Federal Antitrust Policy:

por HOVENKAMP, Herbert
[ Livros ] Motivo da edição:4. ed. Publicado por : West, (St. Paul, Estados Unidos:) Detalhes físicos: 906 p. ISBN:9780314210050. Ano: 1994 Tipo de Material: Livros
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Table of Contents


Chapter 1.The Basic Economics of Antitrust
1.1 Price Theory: Economic Behavior and Perfect Competition
1.1a.The Perfectly Competitive Market
1;1b.Behavior of the Competitive Firm
1.2a.Price and Output of the Protected Monopolist
1.2b.Monopsony; Output Effects; Policy Implications
1.2c.De Facto Monopolies in Real World Markets
1.3Antitrust Policy and the Social Cost of Monopoly
1.3a.Monopoly as a Status; Monopolization as a Process
1.3b.The Deadweight Loss Caused by Monopoly
1.3c.The Social Cost of Monopoly: Rent-Seeking
1.3d. The Social Cost of Monopoly: Lost Competitor Investment
1.4 Industrial Organization Theory and Economies of Scale
1.4a.The General Case of Economies of Scale
1.4b.Persistent Scale Economies, Natural Monopoly, Franchise Bidding and Contestability
1.5 Less-Than-Perfect Competition
1.5a.Product Differentiation
1.5b.Price Discrimination
1.5d.Less-Than-Perfect Competition and "Second Best"
1.6 Barriers to Entry
1.7 The Troubled Life of the Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm
1.8 The Increasing Importance of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis

Chapter 2.History and ldeologym Antitrust Policy
2.1The Development of American Antitrust Policy
2.1a.The Goals of the Sherman Act: Efficiency and Interest Group Explanations
2.1b.The Common Law and the Federal Antitrust Laws
2.1c.A Thumbnail History of Federal Antitrust Policy
2.2On the Role of Economics in Antitrust
2.2a. Antitrust and Economics Before 1960
2.2b.The Chicago School and Its Aftermath
2.2c.Skepticism; Competitor v. Consumer Suits; Private v. Public Suits
2.2d. Politics and Dernocratic Policy
2.2e. Antitrust Policy in the Wake of the Chicago School
2.3 On the Use of Economicsin Antitrust
2.3a. The Domain of Antitrust Economics
2.3b.The Substance of Antitrust Economics
2.3c.The Meaning of "Welfare," "Efficiency" and "Consumer Welfare" in Antitrust Economics

Chapter 3.Market Power and Market Definition
3.1 Introduction
3.1a.Market Power Technically Defined
3.1b.Market Share as a Surrogate for Market Power
3.1c.Market Share as More Than a Surrogate; Independent Relevance of Market Share
3.1d.The Relevant Antitrust Market
3.2 Estimating the Relevant Market; The SSNIP and the 'Hypothetical Monopolist"
3.2a.Size of Hypothesized Price Increase
3.2b.The "Profit-Maximizing" Increase; Critical Loss Analysis
3.2c.Broader and Narrower Markets; General Irrelevance of Submarkets
3.3 The Product Market; General Considerations
3.3a.Markets and Brands; "Lock-in”
3.3a1.Single Brand Ordinarily Not a Relevant Market; Kodak
3.3a2.Lower Court Decisions Limiting Kodak
3.3a3.Contract "Lock-in;" Franchisor Brand as Market
3.3b.Substitutes v. Complements; Cluster Markets
3.3b1.Relevant Market Consists of Substitutes
3.3b2.The Limited Rationale for Finding "Cluster" Markets
3.4 "Cross-Elasticity of Demand:" The "Cellophane" Fallacy and Its Consequences
3.4a.Cross-Price Elasticities and Their Meaning
3.4b.Cross-Elasticity of Demand in the du Pont (Cellophane) Case
3.4c.Correcting for the "Cellophane" Fallacy
3.5 Supply Elasticities; Foreign Imports
3.5a.Foreign Imports and the Alcoa Case
3.5b. Other Decisions Addressing (or Failing to Address) Supply Issues
3.5c. Accounting for Elasticity of Supply: Market Inclusion or Low Barriers to Entry
3.6 The Geographic Market
3.6a.Shipped Goods; Minimum Geographic Market
3.6b.Stationary Goods and Services
3.6c.Price Movements and Shipping Patterns
3.6c1.Price Movements Generaily; Asymmetry
3.6c2.The Elzinga-Hogarty Test
3.6d.Trade Area; Non-competition Covenants
3.6e.Price Discrimination
3.7 Computation and Interpretation of Market Shares
3.7a.Revenue v. Units
3.7b.Output v. Capacity
3.7c.Product Durability and Power
3.7d.Interpreting Market Share Data; Questions of Fact or Law
3.8 Market Definition in the Justice Department Merger Guidelines
3.8a.Product Market Delineation in the 2010 Guidelines
3.8b.Geographic Market Definition Under the 2010 Guidelines
3.8e.Calculation of Market Shares Under the 2010 Merger Guidelines
3.8d.The "Cellophane" Fallacy and the Difference Between Market Delineation for Mergers and Other Practices
3.8e.Conclusion; The Guidelines as a Policy Statement
3.9 Alternative Methods of Establishing Market Power
3.9a.Measuring Residual Demand Directly
3.9b.Persistent Price Discrimination
3.9b1.Price Discrimination and Intellectual Property
3.9b2.Price Discrimination and Market Definition
3.9c.Persistent Monopoly Profits; High Margins
3.9c1.Monopoly Profits v. Accounting Profits
3.9c2.Absence of High Accounting Profits
3.9c3.The Problem of "Rents"
3.9d.Market Power and Intellectual Property


