Contents
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard introducrion Claude Ménard

PART I ON ASSUMPTIONS
1.Oliver Hart (1990), 'Is "Bounded Rationality" an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (4), December, 696-702

2. Richard N. Langlois (1990), 'Bounded Rationality and Behavioralism: A Clarification and Critique', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (4), December, 691-95

3. Margaret Levi (2000), 'When Good Defenses Make Good Neighbors: A Transaction Cost Approach to Trust, the Absence of Trust and Distrust', in Claude Ménard (ed), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations: Perspectives from New Institutional Economics, Chapter 12, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 137-57 15

4. Arthur T. Denzau and Douglass C. North (1994), 'Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions', Kykios, 47 (1), 3-31

PART II ON TRE NATURE OF THE FIRM
5. Alfred D. Chandier, Jr. (1992), 'What is a Firm? A Historical Perspective', European Economic Review, 36,483-92

6. Harold Demsetz (1988), 'The Theory of the Firm Revisited', Journal Of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (1), Spring, 141-61

7. Armen A. Alchian and Susan Woodward (1988), 'The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm: A Review of Oliver E. Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism', Journal of Economic
Literature, XXVI (1), March, 65-79

8. John Moore (1992), 'The Firm as a Coliection ofAssets', European Economic Review, 36,493-507

9. Herbert A. Simon (1991), 'Organizations and Markets', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (2), Spring, 25-44

PART III ON VERTICAL INTEGRATION
10. Benjamin Klein (1988), 'Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (1),
Spring, 199-213

11. R.H. Coase (2000), The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors', Journal of Law and Economics, XLIII (1), April, 15-31

12. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration', Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), August, 691-719

13. Michael D. Whinston (2001), 'Assessing the Property Rights and Transaction-Cost Theories of Firm Scope', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 91(2), May, 184-88

PART IV ON TRANSACTION COSTS
14. William M. Dugger (1983), 'The Transaction Cost Analysis of Oliver E. Williamson: A New Synthesis?', Journal of Economic Issues, XVII (1), March, 95-114

15. Gregory K. Dow (1993), 'The Appropriability Critique of Transaction Cost Economics', in Christos Pitelis (ed), Transaction Costs, Markets and Hierarchies, Chapter 6, Oxford, IJK and
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 101-32

16. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1990), 'Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity', in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Chapter 3, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 57-89, notes, references

17. Yoram Barzel (1985), 'Transaction Costs: Are They Just Costs?', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 141 (1), 4-16

18. Oliver E. Williamson (1990), 'A Comparison of Altemative Approaches to Economic Organization', Journal of institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (1), March, 61-71

PART V OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES?
19. Ernest J. Englander (1988), 'Technology and Oliver Williamson's Transaction Cost Economics', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 10 (3), October, 339-53

20. Oliver E. Williamson (1988), 'Technology and Transaction Cost Economics: A Reply', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 10 (3), October, 355-63

21. Geoffrey M. Hodgson (1993), 'Institutional Economics: Surveying the "Old" and the "New", Me: roeconomica, 44 (1), February, 1-28

22. Terence W. Hutchison (1984), 'Institutionalist Economics Old and New', Ze itschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 140 (1), March, 20-29

23. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (1991), 'Introduction', in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds), The New Institutionalisrn in Organizational Analysis, Chapter 1, Chicago, EL: University of Chicago Press, 1-38, references Controversies and Challenges in the New Institutional Economics

24. Douglass C. North (1995), Tive Propositions about Institutional Change', in Jack Knight and Itai Sened (eds), Explaining Social institutions, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 15-26, references

PART VI WRAPPING IT UP: ON THE RESEARCH AGENDA
25. Douglass C. North (1981), 'ATheory of Institutional Change and the Economic History of the Western World', in Structure and Change in Economic History, Chapter 15, New York, NY and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 201-9, references

26. Jack Knight and Douglass North (1997), 'Explaining Economic Change: The Interplay Between Cognition and Institutions', Legal Theory, 3, 211-26

27. Mark Granovetter (1985), 'Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness', American Journal of Sociology, 91 (3), November, 481-510

28. Paul L. Joskow (2002), 'Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18(1), April, 95-116

29. Asic Rindfleisch and Jan B. Heide (1997), 'Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, Present, and Future Applications', Journal of Marketing, 61, October, 30-54

30.Oliver E. Williamson (2000), 'The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead', Journal of Economic Literature,
XXXVIII (3), September, 595-613

Name index