Annual proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute: (Registro n. 1493)
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| Campo fixo de controle local | 190617s9999 xx 000 0 und d |
| 020 ## - ISBN | |
| ISBN | 9781578233243 |
| 040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
| Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
| 090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
| Localização na estante | 341.3787 A615 |
| Cutter | A615 |
| 245 10 - Titulo Principal | |
| Título principal | Annual proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute: |
| Subtítulo | International Antitrust Law & Policy: 2010/ |
| 260 ## - Editora | |
| Cidade | Nova Iorque, Estados Unidos: |
| Editora | Juris Publishing, |
| Data | 2011. |
| 300 ## - Descrição Física | |
| Número de páginas | 466 p. |
| 505 ## - Conteúdo | |
| Conteúdo | TABLIE OF CONTENTS<br/><br/>Foreword <br/><br/>Summary Table of Contents <br/><br/>Table of Contents<br/><br/>Chapter 1<br/><br/>SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY FOR JOINT VENTURE INFRINGEMENTS<br/>by<br/>Jolling K. de Pree & Stefan C.H.Molin<br/><br/>1. Introduction <br/>II. Legal Basis for Attribution of Liability: Single Economic Unit <br/>III. Joint Venture + Shareholders = Single Economic Unit?<br/>A. Full-Function Joint Ventures <br/>B. Other Joint Ventures<br/><br/>IV. Imposition of Fines / Joint and Several Liability<br/><br/>V. Conclusion <br/><br/>Chapter 2<br/><br/>COMPETITION POLICY IN MEXICO: A TALE OF A DEVELOPING COUNTRY<br/>by<br/>Eduardo Pérez Motta <br/><br/>1. Introduction<br/>II. Competition Regime<br/>III. Enforcement of FLEC: Relative Monopolistic Practices<br/>IV. Competition and Economic Development <br/>V. Second Generation Amendments to the FLEC<br/>VI. Bibliography<br/><br/>FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE<br/><br/>Chapter 3<br/><br/>BRAZILIAN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: GENERAL OVERVIEW AND RECENT TRENDS<br/>by<br/>Barbara Rosenberg et al<br/><br/>1. Merger Control<br/>A. Historical Context<br/>B. General Overview of the Brazilian Merger Review Process<br/>II. Cracking Cartels in Brazil <br/>A. General Overview of the Brazilian Conduct Investigations <br/>B. Investigation Proceedings <br/>C. Leniency / Amnesty Programme<br/>D. Cease-and-desist commitments or settlements (a Brazilian plea bargaining)?<br/>E. Short Note on Criminal Enforcement<br/>F. Trends<br/><br/>Chapter 4<br/><br/>BRAZIL'S ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE<br/>by<br/>Mariana Tavares de Araujo and Ana Paula Martinez<br/><br/>Chapter 5<br/><br/>ENFORCERS' PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST<br/>by<br/>A. Paul Victor<br/>Alexander Italianer<br/>Jon Leibowitz<br/>Mariana Tavares de Araujo<br/>Jolling K. de Pree<br/>Barbara Rosenberg<br/><br/>Panel Discussion<br/><br/>TABLE OF CONTENTS <br/><br/>Chapter 6<br/><br/>THE UNILATERAL EFFECTS ANALYSIS IN THE 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES: BEGINNING OF THE END OF THE AGE OF RESTRAINT?