Inclui índice e bibliografia.

Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction

I.Static Carnes of Complete Information
1.Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
1.1Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and lteratcd Stnct Dominance
1.1.1 Strategic-Form Games
1.1.2 Dominated Strategies
1.1.3 Applications of the Elimination of Dominated Strategies
1.2 Nash Equilibrium
1.2.1 Definition of Nash Equilibrium
1.2.2 Examples of Pure-Strategy Equilibria
1.2.3 Nonexistence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
1.2.4 Multiple Nash Equilibria, Focal Points, and Pareto Optimality
1.2.5 Nash Equilibrium as the Result of Learning or Evolution
1.3 Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria
1.3.1 Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
1.3.2 The Nash-Equilibrium Correspondence Has a Closed Graph
1.3.3 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Games with Continuous Payoffs
Exercises
References
2.Iterated Strict Dominance. Rationalizability, and Correlated Equilibrium
2.1 Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability
2.1.1 Iterated Strict Dominance: Definition and Properties
2.1.2 An Application of Itcraied Strsct Dominance
2. 1.3 Rationalizability
2.1.4 Rationalizability and Iteratcd Strict Dominance
2.1.5 Discussion
2.2 Correfated Equilibrium
Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria
Exercises
References
II Dynamic Carnes of Complete Information Extensive-Form Carnes
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Commitment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
3.2.1 What Is a Multi-Stage Game?
3.2.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
3.2.3 The Value of Cornrnitment and Time Consistency"
3.3 The Extensive Forni
3.3.1 Deírnition
3.3.2 Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
3.4 Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
3.4.1 Behavior Strategies
3.4.2 The Strategic-Form Representation of Extensive- Forrn Games
3.4.3 The Equivalence between Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Games of Perfect Recail
3.4.4 Iterated Strict Dominance and Nash Equilibrium
3.5 Back ward Induction and Subgame Perfection
3.6 Critiques of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
3.6.1 Critiques of Backward Induction
3.6.2 Critiques of Subgame Perfection
Exercises
References
4. Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Principie of Optimality and Subgame Perfection
4.3 A First Look at Repeated Carnes
4.3.1 The Repeated Prisoner's Diiemrna
4.3.2 A Finitely Repeated Game with Severa! Static Equilibria
4.4 The Rubinstein-Stáhl Bargaining Model
4.4.1 A Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
4.4.2 Uniqueness of the Infinite-Horizon Equihbriurn
4.4.3 Comparative Statics
4.5 Simple Timing Games
4.5.1 Definition of Simple Tirning Carnes
4.5.2 The War of Attrition
4.5.3 Preernption Games
4.6 Iterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubinstein Bargaining Game
4.7 Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria
4.7.1 Definitions
4.7.2 A Two-Period Example
4.7.3 Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Games with Many Players
4.8 Finite-Horizon and Infinite-Horizon Equilibria
Exercises
References
5 Repeated Games
5.1 Repeated Games with Observable Actions
5.1.1 The Model
5.1.2 The Folk Theorem for Inlinitely Repeated Games
5.1.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium Set
5.2 Fi1ütely Repeated Games
5.3 Repeated Games with Varying Opponents
5.3.1 Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
5.3.2 Games with Overlapping Generations of Players
5.3.3 Randomly Matched Opponents
5.4 Pareto Perfection and Renego tia tion-Proofness in
Repeated Games
5.4.1 Introduction
5.4.2 Pareto Perfection in Finitely Repeated Games
5.4.3 Renegotiation-Proofness in Infinitely Repeated Games
5.5 Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information
5.5.1 The Model
5.5.2 Trigger-Price Strategies
5.5.3 Public Strategies and Public Equilibria
5.5.4 Dynamic Programming and Self-Generation
5.6 The Folk Theorem with lmperfect Public Information
5.7 Changing the Information Structure with the Time Period
Exercíses
References
III Static Games of Incomplete Information
6 Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilihriurn
6.1 Incomplete Information
6.2 Example
6.1: Providing a Public Good under Incomplete Information
6.3 The Notions of Type and Strategy
6.4 Bayesian Equilibrium
6.5 Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibria
6.6 Deletion of Strictiy Dominated Strategies
6.6.1 Interim vs. Ex Ante Dominance
6.6.2 Examples of Iterated Strict Dominance
6.7 Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria
6.7.1 Examples
6.7.2 Purilication Theorem
6.8 The Distributionai Approach
Exercises
References
7 Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design