Chapter 4.Antitrust Policy Toward Collusion and Oligopoly
4.1 Introduction: The Basic Economics of Price Fixing
4.1a.The (Virtual) Universality of Cartel Cheating
4.1a1.Divergence Between Cartel and Single Firm Profit Maximization
4.1a2. Cartel Cheating Strategies
4.1a3. Detecting and Punishing Cheating; Cartel "Amnesty"
4.1b. Competitive Fringe Firms
4.1c. Interna! Efficiencies of the Cartel
4.1d. Carteis ofBuyers
4.2 Oligopoly, Cooperative and Non-cooperative
4.2a. Non-cooperative Cournot Oligopoly
4.2b. Cooperative v. Non-cooperative Oligopoly Strategies
4.3 The Social Cost of Coliusion
4.4 Antitrust Policy Toward Oligopoly and Tacit Coilusion
4.4a.Attacking Oligopoly; The Turner-Posner Debate
4.4b.Identifying Tacit Coilusion and Facilitators; Policy Options
4.5 Proving a Price or Output "Agreement" From Indirect or Circumstantial Evidence
4.6 Reaching Oligopoly Behavior on Less Explicit Evidence of Agreement
4.6a.Introduction; Incomplete Agreements
4.6b.Challenging Facilitators Established by Agreement
4.6c. "Unilateral" Facilitators; Basing-Point Pricing Schemes
4.6d. Other Facilitators; 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act
4.6e. Motions to Dismiss and Summary Judgment in Conspiracy Cases
4.7 Intraenterprise Conspiracy

