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Table of Contents<br/><br/>PREFACE<br/>WESTLAW OVERVIEW<br/>PART I. FOUNDATIONS: POLICY AND MEASUREMENT<br/><br/>Chapter 1.The Basic Economics of Antitrust <br/>1.1 Price Theory: Economic Behavior and Perfect Competition<br/>1.1a.The Perfectly Competitive Market<br/>1;1b.Behavior of the Competitive Firm <br/>1.2.Monopoly<br/>1.2a.Price and Output of the Protected Monopolist<br/>1.2b.Monopsony; Output Effects; Policy Implications<br/>1.2c.De Facto Monopolies in Real World Markets<br/>1.3Antitrust Policy and the Social Cost of Monopoly<br/>1.3a.Monopoly as a Status; Monopolization as a Process<br/>1.3b.The Deadweight Loss Caused by Monopoly<br/>1.3c.The Social Cost of Monopoly: Rent-Seeking<br/>1.3d. The Social Cost of Monopoly: Lost Competitor Investment <br/>1.4 Industrial Organization Theory and Economies of Scale<br/>1.4a.The General Case of Economies of Scale <br/>1.4b.Persistent Scale Economies, Natural Monopoly, Franchise Bidding and Contestability<br/>1.5 Less-Than-Perfect Competition<br/>1.5a.Product Differentiation<br/>1.5b.Price Discrimination<br/>1.5c.Oligopoly<br/>1.5d.Less-Than-Perfect Competition and "Second Best" <br/>1.6 Barriers to Entry <br/>1.7 The Troubled Life of the Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm <br/>1.8 The Increasing Importance of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis<br/><br/>Chapter 2.History and ldeologym Antitrust Policy <br/>2.1The Development of American Antitrust Policy<br/>2.1a.The Goals of the Sherman Act: Efficiency and Interest Group Explanations<br/>2.1b.The Common Law and the Federal Antitrust Laws<br/>2.1c.A Thumbnail History of Federal Antitrust Policy <br/>2.2On the Role of Economics in Antitrust<br/>2.2a. Antitrust and Economics Before 1960<br/>2.2b.The Chicago School and Its Aftermath<br/>2.2c.Skepticism; Competitor v. Consumer Suits; Private v. Public Suits <br/>2.2d. Politics and Dernocratic Policy<br/>2.2e. Antitrust Policy in the Wake of the Chicago School <br/>2.3 On the Use of Economicsin Antitrust<br/>2.3a. The Domain of Antitrust Economics<br/>2.3b.The Substance of Antitrust Economics<br/>2.3c.The Meaning of "Welfare," "Efficiency" and "Consumer Welfare" in Antitrust Economics <br/><br/>Chapter 3.Market Power and Market Definition <br/>3.1 Introduction<br/>3.1a.Market Power Technically Defined<br/>3.1b.Market Share as a Surrogate for Market Power<br/>3.1c.Market Share as More Than a Surrogate; Independent Relevance of Market Share<br/>3.1d.The Relevant Antitrust Market<br/>3.2 Estimating the Relevant Market; The SSNIP and the 'Hypothetical Monopolist" <br/>3.2a.Size of Hypothesized Price Increase<br/>3.2b.The "Profit-Maximizing" Increase; Critical Loss Analysis<br/>3.2c.Broader and Narrower Markets; General Irrelevance of Submarkets <br/>3.3 The Product Market; General Considerations<br/>3.3a.Markets and Brands; "Lock-in”<br/>3.3a1.Single Brand Ordinarily Not a Relevant Market; Kodak<br/>3.3a2.Lower Court Decisions Limiting Kodak <br/>3.3a3.Contract "Lock-in;" Franchisor Brand as Market<br/>3.3b.Substitutes v. Complements; Cluster Markets<br/>3.3b1.Relevant Market Consists of Substitutes<br/>3.3b2.The Limited Rationale for Finding "Cluster" Markets <br/>3.4 "Cross-Elasticity of Demand:" The "Cellophane" Fallacy and Its Consequences<br/>3.4a.Cross-Price Elasticities and Their Meaning<br/>3.4b.Cross-Elasticity of Demand in the du Pont (Cellophane) Case<br/>3.4c.Correcting for the "Cellophane" Fallacy <br/>3.5 Supply Elasticities; Foreign Imports<br/>3.5a.Foreign Imports and the Alcoa Case<br/>3.5b. Other Decisions Addressing (or Failing to Address) Supply Issues<br/>3.5c. Accounting for Elasticity of Supply: Market Inclusion or Low Barriers to Entry<br/>3.6 The Geographic Market<br/>3.6a.Shipped Goods; Minimum Geographic Market<br/>3.6b.Stationary Goods and Services<br/>3.6c.Price Movements and Shipping Patterns<br/>3.6c1.Price Movements Generaily; Asymmetry<br/>3.6c2.The Elzinga-Hogarty Test<br/>3.6d.Trade Area; Non-competition Covenants<br/>3.6e.Price Discrimination <br/>3.7 