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CONTENTS<br/><br/>Acknowledgements <br/>Table of European Cases<br/>Table of lnternational Cases <br/>Table of Legislation <br/>Table of European and International Treaties, Conventions and Charters <br/>Bibliography<br/>List of Abbreviations<br/> <br/>1. INTRODUCTION TO COMPETITION LAW <br/>1.Central Issues <br/>2.Introduction <br/>3.The Objectives of Competition Law <br/>A.Economic Efficiency <br/>(i) The Maintenance of Effective Competition <br/>(ii) Basic Economic Concepts <br/>(iii) Perfect Competition and Efficiency <br/>(iv) Monopoly <br/>(v) Oligopoly <br/>(vi) Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and Competition in the Real World <br/>(vii) The Concept of Welfare: Total Welfare, Consumer Welfare and Efficiency Trade-offs <br/>(viii) Dynamic Competition <br/>B. Other Objectives of Competition Law <br/>(1) Other Goals for Competition Law? <br/>(ii) Preservation of Liberty and Dispersal of Economic Power <br/>(iii) Protecting Competitors and Fair Competition<br/>(iv) Socio-Political Issues<br/>(v) The EU Dimension <br/>C.Conclusions<br/>4.US law <br/>5.Schools of Competition Analysis <br/>A.The Structure -* Conduct -* Performance Paradigm and the Harvard School <br/>B.The Chicago School<br/>C. Post-Chicago <br/>(i) Game Theory<br/>(ii) Contestable Markets <br/>(iii) Raising Rivais' Costs <br/>(iv) Transaction Cost Economics <br/>(v) Conclusion <br/>D. Other Schools, Theories, and Concepts <br/>(i) Workable Competition <br/>(ii) The Austrian School <br/>(iii) Effective Competition <br/>6. Ordoliberalism <br/>7.EC Competition Law <br/>A. General <br/>B. The Objectives of the European Community and<br/>EC Competition Policy <br/>(í) The Objectives of the European Community <br/>(ii) The Development ofthe Objectives of EC Competition Poilicy <br/>(iii) The 'Modernization' of EC Competition Law and the Consumer Welfare Standard<br/>(iv) Socio-Political or 'Non-Efficiency' Factors and the Relationship of Competition With Other Community Policies <br/>C. The Limits of Competition, Public Services, and Regulation <br/>(i) The Limits of Competition <br/>(ii) Competition and Regulation <br/>D. The New Economy <br/>8.Competition Law and the International Context <br/>9.The Techniques and Tools of Competition Law <br/>10. Market Power, Market Definition, and Barriers to Entry <br/>A. Market Power<br/>B. Market Definition and EC Competition Law<br/>(i) The Importance of Market Definition <br/>(ii) Relevant Market Definition in the Case Law of the Court of justice <br/>(iii) The Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law <br/>(iv) Demand and Supply Substitution <br/>(v) Demand Substitution <br/>(vi) Primary and Secondary Markets (Aftermarkets) <br/> (vii) One Market or Two? <br/>(viii) Two Sided Industries <br/>(ix) Supply Substitution <br/>(x) The Geographic Market <br/>C. Barriers to Entry <br/>(i) The Role of Barriers to Entry <br/>(ii) The Definition of a Barrier to Entry <br/>11. Conclusions <br/>12. Further Reading <br/><br/>2 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE COMPETITION PROVISIONS <br/>1.Central Issues <br/>2.Introduction <br/>3.Introduction to the European Community <br/>A. The European Union and the European Community<br/>B. The Sources of European Community law <br/>(i) Introduction <br/>(ii) The Treaty Establishing the European Community <br/>(iii) The EC Institutions <br/>(iv) Community Acts <br/>(v) The Case Law of the Community Courts <br/>(vi) The General Principies of Community Law <br/>C. A New Legal Order of international Law <br/>(i) Direct Effect <br/>(ii) Supremacy <br/>(iii) Article (Ex Article 177) of the EC Treaty <br/>4. The Competition Provisions <br/>A. General <br/>(i) Article 3(1)(g) of the Treaty <br/>(ii) The Main Treaty Provisions and The Merger Regulation <br/>(iii) Speciai Sectors <br/>B. The Substantive Provisions of the Treaty <br/>(i) Article 81 (Ex Article 85) <br/>(ii) Article 82 (Ex Article 86) <br/>(iii) Articles 86 and 31 (Ex Articles 90 and 37) <br/>C. The Procedural Provisions <br/>(i) Article 83 (Ex Article 87) <br/>(ii) Article 84 (Ex Article 88)<br/>(iii) Article 85 (Ex Artide 89) <br/>D. The Merger Regulation <br/>E. Other Relevant Treaty Provisions <br/>5.The Competition Rules and the European Economic Area <br/>6. Modernization <br/>7. Conclusions <br/>S. Further Reading <br/><br/>3. ARTICLE 81:THE ELEMENTS <br/>Central Issues <br/>2. lntroduction <br/>3.The Text of Article 81 <br/>4. The Scheme of Article 81 <br/>A.The Three Paragraphs <br/>(i) The Prohibition <br/>(iii) Nullity <br/>(iii) Legal Exception—Declaration of lnapplicability <br/>B. The Consequences of lnfringement <br/>(i) Nullity and Private Proceedings Between the Parties to a Contract<br/>(ii) Investigation, Detection, and Penalties—the Commission <br/>(iii) Investigation, Detection, and Penalties—the National Competition Authorities <br/>(iv) Damages and Other Private Proceedings <br/>C.Burden and Standard of Proof <br/>S. The Interpretation and Application of Article 81 (1)<br/>A. General <br/>B.'Undertaking' and 'Associations of Undertaking' <br/>(i) Every Entity Engaged in an Economic Activity: the Constituem Elements <br/>(ii) The Notion of an Undertaking is a Relative Concept <br/>(iii) The legal Status or Form or the Entity is Immaterial <br/>(iv) Public Bodies and Bodies Performing Public Functions <br/>(v)Employees and Trade Unions <br/>(vi) Single Economic Entity <br/>(vii) Associations of Undertakings <br/>C.The meaning of'Agreement', 'Decision', and 'Concerted Practice' <br/>(i)Introduction <br/>(ii) Agreement <br/>(iii) Decisions by Associatiotis of Undertakings <br/>(iv) Concerted Practices <br/>D. Object or Effect the I'revention, Restriction, or Distortion of Competition <br/>E. An Appreciable Effect on Competition <br/>(i) Volk v. Vervaecke <br/>(ii) Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance which do not Appreciably Restrict Competition under Article 81(1) (DeMinimis) <br/>(iii) Networks of Agreements <br/>(iv) Outgrowing the Notice <br/>(v) The Importance of Market Shares and Hard-core Restraints <br/>(vi) Effect of the Notice <br/>F.An Appreciable Effect on Trade between Member States <br/>(i)Jurisdictional Limit <br/>(ii) The Tests <br/>(iii) Pattern of Trade Test <br/>(iv) An Increase in Trade<br/>(v) Partitioning of the Common Market <br/>(vi) Agreements Operating in One Member State <br/>(vii) Restrictions on Competition and Restrictions on Trade<br/>(viii) Agreements which Appreciably Affect Trade between Member States <br/>(ix) The Relationship between Community and National Law <br/>G.Agreements Required by National Legislation <br/>H.Commission Notices <br/>1.Extraterritoriality <br/>6.Article 81(2) <br/>7.Exclusions <br/>8.Conclusions <br/>9.Further Reading <br/><br/>4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLE 81 (1) AND ARTICLE 81(3) OF THE TREATY <br/>1.Central Issues <br/>2.Introduction and Background <br/>A. Article 81(1) and Article 81(3) <br/>B. Possible Ways of Reconciling Article 81 (1) and 81(3) <br/>C. The Interpretation of'Object or Effect is the Prevention, Restriction, or Distortion of Competition'—the Broad Approach <br/>D. The Drawbacks of a Broad Interpretation of Article 8 1(1): the Need for More Economic Approach? <br/>E.Section 1 of the Sherman Act<br/>F.Modernization <br/>(i) Modernization and Regulation 112003 <br/>(ii) The CFI's Judgment in Métropote <br/>G. The Importance of the debate <br/>Article 81(1), Agreements which have as their Object or Effect the Prevention, Restriction, or Distortion of Competition <br/>A.General <br/>B.Object or Effect <br/>(i)Alternative, Not Cumulative, Requirements <br/>(ii)The Object of the Agreement <br/>(iii)The Effect of the Agreement <br/>C.Agreements that restrict Competition by Object <br/>(i) Horizontal Agreements<br/>(ii) Vertical Agreements <br/>(iii) Intellectual Property Licensing Agreements <br/>(iv) Restrictions by Object and 'Hard-Core' Restraints <br/>(v) Object Cases and Appreciability <br/>(vi) A Criticism? <br/>D. Agreements that Restrict Competition by Effect <br/>(i) General <br/>(ii) A Rejection of the Rule of Reason <br/>(iii) The Analytical Framework Set Out by the Commission in the Article 81(3) Guidelines <br/>(iv) Restraints on Inter-Brand Competition: Appraisal of n Agreement in its Legal and Economic Context <br/>(v) Restraints on lntra-Brand Competition <br/>(vi) Ancillary Restraints <br/>(vii) Weighing Anti and Pro-Competitive Effects—Balancing Under Article 81 (1)? <br/>E.Conclusions on the Approach Required Under Article 81 (1) Article 81(3) <br/>A. General <br/>B. The lnterpretation and Application of Article 81(3) <br/>(i) Criterion 1: The Agreement Must lead to an Improvement in the Production or Distribution of Goods or the Promotion of