Advanced Microeconomic Theory/ (Registro n. 1526)
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| Campo fixo de controle local | 190617s2001 -us gr 000 0 eng u |
| 020 ## - ISBN | |
| ISBN | 321079167 |
| 040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
| Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
| 090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
| Localização na estante | 338.5 J47a |
| Cutter | J47a |
| 100 10 - Autor | |
| Autor | JEHLE, Geoffrey Alexander |
| 245 10 - Titulo Principal | |
| Título principal | Advanced Microeconomic Theory/ |
| 250 ## - Edição | |
| Edição | 2. ed. |
| 260 ## - Editora | |
| Cidade | Estados Unidos: |
| Editora | Prentice Hall, |
| Data | 2001. |
| 300 ## - Descrição Física | |
| Número de páginas | 543 p. |
| 505 ## - Conteúdo | |
| Conteúdo | PREFACE<br/>PART I<br/>ECONOMIC AGENTS<br/><br/>CHAPTER 1 CONSUMER THEORY <br/>1.1 Primitive Notions<br/>1.2 Preferences and Utility <br/>1.2.1 Preference Relations <br/>1.2.2 The Utility Function <br/>1.3 The Consumer's Problem <br/>1.4 lndirect Utility and Expendture <br/>1.4.1 The Indirect Utility Function <br/>1.4.2 The Expenditure Function <br/>1.4.3 Relations Between the Two <br/>1.5 Properties of Consumer Demand <br/>1.5.1 Relative Prices and Real Income<br/>1.5.2 Income and Substitution Effects <br/>1.5.3 Some Elasticity Relations <br/>1.6 Exercises <br/><br/>CHAPTER 2 TOPICS IN CONSUMER THEORY <br/>2.1 Duaity: A Closer Look <br/>2.1.1 Expendirure and Consumer Preferences <br/>2.1.2 Convexity and Monotonicicy <br/>2.1.3 lndirect Utiliy and Consumer Preferences <br/>2.2 Infegrability <br/>2.3 Revealed Preference <br/>2.4 Uncertainty <br/>2.4.1 Preferences<br/>2.4.2 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility <br/>2.4.3 Risk Aversion <br/>2.5 Exercises <br/><br/>CHAPTER 3 THEORY OF THE FIRM <br/>3.1 Primitive Notions <br/>3.2 Production<br/>3.2. 1 Returns to Scale and Varying Proportions <br/>3.3 Cost <br/>3.4 Duality in Production <br/>3.5 The Competitive Firm <br/>3.5.1 Profit Maximization <br/>3.5.2 The Profit Function <br/>3.6 Exercises <br/><br/>PART II<br/>MARKETS AND WELFARE <br/><br/>CHAPTER 4 PARTIAL EQUIUBRIUM<br/>4.1 Perfect Compehtion <br/>4.2 Imperfect Competition <br/>4.2.1 Cournot Oligopoly<br/>4.2.2 Bertt'and Oligopoly <br/>4.2.3 Monopolistic Compelition <br/>4.3 Equilibrium and Welfare <br/>4.3.1 Price and IndivivaI Well are <br/>4.3.2 Efficiencv of lhe Coinpetitive Outcome <br/>4.3.3 Efficienc' and Total Surpius Maximization <br/>4.4 Exercises <br/><br/>CHAPTER 5 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM <br/>5.1 Equilibrium in Exchange <br/>5.2 Equilibrium in Competitive Market <br/>Systems <br/>5.2.1 Existcnce ofEquilihrium <br/>5.2.2 Efficiency <br/>5.3 Equilibrium in Production <br/>.3. 1 Producers <br/>5.3.2 Consumers <br/>5.3.3 Equilibrium <br/>5.3.4 Welfare <br/>5.4 Core and Equilibria <br/>5.4.1 Replica heonoInft': <br/>5.5 Exercises <br/><br/>CHAPTER 6 SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE <br/>6.1 The Nature of the Problem <br/>6.2 Social Choice and Arrow's Theorem <br/>6.2.1 A Diagrammatic proof <br/>6.3 Measurability, Comparability, and Some <br/>Possibilities <br/>6.3.1 The Rawlsian Form<br/>6.3.2 The Utilitarian Form <br/>6.3.3 Flexible Forms <br/>6.4 Justice <br/>6.5 Exercises <br/><br/>PART III<br/>STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR <br/><br/>CHAPTER 7 GAME THEORY <br/>7.1 Strategic Decision Making <br/>7.2 Strategic Form Games <br/>7.2.1 Dorninant Strategies <br/>7.2.2 Nash