7.1 Examples of Mechanism Design
7.1.1 Nonlinear Pricing
7.1.2 Auctions
7.2 Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principie
7.3 Mechanism Design with a Singie Agent
7.3.1 Impiementable Decisions and Aliocations
7.3.2 Optimai Mechanisms
7.4 Mechanisms with Several Agents: Feasibie Ailocations Budget Balance, and Efficiency
7.4.1Feasibility under Budget Balance
7.4.2 Dominant Strategy vs. Bayesian Mechanisms
7.4.3 Efficiency Theorems
7.4.4lnefficiency Theorems
7.4.5 Efficiency Limit Theorems
7.4.6 Strong Inefficiency Limit Theorems
7.5 Mechanism Design with Several Agents: Optimization
7.5.1 Auctions
7.5.2 Eflicient Bargaining Processes
7.6 Further Topics in Mechanism Design
7.6.1 Correlated Types
7.6.2 Risk Aversion
7.6.3 lnformcd Principal
7.6.4 Dynamic Mechanism Design
7.6.5 Common Agency
Appendix
Exercíses
Referenees
IV Dynamic Games of Incomplete Inforination
8 Equilibrium Refrnements: Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and
Trembling-Hand Perfection
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games of Incomplete Information
8.2.1 The Basic Signaling Game
8.2.2 Examples of Signaling Games
8.2.3 Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions and Incomplete Lnformation
8.3 Extensive-Form Refinements
8.11 Review of Game Trees
8.3.2 Sequential Equilibrium
8.3.3 Properties of Sequential Equilibrium
8.3.4 Sequential Equilibrium Compared with Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium
8.4 Strategic-Forrn Relinements
8.4.1 Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium
8.4.2 Proper Equilibrium
Appendix
Exercises
References
9 Reputation Effects
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Games with a Single Long-Run Player
9.2.1 The Chain-Store Game
9.2.2 Reputation Effects with a Single Long-Run Player:The General Case
9.2.3 Extensive-Form Stage Games
9.3 Games with Many Long-Run Players
9.3.1 General Stage Games and General Reputations
9.3.2 Common-lnterest Games and Bounded-RecaIl Reputations
9.4 A Single "Big" Player againsi Many Simultaneous Long-
Lived Opponents
Exercises
Refeiences
10 Sequential Bargaining under incomplete Inforination
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Single-Sale Model
10.2.1 The Framework
10.2.2 A Two-Period Introduction to Coasian Dynamics
10.2.3 An Inlinite-Horizon Example of the Coase Conjecture
10.2.4 The Skiniming Property
10.2.5 The Gap Case
10.2.6 The No-Gap Case
10.2.7 Gap vs. No Gap and Extensions of the Single-Sale Model
10.3 Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Rental or
Repeated-Sale Model
10.3.1 Short-Term Contracis
10.3.2 Long-Tcrrn Contracts and Renegotiation
10.4 Price Offers by an lnforrned Buyer
10.4.1 One-Sided Offers and Bilateral Asymmetric Information
10.4.2 Alternating Offers and One-Sided Asymmetric Information
10.4.3 Mechanism Design and Bargaining
Exercises
References
V Advanced Topics
II More Equilibrium Relinements: Stability, Forward
Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance
11.1 Strategic Stability
11.2 Signaling Games
11.3 Forward Induction, lterated Weak Dominance, and "Burning Money"
11.4 Robust Predictions under Payoff Uncertaintv
Exercises
References
12 Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games
12.1 Generic Properties of Nash Equilibria
12.1.1 Number of Nash Equilibria
12.1.2 Robustness of Equilibria to Payoff Perturbations
12.2 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Action Spaces and Discontinuous PayolTs
12.2.1 Existence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
12.2.2 Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
12.3 Supermodular Games
Exercises
References
13 Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
13.1 Markov Equilibria in Speciíic Classes of Games
13.1.1 Stochastic Games: Definition and Existence of M PE
13.1.2 Separable Sequential Games
13.1.3 Examples from Economics
1.1.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General Games: Definition and Properties
13.2.1 Definition
13.2.2 Existence
13.2.3 Robustness to Payoff Perturbations
13.3 Differential Games
13.3.1 Definition
13.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions
13.3.3 Lincar-Quadratic Difíerential Garnes
13.3,4 Technical Issues
13.3.5 Zero-Sum Differe1tial Games
13.4 Capital-Accumulation Games
13.4.1 Open-Loop. Closed-Loop, and Markov Strategies
13.4.2 Differential-Game Strategies
Exercises
References
14 Common Knowlcdge and Games
14.1 Introduction
14.2 KnowIede and Comnion Knowledge
14.3 Com mon Knowledge and Equilibrium
14.3.1 The Dirty Faces and the Sage
14.3.2 Agrceing to Disagrec
14.3.3 No-Speculation Theorems
14.3.4 Interim Effinency ,md Incomplete Contracts
14.4 Conimon Knowledg, Almost Common Knowledgc, and the Scnitivity of Equilihria to the Information Structure
14.4.1 The Lack of lower Hemi-Contiiuity
14.4.2 Lower Hemi-Continuitv and Almost Common Knowledge
Exercises
Relerences
Index