EU competition law, regulation and the internet:

por MANIADAKI, Katerina
[ Livros ] Série: International Competition Law Series . v. 60 Publicado por : Kluwer Law International, (Netherlands:) Detalhes físicos: 389 p. ISBN:9789041141408. Ano: 2015 Tipo de Material: Livros
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Table of Contents

Preface
Foreward
List of Abbreviations

CHAPTER 1

Introduction
§1.01 Net Neutrality Meets Competition Law
§1.02 The Theme of This Book
§1.03 A Solution in Search of a Problem?
§1.04 Methodology and Approach
§1.05 Non-technical, Technical Background
[A] The Internet and Its Main Players
[B] The Architecture of the Internet and the "Stupid Network"
[C] Interconnection
[D] Quality-Differentiation Techniques

CHAPTER 2

Net Neutrality: Definition, Principles and Objectives
§2.01 Introduction
§2.02 The Various Definitions of NN
[A] No Blocking
[B] No Discrimination in Favour of Vertically Integrated Content Services
[CI Maintaining the "Zero-Price Rule"
[D] No "Undue Discrimination" and "Reasonable Traffic Management"
[1] Network Security and End-User Controlled Restrictions
[2] Congestion
[3] The 2014 FCC Proposais and "Commercial Unreasonableness"
[E] Access and Consumer Tiering
[F] "Walled Gardens" and "Granny Packages"
[G] "Managed" or "Specialized" Services: An Exception?
[H] Minimum Q0S Requirements for IASs
§2.03 Looking from Another Angle: NN as an lnterconnection Issue
§2.04 Broader Definitions of NN
[A] Open Access
[B] Neutraiity across All Levels
[C] Device Neutrality
[D] NN and the Regime for the Liability of Online Intermediaries
§2.05 The Arguments of the NN Debate
[A] Central Economic Concepts
[1] Network Effects
[2] Two-Sided Markets
[3] Price Discrimination
[B] Exclusion, Exploitation and Market Power
[1]The IAP Has Market Power in, the Retail Market for IASs
[2] The IAP Faces Competition in the Retail Market for IAS
[C] Welfare Effect
[1] Effects on Static Efficiency
[a] Maintaining the "Zero-Price Rule"
[b] Prohibiting Access-Tiering
[2] Effects on Dynamic Efficiency
[a] innovation at the Content Level
[i] By independeni CPs or "The Man in the Garage"
[ii] By the Network Operators
[b] innovation at the Infrastructure Level
[D] The End-to-End Principio
[E] Beyond Competition and Innovation
[1] Common infrastructure Theories
[2] Freedom of Expression and Pluralism
[3] Participation and User-Generated Content
[F] Congestion
[1] Congestion Pricing
[2] Capacity Expansion
[C] Quality Degradation and the Internet 'Dirt Road"
§2.06 Conclusions

CHAPTER 3

Net Neutrality Regulation in the EU
§3.01 Introduction
§3.02 The EU Regulatory Framework: A Short Overview
[A]General Provisions: Scope
[B] Separation of Transmission and Content
[1] The History of the Distinction
[21 Implementation of the Distinction
[3] Interactions within the Framework
[4] Classification of Services That Are of Relevance
to the NN Debate
[C]The Objectives of the NRAs
[D] The General Authorization Regime
[E] Imposition of Obligations on Operators with Significant
Market Power (SMP): The Article 7 Procedure
[1] Relevant Market Definition
[2] Market Review and lmposition of Remedies
[3] Procedure for EU Consultation
[F] Intercormection
[G] Fuil Harmonization?
[H] Dispute Resolution
[1] Transparency
[J) Minimum QoS
[K] Switching
[L] Blocking of lllegal Content
§3.03 The Background of the Review of the EU Regulatory Framework with Respect to NN
§3.04 Subsequent Developments
[A] EU Institutions
[1] Commission
[2] Council
[31] Parliamente
[B] BEREC
[C] Action by Some Member States
[1] France
[2] UK
[3] Other Member States
[D] The Connected Continent Regulation
§3.05 The Role of Competition Law within the EU Regulatory Regime for NN
§3.06 Conclusions

CHAPTER 4

The lnherent Potential and Limitations of Competition Law in Protecting Net Neutrality
§4.01 Introduction
§4.02 The Objectives of EU Competition Law versus the Objectives of NN: "Openess"
[A] The Objectives of EU Competition Law
[1] The Various Aims of the Rules on Competition
[a] Protecting Competition, Competitors and/or Consumers?
[b] Consumer or Total Welfare?
[c] The Underiying Values of the Rules on Competition
[2) Exclusionary Abuses
[3] Exploitative Abuses
[$] EU Competition Law
[1] The Evolution of the Objectives of EU Competition Law
[2] Per Se Restrictions and Effects Analysis: A Primer
[3] Synthesis: The Applicable Standard for Abuses under EU Competition Law
[a] Tentative Conclusions on the Current State of the Law
[bi Assessment
[C] Comparison with the General Objectives of NN
§4.03 The Objectives of Competition Law versus the Specific Objectives of NN: Pluralism
[A] A Primer on Pluralism
[B) NN and Pluralism
[C] Competition Law and Pluralism
[1] Pluralism as a Public Policy Objective
[21 Diversity as a Hallmark of Consumer Welfare
§4.04 The Objectives of Competition Law versus the Objectives of NN:Innovation
[A] EU Competition Law and Innovation
[1] Case Law with Implications for Dynamic Competition and the 2008 Guidance
[2) Incorporation of Innovation Considerations
[ai Objective Justifications
[b] Burden of Proof of Dynamic Efficiencies
[B) A Tentative Reading of the Case Law and lts Relevance for NN
§4.05 Other lnherent Limitations of EU Competition Rules lii Safeguarding NN
§4.06 Conclusions

