The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC/

por O'DONAHUE, Robert
[ Livros ]
Autores adicionais: PADILLA, Jorge Atilano ; Autor
Publicado por : Hart Publishing, (Oxford, Inglaterra:) Detalhes físicos: 782 p. ISBN:9781841135021. Ano: 2006 Tipo de Material: Livros
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword
Authors preface
Table of cases
Table of legislation

1.INTRODUCTION, SCOPE OF APPLICATION, AND BASIC FRAMEWORK
1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.2 HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND MODERNISATION OF ARTICLE 82 EC
1.2.1 The Historical Context Of Article 82 EC
1.2.2 Development Of Article 82 EC
12 1.2.3 The Modernisation Of Article 82 EC
1.3 ENTITIES AND ACTIVITIES BOUND BY ARTICLE 82 EC
1.3.1 The Definition Of An Undertaking
1.3.1.1 Generally
1.3.1.2 Public bodies as undertakings
1.3.1.3 Sporting and cultural activities
1.3.2 State Action Defence
1.3.3 Parent Liability For A Subsidiary's Actions Under Article 82 EC
1.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLE 82 EC AND OTHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
1.4.1 Article 82 EC And General Principles of Community Law
1.4.2 The Relationship Between Article 82 EC And Article 81 EC
1.4.3 Article 82 EC And Merger Control Laws
1.4.4 Article 82 EC And The Rules On State Action
1.4.5 Article 82 EC And Regulation
1.4.6 Article 82 EC And National Abuse Of Dominance Laws
1.4.7 Article 82 EC And Arbitration
1.5 THE BASIC PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK
1.5.1 Cooperation Within The Network Of Competition Authorities
1.5.2 Cooperation Between The Commission And National Courts
1.5.3 Guidance Letters
1.5.4 Methods Of Bringing Article 82 EC Claims
1.5.5 The Conduct Of Commission Proceedings
1.5.6 Sector Inquiries

2. MARKET DEFINITION
2.1 INTRODUCTION
2.2 PRODUCT MARKET DEFINITION: BASIC CONCEPTS
2.2.1 Demand-Side Substitution
2.2.2 Supply-Side Substitution
2.2.3 Chains of Substitution
2.3 RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKETS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
2.3.1 Hypothetical Monopolist Test: Overview
2.3.2 Assessing Demand-Side Substitution Under The HMT
2.3.2.1 Quantitative techniques
2.3.2.2 Qualitative evidence
2.3.2.3 Other sources of evidence
2.3.3 Assessing Supply-Side Substitution Under The HMT
2.4 GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION
2.4.1 Key Concepts
2.4.2 Defining Geographic Markets In Practice
2.5 SELECTED ISSUES ON MARKET DEFINITION
2.5.1 Impact Of Price Discrimination On Market Definition
2.5.2 Market Definition In Tying And Bundling Cases
2.5.3 Aftermarkets
2.5.4 Market Definition In Two-Sided Industries

3. DOMINANCE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.2 SINGLE FIRM DOMINANCE
3.2.1 Basic Approach
3.2.2 The Starting Point: Market Shares
3.2.3 Barriers To Entry And Expansion
3.2.3.1 Definition of barriers to entry
3.2.3.2 Characteristics inherent in the relevant Market
3.2.3.3 Characteristics specific to the allegedly dominant Firm
3.2.3.4 Conduct of the allegedly dominant firm
3.2.4 Countervailing Buyer Power
3.2.5 Evidence Of Actual Competition On The Relevant Market
3.2.6 Conclusion
3.3 COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE
3.3.1 Introduction
3.3.2 The Economics Of Collective Dominance
3.3.2.1 Firms have the incentive to avoid competing
3.3.2.2 Reaching and maintaining a tacit agreement is feasible
3.3.2.3 Conclusion
3.3.3 Legal Principies Governing Collective Dominance
3.3.3.1 Evolution
3.3.3.2 Establishing collective dominance under Article 82 EC
3.3.3 Selected Issues On Collective Dominance
3.4 DOMINANT BUYERS
3.5 "SUPERDOMINANCE"
3.6 COMPARING DOMINANCE UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC AND OTHER COMMUNITY LEGISLATION
3.7 SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE COMMON MARKET

4. THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF AN ABUSE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.2 THE ECONOMICS OF ABUSIVE UNILATERAL CONDUCT
4.2.1 Evolution Of Economic Thinking On Unilateral Conduct
4.2.2 Designing Economically Optimal Rules For Unilateral Conduct
4.2.3 Recent Advances In Defining Exclusionary Conduct
4.2.3.1 The profit sacrifice test and its close relations
4.2.3.2 Equally efficient competitor test
4.2.3.3 Consumer welfare test
4.3 THE CATEGORIES OF ABUSE UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC
4.3.1 Exploitative Abuses (Article 82(a))
4.3.2 Exclusionary Abuses (Article 82(b))
4.3.3 Discriminatory Abuses (Article 82(c))
4.3.4 Tying Abuses (Article 82(d))
4.3.5 Leveraging Abuses
4.3.6 The List Of Abuses In Article 82 EC: lIlustrative Or Exhaustive
4.4 ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC
4.4.1 The Need For Causation Between Dominance And The Abuse
4.4.2 The Standard For Anticompetitive Effects Under Article 82 EC
4.4.3 Identifying Actual Or Likely Anticompetitive Effects
4.4.4 Harm To Consumers Under The Four Clauses Of Article 82 EC
4.4.5 The Role Of Intent Evidence
4.5 OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION

5. PREDATORY PRICING
5.1 INTRODUCTION
5.2 THE ECONOMICS OF PREDATORY PRICING
5.2.1 Basic Cost Definitions
5.2.2 Strategic Considerations
5.3 THE BASIC RULES ON BELOW-COST PRICE CUTTING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC
5.3.1 Pricing Below AVC
5.3.2 Pricing Above AVC/AAC But Below ATC
5.4 SPECIFIC ISSUES WITH BELOW-COST PRICING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC
5.4.1 Recoupment
5.4.2 Dealing With Joint And Common Costs
5.4.3 Cross-Subsidies
5.4.4 Situations Involving High Fixed And Low Variable Costs
5.4.5 Situations In Which A Product Incurs Inevitable Start-Up Losses
5.5 EXCLUSIONARY ABOVE-COST PRICE CUTS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC
5.6 OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION
5.6.1 Introduction
5.6.2 Meeting Competition
5.6.3 Short-Term Promotional Offers
5.6.4 Market-Expanding Efficiencies
5.6.5 Loss-Leading And "Follow On" Revenues
5.6.6 Excess Capacity And Loss-Minimising
5.6.7 Miscellaneous Defences

6. MARGIN SQUEEZE
6.1 INTRODUCTION
6.2 THE ECONOMICS OF MARGIN SQUEEZE
6.2.1 Types Of Margin Squeeze
6.2.2 Basic Economic Conditions For A Margin Squeeze
6.2.3 Anticompetitive Motivation For A Margin Squeeze
6.3 BASIC LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR A MARGIN SQUEEZE
6.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARGIN SQUEEZE AND OTHERABUSES
6.4.1 Margin Squeeze And Excessive Pricing
6.4.2 Margin Squeeze And "Pure" Predatory Pricing
6.4.3 Margin Squeeze And Cross Subsidies
6.4.4 Margin Squeeze And Refusal To Deal Under Article 82 EC
6.5 DIFFICULTIES WITH IDENTIFYING AN ANTICOMPETITIVE MARGIN SQUEEZE IN PRACTICE
6.6 DISCRIMINATORY MARGIN SQUEEZES AND RELATED STRATEGIES
6.6.1 Problem Stated
6.6.2 Examples of Discrimination By A Vertically Integrated Dominant Firm
6.7 CONFLICTS BETWEEN REGULATION AND COMPETITION LAW IN MARGIN SQUEEZE CASES

7. EXCLUSIVE DEALING, LOYALTY DISCOUNTS, AND RELATED PRACTICES
7.1 INTRODUCTION
7.2 EXCLUSIVE DEALING
7.2.1 Economics of Exclusive Dealing
7.2.2 Exclusive Dealing Under Article 82 EC
7.2.2.1 Evolution of the decisional practice and case law
7.2.2.2 Assessing exclusive dealing under Article 82 EC
7.2.3 Practices Failing Short Of Outright Exclusivity
7.3 LOYALTY DISCOUNTS
7.3.1 Economics of Loyalty Discounts
7.3.2 Assessment of Loyalty Discounts Under Article 82 EC
7.3.2.1 Treatment of loyalty discounts under the case law
7.3.2.2 Factors that affect the economic effects of loyalty discounts
7.3.2.3 Alternative proposals for the assessment of loyalty discounts
7.3.3 Objective Justification
7.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

8. REFUSAL TO DEAL
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.2 THE ECONOMICS OF REFUSAL TO DEAL
8.2.1 IPRights
8.2.2 Physical Property
8.3 THE DUTY TO DEAL WITH COMPETITORS
8.3.1 Evolution Of The Decisional Practice And Case Law
8.3.2 The Legal Conditions For A Duty To Deal With Rivals Under Article 82 EC
8.3.2.1 First contracts or licences
8.3.2.2 How many contracts must be concluded by the dominant firm
8.3.2.3 Terminating a course of dealing
8.3.2.4 Relevance of the source and perceived value of the property right
8.4 DUTY TO DEAL WITH CUSTOMERS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC
8.4.1 The Duty To Supply Inputs To Customers
8.4.2 Refusals To Deal Arising At The Levei Of Distribution Of Resale
8.4.3 Refusal To Deal And Parailel Trade

