Contents
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard introduction Claude Ménard

PART 1 MARKETS, HIERARCHIES, HYBRID FORMS
1. R.H. Coase (1992), 'The Institutional Structure of Production', American Economic Review, 82 (4), September, 713-19

2. Oliver E. Williamson (1991), 'Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives', Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 (2), June, 269-96

3. Steven N.S. Cheung (1983), 'The Contractual Nature of the Firm', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVI (1), April, 1-21

4. Bengt Holmstrom (1999), 'The Firm as a Subeconomy', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15 (1), April, 74-102

5. James G. March (1962), 'The Business Firm as a Political Coalition', Journal o! Polirics, 24, 662-78

6. Claude Ménard (1997), 'The Governance of Hybrid Organizational Forms', Revue Économique, 48 (3), May, 741-50 [originally published as 'Le Pilotage des Formes Organisationnelles Hybrides'],re-set

7. George Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002), Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVII (1), February, 39-84

PART II VERTICAL INTEGRATION
8. Oliver E. Williamson (1971), 'The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, LXI (2), May, 112-23

9. Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford and Armen A. Alchian (1978), 'Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process', Journal of Law and Economics, XXI (2),
October, 297-326

10. Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece (1982), 'Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry', Beil Journal of Economics, 13 (1), Spring, 206-13

11. Scott E. Masten (1984), 'The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVII (2), October, 403-17

12. Paul L. Joskow (1985), 'Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants', Journal o! Law, Economics, and Organization, 1 (1), Spring, 33-80

13. Bruce R. Lyons (1995), 'Specific Investment, Economies of Scale, and the Make-or-Buy Decision: ATest of Transaction Cost Theory', Journal o! Economic Behavior and Organization, 26 (3), May,431-43

14. Erin Anderson and David C. Schmittlein (1984), 'Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination', RAND Journal of Economics, 15 (3), Autumn, 385-95

15. George John and Barton A. Weitz (1988), 'Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analysis', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (2), Fali, 337-55

16. Paul L. Joskow (1988), 'Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4(1), Spring, 95-117

PART III NON-STANDARD AGREEMENTS
17. William G. Ouchi (1980), 'Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans', Administrative Science Quarterly, 25 (1), March, 129-41

18. Robert G. Eccles (1981), 'The Quasifirm in the Construction Industry', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2 (4), 335-57

19. Walter W. Powell (1990), 'Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization', in Barry M. Staw and L.L. Cummings (eds), Research in Organizational Behavior, Volume 12, Greenwich, CT and London, England: JAI Press, 295-336, re-set

20. Claude Menard (1996), 'On Clusters, Hybrids, and Other Strange Forms: The Case of the French Poultry Industry', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 152 (1), March, 154-83

21. Joanne E. Oxley (1997), 'Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 13 (2), October, 387-409

22.Francine Lafontaine and Kathryn L. Shaw (1999), 'The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panei Data', Journal of Political Economy, 107 (5), October, 1041-80

23.Bengt Holmstrnm and John Roberts (1998), 'The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (4), Fall, 73-94

Name Index