Computation and Interpretation of Market Shares<br/>3.7a.Revenue v. Units<br/>3.7b.Output v. Capacity<br/>3.7c.Product Durability and Power<br/>3.7d.Interpreting Market Share Data; Questions of Fact or Law<br/>3.8 Market Definition in the Justice Department Merger Guidelines<br/>3.8a.Product Market Delineation in the 2010 Guidelines<br/>3.8b.Geographic Market Definition Under the 2010 Guidelines<br/>3.8e.Calculation of Market Shares Under the 2010 Merger Guidelines<br/>3.8d.The "Cellophane" Fallacy and the Difference Between Market Delineation for Mergers and Other Practices<br/>3.8e.Conclusion; The Guidelines as a Policy Statement<br/>3.9 Alternative Methods of Establishing Market Power<br/>3.9a.Measuring Residual Demand Directly<br/>3.9b.Persistent Price Discrimination<br/>3.9b1.Price Discrimination and Intellectual Property<br/>3.9b2.Price Discrimination and Market Definition<br/>3.9c.Persistent Monopoly Profits; High Margins<br/>3.9c1.Monopoly Profits v. Accounting Profits<br/>3.9c2.Absence of High Accounting Profits<br/>3.9c3.The Problem of "Rents"<br/>3.9d.Market Power and Intellectual Property<br/><br/>PART II. THE SUBSTANCE OF ANTITRUST<br/><br/>Chapter 4.Antitrust Policy Toward Collusion and Oligopoly<br/>4.1 Introduction: The Basic Economics of Price Fixing<br/>4.1a.The (Virtual) Universality of Cartel Cheating<br/>4.1a1.Divergence Between Cartel and Single Firm Profit Maximization <br/>4.1a2. Cartel Cheating Strategies<br/>4.1a3. Detecting and Punishing Cheating; Cartel "Amnesty"<br/>4.1b. Competitive Fringe Firms<br/>4.1c. Interna! Efficiencies of the Cartel<br/>4.1d. Carteis ofBuyers <br/>4.2 Oligopoly, Cooperative and Non-cooperative<br/>4.2a. Non-cooperative Cournot Oligopoly<br/>4.2b. Cooperative v. Non-cooperative Oligopoly Strategies <br/>4.3 The Social Cost of Coliusion <br/>4.4 Antitrust Policy Toward Oligopoly and Tacit Coilusion <br/>4.4a.Attacking Oligopoly; The Turner-Posner Debate<br/>4.4b.Identifying Tacit Coilusion and Facilitators; Policy Options <br/>4.5 Proving a Price or Output "Agreement" From Indirect or Circumstantial Evidence <br/>4.6 Reaching Oligopoly Behavior on Less Explicit Evidence of Agreement<br/>4.6a.Introduction; Incomplete Agreements<br/>4.6b.Challenging Facilitators Established by Agreement<br/>4.6c. "Unilateral" Facilitators; Basing-Point Pricing Schemes<br/>4.6d. Other Facilitators; 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act<br/>4.6e. Motions to Dismiss and Summary Judgment in Conspiracy Cases<br/>4.7 Intraenterprise Conspiracy <br/><br/>Chapter 5. Joint Ventures of Competitors, Concerted Refusals, Patent Licensing, and the Rule of Reason <br/>5.1 Introduction: Naked and Anciflary Agreements Among Competitors <br/>5.1a.Distinguishing Naked From Ancillary Restraints; Question of Law<br/>5.1b. Why Multilateral Activity Deserves Closer Antitrust Scrutiny<br/>5.1c. Partial Condemnation; Less Restrictive Alternatives Joint Ventures as Market Facilitators<br/>5.2a.Joint Ventures: An Overview<br/>5.2a1.Potential Harms and Benefits<br/>5.2a2.The Two Sides of the Exclusivity Problem <br/>5.2b.Ventures Facilitating R & D, Advertising and Promotion; Ancilary Market Divisions<br/>5.2b1.Joint Ventures and Free Rider Problems<br/>5.2b2.National Cooperative Research Act<br/>5.2b3.Ancillary and Naked Agreements Pertaining to Advertising<br/>5.2b4.Ancillary Market Divisions and Noncompetition Agreements <br/>5.2c.Transactional Efficiencies Justifying Joint Venture Price Setting <br/>5.2d.The Relation Between Joint Venture Analysis and Merger Analysis Competitor Exchanges of Price or Output Information; Posting Agreements <br/>5.3a.Industry-Wide Dissemination of Price and Output Information<br/>5.3b.Direct Competitor Exchange of Price Information <br/>5.3c.Agreements to Post, or to Post and Adhere Concerted Refusals to Deal, Joint Venture Membership Restrictions, and Standard Setting<br/>5.4a.Harms and Benefits; Appropriate Antitrust Standard<br/>5.4a1.A Rule of Reason, With a Few Exceptions<br/>5.4a2.Special Treatment for the Learned Professions<br/>5.4b.Efficient Joint Ventures