Chapter 5. Joint Ventures of Competitors, Concerted Refusals, Patent Licensing, and the Rule of Reason
5.1 Introduction: Naked and Anciflary Agreements Among Competitors
5.1a.Distinguishing Naked From Ancillary Restraints; Question of Law
5.1b. Why Multilateral Activity Deserves Closer Antitrust Scrutiny
5.1c. Partial Condemnation; Less Restrictive Alternatives Joint Ventures as Market Facilitators
5.2a.Joint Ventures: An Overview
5.2a1.Potential Harms and Benefits
5.2a2.The Two Sides of the Exclusivity Problem
5.2b.Ventures Facilitating R & D, Advertising and Promotion; Ancilary Market Divisions
5.2b1.Joint Ventures and Free Rider Problems
5.2b2.National Cooperative Research Act
5.2b3.Ancillary and Naked Agreements Pertaining to Advertising
5.2b4.Ancillary Market Divisions and Noncompetition Agreements
5.2c.Transactional Efficiencies Justifying Joint Venture Price Setting
5.2d.The Relation Between Joint Venture Analysis and Merger Analysis Competitor Exchanges of Price or Output Information; Posting Agreements
5.3a.Industry-Wide Dissemination of Price and Output Information
5.3b.Direct Competitor Exchange of Price Information
5.3c.Agreements to Post, or to Post and Adhere Concerted Refusals to Deal, Joint Venture Membership Restrictions, and Standard Setting
5.4a.Harms and Benefits; Appropriate Antitrust Standard
5.4a1.A Rule of Reason, With a Few Exceptions
5.4a2.Special Treatment for the Learned Professions
5.4b.Efficient Joint Ventures and Refusals to Deal
5.4b1.Closed-Membership and Other Traditional Joint Ventures
5.4b2.Open-Membership Ventures; Positive Network Externalities
5.4c.Standard Setting and Rule Enforcement in Private Entrepreneurial and Professional Associations
5.4d.Agreements Involving Non-Competitors
5.4e.Expressive and Noncommercial Boycotts Agreements Governing the Licensing and Use of Patents and Other Intellectual Property
5.5a. Introduction; Basic Issues
5.5b. The Scope of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, Antitrust and Beyond
5.5c.Patent Licensing
5.5c1.Price Fixing; Output Restrictions; Royalty Rates; Exclusivity
5.5c2.Horizontal Territorial and Other Market Division Agreements; Patent Settlements, Pharmaceutical and Otherwise
5.5c3.Package Licenses
5.5c4.Patent Pools
5.5d.Agreements Concerning Non-Patent Intellectual Property Characterization and Evaluation: The Per Se Rule and the Rule of Reason
5.6a. The Supreme Court and the Per Se Rule
5.6b. The Exaggerated Distinction Between Rule of Reason and Per Se Treatment
5.6c.IdentiQying Anticompetitive Conduct: A Tentative Road Map
5.6d. The Truncated, or "Quick Look," Rule of Reason
5.6e. The Burden of Proof

Chapter 6.Exclusionary Practices and the Dominant Firm: The Basic Doctrine of Monopolization and Attempt
6.1 The Monopolization Offense
6.2Monopoly Power and Illegal Monopolization
6.2a.Monopolization's Market Power Requirement
6.2b.The Relation Between Market Power and Market Share; Entry Barriers
6.3 Conduct Requirements—Is Bad Conduct Necessary9
6.4Identifying Monopolizing Conduct
6.4a.Exclusionary Conduct Defined
6.4b.Private and Government Suits Distinguished
6.5 The Offense of Attempt to Monopolize
6.5a.Attempt Law's Specific Intent Requirement
6.5b."Dangerous Probability of Success"
6.5b1.The "Dangerous Probability" Requirement as a Screening Device
6.5b2.Dangerous Probability and Market Power
6.6 Conspiracy to Monopolize

Chapter 7.Exclusionary Practices in Monopolization and Attempt Cases
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Merger and Monopoly
7.3 Output Expansion; Strategic Capacity Construction
7.Price Discrimination; Leasing Practices
7.5Unilateral Refusals to Deal 1: General Doctrine
7.5a.Refusals Directed at Competitors
7.5b.Scope of Duty to Deal
7.5c.Possible Qualifications; Dominated Networks
7.6 Unilateral Refusal to Deal II: Vertical Integration, Price Squeezes, Tying and Exclusive Dealing
7.6a.Kodak and Its Aftermath
7.6a1."Lock-in" Requires Initial Purchase and Subsequent Change of Policy
7.6a2."Average" Customer Must Be Poorly Informed; or Price Discrimination Must Be Possible
7.6a3.Summary: Mtermarket Opportunism Not Within 2's Purview
7.6b.The Price or Supply "Squeeze;" Vertical Integration and linkLine
7.6c.Quasi-Tying and Exclusive Dealing—Technological Ties
7.6d.Use of Vertical Refusals by Private Antitrust Plaintiffs
7.6e.Legitimate Business Purpose
7.6f.Unilateral Refusal by Nonmonopolist
7.7 Refusal to Deal III: The "Essential Facility" Doctrine
7.7a.What Is a Qualifying "Essential Facility"?
7.7b.The Extent of the Duty to Deal
7.7c.Reasonablenessof Refusal to Deal
7.7d.Essential Facility Doctrine Inconsistent With General Antitrust Goals
7.7d1.Forced Sharing Requires Price Administration
7.7d2.Forced Sharing Undercuts Incentives to Develop Alternative Sources Of Supply
7.7d3.Dominated Networks as Essential Facilities
7.8 "Predatory" Product Design and Development; Failure to Predisclose; Altered Complementary Products
7.8a. Predatory Product or Process Innovation
7.8b. Failure to Predisclose New Technology
7.8c.Microsoft: Unnecessarily Harmful Redesigns and Licensing Requirements
7.8d.Strategic Entry Deterrence; Predatory Advertising, Excessive Product Differentiation
7.9 The Troublesome "Leverage" Theory; Nonmonopolistic Advantage in Second Market
7.10 Raising Rivals' Costs (RRC)
7.10a.The Pedigree and Judicial Development of RRC
7.10h.Pre-emption of Markets or Customers as RRC
7.11 Unreasonably Exclusionary Practices Involving Patents or Other Intellectual Property Rights
7.11a.Walker Process: "Obtaining" Patent by Fraud
7.11b. Enforcement of Patent Known to Be Invalid or Unenforceable; Noerr Issues
7.11c.Accumulation; Nonuse
7.11d.Unilateral Refusal to License, Simple and Conditional
7.11d1.Absolute Refusal to License
7.11d2.Conditional Refusals to License
7.11e. Patent "Deception" and Failure to Disclose, Particularly in Standard Setting
7.12 Abuse of Government Process
7.13 Business Torts as Antitrust Violations
7.14 Conduct Requirements in Attempt Cases