Equilibrium <br/>7.2.3 Incomplete Information <br/>7.3 Extensive Form Games <br/>7.3.1 Game Trees: A Diagramrnatic <br/>Representation<br/>7.3.2 An Informal Analysis of Take-Away <br/>7.3.3 Extensive Form Game Strategies <br/>7.3.4 Strategies and Payoffs <br/>7.3.5 Games of Perfect Information and Backward <br/>Induction Strategies <br/>7.3.6 Games of lmperfect Information and Subgame <br/>Perfect Equilibrium <br/>7.3.7 Sequential Equilibrium <br/>7.4 Exercises <br/><br/>CHAPTER 8 INFORMATION ECONOMICS <br/>8.1 Adverse Selection <br/>8. 1.1 Information and the Efficiency of Market <br/>Outcomes <br/>8.! .2 Signaling <br/>81.3 Screening <br/>8.2 Moral Hazard and the Principal <br/>Agent Probiem <br/>8.2.1 Symmetric Information <br/>8.2.2 Asymmetric Information <br/>8.3 Information and Market Performance <br/>8.4 Exercises <br/><br/>CHAPTER 9 AUCTIONS AND MECHÂNISM DESIGN<br/>9.1 The Four Standard Auctions <br/>9.2 The Independent Private Values Model <br/>9,2. 1 Bidding Behavior in a First-Price. Sealed-Bid Auction <br/>9.2.2 Bidding Behavior in a Dutch Auction <br/>9.2.3 Bidding Behavior in a Sccond-Price. Scalcd-Bid Auction <br/>9.2.4 Bidding Behavior in an English Auction <br/>9.2.5 Revenue Comparisons <br/>9.3 The Revenue Equivalence Theorem <br/>9.3.1 Incentive-Compatible Direct Selling Mechanisnis <br/>9.3.2 Efficiency <br/>9.4 Revenue-Maximization: An Application of Mechanism Design <br/>9.4.1 Individual Rationality <br/>9.4.2 An Optimal Sclling Mechanism <br/>9.4.3 A Cioser Look at the Optimal Selling Mechanisni <br/>9.4.4 Efficiency, Syrnnietry, and Comparison to the Four Standard Auctions <br/>9.5 Exercises <br/><br/>MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX <br/>CHAPTER A1 SETS AND MAPPINGS <br/>A 1. 1 Elements of Logic <br/>A 1.1. 1 Necessity and Sufficiency <br/>Ai. 1.2 Theoreins and Proofs <br/>Ai .2 Elements of Set Theory <br/>A1.2.1 Notation and Basic Concepts <br/>A 1. 2.2 Convex Sets <br/>A1.2.3 Relations and Functions <br/>A1.3 ALiltieTopology <br/>Al.3.1 Continuity <br/>AI .3.2 Some Existence Theorems <br/>A1.4 Real-Valued Functions <br/>A1.4.1 Related Sets<br/>A1.4.2 Concave Functions <br/>A 1.4.3 Quasiconcave Functions <br/>Ai .4.4 Convex and Quasiconvex Functions <br/>A1.5 Exercises <br/><br/>CHAPTER A2 CALCULUS AND OPTIMIZATION <br/>A2.1 Cokulus <br/>A2.1.1 Functions of a Single Variable <br/>A2.1.2 Functions of Severa] Variables <br/>A2.1.3 Homogeneous Functions <br/>A2.2 Optimization <br/>A2.2.1 Real-Va!ued Functions of Severa! Variables <br/>A2.2.2 SecondOrder Conditions <br/>A2.3 Constroined Optimizcition <br/>A2.3.1 Equality Constraints <br/>A2.3.2 Lagrange's Method <br/>A2.3.3 Geometric Interpretation <br/>A2.3.4 Second-Order Conditions <br/>A2.3.5 Inequality Constraints <br/>A2.3.6 Kuhn-Tucker Conditions <br/>Â2.4 Value Functions <br/>A2.5 Exercises <br/>LIST OF THEOREMS <br/>UST OF DEFINITIONS <br/>HINTS AND ANSWERS <br/>REFERENCES <br/>INDEX <br/><br/><br/> |
| 700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 858 |
| Nome pessoa | RENY, Philip J. |
| Relação | Autor |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
| Classificação | Empréstimo | Locação permanente | Locação corrente | Data de aquisição | Forma de aquisição | Patrimônio | Número completo de chamada | Código de barras | Número do exemplar | Data de inserção do exemplar | Tipo de item no Koha |
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| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-07-01 | Doação | 30176 | 338.5 J47a | 2019-0193 | 1 | 2019-07-01 | Livros |