<br/>by<br/>Kevin J. Arquit<br/><br/>1. Introduction <br/>II. The Evolution of the Guidelines Away From Their Role as a Constraint on Agency Discretion and Toward Their Use as a Tool of Increased Enforcement <br/>A. Evolution of the Guidelines <br/>III. The Pendulum Swings: Unilateral Effects in the 2010 Revised Guidelines <br/>A. The 2010 Revisions Signify Greater Ambition to Intervene But Appear Not to Contain Any Overall Guiding Doctrine or Limiting Principle <br/>B. The Revised Guidelines Include Several Changes Regarding Unilateral Effects Intended to Expand Agency Discretion <br/>C. Four Areas Pose the Greatest Problems Regarding Unilateral Effects: Upward Pricing Pressure, Merger Simulation, Innovation, and Variety <br/>D. The 2010 Revised Guidelines Create Uncertainty Concerning Not Only How the Agencies Will Act, But Also How Courts Will React to the Changes<br/>IV. Conclusion<br/><br/>Chapter 7<br/><br/>UNILATERAL EFFECTS IN EUROPEAN MERGER ANALYSIS<br/>by<br/>Thorsten Mager<br/><br/>I. Introduction<br/>II. Determining Unilateral Effects by Means of the Dominance and Siec Test<br/>A. The "Old" European Merger Regulation<br/>B. Heinz/Beech-Nut <br/>C. The "New" European Merger Regulation<br/>FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE<br/>III. Analysis of the EU Commission's Case Law<br/>A. Volvo/Renault Vi<br/>B. Philips/Agilent Health Care Solutions <br/>C. Philips! Marconi Medical Systems <br/>D. Oracle! PeopleSoft <br/>E. Ryanair/Aer Lingus<br/>F. Arsenal/DSP<br/>IV. Conclusion<br/><br/>Chapter 8<br/><br/>PRICING OF DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS IN THE 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES: SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS<br/>by<br/>Michael N. Sohn<br/><br/>1. The Role of Market Definition in AnaIyzing Pricing Effect<br/><br/>II. Diversion Ratios and Upward Pricing Pressure <br/><br/>Chapter 9<br/><br/>UNILATERAL EFFECTS IN MERGER ANALYSIS<br/>by<br/>Kevin J. Arquit<br/>Joseph Farrell<br/>Thorsten Mager<br/>Miguel de Ia Mano<br/>Alison Oldale<br/>Michael N. Sohn<br/><br/>Panel Discussion<br/><br/>TABLE OF CONTENN <br/><br/>Chapter 10<br/><br/>CARTELS IN THE EU: PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS FOR DEFENDANTS AND CLAIMANTS<br/>by<br/>David Anderson and Rachel Cuff<br/><br/>1. introduction <br/>II. The Defendant's View from Three Feet <br/>A. Raids and Inspections <br/>B. Access to the Commission's File<br/>C. Oral Hearing and the role of the Hearing Officer<br/>D Clarity of Procedural Steps <br/><br/>III. The Defendant's View from Three Thousand Feet<br/><br/>A. Leniency<br/>B. Levei of Fines <br/>C. Parental and Successor Liability<br/>D. Settlements<br/>E. Timing and Delay <br/>F. Transfer of Information Between Competition Authorities<br/><br/>III. The Defendant's View from Thirty Thousand Feet<br/><br/>A. The Commission as Legisiator, Prosecutor, Judge and Jury<br/>B. Impact of Possibility of Criminal Sanctions and Extradition<br/>C. Impact of Human Rights Argument <br/>D. Impact of Increase in Damages Actions<br/>E. A Time for Change?<br/><br/>IV. The View from the Other Side: Damages Claimants <br/><br/>A. Obstacies to Effective Damages Actions, and Possible Fixes<br/>B. Public and Private Enforcement Never the Twain Shall Meet or a New Way Forward?<br/>V. Moving Forward: Are We on the Right Path?<br/><br/>FORMAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE<br/><br/>Chapter 11<br/><br/>NATIONAL JUDGES AND THE APPLICATION OF REGULATION 1/2003: REMARKS AND PROPOSALS<br/>by<br/>Enrico Adriano Raffaelli<br/><br/>1. Introduction<br/>II. Interaction Between National Judges and European Commission In Implementing EU Antitrust Law Pre-" Modernisation"<br/>III. Evaluation of the Functioning of the New Rules Over Their First Five Years of Application<br/>A. The Cooperation Instruments Provided by Article 15 (Cooperation with National Courts) <br/>B. The