and Refusals to Deal<br/>5.4b1.Closed-Membership and Other Traditional Joint Ventures <br/>5.4b2.Open-Membership Ventures; Positive Network Externalities<br/>5.4c.Standard Setting and Rule Enforcement in Private Entrepreneurial and Professional Associations <br/>5.4d.Agreements Involving Non-Competitors <br/>5.4e.Expressive and Noncommercial Boycotts Agreements Governing the Licensing and Use of Patents and Other Intellectual Property<br/>5.5a. Introduction; Basic Issues<br/>5.5b. The Scope of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, Antitrust and Beyond <br/>5.5c.Patent Licensing<br/>5.5c1.Price Fixing; Output Restrictions; Royalty Rates; Exclusivity<br/>5.5c2.Horizontal Territorial and Other Market Division Agreements; Patent Settlements, Pharmaceutical and Otherwise<br/>5.5c3.Package Licenses <br/>5.5c4.Patent Pools<br/>5.5c5.Grantbacks <br/>5.5d.Agreements Concerning Non-Patent Intellectual Property Characterization and Evaluation: The Per Se Rule and the Rule of Reason <br/>5.6a. The Supreme Court and the Per Se Rule<br/>5.6b. The Exaggerated Distinction Between Rule of Reason and Per Se Treatment <br/>5.6c.IdentiQying Anticompetitive Conduct: A Tentative Road Map <br/>5.6d. The Truncated, or "Quick Look," Rule of Reason <br/>5.6e. The Burden of Proof <br/><br/>Chapter 6.Exclusionary Practices and the Dominant Firm: The Basic Doctrine of Monopolization and Attempt <br/>6.1 The Monopolization Offense<br/>6.2Monopoly Power and Illegal Monopolization<br/>6.2a.Monopolization's Market Power Requirement<br/>6.2b.The Relation Between Market Power and Market Share; Entry Barriers <br/>6.3 Conduct Requirements—Is Bad Conduct Necessary9 <br/>6.4Identifying Monopolizing Conduct<br/>6.4a.Exclusionary Conduct Defined<br/>6.4b.Private and Government Suits Distinguished<br/>6.4c.Intent <br/>6.5 The Offense of Attempt to Monopolize<br/>6.5a.Attempt Law's Specific Intent Requirement <br/>6.5b."Dangerous Probability of Success"<br/>6.5b1.The "Dangerous Probability" Requirement as a Screening Device <br/>6.5b2.Dangerous Probability and Market Power <br/>6.6 Conspiracy to Monopolize<br/><br/>Chapter 7.Exclusionary Practices in Monopolization and Attempt Cases <br/>7.1 Introduction<br/>7.2 Merger and Monopoly <br/>7.3 Output Expansion; Strategic Capacity Construction <br/>7.Price Discrimination; Leasing Practices<br/>7.5Unilateral Refusals to Deal 1: General Doctrine<br/>7.5a.Refusals Directed at Competitors<br/>7.5b.Scope of Duty to Deal<br/>7.5c.Possible Qualifications; Dominated Networks <br/>7.6 Unilateral Refusal to Deal II: Vertical Integration, Price Squeezes, Tying and Exclusive Dealing<br/>7.6a.Kodak and Its Aftermath<br/>7.6a1."Lock-in" Requires Initial Purchase and Subsequent Change of Policy<br/>7.6a2."Average" Customer Must Be Poorly Informed; or Price Discrimination Must Be Possible<br/>7.6a3.Summary: Mtermarket Opportunism Not Within 2's Purview<br/>7.6b.The Price or Supply "Squeeze;" Vertical Integration and linkLine<br/>7.6c.Quasi-Tying and Exclusive Dealing—Technological Ties <br/>7.6d.Use of Vertical Refusals by Private Antitrust Plaintiffs<br/>7.6e.Legitimate Business Purpose<br/>7.6f.Unilateral Refusal by Nonmonopolist <br/>7.7 Refusal to Deal III: The "Essential Facility" Doctrine<br/>7.7a.What Is a Qualifying "Essential Facility"?<br/>7.7b.The Extent of the Duty to Deal<br/>7.7c.Reasonablenessof Refusal to Deal<br/>7.7d.Essential Facility Doctrine Inconsistent With General Antitrust Goals<br/>7.7d1.Forced Sharing Requires Price Administration<br/>7.7d2.Forced Sharing Undercuts Incentives to Develop Alternative Sources Of Supply<br/>7.7d3.Dominated Networks as Essential Facilities<br/>7.8 "Predatory" Product Design and Development; Failure to Predisclose; Altered Complementary Products<br/>7.8a. Predatory Product or Process Innovation<br/>7.8b. Failure to Predisclose New Technology<br/>7.8c.Microsoft: Unnecessarily Harmful Redesigns and Licensing Requirements<br/>7.8d.Strategic Entry Deterrence; Predatory Advertising, Excessive Product Differentiation<br/>7.9 The Troublesome "Leverage" Theory; Nonmonopolistic