Chapter 8.Predatory and Other Exclusionary Pricing
8.1 Introduction
8.2 When Is a Price Predatory? The Areeda-Turner Test
8.3 Predatory Pricing: Application and Criticism of the Areeda-Turner Test
8.3a.The Average Variable Cost (AVC) Surrogate
8.3b.The Problem of Long-Run, Strategic Behavior; "Predatory" Prices Above Cost; Multiple-Benefit Predation
8.3b1.Limit Pricing and Strategic Entry Deterrence
8.3b2.Multiple-Benefit Predation
8.3c.AVC Measured as Average Avoidable Cost; Opportunity Cost
8.4 Structural Issues: When Is Predatory Pricing Plausible? Recoupment
8.4a.The Predator's Market Position
8.4b.Barriers to Entry
8.4c.Excess Capacity
8.4d.Disposition of Productive Assets
8.4e.Should Competitor Predatory Pricing Suits Be Abolished
8.5 Judicial Adaption of the Areeda-Turner Test: Price/Cost Relationships and Intent.
8.5a.Price/Cost Relationships
8.6 Judicial Adaption of Areeda-Turner: Identifying Relevant Costs; Multi-product Firms; Customer-Specific Pricing
8.7 Judicial Adaption of Areeda-Turner: Structural Issues and Recoupment
8.8 Predatory Pricing and the Robinson-Patman Act
8.9 More Complex Exclusionary Pricing Strategies, Particularly Discounts
8.9a.Quantity and Loyalty Discounts
8.9b.Package Pricing and Bundled Discounts
8.9b1.The Varieties of Bundled Discounts
8.9b2.The "Attribution" Test for Bundled Discounts
8.9b3.More Complex Bundies
8.9c.Slotting Allowances and Related Pricing Incentives Paid to Retailers
8.10 Predatory Buying and the Weyerhaeuser Decision

Chapter 9.Vertical Integration and Vertical Mergers
9.1 Introduction
9.2 The Economics of Vertical Integration
9.2a.The Implications of Coase's Work; Transaction Cost Economics
9.2b.Cost Savings, Technological and Transactional
9.2c.Efficient Vertical Integration and Multi-Stage Market Power; Eliminating Double Marginalization; Two-Part Tariffs
9.3 Plausible Anticompetitive Consequences of Vertical Integration
9.3a.Strategic Control of lnputs
9.3b.Price Discrimination
9.3c.Foreclosure and Entry Barriers
9.3d.Vertical Integration by Price Regulated Firms
9.3e.Vertical Integration and Cartels
9.4 Vertical Mergers and Antitrust Law
9.5 Vertical Mergers and the Antitrust Division Merger Guidelines
9.5a.Increased Barriers to Entry
9.5b.Vertical Mergers That Facilitate Collusion
9.5c. Avoidance of Rate Regulation

