CONTENTS

Foreword
Acknowledgernents

Introduction
Catching the Uncatchable
Pathways to Cooperation in Cartel Enforcement
Dismantling Perceptions about CBCs in the Developing World
Perception 1: Younger or Smaller Competition Authorities Should Prioritise Going after Domestic Carteis before Investigating ComplexCBCs
Perception 2: Cross-Border Carteis are All the Same, and there are One-Size-Fits-All solutions
Perception 3: Regional CBCs can only be Successfully Targeted by Effective Regional Competition Authorities
Perception 4: Anti-Cartel Laws in Emerging Markets are Still intheir Infancy
Perception 5: Trust is the First Issue to Look at when Dealing with Younger Jurisdictions
Perception 6: In Cartel Enforcement, All Information Exchanged by Competition Authorities is Confidential
Turning a Paper Tiger into an Effective Hunter
Methodology and Exposure

PART 1
CROSS BORDER CARTELS

1.Conceptual Framework
1.1.Definition of Cross-Border Cartels
1.1.1.Cartels as Horizontal Agreements between Cornpetitors
1.1.2. Overt (Explicit) vs Covert (Tacit) Collusion
1.1.3. Private vs Public Cartels
1.1.4. International vs Domestic Carteis
1.1.5. CBCs and CAPs
1.1.6.1-Harmful Effects of Cross-Border Cartels
1.2. Implications of lhe Size and Maturity of Competition Regimes for CBC Enforcernent
1.3. CBCs and Algorithms
1.4. Summary

2. Classification of Cross-Border Cartels
2.1. Rationale for the Classification of CBCs
2.2. Types of CBCs
2.2.1. Export Cross-Border Cartels
2.2.2. Import. Cross-Border Cartels
2.2.3. Regional Cross-Border Cartels
2.2.4. Multinational Cross-Border Cartels
2.2.4.1. The Lysine Cartel (1992-95)
2.2.42. The Vitamins Cartel (1990-99)
2.2.4.3. The Marine Hoses Cartel and the Air Cargo Cartel
2.2.5. Transnational Cross-Border Cartels
2.2,5.1. First Wave of Transnational Cartels
2.2.5.2. Second Wave ofTransnational Cartels
2.2.5.3. The Auto-Parts Cartels
2.3. Summary

3 Theory and Practice of International Cooperation
3.1. Rationale for Cooperation
3.1.1. Phases ofintcrnational Cooperation in Cartel Investigations.
3.1.2. The Role of Politics in International Cooperation..
3.2. Tools for International Cooperation and Information-Sharing
3.2.1. Formal Cooperation
3.2.1.1. Memoranda of Understanding vs Agreements:The Legal Principie of Comity
3.2.1.2. Competition Chapters.in Regional or Multilateral Trade A.greements
3.2.2. Informal Cooperation
3.3. International Organisations
3.3.1 The Work of the Organisation for Econornic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
3.3.2. The Work of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAI
33.3. lhe Work of the International Competition Network(ICN)
3.4. Summary

PART II
CHALLENGES OF CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION IN MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT

4. Multinational vs Transnational CBCs
4.1. Challenges in Multinational CBC Enforcement
4.1.1.Overall Trust
4.1.1.1. Lack of Repeated Personal Interaction can be Found at the Global Level
4.1.1.2. Lack of Shared Interests and Values
4.1.1.3. Lack of Understanding
4.1.1.4. Lack of Joint Activities
4.1.2.Legal Culture Barriers
4.1.3.Diverging Sanctions vs Optimal Deterrence
4.2. Challenges in Transnational CBC Enforcement
4.2.1.Lack of Incentives for Cooperation
4.2.1.1. For Mature or Large Competition Authorities
4.2.1.2.For Young or Small Authorities
4.2.1.3. For the Parties, Companies and Lawyers
4.2.2.Diverging Leniency Regimes
4.2.2.1. Lack of Effective Implementation of Leniency Prograrnmes in Young Competition Authorities
4.2.2.2. Lack of Trust by the Leniency Applicants in Providing a Confidentiality Waiver to Young Competition Authorities
4.2.2.3. Lack of Specific Cooperation Arrangements of Mutual Recognition in Leniency
4.2.3. Lack of ali International Definition of Confidential Information
4.2.4. Lack of Physical Presence
4.3. Summary