Advantage in Second Market<br/>7.10 Raising Rivals' Costs (RRC)<br/>7.10a.The Pedigree and Judicial Development of RRC<br/>7.10h.Pre-emption of Markets or Customers as RRC <br/>7.11 Unreasonably Exclusionary Practices Involving Patents or Other Intellectual Property Rights<br/>7.11a.Walker Process: "Obtaining" Patent by Fraud<br/>7.11b. Enforcement of Patent Known to Be Invalid or Unenforceable; Noerr Issues <br/>7.11c.Accumulation; Nonuse<br/>7.11d.Unilateral Refusal to License, Simple and Conditional<br/>7.11d1.Absolute Refusal to License<br/>7.11d2.Conditional Refusals to License<br/>7.11e. Patent "Deception" and Failure to Disclose, Particularly in Standard Setting<br/>7.12 Abuse of Government Process<br/>7.13 Business Torts as Antitrust Violations <br/>7.14 Conduct Requirements in Attempt Cases<br/><br/>Chapter 8.Predatory and Other Exclusionary Pricing<br/>8.1 Introduction<br/>8.2 When Is a Price Predatory? The Areeda-Turner Test<br/>8.3 Predatory Pricing: Application and Criticism of the Areeda-Turner Test<br/>8.3a.The Average Variable Cost (AVC) Surrogate<br/>8.3b.The Problem of Long-Run, Strategic Behavior; "Predatory" Prices Above Cost; Multiple-Benefit Predation<br/>8.3b1.Limit Pricing and Strategic Entry Deterrence<br/>8.3b2.Multiple-Benefit Predation<br/>8.3c.AVC Measured as Average Avoidable Cost; Opportunity Cost<br/>8.4 Structural Issues: When Is Predatory Pricing Plausible? Recoupment<br/>8.4a.The Predator's Market Position<br/>8.4b.Barriers to Entry<br/>8.4c.Excess Capacity<br/>8.4d.Disposition of Productive Assets<br/>8.4e.Should Competitor Predatory Pricing Suits Be Abolished<br/>8.5 Judicial Adaption of the Areeda-Turner Test: Price/Cost Relationships and Intent. <br/>8.5a.Price/Cost Relationships<br/>8.5b.Intent <br/>8.6 Judicial Adaption of Areeda-Turner: Identifying Relevant Costs; Multi-product Firms; Customer-Specific Pricing<br/>8.7 Judicial Adaption of Areeda-Turner: Structural Issues and Recoupment <br/>8.8 Predatory Pricing and the Robinson-Patman Act <br/>8.9 More Complex Exclusionary Pricing Strategies, Particularly Discounts<br/>8.9a.Quantity and Loyalty Discounts<br/>8.9b.Package Pricing and Bundled Discounts<br/>8.9b1.The Varieties of Bundled Discounts<br/>8.9b2.The "Attribution" Test for Bundled Discounts<br/>8.9b3.More Complex Bundies<br/>8.9c.Slotting Allowances and Related Pricing Incentives Paid to Retailers <br/>8.10 Predatory Buying and the Weyerhaeuser Decision <br/><br/>Chapter 9.Vertical Integration and Vertical Mergers<br/>9.1 Introduction <br/>9.2 The Economics of Vertical Integration<br/>9.2a.The Implications of Coase's Work; Transaction Cost Economics<br/>9.2b.Cost Savings, Technological and Transactional<br/>9.2c.Efficient Vertical Integration and Multi-Stage Market Power; Eliminating Double Marginalization; Two-Part Tariffs <br/>9.3 Plausible Anticompetitive Consequences of Vertical Integration<br/>9.3a.Strategic Control of lnputs<br/>9.3b.Price Discrimination<br/>9.3c.Foreclosure and Entry Barriers<br/>9.3d.Vertical Integration by Price Regulated Firms<br/>9.3e.Vertical Integration and Cartels <br/>9.4 Vertical Mergers and Antitrust Law <br/>9.5 Vertical Mergers and the Antitrust Division Merger Guidelines<br/>9.5a.Increased Barriers to Entry<br/>9.5b.Vertical Mergers That Facilitate Collusion<br/>9.5c. Avoidance of Rate Regulation <br/><br/>Chapter 10.Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, Exclusive Dealing and the Franchise Contract <br/>10.1 Introduction: The Judicial Test for Tie-Ins<br/>10.2 Tying Arrangements and Consumer Welfare<br/>10.3 Market Power and Per Se Unlawful Ties; Sherman v. Clayton Act Tests<br/>10.3a. The Rationale and Development of Tying's Market Power Requirement<br/>10.3b. Tying Arrangements in Imperfectly Competitive Markets; Locked-In Customers<br/>10.3c. Intellectual Property and the Presumption of Market Power<br/>10.3d."Uniqueness" and Ubiquity as Market Power<br/>10.3e. Separate Sherman and Clayton Act Tests? Federal Trade Commission Act <br/>10.3f.The Rationale for Per Se Iliegal Tie-Ins <br/>10.4 When Are Products