A Course in Game Theory/

por OSBORNE, Martin J.
[ Livros ]
Autores adicionais: RUBINSTEIN, Ariel ; Autor
Publicado por : The Mit Press, (Londres, Inglaterra:) Detalhes físicos: 362 p. ISBN:9780262650403. Ano: 1994 Tipo de Material: Livros
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Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães
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Contents
Preface

Introduction

1.1 Game Theory
1.2 Games and Solutions
1.3 Game Theory and the Theory of Competitive Equilibrium
1.4 Rational Behavior
1.5 The Steady State and Deductive Interpretations
1.6 Bounded Rationality
1.7 Terminology and Notation
Notes

I Strategic Games
2 Nash Equilibrium
2.1 Strategic Games
2.2 Nash Equilibrium
2.3 Examples
2.4 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium
2.5 Strictly Competitive Games
2.6 Bayesian Games: Strategic Games with Imperfect
Information
Notes
3 Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium
3.1 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 31
3.2 Interpretations of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
3.3 Correlated Equilibrium
3.4 Evolutionary Equilibrium
Notes
4 R.ationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions
4.1 Rationalizability
4.2 Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions
4.3 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Actions
Notes
5 Knowledge and Equilibrium
5.1 A Model of Knowledge
5.2 Common Knowledge
5.3 Can People Agree to Disagree?
5.4 Knowledge and Solution Concepts
5.5 The Electronic Mail Game
Notes

II Extensive Games with Perfect Information
6 Extensive Games with Perfect Information
6.1 Extensive Games with Perfect Information
6.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
6.3 Two Extensions of the Definition of a Game
6.4 The Interpretation of a Strategy
6.5 Two Notable Finite Horizon Games
6.6 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies
Notes
7 Bargaining Games
7.1 Bargaining and Game Theory
7.2 A Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers
7.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
7.4 Variations and Extensions
Notes
8 Repeated Games
8.1 The Basic Idea
8.2 Infinitely Repeated Games vs. Finitely Repeated Games
8.3 Infinitely Repeated Games: Definitions
8.4 Strategies as Machines
8.5 Trigger Strategies: Nash Folk Theorems
8.6 Punishing for a Limited Length of Time: A Perfect Folk
Theorem for the Limit of Means Criterion
8.7 Punishing the Punisher: A Perfect FoIk Theorem for the
Overtaking Criterion
8.8 Rewarding Players Who Punish: A Perfect Folk Theorem for
the Discounting Criterion
8.9 The Structure of Subgame Perfect Equilibria Under the
Discounting Criterion
8.10 Finitely Repeated Games
Notes
9 Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Complexity and the Machine Game
9.3 The Structure of the Equilibria of a Machine Game
9.4 The Case of Lexicographic Preferences
Notes
10 Implementation Theory
10.1 Introduction
10.2 The Implementation Problem
10.3 Implementation in Dominant Strategies
10.4 Nash Implementation
10.5 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Implementation
Notes

III Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
11 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
11.1 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
11.2 Principies for the Equivalence of Extensive Games
11.3 Framing Effects and the Equivalence of Extensive
Games
11.4 Mixed and Behavioral Strategies
11.5 Nash Equilibrium
Notes
12 Sequential Equilibrium
12.1 Strategies and Beliefs
12.2 Sequential Equilibrium
12.3 Games with Observable Actions: Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium
12.4 Refinements of Sequential Equilibrium
12.5 Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium
Notes
IV Coalitional Games
13 The Core
13.1 Coalitional Games with Transferable Payoff
13.2 The Core
13.3 Nonemptiness of the Core
13.4 Markets with Transferable Payoff
13.5 Coalitional Games without Transferable Payoff
13.6 Exchange Economies
Notes
14 Stable Sets, the Bargaining Set, and the Shapley Value
14.1 Two Approaches
14.2 The Stabie Sets of von Neumann and Morgenstern
14.3 The Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleoius
14.4 The Shapley Value
Notes
15 The Nash Solution
15.1 Bargaining Problems
15.2 The Nash Solution: Definition and Characterization
15.3 An Axiomatic Definition
15.4 The Nash Solution and the Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers
15.5 An Exact Implementation of the Nash Solution
Notes
List of Results
References
Index


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