5. Specffic Issues for Young or Small Competition Authorities in Investigating Regional Cross-Border Cartels
5.1.Lack of Effective Regional Competition Authorities
5.2. Different Legal Standings Regarding Cartel Offences
5.2.1. Dual Criminality
5.2.2. Irnplementation of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs)
5.2.3. Limitations on the Use of information
5.2.4. Different Levels of Protection of Due Process Rights
5.2.5. Diverging Goals of Competition Policy and Law
5.3. Diverse Set of Rules Concerning the Powers of Investigation
5.4. Diverse Adjudication Techniques
5.5 Issues Related to Export and Import Cross-Border Cartel Investigations
5.5.1 Export CBD investigation
5.5.1.1. Lack of Incentives and Wilhingness to Investigate Export Cross-Border Cartels
5.5.1.2. Lack of a Compulsory Agreernent to Gather Information
5.5.2.Import CBC Investigations
5.5.2.1. Lack of Incentives and Willingness to investigate Import Cross-Border Cartels
5.5.2.2. Liniitations on the Admissibility of Foreign Evidence
5.6. Summary

6. Past Solutions to Combatting Cross-Border Cartels
6.1. Most Common Solutions to Improve Multijurisdictional Cooperation lo Cross-Border Cartel Investigations
6.1.1. Extraterritorial Application of Competition Laws
6.1.2. Addressing Differences in Leniency App!ications Through One-Stop Shop' Models
6.1.3. Overcoming Legal Barriers ihrough Ioint investigative Teams and Cross-Appointments
6.1.4. Addressing the Issue of Confidential Information Through Information Gateways and Appropriate Safeguards
6.1.5. Achieving More Comparable Sanctions and Rernedies through Cooperation at the Court Level
6.1.6.Summary of the Previously Proposed Solutions
6.2. Most Common Partia! Solutions to Improve Cooperation in Regional, Export and Import CBC Investigations
6.2.1. Solutions Proposed for Regional CBC Investigations
6.2.1.1. Addressing the Absence of Effective Regional Competition Authorities: the International Private Law Solution
6.2.1.2. Addressing Dilferent Legal Standings of Cartel Offences: Appointment of One or More Lead Jurisdiction(s) in Cross-Border Cases
6.2.1.3. Addressing the Diverse Criteria in Adjudication Techniques: Recognition of Decisions Made by Agencies or Courts in other Jurisdctions
6.2.2. Proposed Solution for Export CBC Investigations
6.2.3. Recognition of Foreign Evidence Provided by Affected Exporters in Import CBC Investigations
6.3.Summary

PART III
NOVEL PROPOSALS 10 TARGET SELECTED TYPES OF CROSS-BORDER CARTELS

7.CBCs in Latin America
7.1.Competition Law and Policy Developments in Latin America
7.2.National Cartel Cases with Regional Cross-Border Dimensions
7.2.1.Four Central Aspects ot' Anti-Cartel Enforcement
7.2.1.1.the Legal Franmework
7.2.1.2.Investigatory Powers
7.2.1.3.Leniency Programmes
7.11.4.Sanctions, Rernedies and Settlements
7.2.2.Domestic Cartel Cases in the Region
7,3.Cross-Border Carteis in Latin America
7.3.1.Mexico: the Lysine Cartel (1998)
7.3.2.Brazil: The Vitamins Cartel (2007)
7.3.3.Colombia: The Auto-Parts Cartel (2012)
7.3.4.Chile: The Shipping Cartel (2015)
7.3.5.Colombia: The Sugar Irnport Cartel (2015
7.3.6.Brazil: lhe Rcfrigeration Compressor Cartel (2006)
7.3.7.Colombia: the Nappy Cartel (2016)
7.3.8.Peru: 'the Roll-0n RolI-Off Cargo Cartel (2017)
7.4.Existing Efforts of CBC Enforcement in Latin Arnerica
7.4.1.Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreernents
7.4.2.Sub-Regional Competition Regimes and Platforms
7.4.2.1.The CAN
7.4.2.2.The RECAC
7.4.2.3. The MERCOSUR
7.4.3.Parallel Domestic Cartel Investigations
7.4.4.Informal Cooperation Arrangements
7.5.Summary