Tied Together9<br/>10.4a.Coercion by Contract, Condition, or Understanding<br/>10.4b. Proof of a Relevant Tying "Agreement;" Uncommunicated Conditions<br/>10.4c.Package Discounts<br/>10.4d.Coercion by Package Design; Technological Ties <br/>10.5 The Requirement of Separate Tying and Tied Products<br/>10.5a.Introduction; Basic Competitive Market Test<br/>10.5b."New" Products<br/>10.5c.Complete and Partial Substitutes as Separate Products<br/>10.5d.Intellectual Property and Labor as Separate Products<br/>10.5e.Efficiency—"Economies of Joint Provision" <br/>10.6 Competitive Effects<br/>10.6a.The Leverage Theory: Using Tie-Ins to Turn One Monopoly into Two; Tipping<br/>10.6b.Entry Barriers, Foreclosure, and Collusion<br/>10.6b1.Entry Barriers and Tying Arrangements<br/>10.6b2.Foreclosure; Market Share<br/>10.6b3.Tie-Ins and Collusion<br/>10.6c. Evasion of Rate Regulation<br/>10.6d.Predatory Pricing and Other Attempts to Monopolize<br/>10.6e.Tie-Ins as Price Discrimination and Metering Devices; Franchise Agreements<br/>10.6f.Tying and Double Marginalization; "Reverse Leveraging<br/>10.7 Tie-Ins and Efficiency: Toward a General Rule of Reason<br/>10.7a.Efficiencies and Tying Law's Idiosyncratic Per Se Rule<br/>10.7b.Distribution Economies; Full-Line Forcing and Unwanted Tied Products;Lack of Consumer injury<br/>10.7c.Conclusion: Moving Tying Law Toward a Rule of Reason <br/>10.8 Reciprocity <br/>10.9 Exclusive Dealing<br/>10.9a.Anticompetitive Foreclosure and Its Variations<br/>10.9a1.The Foreclosure Theory of Exclusive Dealing<br/>10.9a2.Raising Rivals' Costs<br/>10.9a3.Defining Markets to Measure Vertical Foreclosure<br/>10.9b.Exclusive Dealing as a Cartel Facilitator<br/>10.9c.The Difference Between Exclusive Dealing and Tying<br/>10.9d.Efficiency Explanations and Defenses for Exclusive Dealing<br/>10.9e.The Legal Standard for Exclusive Dealing Contracts<br/><br/>Chapter 11.Intrabrand Restraints on Distribution <br/>11.1Introduction<br/>11.2 Perceived Competitive Threats of Minimum RPM and Vertical Territorial Restraints <br/>11.2a.Introduction<br/>11.2b.Vertical Restraints as Collusion Facilitators; Powerful Individual Dealers<br/>11.2b1.Dealer Power; Policy Implications<br/>11.2b2. Manufacturer Collusion and Vertical Restraints<br/>11.2c.Foreclosure Effects<br/>11.2d.Third Degree Price Discrimination<br/>11.2e.OtherTheories <br/>11.3 Vertical Restraints and Efficiency<br/>11.3a.The Free-Rider Problem<br/>11.3a1. The Economics of Vertical Restraints to Combat Free Riding<br/>11.3a2. The Domain and Efficiency of Vertical Restraints to Combat Free-Riding<br/>11.3b.Variations on the Free-Rider Problem and Alternative Explanations <br/>11.3b1. Purchase of Preferred Distribution Services; Shelf Space; Quality Certification<br/>11.3b2.Facilitating Resale Density<br/>11.3b3.Fadiitating Supplier Entry<br/>11.3b4. Protection of Dealer Margins; Enforcement of Distribution Contracts<br/>11.3c.Vertical Restraints and Efficiency Reconsidered<br/>11.4 The Agreement Requirement in Vertical Restraints Cases<br/>11.4a.Agreements—Horizontal and Vertical, Price and Nonprice<br/>11.4b.The Colgate Doctrine<br/>11.4c.Dealer Terminations<br/>11.4d.The Agreement Requirement and Antitrust Policy Respecting Vertical Restraints; Restraints Initiated by Powerful Dealers <br/>11.5 Resale Price Maintenance in the Courts <br/>11.5a.From Dr. Miles to Leegin<br/>11.5b.The Meaning of "Resale"—Consignment Exception<br/>11.5c.Maximum RPM<br/>11.5d.The Difference Between Price and Non-Price Agreements<br/>11.6 Vertical Nonprice Restraints Under the Rule of Reason<br/>11.6a.Balancing "Intrabrand" and "Interbrand" Competition<br/>11.6b.Sylvania's Impact in the Lower Courts<br/>11.6c.Boycott Claims<br/>11.6d.Exclusive Dealerships, Sole Outlets, and Refusals to Deal<br/>11.6e.Dual Distribution<br/>11.7 Conclusion:The Rule of Reason for Distribution Restraints <br/>11.7a.General Policy Concerns<br/>11.7b.General Efficiency of Vertical Integration Not Decisive<br/>11.7c.Rejected Approaches<br/>11.7d.Rule of Reason lnquiry Summarized <br/><br/>Chapter 12.Mergers of