Regulation And Its Reform/ (Registro n. 1127)
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| 007 - Campo Fixo - Descrição Física | |
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| 008 - Campo de Tamanho Fixo | |
| Campo fixo de controle local | 190617s1982 enk gr 000 0 eng u |
| 020 ## - ISBN | |
| ISBN | 0674753763 |
| 040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
| Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
| 090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
| Localização na estante | 341.3221 B848r |
| Cutter | B848r |
| 100 10 - Autor | |
| Autor | BREYER, Stephen |
| 245 10 - Titulo Principal | |
| Título principal | Regulation And Its Reform/ |
| 260 ## - Editora | |
| Cidade | Cambridge, Inglaterra: |
| Editora | Harvard University Press, |
| Data | 1982. |
| 300 ## - Descrição Física | |
| Número de páginas | 472 p. |
| 505 ## - Conteúdo | |
| Conteúdo | Contents<br/><br/>Introduction<br/><br/>1. The Object and Approach of This Book<br/>Limitations <br/>A Theory of Regulation<br/>Typical Justihcations for Regulation <br/>The Control of Monopoly Power <br/>The Traditional Economic Rationale for Regulation. Objections (o the Traditional Economic Rationale. Additional Bases for Regulation.<br/>Rent Control or "Excess Profits" <br/>What Is a Rent? The Rationale for Regulation. Compensating for Spillovers (Externalities) <br/>What Are Spillovers? The Classical Rationale for Regulation.<br/>Objections to the Classical Rationale. A Caveat. Inadequate Information <br/>The Classical Rationale for Regulation. Criticisrns of the Rationale.<br/>Excessive Competition: The Empy Box <br/>Historical Use. Current Use.<br/>Other Justifications <br/>The Mixture of Rationales <br/><br/>2 Cost-of-Service Ratemaking<br/>The System <br/>The Problems <br/>Determrning the Rate Base. Determining the Rate of Return.<br/>Efficiency. The Test Year." Rate Structure.<br/>Conclusion <br/><br/>3 Historically Based Price Regulation<br/>The System <br/>The Problems <br/>Categorization. Cost-of-Service Ratemaking. Allocaiion. Enforcement. New Investment.<br/>Conclusion <br/><br/>4 Aliocation under a Publlc Interest Standard<br/>The System <br/>Problems <br/>What Is to Be Allocated? The Selection Process. The Renewal Process.<br/>Conclusion<br/><br/>5 Standard Setting<br/>The System <br/>The Procedural Background. The Standard-Selting Process.<br/>Problems Inherent in the Process <br/>Information. Enforcement. Anticompetitive Effects. Judicial Review.<br/>Conclusion <br/><br/>6 Historically Based Allocatlon<br/>The System <br/>The Need for Exceptions <br/>The Exception Process <br/>Conclusion <br/><br/>7 Individualized Screening<br/>The Food Additive Screening System <br/>Problems with This Form of Regulation <br/>Developing a Test for Risk. The Use of Experis. The Effort to be Comprehensive: Calculating and Weighing Benefits. Varying Standards of Selection.<br/>Conclusion <br/><br/>8 Alternatives to Classical Regulation<br/>Unregulated Markets Policed by Antitrust <br/>Disclosure <br/>Taxes <br/>The Creation of Marketable Property Rights <br/>Changes in Liability Rules <br/>Bargaining <br/> Nationalization <br/><br/>9 General Guidelines for Policy Makers<br/>II Appropriate Solutions<br/><br/>10 Match and Mismatch<br/><br/>11 Mismatch: Excessive Competition and Airline Regulation<br/><br/>The Industry <br/>Regulation <br/>Harmful Effects of Regulation <br/>Mismatch as Cause <br/>Price Reguiation. Route Awards. Efficiency. The Effort to<br/>Regulate Schedules.<br/>An Alternative to Classical Regulation <br/>Conclusion <br/><br/>12 Mismatch: Excessive Competition and the Trucking lndustry<br/>The Industry and Regulation<br/>The Effects of Regulation <br/>Alternatives to Classical Regulation <br/>Conclusion <br/><br/>13 Mismatch: Rent Control and Natural Gas Field Prices <br/>The Indusiry <br/>Regulation <br/>Adverse Effects <br/>The Mismatch and the Shortage <br/>Firm-by-Firm Cost-of-Service Ratemaking. Areawide Cost-of-<br/>Service Ratemaking.<br/>The Mismatch and Natural Gas Aliocation <br/>Standard Setting. Pubiic Interesi Aliocation. Negotiation.<br/>Alternatives <br/>Conclusion <br/>14 Partial Mismatch: Spillovers and Environmental Poilution<br/>The Problems of Standard Setting <br/>Incentive-Based Systems: Taxes and Marketable Rights <br/>In Principie. A More Practicai Comparison.<br/>Conclusion <br/><br/>15 Problems of a Possible Match: Natural Monopoly and Telecom-<br/>munications<br/>The Characienstics of the Longline Problem <br/>The Industry and the Service. Regulation and Joint Costs. The<br/>Entry of Competition into Long-Distance Telecommunications.<br/>The FCC's Response to the Problem <br/>Above MCI. Specialized Common Carriers (SCCs). AT&T's Competitive Response: Special Rates. Docket 18128. Expanding the Area of Conipetition.<br/>The Basic Choices <br/>Conclusion <br/>III Practical Reform <br/><br/>16 From Candidate to Reform<br/>The Elements of Implementation <br/>The Kennedy Hearings <br/>Preparation. The Actual Hearings. Conclusion <br/><br/>17 Generic Approaches to Regulatory Reform<br/>Better Personnel <br/>Procedural Changes <br/>Fairness and Efficiency.Legit,macy.<br/>Structural Change <br/>Managerial Proposais. Superv isory Proposais. New Institutions.<br/>Encouraging Substantive Reform <br/>Impaci Statements. Encouragi ng Step-by- Step Reform.<br/><br/>Appendix 1 The Regulatory Agencies<br/>Appendix 2 A Note on Administrative Law<br/>Further Reading <br/>Notes<br/>Index <br/> |
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| Classificação | Empréstimo | Locação permanente | Locação corrente | Data de aquisição | Forma de aquisição | Patrimônio | Número completo de chamada | Código de barras | Número do exemplar | Data de inserção do exemplar | Tipo de item no Koha |
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| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-08-08 | Compra | 30743 | 341.3221 B848r | 2019-0393 | 1 | 2019-08-08 | Livros |