Game Theory/

por FUDENBERG, Drew
[ Livros ]
Autores adicionais: TIROLE, Jean ; Autor
Publicado por : MIT Press, (Inglaterra:) Detalhes físicos: 579 p. ISBN:9780262061414. Ano: 1991 Tipo de Material: Livros
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Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction

Static Games of Complete Information
Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated
Strict Dominance
1.1.1 Strategic-Form Games
1.1.2 Dominated Strategies
1.1.3 Applications of the Elimina tion of Dominated Strategies
1.2 Nash Equilibrium
1.2.1 Definition of Nash Equilibrium
1.2.2 Examples of Pure-Strategy Equilibria
1.2.3 Nonexistence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
1.2.4 Multiple Nash Equilibria, Focal Points, and Pareto Optimality
1.2.5 Nash Equilibrium as the Result of Learning or Evolution
1.3 Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria
1.3.1 Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
1.3.2 The Nash-Equilibrium Correspondence Has a Closed Graph
1.3.3 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Games with Continuous Payoffs
Exercises
References
Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and
Correlated Equilibrium
Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability
2.1.1 Iterated Strict Dominance: Definition and Properties
2.1.2 An Application of Iterated Strict Dominance
2.1.3 Rationalizability
2.1.4 Rationalizability and Iterated Strict Dominance
2.1.5 Discussion
Correlated Equilibrium
Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria
Exercises
References

II Dynamic Games of Complete information
3 Extensive-Form Games
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Commítment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
3.2.1 What Is a Multi-Stage Game?
3.2.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
3.2.3 The Value of Commitment and 'Time Consistency"
3.3 The Extensive Form
3.3.1 Definition
3.3.2 Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
3.4 Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
3.4.1 Behavior Strategies
3.4.2 The Strategic-Form Representation of Extensive- Form Games
3.4.3 The Equivalence between Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Games of Perfect Recali
3.4.4 Iterated Strict Dominance and Nash Equilibrium
3.5 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
3.6 Critiques of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
3.6.1 Critiques of Backward Induction
3.6.2 Critiques of Subgame Perfection
Exercises
References
4 Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Principie of Optimality and Subgame Perfection
4.3 A First Look at Repeated Games
4.3.1 The Repeated Prisoner's Diiemma
4.3.2 A Finitely Repeated Game with Several Static Equilibria
4.4 The Rubinstein-Stáhi Bargaining Model
4.4.1 A Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
4.4.2 Uniqueness of the Infïnite-Horizon Equilibrium
4.4.3 Comparative Statics
4.5 Simple Timing Games
4.5.1 Defínition of Simple Timing Games
4.5.2 The War of Attrition
4.5.3 Preemption Games
4.6 Iterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubinstein Bargaining Game
4.7 Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria
4.7.1 Definitions
4.7.2 A Two-Period Example
4.7.3 Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Games with Many Players
4.8 Finite-Horizon and Infinite-horizon Equilibria
Exercises
References
5 Repeated Games
5.1 Repeated Games with Observable Actions
5.1.1 The Model
5.1.2 The Folk Theorem for Inlinitely Repeated Games
5.1.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium Set
5.2 Finitely Repeated Games
5.3 Repeated Games with Varying Opponents
5.3.1 Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
5.3.2 Games with Overlapping Generations of Players
5.3.3 Randomly Matched Opponents
5.4 Pareto Perfection and Renego tia tion-Proofness in Repeated Games
5.4.1 Introduction
5.4.2 Pareto Perfection in Finitely Repeated Games
5.4.3 Renegotiation-Proofness in lnfinitely Repeated Games
5.5 Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information
5.5.1 The Model
5.5.2 Trigger-Price Strategies
5.5.3 Public Strategies and Public Equilibria
5.5.4 Dynamic Programming and Self-Generation
5.6 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
5.7 Changing the Information Structure with the Time Period
Exercises
References