Competitors <br/>12.1 Introduction: Federal Merger Policy and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines<br/>12.1a.The Continuing Importance of Market Structure to Merger Analysis<br/>12.1b.The Basic Concerns of Merger Policy: Reduced Market Output, Higher Prices, and Offsetting Efficiencies<br/>12.lc.Mergers and Exclusionary Practices; Predatory Pricing; Private Challenges <br/>12.2 Efficiency and Merger Policy<br/>12.2a.The Dubious Legacy of the Warren Era<br/>12.2b.Assessing the Efficiency Effects of Horizontal Mergers<br/>12.2b1.The Welfare "Tradeoff" Model<br/>12.2b2. Must Efficiencies Be "Passed On"?<br/>12.2h3. Efficiencies Must Be "Merger-Specific" and "Extraordinary" <br/>12.2b4.Problems of Identification and Measurement <br/>12.2b5.Benefit and Threat in Different Markets <br/>12.3 Estimating Anticompetitive Consequences 1: Mergers Facilitating Unilateral Price Increases <br/>12.3a.Introduction<br/>12.3b.Merger to Monopoly<br/>12.3c.Dominant Firm's Acquisition of Nascent Rival<br/>12.3d.Unilateral Effects in Product Differentiated Markets<br/>12.3e.Mergers That Threaten Innovation <br/>12.4 Estimating Anticompetitive Consequences II: Mergers Facilitating Coordinated Interaction<br/>12.4a. Measuring Market Concentration: The CR4 and the Herfindahl<br/>12.4a1.The Four-Firm Concentration Ratio (CR4)<br/>12.4a2.The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) <br/>12.4b. Market Share Thresholds Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines<br/>12.4c. The Weight to Be Given to Market Definition and Market Share Measures <br/>12.4d.How Should Concentration Count? Philadelphia Bank<br/>12.4e.Mergers of Competing Buyers <br/>12.5 The Significance of Product Differentiation<br/>12.5a.Product Differentiation as Undermining Collusion<br/>12.5b.Product Differentiation: When Is a Merger Horizontal?<br/>12.6 Barriers to Entry in Merger Cases<br/>12.6a.The Appropriate Definition of Entry Barriers for Merger Policy<br/>12.6b.What Constitutes an Entry Barrier?<br/>12.6b1.Economies of Scale<br/>12.6b2.Risk and Size of lnvestment; Sunk Costs<br/>12.6b3. Advertising, Promotion, and Customer Loyalty<br/>12.6b4.Product Differentiation<br/>12.6b5.Government Entry Restrictions<br/>12.6c.Evidence Required to Prove Entry Barriers or Their Absence<br/>12.6d. Entry Barrier Analysis Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines <br/>12.7 Other Factors Mfecting the Competitive Consequences of Mergers <br/>12.7a.Sophistication and Power of Trading Partners<br/>12.7b.Adequacy of Irreplaceable Raw Materiais<br/>12.7c.Excess Capacity<br/>12.7d.Marketing and Sales Methods<br/>12.7e.History of Collusion or Facilitating Practices<br/>12.7f."Trends" Towards Concentration<br/>12.7g.Aggressiveness of Acquired Firm<br/>12.8 Observed Anticompetitive Behavior; Post-Acquisition Review <br/>12.9 The "Failing Company" Defense and Related Factors Affecting Firm Viability <br/>12.10 Partial Acquisitions and Acquisitions "Solely for Investment”<br/>12.11 Interlocking Corporate Directors or Officers <br/><br/>Chapter 13.Conglomerate Mergers. <br/>13.1 Introduction: Competition and Conglomerate Mergers <br/>13.2 Conglomerate Mergers and Efficiency <br/>13.3 Perceived Dangers to Competition <br/>13.3a.Reciprocity<br/>13.3b.Leverage and Tie-Ins<br/>13.3c.Strategic Pricing and Entry Deterrence <br/>13.4 Mergers of Potential Competitors<br/>13.4a.The Perceived Potential Entrant Doctrine<br/>13.4b."Actual" Potential Entrant Doctrine<br/>13.5 Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Division Guidelines <br/><br/>Chapter 14.Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act <br/>14.1 Introduction: Price Discrimination <br/>14.2 Price Discrimination and Competition <br/>14.3 Price Discrimination and Market Power<br/>14.4 Three Degrees of Price Discrimination; Arbitrage <br/>14.5 Price Discrimination and Antitrust Policy<br/>14.5a.The Social Cost of Price Discrimination<br/>14.5b. The Social Cost of Preventing Price Discrimination in Concentrated Markets<br/>14.6 The Robinson-Patman Act and Price Discrimination<br/>14.6a.General Interpretation<br/>14.6a1.Legislative History and Effectiveness in Achieving Goals <br/>14.6a2. The Robinson-Patman Act's Theory of Competitive Injury<br/>14.6b.The Meaning of Price "Discrimination" Under the Act<br/>14.6c.Primary- and Secondary- Line Violations<br/>14.6d.Technical Requirements<br/>14.6e.Violations by Buyers<br/>14.6f.Affirmative Defenses<br/>14.6f1."Cost Justification" Defense<br/>14.6f2."Meeting Competition" Defense <br/><br/>PART III. ANTITRUST AS A REGULATORY INSTITUTION<br/><br/>Chapter 15. Public Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws <br/>15.1 Public Enforcement Generally; The Antitrust Division<br/>642 15.1a. Criminal Enforcement<br/>15.1b. Civil Enforcement<br/>15.2 The Federal Trade Commission<br/>15.3 The Process of Premerger Notification<br/>15.4 "Quasi-Public" Enforcement: The States' Attorneys General <br/><br/>Chapter 16.Private Enforcement<br/>16.1 Introduction: § 4 of the Clayton Act <br/>16.2 Permissible Plaintiffs—Who Should Enforce the Antitrust Laws? <br/>16.3 Antitrust's Special Requirement of Competitive Injury<br/>16.3a."Antitrust Injury"; Private Merger Chalienges<br/>16.3a1. Mergers Alleged to Facilitate Exclusionary Practices<br/>16.3a2.Takeover Targets as Antitrust Plaintiffs <br/>16.3a3.Consumer Plaintiffs<br/>16.3b."Antitrust Injury" Beyond 7; Per Se Violations<br/>16.3c.Causation, Injury-in-fact, Antitrust Injury Distinguished<br/>16.3d.Antitrust Injury and Damages Claims<br/>16.3e.Injunctive Relief<br/>16.3f.Plaintiffs Unaffected by Injury to Competition <br/>16.4 Statutory and Judicial Rules Limiting Antitrust Standing<br/>16.4a."Business or Property"<br/>16.4b.Market Relationships; "Direct Injury" and "Target Area" Tests<br/>16.4b1."Direct Injury<br/>16.4b2."Target Area<br/>16.4b3. Supreme Court Attempts at a More Useful Alternative <br/>16.4c.The Preferred Position of Consumers and Competitors <br/>16.5 Special Problems of Antitrust Standing<br/>16.5a.The Unestablished Business as Antitrust Plaintiff<br/>16.5b.Employees<br/>16.5c.Derivative Injuries and "Duplicative Recovery"<br/>16.5d.Second Best Plaintiffs<br/>16.5e.Pari Delicto; Declaratory Judgment Actions <br/>16.6 The Indirect Purchaser Rule<br/>16.6a.Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick<br/>16.6b.Exceptions to the Illinois Brick Rule<br/>16.6b1.Pre-existing Contracts<br/>16.6b2.Injunction Suits<br/>16.6b3.Cases Involving Vertical Agreements or Control<br/>16.6c.Monopsony; Buyers' Cartels<br/>16.6d. Policy Implications of the Indirect Purchaser Rule; State Indirect Purchaser Statutes<br/>16.6e.The Umbrella Plaintiff<br/>16.7 The Antitrust Statute of Limitation <br/>16.8 Disposition of Issues; Pleadings; Summary Judgment; Expert Testimony; Tagalong Suits<br/>16.8a.Jury Trial<br/>16.8b.Antitrust Pleadings and Summary Judgment<br/>16.8b1. Antitrust Motions to Dismiss and the Twombly Case <br/>16.8b2. Matsushita and Summary Judgment in Antitrust Cases <br/>16.8c.Judicial Control of Expert Testimony <br/>16.8d.Tagalong Suits; Offensive Coilateral Estoppel<br/>16.9 Equitable Relief <br/>16.10 Compulsory Arbitration<br/><br/>Chapter 17.Damages <br/>17.1 Antitrust Damages Actions and Social Welfare<br/>17.1a.Introduction: The Role of Efficiency in Damages Theory<br/>17.1b.Deterrence and Damages<br/>17.1c.Using Damages to Minimize the Social Cost of Antitrust Violations <br/>17.2 The Optimal Deterrence Model for Antitrust Damages<br/>17.2a.Victim's Losses v. Violator's Gains<br/>17.2b.Optimal Damages for Overcharge Injuries<br/>17.2c. Optimal Damages for Exclusionary Practices<br/>17.2d.The Optimal Deterrence Model in Litigation <br/>17.3 The Rationale for Treble Damages<br/>17.4 How Accurately Must Damages Be Measured7 <br/>17.5 Measuring Damages for Overcharge Injuries<br/>17.5a.Introduction; Basic Conceptual Problems<br/>17.5b. Methods of Measurement: "Yardstick" and "Before—and—After"<br/>17.5b1.Yardstick Method<br/>17.5b2.Before—and—After Method <br/>17.6 Damages for Exclusionary Practices<br/>17.6a.When Are Damages Due?