Exclusionary practices:

por FUMAGALLI, Chiara
[ Livros ]
Autores adicionais: MOTTA, Massimo ; Autor | CALCAGNO, Claudio ; Autor
Publicado por : Cambridge University Press, (Reino Unido:) Detalhes físicos: 636 p. ISBN:9781107017382. Ano: 2018 Tipo de Material: Livros
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List of Figures
List of Tables
Acknowledgements

Introduction

1 Predatory Pricing
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Theories of Predation
1.2.1 Predation: The Chicago School and rhe Search for a Theory
1.2.2 Traditional Theories of Predatory pricing
1.2.3 A Theory of Predation Based ou Scale Economies and incumbency Advantage

1.3A Simple Theory of Predation*
1.3.1 The Base Model (Supply-side Scale Economies)
1.3.2 Generalisation of the Theory and Extensions*
1.4 From Theory to Practice
1.4.1 Policy Implications from Theories of Predation: Profit Sacrifice and Recoupment
1.4.2 How to Recognise Predation: The Theory of Harm
1.4.3 How to Recognise Predation: Tests for profit Sacrifice
1.5 Case-Law
1.5.1 United States
1.5.2 European Union
1.5 Cases
1.6.1 Napp
1,6.2 Sanofi-Aventis
1.6.3 Cardiff Bus
1.6.4 telecon Italia
1.6.5 Wanadoo
1.6.6 Deutsche Post
1.6.7 Aberdeen Journals
1.6.8 Media 24
1.6.9 ECS/AKZO
1.6.10 American .airlines
1.6.11 Standard Oil and American tobacco

2 Price Discrimination and SingIe-Product Rebates
2.1 introduction
2.2 Price Discrimination Welfare and Efficiencies
22.1 Forms of Price Discrimination
2.2.2 Welfare effects of price discriminations
2.3 Price Discrimination as an Exclusionary Device
2.3.1 Non-strategic Selective Price cuts
2.3.2 Price Discrimination to Deprive the Rival of the Scale it Needs
2.3.3 Other Anti-competitive concerns af Contracts that Refrence Rivals
2.3.4 Príce Discrimination between Off net and On-net Users
2.4 Price Discrimination when Scale Matters*
2.4.1 Innes, and Sexton's Divide-and-conquer Price Discrimination
2.4.2 (Explicit and implicit) Selective Discounts*
2.4.3 Conditional Rebates to Target the contesttable Dernand"
2.4.4 Discounts ConditionaI on Exclusivity
2.5 From Theory to Practice
2.6 Case-law
2.6.1 United States
2.6.2 European Union
2.7 Cases
2.7.1 Intel
2.7.2 Tomra.
2.7.3 Mentor
2.7.4 Eisai
2.7.5 South african airways I and II
2.7.6 compagnie Maritinze Belge
2.7.7 Michelin II

3 Exclusive Dealing
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Anti-competitive ED
3.2.1 the Chicago School Critique
3.2.2 upstream Competition
3.2.3 Scale Economies Externalities Among Buyers
3.2.4 When Exclusivity can be Breached upon or Renegotiated
3.2.5 Competing Exclusivity
3.2.6 Empirical Evidence
3.3 Efficiency-enhancing Exclusive Dealing
3.3.1Exclusive Dealing and Protection of Relation-specific Investments
3.3.2 Other Efficiency Justifications
3.3.3 Empirical Evidence
3.4Economíc Models of Exclusive Dealing
3.4.1 The Chicago School critique
3.4.2 Upstream competition
3.4.3 Multiple Buyers and Scale Economies*
3.4.4 Penalty fess for Exclusivity Breach
3.4.5 Competing for Exchusivity
3.4.6 ED and Investment Promotion
3.5 From Theory to Practice
3.5.1 Differences between Exclusive Contracts and Rebates
3.5.2 Theory of Harm and Factors which Facilitate exclusion
3.5.3 Pro-competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing
3.6 Case-law
3.6.1 United States
3.6.2 European a Union
3.7 Cases
3.7.1 Langnese-IgIo
3.7.2 TIM
3.7.3 Posten Norge
3.7.4 Lorain Journal
3.75 Dentsply
3.7.6 Nielsen
3.7.7 distrigaz
3.7.8 Events Ticketing

4 Tying, Bundling and Bundled Rebates
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Efficiency and Price Discrimination Rationales
4.2.1 Efficiency Rationales for Tying and Bundling
4.2,2 Tyng and .Bundling as Price Disçrimination Devices
4.3 Anti-competitive Tying, Bundling and Bundled Rebates
4.3.1 The Chicago School Critique ia the Levenige Theory
4.3.2 Imperfect Rent Extraction
4.3.3 Bundling as a commitment to Aggressive Pricing
4.3.4 Bundling where Entry is Possible in All Markets
4.3.5 Anti-competitive Bundled Rebates
4.3.6 Tyng and After-markets
4.4 Economic Models of Bundling and Tying'
4.4.1 Profitabi!ity of bundling with Elastic Demand Functions*
4.4.2 Carlton and Waldman (2012): hnperfect Rent Extraction fromFature Investments
4.4.3 Carlton and Waldman (2002)"The Model with Fixed Entry Costs
4.4.4 Carlton and Waldman (2002) The Model with Network externalities
4.4.5 Tying in After markets with Limited Commitment
4.5 From Theory to Practice
4.5.1 Some General Principles
4.5.2 Tying and Bundling Theories of Harm
4.5.3Bundled Rebates Theory of Harm
4.6 Case Law
4.6.1 United States
4.6.2 European union
4.7 Cases
4.7.1 Microsoft internet explorer - US
4.7.2 Microsoft Windows Media Player - EU
4.7.3 Rio Tinto Alcan
4.7.4 IDEXX

5 Vertical Foreclosure
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The Economics of Vertical Foreclosure
5.2.1 Ownership of an 'Essential Facility
5.2.2 The Chicago Schooi Critique
5.2.3 Imperfect Rent Extraction
5.2.4 A Dynamic Theory.of Vertical Foreclosure
5.3 Formal Models of Vërtical Foreclosure
5.3.1 The Chicago School Result
5.3.2 Regtilation of the wholesale Prices
5.3.3 Foreclosure because of Opportunistic behaviour
5.3.4 Uncertainty and Risk Aversion
5.3.5 Upstream competition and the Raising Rivals costs Argument*
5.3.6 A Dynamic Model of Vertical Foreclosure to Protect or transfer Monopoly Power
5.4 From Theory to Practice
5.4.1 The need to Preserve the incentives to lnvest and to innovate
5.4.2 Policy Implications
5,4.3 Summary: Analysing Vertical Foreclosure Cases in Practice
5.5 Case-Iaw
5.5.1 United States
5.5.2 European Union
5.6 Cases
5.6.1 Microsoft (EU - Interoperability)
5.6.2 Genzyme
5.6.3 BT/THUS/Gamma
5.6.4 Deutsche Telekom
5.6.5 Telefónica
5.6.6 Long term Capacíty Bookings (RWE. GDF,E.ON)
56.7 ENI
5.6.8 Google (comparison shopping)

References
Cases
Index


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