Binding Effect of European Commission Decisions Introduced by Article 16(1)<br/>C. The Codification of the European Commission's Supremacy<br/>IV. Critical Aspects of the Framework Introduced by Regulation1/2003<br/>A. Risk of Limiting National Judges' Independence <br/>B. Preliminary Reference under Regulation 1/2003: Remarks and Unresolved Issues<br/>C. The Binding Effect of Commission Decisions and Its Impact on Res Judicata <br/>D. The Peculiar, Institutional Nature of the European Commission<br/>E. Challenging the Compatibility of Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 with the concept of due process and other fundamental principles <br/>V. Conclusions and Proposals <br/><br/>Chapter 12<br/><br/>EU COMPETITION POLICY<br/>by<br/>Laurence Sorkin<br/>David Anderson<br/>Enrico Adriano Raffaelli<br/>Rein Wesseling<br/><br/>Panel Discussion <br/><br/>TABLE OF CONTENTS <br/><br/>Chapter 13 <br/><br/>COMPETITION POLICY, ABUSIVE DOMINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: SOME REFLECTIONS <br/>by <br/>Maher M. Dabbah <br/><br/>I. Overview<br/>II. The "Contexts" of the Topic <br/>III. The Different Types <br/>IV. Is Abusive Dominance a Serious Issue in the Developing World?<br/>V. Under-Enforcement Against Abusive Dominance <br/><br/>A. The " Dominance" of Anti-cartel Enforcement and Competition Advocacy <br/>B. The Perception of Abusive Dominance Cases as "Hard" Cases<br/>C. The Question of Resources <br/>D. The Provisions, of the Law<br/>E. Political Constraints <br/><br/>VI. An International Perspective <br/>VII. A Comment On Exploitative Abuses <br/>VIII. Conclusions <br/><br/>Chapter 14<br/><br/>ABUSE OF DOMINANCE, COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM THE SOUTHERN TIP OF AFRICA<br/>by<br/>D.M. Davis<br/><br/>1. The South African Response<br/>II. The Role of the Doctrine of Abuse of Dominance<br/>III. Economic Development <br/>IV. The Need for Responsible Legislation<br/>V. The Potential Dangers<br/>VI. Conclusion<br/><br/>FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE<br/><br/>Chapter 15<br/><br/>COMPETITION POLICY, ABUSIVE DOMINANCE AND ECONOMJC DEVELOPMENT<br/>by<br/>Tad Lipsky<br/><br/>1. Introduction<br/>II. Lessons of the Past<br/><br/>Chapter 16<br/><br/>COMPETITION POLICY, ABUSE OF DOMINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES<br/>by<br/>Frédéric Jenny<br/>Maher Dabbah<br/>Dennis Davis<br/>Wilhiam Kovacic<br/>Tad Lipsky<br/>Eduardo Pérez Motta<br/><br/>Panel Discussion<br/><br/>Chapter 17<br/><br/>LUNCHEON ADDRESS<br/>by<br/>Ken Auietta<br/><br/>TABLE OF CONTENTS <br/><br/>Chapter 18<br/><br/>ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT<br/>by<br/>Daniel A. Crane<br/>John Frank<br/>Julia Holtz<br/>Lawrence A. Jacobs<br/>Miguel de Ia Mano<br/>Damien Neven<br/><br/>Carl Shapiro<br/><br/>Panel Discussion<br/> |
| 700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 1133 |
| Nome pessoa | HAWK, Barry E. |
| Relação | Editor |
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| Tipo de Material | Livros |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
| Classificação | Empréstimo | Locação permanente | Locação corrente | Data de aquisição | Patrimônio | Número completo de chamada | Código de barras | Número do exemplar | Data de inserção do exemplar | Tipo de item no Koha |
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| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-08-20 | 30972 | 341.3787 A615 | 2019-0549 | 1 | 2019-08-20 | Livros |