Chapter 10.Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, Exclusive Dealing and the Franchise Contract
10.1 Introduction: The Judicial Test for Tie-Ins
10.2 Tying Arrangements and Consumer Welfare
10.3 Market Power and Per Se Unlawful Ties; Sherman v. Clayton Act Tests
10.3a. The Rationale and Development of Tying's Market Power Requirement
10.3b. Tying Arrangements in Imperfectly Competitive Markets; Locked-In Customers
10.3c. Intellectual Property and the Presumption of Market Power
10.3d."Uniqueness" and Ubiquity as Market Power
10.3e. Separate Sherman and Clayton Act Tests? Federal Trade Commission Act
10.3f.The Rationale for Per Se Iliegal Tie-Ins
10.4 When Are Products Tied Together9
10.4a.Coercion by Contract, Condition, or Understanding
10.4b. Proof of a Relevant Tying "Agreement;" Uncommunicated Conditions
10.4c.Package Discounts
10.4d.Coercion by Package Design; Technological Ties
10.5 The Requirement of Separate Tying and Tied Products
10.5a.Introduction; Basic Competitive Market Test
10.5b."New" Products
10.5c.Complete and Partial Substitutes as Separate Products
10.5d.Intellectual Property and Labor as Separate Products
10.5e.Efficiency—"Economies of Joint Provision"
10.6 Competitive Effects
10.6a.The Leverage Theory: Using Tie-Ins to Turn One Monopoly into Two; Tipping
10.6b.Entry Barriers, Foreclosure, and Collusion
10.6b1.Entry Barriers and Tying Arrangements
10.6b2.Foreclosure; Market Share
10.6b3.Tie-Ins and Collusion
10.6c. Evasion of Rate Regulation
10.6d.Predatory Pricing and Other Attempts to Monopolize
10.6e.Tie-Ins as Price Discrimination and Metering Devices; Franchise Agreements
10.6f.Tying and Double Marginalization; "Reverse Leveraging
10.7 Tie-Ins and Efficiency: Toward a General Rule of Reason
10.7a.Efficiencies and Tying Law's Idiosyncratic Per Se Rule
10.7b.Distribution Economies; Full-Line Forcing and Unwanted Tied Products;Lack of Consumer injury
10.7c.Conclusion: Moving Tying Law Toward a Rule of Reason
10.8 Reciprocity
10.9 Exclusive Dealing
10.9a.Anticompetitive Foreclosure and Its Variations
10.9a1.The Foreclosure Theory of Exclusive Dealing
10.9a2.Raising Rivals' Costs
10.9a3.Defining Markets to Measure Vertical Foreclosure
10.9b.Exclusive Dealing as a Cartel Facilitator
10.9c.The Difference Between Exclusive Dealing and Tying
10.9d.Efficiency Explanations and Defenses for Exclusive Dealing
10.9e.The Legal Standard for Exclusive Dealing Contracts

Chapter 11.Intrabrand Restraints on Distribution
11.2 Perceived Competitive Threats of Minimum RPM and Vertical Territorial Restraints
11.2b.Vertical Restraints as Collusion Facilitators; Powerful Individual Dealers
11.2b1.Dealer Power; Policy Implications
11.2b2. Manufacturer Collusion and Vertical Restraints
11.2c.Foreclosure Effects
11.2d.Third Degree Price Discrimination
11.3 Vertical Restraints and Efficiency
11.3a.The Free-Rider Problem
11.3a1. The Economics of Vertical Restraints to Combat Free Riding
11.3a2. The Domain and Efficiency of Vertical Restraints to Combat Free-Riding
11.3b.Variations on the Free-Rider Problem and Alternative Explanations
11.3b1. Purchase of Preferred Distribution Services; Shelf Space; Quality Certification
11.3b2.Facilitating Resale Density
11.3b3.Fadiitating Supplier Entry
11.3b4. Protection of Dealer Margins; Enforcement of Distribution Contracts
11.3c.Vertical Restraints and Efficiency Reconsidered
11.4 The Agreement Requirement in Vertical Restraints Cases
11.4a.Agreements—Horizontal and Vertical, Price and Nonprice
11.4b.The Colgate Doctrine
11.4c.Dealer Terminations
11.4d.The Agreement Requirement and Antitrust Policy Respecting Vertical Restraints; Restraints Initiated by Powerful Dealers
11.5 Resale Price Maintenance in the Courts
11.5a.From Dr. Miles to Leegin
11.5b.The Meaning of "Resale"—Consignment Exception
11.5c.Maximum RPM
11.5d.The Difference Between Price and Non-Price Agreements
11.6 Vertical Nonprice Restraints Under the Rule of Reason
11.6a.Balancing "Intrabrand" and "Interbrand" Competition
11.6b.Sylvania's Impact in the Lower Courts
11.6c.Boycott Claims
11.6d.Exclusive Dealerships, Sole Outlets, and Refusals to Deal
11.6e.Dual Distribution
11.7 Conclusion:The Rule of Reason for Distribution Restraints
11.7a.General Policy Concerns
11.7b.General Efficiency of Vertical Integration Not Decisive
11.7c.Rejected Approaches
11.7d.Rule of Reason lnquiry Summarized