8. Strengthening Cooperation between Mature and Young Competition Authorities in Transnatinal Cross-Border Cartel Invesligations
8.1.lntroducing Caleculus-Based Trust .Activities
8.1.1.Conceptual franiework for Trust Development
8.1.1.1. Deterrence-Based or Calculus- Based Trust (CBT)
8.1.1.2.Knowledge-Based Trust (KBT)
8.1.1.3.Identification-Based Trust (IBT)
8.1.2.Applicability of the Framework to Competition Authorities
8.1.3.Building Trust Through Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building
8.2.Towards an International Benchmark for the Definition of 'Sharable Information
8.2.1.Information Needed for Transnational CBC Enforcement
8.2.1.1.Criteria Set by Young Competition Authorities
8.2.1.2.Criteria Used to Assess the Confidential Information by Young Competition Authorities in Latin America: Colombia, Chile and Peru
8.2.1.3.Types of Information Handled by the Authority
8.2.1.4.Setting the Benchmark for Sharable Information
8.2.2.Establishing Conditional Information Gateways in the Absence of(Effective) Leniency Programmes
8.3.Strengthening the ICN for Sharing Non-Confidential Information
8.3.1.Weaving the UN Mechanism into the ICN
8.3.2.Towards a Voluntary Consultation Mechanism under Section F.4 of the UN Set of Competition
8.4. Summary

9. Strengthening Cooperation Among Young Competition Authorities in Regional Cross-Border Cartel Investigations
9.1.From Calculus..Based Trust (CBT) to Knowledge-Based Trust(KBT)
9.1.1.Development of Trust in Selected Regional Groupings
9.1.1.1.The Andean Community
9.1.1.2.'11e Central American Network of Competition Authorities (RECAC)
9.1.1.3.MERCOSUR9
9.1.2 Building Trust Among Young Competition Authorities for Regional CBC Investigations.
9.1.3.Introducing Ad-Hoc Information Gateways Among Young Competition Authorities
9.2.Strengthening Information Cooperation Through Coordination Games
9.2.1.The Problem of Cooperation vs the Problem of Coordination
9.2.2.The Assurance or 'Stag Hunt' Game.
9.2.3.The Battle of the Sexes Game
9.2.4.Applying Coordination Games to CBC Enforcement Among Young Competition Authorities
9.2.5.Promoting Informal Coordination Through 'Coordination Games' in Latin America
9.2.5.1.The Rationale of the Stag Hunt Game
9.2.5.2.Solving the Coordination Problem
9.2.5.3.A Hypothetical Case: the Airline Sector,
9.3.Summary and Outlook

10.Conclusions
10.1.Building Blocks for Effective Transnational CBC Investigations
10.1.1. On the Issue of Trust Development between Mature or Large and Young or SmalI Authorities
10.1.2.On the Issue oflncorporating a New Concept of 'Sharable' Information
10.1.3.On the Issue of the Platform Proposed
10.2. Froni Cooperation to Coordination irá Regional CBC investigations
10.2.1.On the Issue of Strengthening Trust in the Region
10.2.2.On the Issue of introducing Coordination Games
10.3.Final Reflections

Bibliograply
Index