CONTENTS
Permissions

H. W. KUHN
Foreword

DAVID KREPS AND ARIEL RUBINSTEIN
An Appreciation

1. JOHN F. NASH, JR.
Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. PNAS 36 (1950)


2. JOHN F. NASH, JR.
The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18 (1950) 155-162.

3. JOHN NASH
Non-Cooperative Games. Annais of Mathematics 54 (1951)


4. JULIA ROBINSON
An Iterative Method of Solving a Game. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951)

5. F. B. THOMPSON
Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form. RAND Memo RM-759 (1952).

6. H. W. Kuín
Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. Contributions to the Theory of Games 11(1953)

7. L. S. SHAPLEY
A Value for n-Person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953)

8. L. S. SHAPLEY
Stochastic Games. PNAS 39 (1953)

9. H. EVERETT
Recursive Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games III (1957)

10. R. J. AUMANN AND B. PELEG
Von Neumann—Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments. Bulletin AMS 66 (1960)

11. Giiu DEBREU AND HERBERT Scju
A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy. International Economic Review 4 (1963)

12. ROBERT J. AUMANN AND MICHAEL MASCHLER
The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games. Advances in Game Theory (1964)

13. ROBERT J. AUMANN
Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders. Econometrica 34 (1966)

14. HERBERT E. SCARF
The Core of an n-Person Game. Econometrica (1967)

15. JOHN C. HARSANYI
Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part 1: The Basic Model. Man. Sci. 14 (1967) 159-182 216 Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points. Man. Sci. 14 (1968) Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game. Man. Sci. 14 (1968)

16. DAVID BLACKWELL AND T. S. FERGUSON
The Big Match. Ann. Math. Star. 39 (1968)

17. LLOYD S. SHAPLEY AND MARTIN SHUBIK
On Market Games. J.E.T. 1(1969).

18. R. SELTEN
Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game 77z. 4 (1975)

List of Contributors
Index