Chapter 12.Mergers of Competitors
12.1 Introduction: Federal Merger Policy and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
12.1a.The Continuing Importance of Market Structure to Merger Analysis
12.1b.The Basic Concerns of Merger Policy: Reduced Market Output, Higher Prices, and Offsetting Efficiencies
12.lc.Mergers and Exclusionary Practices; Predatory Pricing; Private Challenges
12.2 Efficiency and Merger Policy
12.2a.The Dubious Legacy of the Warren Era
12.2b.Assessing the Efficiency Effects of Horizontal Mergers
12.2b1.The Welfare "Tradeoff" Model
12.2b2. Must Efficiencies Be "Passed On"?
12.2h3. Efficiencies Must Be "Merger-Specific" and "Extraordinary"
12.2b4.Problems of Identification and Measurement
12.2b5.Benefit and Threat in Different Markets
12.3 Estimating Anticompetitive Consequences 1: Mergers Facilitating Unilateral Price Increases
12.3b.Merger to Monopoly
12.3c.Dominant Firm's Acquisition of Nascent Rival
12.3d.Unilateral Effects in Product Differentiated Markets
12.3e.Mergers That Threaten Innovation
12.4 Estimating Anticompetitive Consequences II: Mergers Facilitating Coordinated Interaction
12.4a. Measuring Market Concentration: The CR4 and the Herfindahl
12.4a1.The Four-Firm Concentration Ratio (CR4)
12.4a2.The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
12.4b. Market Share Thresholds Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
12.4c. The Weight to Be Given to Market Definition and Market Share Measures
12.4d.How Should Concentration Count? Philadelphia Bank
12.4e.Mergers of Competing Buyers
12.5 The Significance of Product Differentiation
12.5a.Product Differentiation as Undermining Collusion
12.5b.Product Differentiation: When Is a Merger Horizontal?
12.6 Barriers to Entry in Merger Cases
12.6a.The Appropriate Definition of Entry Barriers for Merger Policy
12.6b.What Constitutes an Entry Barrier?
12.6b1.Economies of Scale
12.6b2.Risk and Size of lnvestment; Sunk Costs
12.6b3. Advertising, Promotion, and Customer Loyalty
12.6b4.Product Differentiation
12.6b5.Government Entry Restrictions
12.6c.Evidence Required to Prove Entry Barriers or Their Absence
12.6d. Entry Barrier Analysis Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
12.7 Other Factors Mfecting the Competitive Consequences of Mergers
12.7a.Sophistication and Power of Trading Partners
12.7b.Adequacy of Irreplaceable Raw Materiais
12.7c.Excess Capacity
12.7d.Marketing and Sales Methods
12.7e.History of Collusion or Facilitating Practices
12.7f."Trends" Towards Concentration
12.7g.Aggressiveness of Acquired Firm
12.8 Observed Anticompetitive Behavior; Post-Acquisition Review
12.9 The "Failing Company" Defense and Related Factors Affecting Firm Viability
12.10 Partial Acquisitions and Acquisitions "Solely for Investment”
12.11 Interlocking Corporate Directors or Officers

Chapter 13.Conglomerate Mergers.
13.1 Introduction: Competition and Conglomerate Mergers
13.2 Conglomerate Mergers and Efficiency
13.3 Perceived Dangers to Competition
13.3b.Leverage and Tie-Ins
13.3c.Strategic Pricing and Entry Deterrence
13.4 Mergers of Potential Competitors
13.4a.The Perceived Potential Entrant Doctrine
13.4b."Actual" Potential Entrant Doctrine
13.5 Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Division Guidelines

