The Theory of Incentives:

por LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques
[ Livros ]
Autores adicionais: MARTIMORT, David ; Autor
Publicado por : Princeton University, (Oxford, Inglaterra:) Detalhes físicos: 421 p. ISBN:691091838. Ano: 1947 Tipo de Material: Livros
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Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães
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Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães
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Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães
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Contents
Foreword
Introduction

1 Incentives in Economic Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Groves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 Léon Wairas and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Planned Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optimization Program of the Principal
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principie
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mcc hanisms
2.14 Informative Signais to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
4.3 The Trade-Off Between Limited Liabiiity Rent Extraction and Efficiency
4.4 The Trade-Off Between Insurance and Efficiency
4.5 More than Two Leveis of Performance
4.6 Informative Signais to Improve Contracting
4.7 Moral Hazard and the Theoiy of the Firm
4.8 Contract Theory at Work
4.9 Commitment Under Moral Hazard
Appendices

5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with
Moral Hazard
5.1 More than Two Leveis of Effort
5.2 The Multitask Incentive Probiem
5.3 Nonseparability of the Utility Function
5.4 Redistribution and Moral Hazard
Appendices

6 Nonverifiability
6.1 No Contract at Date O and Ex Post Bargaining
6.2 Incentive Compatible Contract
6.3 Nash Implementation
6.4 Subgame-Perfect Implementation
6.5 Risk Aversion
6.6 Conciuding Remarks

7 Mixed Modeis
7.1 Adverse Selection Foliowed by Morai Hazard
7.2 Morai Hazard Foliowed by Adverse Seiection
7.3 Morai Hazard Foliowed by Nonverifiability

8 Dynamics under Fuli Commitment
8.1 Repeated Adverse Selection
8.2 Repeated Moral Hazard
8.3 Constraints on Transfers: The Role of Implicit Incentives

9 Limits and Extensions
9.1 lnformed Principal
9.2 Limits to Enforcement
9.3 Dynamics and Limited Commitment
9.4 The Hold-Up Problem
9.5 Limits to the Complexity of Contracts
9.6 Limits in the Action Space
9.7 Limits to Rational Behavior
9.8 Endogenous Information Structures

References
Author Index
Subject Index


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