III Static Games of Incomplete Information
6 Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium
6.1 Incomplete Information
6.2 Example
6.1: Providing a Public Good under Incomplete Information
6.3 The Notions of Type and Strategy
6.4 Bayesian Equilibrium
6.5 Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibria
6.6 Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies
6.6.1 Interim vs. Ex Ante Dominance
6.6.2 Examples of lterated Strict Dominance
6.7 Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria
6.7.1 Examples
6.7.2 Purification Theorem
6.8 The Distributional Approach
Exercises
References
7 Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design
7.1 Examples of Mechanism Design
7.1.1 Nonlinear Pricing
7.1.2 Auctions
7.2 Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principie
7.3 Mechanism Design with a Single Agent
7.3.1 Implementable Decisions and Aliocations
7.3.2 Optimal Mechanisms
7.4 Mechanisms with Several Agents: Feasible Aliocations, Budget Balance, and Efficiency
7.4.1 Feasibility under Budget Balance
7.4.2 Dominant Strategy vs. Bayesian Mechanisms
7.4.3 Efficiency Theorems
7.4.4 lnefficiency Theorems
7.4.5 Efficiency Limit Theorems
7.4.6 Strong lnefficiency Limit Theorems
7.5 Mechanism Design with Several Agents: Optimization
7.5.1 Auctions
7.5.2 Efficient Bargaining Processes
7.6 Further Topics in Mechanism Design
7.6.1 Correlated Types
7.6.2 Risk Aversion
7.6.3 Informed Principal
7.6.4 Dynamic Mechanism Design
7.6.5 Common Agency
Appendix
Exercises
References

IV Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
8 Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling-Hand Perfection
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games of Incomplete Information
8.2.1 The Basic Signaling Game
8.2.2 Examples of Signaling Games
8.2.3 Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions and Incomplete Information
8.3 Extensive-Form Refinements
8.3.1 Review of Game Trees
8.3.2 Sequential Equilibrium
8.3.3 Properties of Sequential Equilibrium
8.3.4 Sequential Equilibrium Compared with Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
8.4 Strategic-Form Refinements
8.4.1 Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium
8.4.2 Proper Equilibrium
Appendix
Exercises
References
9 Reputation Effects
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Games with a Single Long-Run Player
9.2.1 The Chain-Store Game
9.2.2 Reputation Effects with a Single Long-Run Player: The General Case
9.2.3 Extensive-Form Stage Games
9.3 Games with Many Long-Run Players
9.3.1 General Stage Games and General Reputations
9.3.2 Common-lnterest Games and Bounded-Recall Reputations
9.4 A Single "Big" Player agaínst Many Simultaneous Long-Lived Opponents
Exercises
References
10 Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Single-Sale Model
10.2.1 The Framework
10.2.2 A Two-Period Introduction to Coasian Dynamics
10.2.3 An Infinite-Horizon Example of the Coase Conjecture
10.2.4 The Skimming Property
10.2.5 The Gap Case
10.2.6 The No-Gap Case
10.2.7 Gap vs. No Gap and Extensions of the Single-Sale Model
10.3 Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Rental or Repeated-Sale Model
10.3.1 Short-Term Contracts
10.3.2 Long-Term Contracts and Renegotiation
10.4 Price Offers by an Informed Buyer
10.4.1 One-Sided Offers and Bilateral Asyrnmetric Information
10.4.2 Alternating OfTers and One-Sided Asymmetric Information
10.4.3 Mechanism Design and Bargaining
Exercises
References

V Advanced Topics
11 More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance
11.1 Strategic Stability
11.2 Signaling Games
11.3 Forward Induction, Iterated Weak Dominance, and "Burning Money"
11.4 Robust Predictions under Payoff Uncertainty
Exercises
References
12 Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games
12.1 Generic Properties of Nash Equilibria
12.1.1 Number ofNash Equilibria
12.1.2 Robustness of Equilibria to Payoff Perturbations
12.2 Existence ofNash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Action Spaces and Discontinuous Payoffs
12.2.1 Existence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
12.2.2 Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
12.3 Supermodular Games
Exercises
References
13 Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
131 Markov Equilibria in Specific Classes of Games
13.1.1 Stochastic Games: Definition and Existence of MPE
13.1.2 Separable Sequential Games
13.1.3 Examples from Economics
13.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General Games: Definition and Properties
13.2.1 Definition
13.2.2 Existence
13.2.3 Robustness to Payoff Perturbations
13.3 Differential Games
13.3.1 Definition
13.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions
13.3.3 Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
13.3.4 Technical Issues
13.3.5 Zero-Sum Differential Games
13.4 Capital-Accumulation Games
13.4.1 Open-Loop, Closed-Loop, and Markov Strategies
13.4.2 Differential-Game Strategies
Exercises
References
14 Common Knowledge and Games
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Knowledge and Common Knowledge
14.3 Common Knowledge and Equilibrium
14.3.1 The Dirty Faces and the Sage
14.3.2 Agreemg to Disagree
14.3.3 No-Speculation Theorems
14.3.4 Interim Efficiency and Incomplete Contracts
14.4 Common Knowledge, Almost Common Knowledge, and the Sensitivity of Equilibria to the Information Structure
14.4.1 The Lack of Lower Hemi-Continuity
14.4.2 Lower Hemi-Continuity and Almost Common Knowledge
Exercises
References
Index


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