Principles of Law and Economics/ (Registro n. 1468)
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| 007 - Campo Fixo - Descrição Física | |
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| 008 - Campo de Tamanho Fixo | |
| Campo fixo de controle local | 190617s2005 -us gr 000 0 eng u |
| 020 ## - ISBN | |
| ISBN | 130932612 |
| 040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
| Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
| 090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
| Localização na estante | 338.8 C689p |
| Cutter | C689p |
| 100 10 - Autor | |
| Autor | COLE, Daniel H. |
| 245 10 - Titulo Principal | |
| Título principal | Principles of Law and Economics/ |
| 260 ## - Editora | |
| Cidade | Estados Unidos: |
| Editora | Pearson Prentice Hall, |
| Data | 2005. |
| 300 ## - Descrição Física | |
| Número de páginas | 365 p. |
| 505 ## - Conteúdo | |
| Conteúdo | CONTENTS<br/>Preface<br/><br/>CHAPTER 1 Economic Concepts and Institutions<br/>What Economists Study <br/>Resource Scarcity <br/>Cost and Price <br/>Economic Decisions Are Made at the Margins <br/>Allocating Entitlements to Resources <br/>Demand, Supply, and the Market <br/>The Law of Demand <br/>The Law of Supply <br/>The Market: Where Buyers and Sellers Meet <br/>Market Equilibrium: Where Supply Meets Demand <br/>Efficiency <br/>Productive, Aliocative, and Adaptive Efficiency <br/>Measuring Aliocative Efficiency: The Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks Críteria <br/>Cost-Benefit Analysis <br/>Market Failure <br/>Neoclassical Assumptions Versus the Real World<br/>Imperfect Competition<br/>Imperfect or Asymmetric Information<br/>Externalities<br/>Public Goods <br/>Transaction Costs<br/>Strategic Behavior: Free Riders and Holdouts<br/>Responses to Market Failure: Firms and Governments<br/>(and Their Failures) <br/>Firms <br/>Government Intervention to Correct Market and Firm Failures<br/>Government Failure <br/>The Second-Best (Real Coasean) World <br/>Chapter Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 2 An Introduction to the American Legal System <br/>Why Law? <br/>Scarcity Again <br/>The Purposes of Law <br/>Legal Institutions: The Rules of the Game <br/>Legal Rules <br/>The Rule of Law <br/>Criminal and Civil Law <br/>Rights and Duties <br/>Liability and Remedy<br/>Sources and Areas of Law<br/>Constitutional Law<br/>The Common Law and Its Courts<br/>Statutory Law <br/>Administrative Law <br/>A Note on Local Custom: How Neighbors Settle Disputes <br/>The Organization of American Legal Decision Making<br/>The State Court Systems <br/>The Federal Courts of the United States<br/>State and Federal Legislative and Regulatory Bodies and Processes <br/>Chapter Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 3 Putting Law and Economics Together: Frameworks,<br/>History, and Perspectives <br/>Economic and Legal Frameworks <br/>What Economic Analysis Offers to Legislators, Judges, and Legal Scholars <br/>Limitations of the Economic Approach to Law<br/>The Legal Structure of Economic Activity <br/>A History of Law and Economics <br/>Progressive Era Law and Economics <br/>The Coasean Revolution <br/>Modern Law and Economics <br/>Perspectives on Law and Economics <br/>The Chicago School: Neoclassical Law and Economics <br/>Public Choice <br/>Institutional Law and Economics <br/>New Institutional Economics <br/>Behavioral Law and Economics <br/>Chapter Summary <br/>Questions and Problem <br/><br/>CHAPTER 4 "The Problem of Social Cost" and Modern Law and Economics <br/>The Nature of Social-Cost Problems: Coase Versus Pigou<br/>The Coase Theorem <br/>No Problems of Social Cost Would Arise in a World of Perfect Competition, Complete Information,<br/>and Costless Transacting <br/>Critiques of the Coase Theorem<br/>Transaction Costs and Law in the Real World <br/>The Courts and the Delimitation of Entitlements <br/>"The Problem of Social Cost" and Modern Law and Economics <br/>Chapter Summary<br/>Questions and Problems<br/><br/>CHAPTER 5 Property 1: Acquisition <br/>What Is Property? <br/>Rights and Duties Respecting Things<br/>Not One Right, Bufa Bundie of Rights <br/>What Makes a Right "Property"? <br/>Ownership and Relativity of Title <br/>Types of Property Regimes<br/>Res Privatae <br/>Res Publicae<br/>Res Communes<br/>Res Nullius<br/>Mixed Property Regimes<br/>Property Regime Choice<br/>Economic Functions of Property<br/>Economic Exchange<br/>Resource Conservation <br/>Capitalization and Investment<br/>Anticompetitive Effects of Monopoly Property Rights: Incentives to Innovate Versus Market Com petition in Inteilectual Property Law<br/>Sources of Property <br/>Bottom-LIp Theories of Property: Prepolitical or Natural Property Rights<br/>Top-Down: Political Definition and Aliocation of Property<br/>Allocating Property Rights <br/>Allocation Organizations <br/>Aliocation Institutions <br/>Chapter Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 6 Property II: Protection <br/>Determining Liability <br/>Strict Liability: Trespass and Nuisance Distinguished <br/>Modern Nuisance Law<br/>The Remedy Decision <br/>Types of Remedies <br/>Property Rules: Injunctive Relief <br/>Liability Rules: Money Damages <br/>Hybrid Property/Liability Rules <br/>Inalienability Rules <br/>Chapter Summary <br/>Questions and Problems<br/><br/>CHAPTER 7 Property III: Limits <br/>Private Law Linutations <br/>Nuisance Law as a Limitation on Property <br/>Private Land-Use Planning: Covenants <br/>Public Law Limitations on Private Property <br/>Police Power Regulation<br/>Eminent