The Theory of Industrial Organization/

por TIROLE, Jean
[ Livros ] Publicado por : The MIT Press, (Cambridge, Estados Unidos:) Detalhes físicos: 479 p. ISBN:0262200716. Ano: 1988 Tipo de Material: Livros
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Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães
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Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães
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Contents
Preface
Introduction
The Theory of the Firm

1 What Is a Firm?

2 The Profit-Maximization Hypothesis

3 Supplementary Section: The Principal-Agente Relationship
Answers and Hints
References

1 The Exercise of Monopoly Power
Introduction
1 Monopoly
1.1 Pricing Behavior
1.2 Cost Distortions
1.3 Rent-Seeking Behavior
1.4 Concluding Remarks
1.5 Supplementary Section: Durable Goods and Limits on Monopoly Power
Answers and Hints
Appendix: A Heuristic Proof of the Coase Conjecture
References

2 Product Selection, Quality, and
Advertising
2.1 The Notion of Product Space
2.2 Product Selection
2.3 Quality and Information
2.4 Advertising
2.5 Concluding Remarks
2.6 Supplementary Section: Repeat Purchases
Answers and Hints
References

3 Price Discrimination
3.1 Perfect Price Discrimination
3.2 Multimarket (Third-Degree) Price Discrimination
3.3 Personal Arbitrage and Screening (Second-Degree Price Discrimination)
3.4 Concluding Remarks
3.5 Supplementary Section: Nonlinear Pricing
Answers and Hints
References

4 Vertical Control
4.1 Linear Prices versus Vertical Restraints
4.2 Externalities and Vertical Control
4.3 Intrabrand Competition
4.4 Interbrand Competition
4.5 Concluding Remarks
4.6 Supplementary Section: Competition-Reducing
Restraints
Answers and Hints
References

II Strategic Interaction
Introduction
5 Short-Run Price Competition
5.1 The Bertrand Paradox
5.2 Solutions to the Bertrand Paradox: An Introduction
5.3 Decreasing Rehirns to Scale and Capacity Conshaints
5.4 Traditional Cournot Analysis
5.5 Concentrahon Indices and Industry Profitability
5.6 Concluding Remarks
5.7 Supplementary Section: Quantity Competition
Answers and Hints
References

6 Dynamic Price Competition and Tacit Collusion
6.1 Conventional Wisdom (Factors Facilitating and Hindering Coliusion)
6.2 Static Approaches to Dynamic Price Competition
6.3 Supergames
6.4 Price Rigidities
6.5 Reputation for Friendly Behavior
6.6 Concluding Remarks
6.7 Supplementary Section: Dynamic Games and Tacit Collusion
Answers and Hints
References

7 Product Differentiation: Price Competition and Non-Price Competition
7.1 Spatial Competition
7.2 Monopolistic Competition
7.3 Advertising and Informational Product Differentiation
7.4 Concluding Remarks
7.5 Supplementary Section: Vertical Differentiation and Monopolistic Competition
Answers and Hints
References

8 Entry, Acconunodation, and Exit
8.1 Fixed Costs: Natural Monopoly and Contestability
8.2 Surik Costs and Barriers to Entry: The Stackelberg-Spence-Dixit Model
8.3 A Taxonomy of Business Strategies
8.4 Applications of the Taxonomy
8.5 Epilogue: Prices versus Quantities
8.6 Supplementary Section: Strategic Behavior and Barriers to Entry or Mobility
Answers and Hints
References

9 Information and Strategic Behavior: Reputation, Limit Pricing, and Predation
9.1 Static Competition under Asymmetric Information
9.2 Dynamics: A Heuristic Approach
9.3 Accommodation and Tacit Collusion
9.4 The Milgrom-Roberts Model of Limit Pricing
9.5 Predation for Merger
9.6 Multimarket Reputation
9.7 The "Long Purse" Story
9.8 Concluding Remarks
9.9 Supplemenfary Section: Darwinian Selection in an Industry
Answers and Hints
References

10 Research and Development and the Adoption of New Technologies
10.1 Incentives as a Function of the Market Structure: The Value of Innovation
10.2 Introduction to Patent Races
10.3 WeIfare Analysis of Patent Protection
10.4 Alternative lnducements to R&D
10.5 Strategic Adoption of New Technologies
10.6 Network Externalities, Standardization, and Compatibility
10.7 Concluding Remarks
10.8 Supplementary Section: Patent Licensing and Research Joint Ventures
Answers and Hints
References

11 Noncooperative Game Theory: A User's Manual
11.1 Games and Strategies
11.2 Nash Equilibrium
11.3 Perfect Equilibrium
11.4 Bayesian Equilibrium
11.5 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
11.6 Supplementary Section
Answers and Hints
References
Review Exercises
Index


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