Chapter 14.Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act
14.1 Introduction: Price Discrimination
14.2 Price Discrimination and Competition
14.3 Price Discrimination and Market Power
14.4 Three Degrees of Price Discrimination; Arbitrage
14.5 Price Discrimination and Antitrust Policy
14.5a.The Social Cost of Price Discrimination
14.5b. The Social Cost of Preventing Price Discrimination in Concentrated Markets
14.6 The Robinson-Patman Act and Price Discrimination
14.6a.General Interpretation
14.6a1.Legislative History and Effectiveness in Achieving Goals
14.6a2. The Robinson-Patman Act's Theory of Competitive Injury
14.6b.The Meaning of Price "Discrimination" Under the Act
14.6c.Primary- and Secondary- Line Violations
14.6d.Technical Requirements
14.6e.Violations by Buyers
14.6f.Affirmative Defenses
14.6f1."Cost Justification" Defense
14.6f2."Meeting Competition" Defense


Chapter 15. Public Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws
15.1 Public Enforcement Generally; The Antitrust Division
642 15.1a. Criminal Enforcement
15.1b. Civil Enforcement
15.2 The Federal Trade Commission
15.3 The Process of Premerger Notification
15.4 "Quasi-Public" Enforcement: The States' Attorneys General

Chapter 16.Private Enforcement
16.1 Introduction: § 4 of the Clayton Act
16.2 Permissible Plaintiffs—Who Should Enforce the Antitrust Laws?
16.3 Antitrust's Special Requirement of Competitive Injury
16.3a."Antitrust Injury"; Private Merger Chalienges
16.3a1. Mergers Alleged to Facilitate Exclusionary Practices
16.3a2.Takeover Targets as Antitrust Plaintiffs
16.3a3.Consumer Plaintiffs
16.3b."Antitrust Injury" Beyond 7; Per Se Violations
16.3c.Causation, Injury-in-fact, Antitrust Injury Distinguished
16.3d.Antitrust Injury and Damages Claims
16.3e.Injunctive Relief
16.3f.Plaintiffs Unaffected by Injury to Competition
16.4 Statutory and Judicial Rules Limiting Antitrust Standing
16.4a."Business or Property"
16.4b.Market Relationships; "Direct Injury" and "Target Area" Tests
16.4b1."Direct Injury
16.4b2."Target Area
16.4b3. Supreme Court Attempts at a More Useful Alternative
16.4c.The Preferred Position of Consumers and Competitors
16.5 Special Problems of Antitrust Standing
16.5a.The Unestablished Business as Antitrust Plaintiff
16.5c.Derivative Injuries and "Duplicative Recovery"
16.5d.Second Best Plaintiffs
16.5e.Pari Delicto; Declaratory Judgment Actions
16.6 The Indirect Purchaser Rule
16.6a.Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick
16.6b.Exceptions to the Illinois Brick Rule
16.6b1.Pre-existing Contracts
16.6b2.Injunction Suits
16.6b3.Cases Involving Vertical Agreements or Control
16.6c.Monopsony; Buyers' Cartels
16.6d. Policy Implications of the Indirect Purchaser Rule; State Indirect Purchaser Statutes
16.6e.The Umbrella Plaintiff
16.7 The Antitrust Statute of Limitation
16.8 Disposition of Issues; Pleadings; Summary Judgment; Expert Testimony; Tagalong Suits
16.8a.Jury Trial
16.8b.Antitrust Pleadings and Summary Judgment
16.8b1. Antitrust Motions to Dismiss and the Twombly Case
16.8b2. Matsushita and Summary Judgment in Antitrust Cases
16.8c.Judicial Control of Expert Testimony
16.8d.Tagalong Suits; Offensive Coilateral Estoppel
16.9 Equitable Relief
16.10 Compulsory Arbitration

Chapter 17.Damages
17.1 Antitrust Damages Actions and Social Welfare
17.1a.Introduction: The Role of Efficiency in Damages Theory
17.1b.Deterrence and Damages
17.1c.Using Damages to Minimize the Social Cost of Antitrust Violations
17.2 The Optimal Deterrence Model for Antitrust Damages
17.2a.Victim's Losses v. Violator's Gains
17.2b.Optimal Damages for Overcharge Injuries
17.2c. Optimal Damages for Exclusionary Practices
17.2d.The Optimal Deterrence Model in Litigation
17.3 The Rationale for Treble Damages
17.4 How Accurately Must Damages Be Measured7
17.5 Measuring Damages for Overcharge Injuries
17.5a.Introduction; Basic Conceptual Problems
17.5b. Methods of Measurement: "Yardstick" and "Before—and—After"
17.5b1.Yardstick Method
17.5b2.Before—and—After Method
17.6 Damages for Exclusionary Practices
17.6a.When Are Damages Due?
17.6b.Damages for Lost Sales and Market Share
17.6b1.Before-and-After Method
17.6b2.Yardstick Method
17.6b3.Lost Market Share
17.6c.Damages and Disaggregation
17.6d.Terminated Dealers and Firms Driven From Business
17.6e.Damages for Precluded Entry
17.7 Contribution; Joint and Several Liability

