - Descrição Física | |
Número de páginas | 479 p. |
505 ## - Conteúdo | |
Conteúdo | Contents<br/>Preface <br/>Introduction<br/>The Theory of the Firm <br/><br/>1 What Is a Firm? <br/><br/>2 The Profit-Maximization Hypothesis <br/><br/>3 Supplementary Section: The Principal-Agente Relationship <br/>Answers and Hints<br/>References<br/><br/>1 The Exercise of Monopoly Power <br/>Introduction <br/>1 Monopoly <br/>1.1 Pricing Behavior <br/>1.2 Cost Distortions <br/>1.3 Rent-Seeking Behavior <br/>1.4 Concluding Remarks <br/>1.5 Supplementary Section: Durable Goods and Limits on Monopoly Power <br/>Answers and Hints <br/>Appendix: A Heuristic Proof of the Coase Conjecture <br/>References <br/><br/>2 Product Selection, Quality, and<br/>Advertising <br/>2.1 The Notion of Product Space<br/>2.2 Product Selection <br/>2.3 Quality and Information <br/>2.4 Advertising <br/>2.5 Concluding Remarks <br/>2.6 Supplementary Section: Repeat Purchases <br/>Answers and Hints<br/>References <br/><br/>3 Price Discrimination <br/>3.1 Perfect Price Discrimination <br/>3.2 Multimarket (Third-Degree) Price Discrimination<br/>3.3 Personal Arbitrage and Screening (Second-Degree Price Discrimination) <br/>3.4 Concluding Remarks <br/>3.5 Supplementary Section: Nonlinear Pricing <br/>Answers and Hints<br/>References <br/><br/>4 Vertical Control <br/>4.1 Linear Prices versus Vertical Restraints <br/>4.2 Externalities and Vertical Control <br/>4.3 Intrabrand Competition <br/>4.4 Interbrand Competition <br/>4.5 Concluding Remarks <br/>4.6 Supplementary Section: Competition-Reducing<br/>Restraints <br/>Answers and Hints <br/>References <br/><br/>II Strategic Interaction <br/>Introduction <br/>5 Short-Run Price Competition <br/>5.1 The Bertrand Paradox <br/>5.2 Solutions to the Bertrand Paradox: An Introduction <br/>5.3 Decreasing Rehirns to Scale and Capacity Conshaints <br/>5.4 Traditional Cournot Analysis <br/>5.5 Concentrahon Indices and Industry Profitability<br/>5.6 Concluding Remarks <br/>5.7 Supplementary Section: Quantity Competition<br/>Answers and Hints<br/>References <br/><br/>6 Dynamic Price Competition and Tacit Collusion <br/>6.1 Conventional Wisdom (Factors Facilitating and Hindering Coliusion) <br/>6.2 Static Approaches to Dynamic Price Competition <br/>6.3 Supergames <br/>6.4 Price Rigidities <br/>6.5 Reputation for Friendly Behavior <br/>6.6 Concluding Remarks <br/>6.7 Supplementary Section: Dynamic Games and Tacit Collusion <br/>Answers and Hints<br/>References <br/><br/>7 Product Differentiation: Price Competition and Non-Price Competition <br/>7.1 Spatial Competition <br/>7.2 Monopolistic Competition <br/>7.3 Advertising and Informational Product Differentiation <br/>7.4 Concluding Remarks <br/>7.5 Supplementary Section: Vertical Differentiation and Monopolistic Competition <br/>Answers and Hints<br/>References <br/><br/>8 Entry, Acconunodation, and Exit <br/>8.1 Fixed Costs: Natural Monopoly and Contestability <br/>8.2 Surik Costs and Barriers to Entry: The Stackelberg-Spence-Dixit Model <br/>8.3 A Taxonomy of Business Strategies <br/>8.4 Applications of the Taxonomy <br/>8.5 Epilogue: Prices versus Quantities <br/>8.6 Supplementary Section: Strategic Behavior and Barriers to Entry or Mobility <br/>Answers and Hints <br/>References <br/><br/>9 Information and Strategic Behavior: Reputation, Limit Pricing, and Predation <br/>9.1 Static Competition under Asymmetric Information <br/>9.2 Dynamics: A Heuristic Approach <br/>9.3 Accommodation and Tacit Collusion <br/>9.4 The Milgrom-Roberts Model of Limit Pricing<br/>9.5 Predation for Merger <br/>9.6 Multimarket Reputation <br/>9.7 The "Long Purse" Story <br/>9.8 Concluding Remarks <br/>9.9 Supplemenfary Section: Darwinian Selection in an Industry <br/>Answers and Hints <br/>References <br/><br/>10 Research and Development and the Adoption of New Technologies <br/>10.1 Incentives as a Function of the Market Structure: The Value of Innovation <br/>10.2 Introduction to Patent Races <br/>10.3 WeIfare Analysis of Patent Protection <br/>10.4 Alternative lnducements to R&D <br/>10.5 Strategic Adoption of New Technologies <br/>10.6 Network Externalities, Standardization, and Compatibility <br/>10.7 Concluding Remarks <br/>10.8 Supplementary Section: Patent Licensing and Research Joint Ventures <br/>Answers and Hints<br/>References<br/><br/>11 Noncooperative Game Theory: A User's Manual <br/>11.1 Games and Strategies <br/>11.2 Nash Equilibrium <br/>11.3 Perfect Equilibrium <br/>11.4 Bayesian Equilibrium <br/>11.5 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium <br/>11.6 Supplementary Section <br/>Answers and Hints <br/>References <br/>Review Exercises <br/>Index <br/><br/><br/> |
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Tipo de Material | Livros |
Classificação | Empréstimo | Locação permanente | Locação corrente | Data de aquisição | Forma de aquisição | Patrimônio | Número completo de chamada | Código de barras | Número do exemplar | Data de inserção do exemplar | Tipo de item no Koha |
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Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-11-21 | Compra | 30204 | 338.7 T597t | 2019-1540 | 1 | 2019-11-21 | Livros | ||
Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-11-21 | Compra | 30203 | 338.7 T597t | 2019-1541 | 2 | 2019-11-21 | Livros |