Contents
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard

PART 1 STRUCTURES
1. Alfred D. Chandier, Jr. (1980), 'The United States: Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism', in Alfred D. Chandier, Jr. and Herman Daems (eds), Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives
on the Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise, Chapter 1, Cambridge, MÁ and London, England: Harvard University Press,9-40

2. Oliver E. Williamson (1981), 'The Modern Corporation: Ongins, Evolution, Attributes', Journal o! Economic Literature, XIX (4), December, 1537-68

3. Masahiko Aoki (1990), 'Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm', Journal of Economic Literature, XXVIII (1), March, 1-27

4. Henry Ogden Armour and David J. Teece (1978), 'Organizational Structure and Economic Performance: A Test of the Multidivisional Hypothesis', Bel! Journal of Economics, 9 (1), Spring, 106-22

5. Scott E. Masten, James W. Meehan, Jr. and Edward A. Snyder (1991), 'The Costs of Organization', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (1), Spring, 1-25

PART II CONTROL WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS
6. Roy Radner (1986), 'The Interna] Economy of Large Firms', Economic Journal, 96, Supplement: Conference Papers, 1-22

7. Kenneth J. Arrow (1964), 'Control in Large Organizations', Management Science, 10 (3), April, 397-408

8. Oliver E. Williamson (1967), 'Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size', Journal ofPolitical Economy, 75 (2), April, 123-38

9. Masahiko Aoki (1986), 'Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm', American Economic Review, LXXVI, 971-83

10. Jean Tirole (1986), 'Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Coilusion in Organizations', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (2), Fall, 181-214

11. Gary J. Milier (1990), 'Managerial Dilenimas: Political Leadership in Hierarchies', in Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi (eds), The Limits of Rationality, Chapter 9, Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press, 324-48

12. Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), 'Formal and Real Authority in Organizations', Journal of Political Economy, 105 (1), 1-29

13. Gregory K. Dow (1987), 'The Function ofAuthority in Transaction Cost Economics', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 8 (1), March, 13-38

14. Claude Ménard (1994), 'Organizations as Coordinating Devices', Macroeconomica, 45 (3), October, 224-47

PART III MOTIVATIONS AND VALUES
15. Jeffrey Pfeffer (1990), 'Incentives in Organizations: The Importance of Social Relations', in Oliver E. Williamson (ed), Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Presenr and Beyond, Chapter 4, New York, NY and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 72-97

16. Sherwin Rosen (1988), 'Transactions Costs and Internal Labor Markets', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizarion, 4 (1), Spring, 49-64

17. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1991), 'Multitask Principal-Agent Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7, Special Issue, 24-52

18. David M. Kreps (1990), 'Corporate Culture and Economic Theory', in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Chapter 4, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 90-143, notes, references

19. Gareth R. Jones (1983), 'Transaction Costs, Property Rights, and Organizational Culture: An Exchange Perspective', Administrative Science Quarterly, 28 (3), 454-67

20. Mats Alvesson and Lars Lindkvist (1993), 'Transaction Costs, Clans and Corporate Culture', Journal of Management Studies, 30 (3),May, 427-52

PART IV PUBLIC POLICIES AND ORGANIZATION CHOICES
21. Mark J. Roe (2002), 'Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?', University of Chicago Law Review, 69 (3),Summer, 1251-69

22. Paul M. Hirsch (1975), 'Organizational Effectiveness and the Institutional Environment', Adniinistrative Science Quarterly, 20 (3), September, 327-44

23. Oliver E. Williamson (1976), 'Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - in General and with Respect to CATV', Bel! Journal of Economics, 7 (1), Spring, 73-104

24. Paul L. Joskow (1991), 'The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies', Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization, 7, Special Issue, 53-83

25. Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller (1994), 'The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation', Journal ofLaw, Economics,
and Organization, 10 (2), October, 201-46

Name Index