Domain <br/>Constitutional Limitations on Public Regulation of Private Property:<br/>Regulatory Takings Law <br/>Justifications for Regulatory Takings Law in the Law<br/>and Economics Literature <br/>Chapter Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 8 Contracts 1: Formation and Enforcenient <br/>The Basics of Contract Law <br/>The Nature of a Contract <br/>Enforcement<br/>Should Contracts Always Be Enforced? <br/>Contract Failure <br/>Two Economic Views of Contract Failure and the Role ofCourts <br/>Reasons for Contract Breach <br/>Formation Defenses <br/>Performance Excuses <br/>Not All Promises Are Contracts <br/>Chapter Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 9 Contracts II: Remedies <br/>Types of Remedy for Contract Breach <br/>Specific Performance <br/>Money Damages <br/>The Notion of Efficient Breach <br/>The Costs of Reliance and Precaution <br/>Efficient Reliance <br/>Efficient Precaution <br/>Alternative Approaches to Calculatmg Damages <br/>Expectation Damages <br/>Reliance Damages<br/>Restitution <br/>Liquidated Dama ges/Penalty Clauses<br/>Chapter Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 10 Torts 1: Negligence <br/>Prologue: Accidents Happen <br/>What Is a Tort? <br/>Civil Wrongs <br/>The Common Law of Torts <br/>Types of Torts <br/>An Economic Approach to Torts <br/>Legal and Economic Functions of Tort Law <br/>Corrective Justice <br/>Deterrence Through Internalization of Externalities <br/>Punishment <br/>Maximizing Social Welfare by Minimizing the Total Costs of Torts <br/>The Law and Economics of Negligence <br/>Sim pie Negligence: Creating Incentives for Reasonable Behavior<br/>by Tort Defendants <br/>Influencing Plaintiffs' incentives: Defenses to Negligence <br/>The Role of Insurance in Negligence Law <br/>Chapter Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 11 Torts II: Strict Liability <br/>An Alternative to Negligence<br/>The Elements of Strict Liability <br/>Why Strict Liability? <br/>Defenses to Strict Liability <br/>Strict Liability Versus Negligence<br/>Historical Context of the Debate <br/>The Comparative Ethics of Negligence and Strict Liability <br/>Com parative Institutional Analysis <br/>The Costs of Administering the Torts System <br/>Choosing the Legal Rule <br/>The Costs of Estimating Damages <br/>The Costs of Evaivating Ex Ante Precautions and Potential Precautions <br/>Chapter Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 12 Torts III: Reform <br/>The Case for Tort Reform <br/>The Current Tort System Produces Net Social Costs <br/>Tort Reform Recommendations <br/>The Case Against Tort Reform <br/>Fact, Fiction, and the Tort System <br/>Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease? <br/>Experiences in Tort Reform <br/>Caps on Punitive Damages <br/>Límitations on Joint and Several Liability <br/>Ceilings on Mal practice Liability <br/>Coilateral Source Rules <br/>Federal Tort Reforms <br/>Economic Consequences of Tort Reform <br/>The No-Fault Alternative <br/>Workers' Com pensation and No-Fault Auto Insurance in the Llnited States <br/>Com prehensive No-Fault Insurance in New Zealand <br/>Chapter Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 13 Crime and Punishment <br/>Criminal Wrongs <br/>Crime and Criminal Law <br/>Criminal Procedure <br/>Society Criminalizes Certain Wrongful Acts, But Not Others <br/>The Economics of Crime<br/>Crime and Its Economic Consequences in the United States <br/>Why People Commit Crimes <br/>The Economics of Crime Prevention, Criminal Prosecution, and Punishment <br/>Data on Law Enforcement, Arrests, Convictions, and Punishments <br/>Selecting the LeveIs of Crime Prevention and Law Enforcement <br/>The Economics of Criminal Punishment<br/>Selected Issues in Crime and Punishment <br/>The "War on Drugs" <br/>The Death Penalty <br/>Gun Control <br/>Chapter Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 14 Antitrust and Regulated Industries <br/>Introduction <br/>The Problem of Monopoly <br/>Antitrust Law <br/>The Sherman Act <br/>Expansion of Antitrust Law <br/>The Microsoft Case <br/>Regulated Industries<br/>The Theory of Natural Monopoly <br/>The Deregulation Movement <br/>California's Power Crisis<br/>Chapter Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 15 Environmental Protection <br/>What Is Poilution? <br/>Poliution as an Economic Problem <br/>Poliution as a Negative Externality <br/>Environmental Amenities as Public Goods <br/>Transaction Costs and Poilution <br/>Poliution and the Common Law <br/>Environmental Nuisances <br/>The Costs and Benefits of Environmental Regulation <br/>Environmental Instrument Choice <br/>Types of Regulatory Approaches <br/>Com pliance Cost Advantages of Economic Instruments <br/>Monitoring and Enforcement Costs of Environmental Regulation <br/>Technological Constraints on Emissions Momtoring <br/>Chapter Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>Index <br/><br/><br/><br/> |
| 700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 882 |
| Nome pessoa | GROSSMAN, Peter Z. |
| Relação | Autor |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
| Classificação | Empréstimo | Locação permanente | Locação corrente | Data de aquisição | Forma de aquisição | Patrimônio | Número completo de chamada | Código de barras | Número do exemplar | Data de inserção do exemplar | Tipo de item no Koha |
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| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-07-02 | Compra | 30210 | 338.8 C689p | 2019-0216 | 1 | 2019-07-02 | Livros |