Chapter 18.Antitrust and the Process of Democratic Govermnent
18.1 Regulation, Rent-Seeking and Antitrust Immunity
18. 1a.Introduction
18. 1b.Regulatory lntervention and the RighttoSeeklt
18. 1c.The General Irrelevance of Regulatory Capture
18. 1d.Noerr Protects the Process, Not the Result
18.2 The Scope of Antitrust's Petitioning Immunity
18.2a.Petitions for Legislative or Executive Action Generaily
18.2b.Petitions to Governments Acting as Market Participants
18.2c.Petitions for Adjudicative Action
18.3 The "Sham" Exception in Legislative and Adjudicative Contexts
18.3a.Use of Abusive Methods; False Information
18.3b.Baselessness in the Adjudicative Setting; Successful Claims
18.3c.Single or Repetitive Claims
18.3d.Threat to Sue; Ex Parte Statements
18.3e.Petitions for Invalid Legislation and Administrative Rules
18.4 The Relation Between Unprotected Petitioning and the Substantive Offense
18.5 Corruption of Private Decision Making Bodies

Chapter 19.Antitrust and Federal Regulatory Policy
19.1 Antitrust and Regulation ina Federal Systern
19.2 Regulation, Dereulation and Antitrust Policy
19a. The Scope of Regulation and the Donain of Antitrust
19.2b. The Rationales for Deregulation
768 19.2b1. Expanded Confidence in Competition and Markets
19.2b2. Public Choice: Decreased Confidence in the Regulatory Process
19.3 The Role of Antitrust in the Regulated Market
19.3a. Express or Implied Repeal
19.3b. The Relation Between Federal Regulation and Antitrust Jurisdiction: Two Views
19.3c. Requisite Regulatory Oversight; "State Action" Compared
19.4 Procedure in Areas of Divided Authority; Primary Jurisdiction
19.5 Market Power Offenses in Regulated Markets
19.6 Antitrust Damages Actions and Regulated Rates: The Keogh Doctrine
19.7 Particular Exemptions
19.7a. Miscellaneous Express Exemptions
19.7b. Antitrust and Federal Labor Policy
19.7c. The McCarran-Ferguson Act and the Insurance Exemption
19.7c1. "Business oflnsurance"
19.7c2. "Regulated by State Law
19.7c3. Acts of Boycott, Coercion or Intimidation
19.7c4. Continuing Vitality of McCarran-Ferguson

Chapter 20. Antitrust Federalism and the "State Action" Doctrine
20.1 Introduction; Preemption
20.2 Federalism and the Policy of the "State Action" Doctrine
20.2a.The Historical Basis of the "State Action" Doctrine
20.2b. Conflicts Between Federal Antitrust and State Regulation; Alternative SoluTions
20.3 Basic Qualifications for Exemption
20.4 Authorization
20.5 Active Supervision
20.5a.When Is Supervision Required
20.5b.What Kind of Supervision ls Required?
20.5c.Who Must Supervise?
20.6 The Special Problem of Municipal Antitrust Liability
20.7 The Relationship Between Petitions to the Government and the "State Action" Doctrine
20.8 The Relation Between State and Federal Antitrust Law

Chapter 21.The Reach of the Federal Antitrust Laws
21.1 Local Activities: Federal Antitrust and Interstate Commerce
21.1a.The Sherman Act's Jurisdictional Reach
21.1b.Jurisdictional Reach of Other Antitrust Provisions
21.1c."Commerce": Antitrust and Noncommercial Activities
21.2 Antitrust's Global Reach
21.2a.Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Basic Doctrine and the FTAIA
21.2b.Prudential Constraints on Extraterritorial Reach
21.2c.The Act of State Doctrine
21.2d.Foreign Sovereign Compulsion; Petitions to Foreign Governments
21.2e.Foreign Sovereign Immunity
21.3 Judicial Jurisdiction and Antitrust


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