<br/>17.6b.Damages for Lost Sales and Market Share<br/>17.6b1.Before-and-After Method <br/>17.6b2.Yardstick Method<br/>17.6b3.Lost Market Share <br/>17.6c.Damages and Disaggregation<br/>17.6d.Terminated Dealers and Firms Driven From Business <br/>17.6e.Damages for Precluded Entry <br/>17.7 Contribution; Joint and Several Liability <br/><br/>Chapter 18.Antitrust and the Process of Democratic Govermnent <br/>18.1 Regulation, Rent-Seeking and Antitrust Immunity<br/>18. 1a.Introduction<br/>18. 1b.Regulatory lntervention and the RighttoSeeklt<br/>18. 1c.The General Irrelevance of Regulatory Capture<br/>18. 1d.Noerr Protects the Process, Not the Result<br/>18.2 The Scope of Antitrust's Petitioning Immunity<br/>18.2a.Petitions for Legislative or Executive Action Generaily<br/>18.2b.Petitions to Governments Acting as Market Participants<br/>18.2c.Petitions for Adjudicative Action <br/>18.3 The "Sham" Exception in Legislative and Adjudicative Contexts<br/>18.3a.Use of Abusive Methods; False Information<br/>18.3b.Baselessness in the Adjudicative Setting; Successful Claims<br/>18.3c.Single or Repetitive Claims<br/>18.3d.Threat to Sue; Ex Parte Statements<br/>18.3e.Petitions for Invalid Legislation and Administrative Rules <br/>18.4 The Relation Between Unprotected Petitioning and the Substantive Offense <br/>18.5 Corruption of Private Decision Making Bodies <br/><br/>Chapter 19.Antitrust and Federal Regulatory Policy <br/>19.1 Antitrust and Regulation ina Federal Systern <br/>19.2 Regulation, Dereulation and Antitrust Policy <br/>19a. The Scope of Regulation and the Donain of Antitrust <br/>19.2b. The Rationales for Deregulation <br/>768 19.2b1. Expanded Confidence in Competition and Markets <br/>19.2b2. Public Choice: Decreased Confidence in the Regulatory Process<br/>19.3 The Role of Antitrust in the Regulated Market<br/>19.3a. Express or Implied Repeal<br/>19.3b. The Relation Between Federal Regulation and Antitrust Jurisdiction: Two Views<br/>19.3c. Requisite Regulatory Oversight; "State Action" Compared<br/>19.4 Procedure in Areas of Divided Authority; Primary Jurisdiction<br/>19.5 Market Power Offenses in Regulated Markets<br/>19.6 Antitrust Damages Actions and Regulated Rates: The Keogh Doctrine <br/>19.7 Particular Exemptions<br/>19.7a. Miscellaneous Express Exemptions<br/>19.7b. Antitrust and Federal Labor Policy <br/>19.7c. The McCarran-Ferguson Act and the Insurance Exemption <br/>19.7c1. "Business oflnsurance" <br/>19.7c2. "Regulated by State Law<br/>19.7c3. Acts of Boycott, Coercion or Intimidation <br/>19.7c4. Continuing Vitality of McCarran-Ferguson <br/><br/>Chapter 20. Antitrust Federalism and the "State Action" Doctrine <br/>20.1 Introduction; Preemption<br/>20.2 Federalism and the Policy of the "State Action" Doctrine<br/>20.2a.The Historical Basis of the "State Action" Doctrine<br/>20.2b. Conflicts Between Federal Antitrust and State Regulation; Alternative SoluTions<br/>20.3 Basic Qualifications for Exemption<br/>20.4 Authorization <br/>20.5 Active Supervision<br/>20.5a.When Is Supervision Required<br/>20.5b.What Kind of Supervision ls Required?<br/>20.5c.Who Must Supervise? <br/>20.6 The Special Problem of Municipal Antitrust Liability <br/>20.7 The Relationship Between Petitions to the Government and the "State Action" Doctrine<br/>20.8 The Relation Between State and Federal Antitrust Law <br/><br/>Chapter 21.The Reach of the Federal Antitrust Laws <br/>21.1 Local Activities: Federal Antitrust and Interstate Commerce<br/>21.1a.The Sherman Act's Jurisdictional Reach<br/>21.1b.Jurisdictional Reach of Other Antitrust Provisions<br/>21.1c."Commerce": Antitrust and Noncommercial Activities <br/>21.2 Antitrust's Global Reach<br/>21.2a.Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Basic Doctrine and the FTAIA<br/>21.2b.Prudential Constraints on Extraterritorial Reach<br/>21.2c.The Act of State Doctrine<br/>21.2d.Foreign Sovereign Compulsion; Petitions to Foreign Governments<br/>21.2e.Foreign Sovereign Immunity <br/>21.3 Judicial Jurisdiction and Antitrust <br/><br/>APPENDIX: WESTLAW <br/>TABLE OF CASES <br/>TABLE OF STATUTES <br/>INDEX<br/><br/> |