CHAPTER 5

Relevant Market Definition and Assessment of Market Power
§5.01 Introduction
§5.02 Setting the Background; Primers 011 Market Definition and Market Power
[A] Relevam Market Definition
[B] Assessment of Market Power Dominance
§5.03 The Markets for Content Termination
[A] Introductory Remarks
[B] Call Termination
[C] Contem Termination
[1] Direct Constraints
[2] Indirect Constraints
[a] Ability to Switch; Availability of Alternatives
[b] Switching Costs
[c] Incentive to Switch: Reaction to Restrictive Practices by IAPs
[d] Switching Inertia: On the Role of Transparency
[i] Consumer Sovereignty and Behavioural Theories
[ii] Behavioural Theories and Regulation
[31 Countervailing Power
[D] Conclusions and Extensions
§5.04 The Retail Markets for Internet Access Services
§5.05 The Markets for interconnection
§5.06 The Markets for Interconnection to an IAP's Network
§5.07 Collective Dominance
§5.08 Relevant Markets at the Content Levei
§5.09 Conclusions

CHAPTER 6

Net Neutrality Violations as Refusais to Deal
§6.01 Introduction
§6.02 Practices under Examination
§6.03 EU Case Law on Refusais to Deal
[A] The World without Microsoft I
[1] The Case Law of the C0J
[2] Summary
[3] The Commission's Practice
[4] Summary
[B] Microsoft I
[1] The Comrnission's Decision and the Judgment of the General Court
[2] Summary
[C] The Commission's 2008 Guidance
§6.04 An Alternative Approach to Refusals to Deal
[A] lntroductory Remarks
[B] Indispensability
[C] Restriction of Effective Competition
[D] Restriction of Effective Competition is Such as to Harm Consumers
[1] The Tension between the Different Efficiencies Resulting from a Refusal to Deal
[2] Solving the Tension
§6.05 Violations of NN as Refusais to Deal
[A] Blocking
[1] Indispensabiiity
[a] Market Power in Content Termination Markets
[b] Market Power at the Retail Internet Access Level
[2] Restriction of Competition and Consumer Harm
[BI Refusal to Interconnect
[C] Refusal to Provide Premium Services
[D] Refusal to Include in a "Granny Package" or "Wailed Garden"
[E] Objective Justifications
[11 Congestion Control
[21 Other Justifications
§6.06 Conclusions

CHAPTER 7

Net Neutrality, Discrimination and Unfair Pricing
§7.01 Introduction
§7.02 Discrimination
[A] EU Case Law on Articie 102(c)
[1] Overview of the Case Law
[a] Shortage of Supplies
[i] BP
[ii] BPB Industries
[B] Discounts and Rebates
[i] Hoffmann-La Roche
[ii] Michelin 1
[iii] AKZQ[iv] Soda-as/z/Soluay
[v] frish Sugar
[vi] British Amvays
[c] Violations of the internai Market Principie
[i] United Brands
[li] Tetra Pak II
[iii] Corsica Femes
[iv] Portuguese Airports
[v]Deutsche Bahn
[d] Miscelianeous
[i] Deutsche Post
[ii] Clearstream
[iii] Kanal 5
[iv] Post Denmark
[2] Assessrnent
[a] Harm to Competitors versus Harm to Efective Competition and Consumers
[b] Efficiencies
[c] Other Objective Justifications
[3] Price or Quality Discrimination against Downstream Competitors; Relationship with Article 102(b)
[B] NN Violations as Abusive Discrimination
[1] Price Discrimination
[a] Offering Menus of QoS
[h] Charging Different Prices for the Sarne Levei of Q0S
[2] Quality Discriniination
[3] Objective Justification
§7.03 Excessive Pricing
[A] The Case Law on Excessive Pricing
[B] Implications for NN
§7.04 Practices lmplernented on the Consumer Side
§7.05 Conciusions

CHAPTER 8

Extensions and Conclusions
§8.01 Extensions
[A) The EU Google Investigation
[B] The (New?) Features of Online Competition
[1] Non-price Competition
[2] Information Failures and Behavioural Biases
[3] Network Effects, Economies of Scale and Two-Sided Markets
[4] innovation
[5] Proof of Discrimination
§8.02 Final Remarks

BIBLIOCRAPHY AND TABLES OF CASES AND MATERIAL
Bibliography
Decisions of the European Cornmission under the Competition Rules
Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union
Judgments of the General Court
Opinions of Advocates General
Comment Letters and Decisions of the European Commission under
Article 7 of the Framework Directive
EU Legislation
Notices, Recommendations, Communications, Guidance, Guidelines, White Papers, Reports and Staff Working Documents of the European
Commission
Declarations and Reports by EU Institutions
Decisions, Declarations, Reports by BEREC and National Authorities
National Case Law
Speeches/Statements
Index


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