9.TYING AND BUNDLING
9.1.INTRODUCTION
9.2 THE ECONOMICS OF TYING AND BUNDLING
9.2.1 Efficiency Motivations
9.2.2 Possible Anticompetitive Motivations
9.2.3 Empirical Evidence
9.2.4 Conclusions
9.3 THE APPROACH TO TYING AND BUNDLING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC
9.3.1 Contractual Tying
9.3.2 Technological Tying
9.3.3 Microsoft
9.3.4 Mixed Bundling
9.3.4.1 Overview
9.3.4.2 The legal treatment of mixed bundling
9.3.5 Tying In Aftermarkets
9.3.6 Classifying the overall approach to tying under Article 82 EC
9.4 SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO TYING
9.5 CONCLUSIONS

10. EXCLUSIONARY NON-PRICE ABUSES
10.1 INTRODUCTION
10.2 EXAMPLES OF EXCLUSIONARY NON-PRICE ABUSES
10.2.1 Predatory Design Changes/Product Introduction
10.2.2 Vexatious Litigation
10.2.3 Use And Abuse Of Regulatory Or Government Procedures
10.2.4 Abuses In Standard-Setting Organisations
10.2.5 Abusive Acquisition Or Accumulation Of IPRs
10.2.6 Miscellaneous Practices

11. ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION
11.1 INTRODUCTION
11.2 THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION
11.2.1 Conditions For Price Discrimination
11.2.2 Welfare Effects Of Price Discrimination
11.2.3 Conclusion
11.3 LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION
11.3.1 Equivalent Transactions
11.3.2 Dissimilar Conditions
11.3.3 Competitive Disadvantage
11.4 SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 82(C)
11.4.1 Pure Secondary-Line Discrimination
11.4.2 Nationality Discrimination
11.4.3 Discrimination lntended To Partition National Markets
11.4.4 Most-Favoured Company Clauses
11.4.5 Discriminatory Supplies In Times Of Shortage
11.5 OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION
11.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

12. EXCESSIVE PRICES
12.1 INTRODUCTION
12.2 THE ECONOMICS OF EXCESSIVE PRICES
12.3 THE LEGAL TEST(S) FOR EXCESSIVE PRICES
12.4 DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH TO EXCESSIVE PRICES UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC
12.5 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO EXCESSIVE PRICING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC
12.6 CONCLUSION
13.OTHER EXPLOITATIVE ABUSES
13.1 INTRODUCTION
13.2 ABUSE OF MONOPSONY PURCHASING POWER
13.2.1 Basic Economics Of Monopsony Power
13.2.2 Conditions For A Possible Abuse
13.3 UNFAIR AND EXPLOITATIVE CONTRACT TERMS
13.3.1 Reasons For A Limited Case Law
13.3.2 Legal Test For Abusive And Unfair Contract Terms
13.3.3 Conclusion

14. EFFECT ON TRADE
14.1 INTRODUCTION
14.2 BASIC LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR EFFECT ON TRADE
14.3 SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF THE EFFECT ON TRADE CONCEPT
14.3.1 Abuses Covering Several Member States
14.3.2 Abuses Covering A Single Member State
14.3.3 Abuses Covering Only A Part Of A Member State
14.3.4 Abuses Concerning Trade Outside The EU

15. REMEDIES
15.1 INTRODUCTION
15.2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING REMEDIES
15.2.1 Objectives Of Remedies
15.2.2 Remedies Must Be Effective
15.2.3 Remedies Must Be Proportionate
15.3 PRINCIPAL TYPES OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
15.3.1 Interim Measures
15.3.2 Commitment Decisions
15.3.2.1 Overview
15.3.2.2 Commitment decision procedure
15.3.2.3 Legal effect of commitment decisions
15.3.3 Undertakings
15.3.4 Final Infringement Decisions
15.4 PRINICIPAL TYPES OF REMEDIES
15.4.1 Fines
15.4.2 Behavioural Remedies
15.4.2.1 Exclusionary pricing abuses
15.4.2.2 Remedies for excessive pricing
15,4.2.3 Remedies in discrimination cases
15.4.2.4 Compulsory dealing remedies
15.4.2.5 Remedies in tying cases
15.4.3 Structural Remedies
15.4.3.1 Introduction and overview
15.4.3.2 Conditions for ordering a structural remedy
15.4.3.3 Case study: Microsoft
15.5 PRIVATE LITIGATION AND REMEDIES
15.5.1 Introduction
15.5.2 Goals Of Private Enforcement
15.5.3 Legal Basis For Private Enforcement
15.5.4 Obstacles To Effective Private Enforcement
15.5.5 Conclusion
Index

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