Technical or Economic Progress <br/>(ii) Criterion 2: Allowing Consumers a Fair Share of the Resuking Benefit <br/>(iii) Criterion 3: Indispensable Restrictions <br/>(iv) Criterion 4: The Agreement must not Afford the Parties the Possibility of Eliminating Competition <br/>C. Application in Individual Cases <br/>D. Block Exemptions <br/>(i) General <br/>(ii) Current Block Exemptions <br/>(iii) Block Exemptions are Directly Applicable <br/>(iv) Market Share Thresholds <br/>(v) Opposition Procedure <br/>(vi) Withdrawal of Block Exemptions <br/>(vii) Safe Harbours <br/>E. Unilateral Action and Article 81(3) <br/>F.The Relationship Between Article 81(3) and Article 82 <br/>5.Conclusions <br/>6.Further Reading <br/><br/>5. ARTICLE 82: THE ELEMENTS <br/>1.Central Issues <br/>2.Introduction <br/>3.The Text of Article 82 <br/>4.The Reform of Article 82 <br/>5.The Scheme of Article 82 <br/>A.The Prohibition <br/>B.Consequences of lnfringement <br/>(i)Investigation, Fines, and Other Remedies <br/>(ii) Private Action <br/>6. The Interpretation and Application of Article 82 <br/>A. The Meaning of One or More Undertakings <br/>(i) General <br/>(ii) Public Bodies and Bodies Performing Public Functions <br/>(iii) One or More Undertakings—Collective Dominance<br/>B. Dominant Position <br/>(i) What is Meant by a 'Dominant Position? <br/>(ii) The Definition of Dominant Position in the Case-law of the ECJ <br/>(iii) Problems with the Definition of Dominant Position <br/>(iv) Effects-based Analysis and the Concept of Dominance <br/>(v) Assessing Dominance <br/>(vi) Super-Dominance <br/>C.A Dominant Position within a Substantial Part of the Common Market<br/>(i). Purpose of the requirernent <br/>(ii) Meaning of a Substantial Part of the Common Market <br/>(iii) Relevance of Volume ofProduction <br/>(iv) A Member State is Likely to be a Substantial Part of the Common Market <br/>(v) Transport Cases<br/>D. The Meaning of Abuse <br/>(i) Introduction <br/>(ii) Exploitative and Exclusionary (Anti-competitive) Abuses <br/>(iii) Categories of Abuse are not Mutually Exclusive <br/>(iv) The Broad Nature of the Concept of Abuse <br/>(v) Exclusionary Abuses: Distinguishing Competition on the Merits from Exclusionary Behaviour <br/>E.An Effect on Trade Between Member States <br/>(i) General <br/>(ii) Abuse of a Dominant Position Covering Several Member States <br/>(iii) Abuse of a Dominant Position Covering a Single Member State <br/>(iv) Abuse of a Dominant Position Covering only Part of a Member State <br/>(v) Abuses Involving Trade with Third Countries <br/>7. The Relationship Between Article 82 and Article 81 <br/>8.Comparison Between Article 82 and Section 2 of the US Sherman Act <br/>9.Conclusions <br/>10.Further Reading <br/><br/>6. ARTICLE 82: ESTABLISHING DOMINANCE <br/>1. Central Issues <br/>2. Introduction <br/>3. Market Definition <br/>A.General <br/>B.The Product Market <br/>(i)Demand Substitution <br/>(ii)Supply Substitution <br/>C.The Geographic Market <br/>D.The Temporal Market <br/>E.The Tetra Pak 11 Case <br/>4.Assessing Market Power <br/>A.General <br/>B.Market Shares in the Case of Single Undertaking Dominance <br/>(i) General <br/>(ii) High Market Shares and the Presumption of Dominance <br/>(iii) Low Market Shares and Dominance <br/>(iv) Market Shares and the Commission Discussion Paper <br/>(v) Problems with the Role of Market Shares in the Assessment of Market Power <br/>C. Market Shares in the Case of Collective Dominance <br/>D. Other Factors lndicating Dominance <br/>(i) General <br/>(ii) Some Leading Cases <br/>(iii) Summary of Other Factors Indicating Dominance<br/>E. Power over Locked-In Customers and on Aftermarkets <br/>F. Buyer Power <br/>G. Dominant Positions in the New Economy <br/>H. Super-Dominance <br/>5. Conclusions <br/>6.Further Reading <br/><br/>7. CONDUCT WHICH CAN BE ABUSE <br/>1.Central Issues <br/>2.introduction <br/>3.Abuse and the Degree of Dominance <br/>4.Dominance and Abuse on Different Markets <br/>5.Exploitative and Exclusionary Pricing Policies <br/>A.General <br/>B.Price Discrimination<br/>(i) What is Price Discrimination? <br/>(ii) Primary Line and Secondary Line Injury <br/>6. Exclusionary Pricing Abuses and Tying <br/>A. Predatory Pricing <br/>(i) General <br/>(ii) Cost Levels <br/>(iii) The Areeda-Turner Test <br/>(iv) Problems with the Areeda-Turner Test <br/>(v) The AKZO Case <br/>(vi) Some Problems with the Criteria Laid Down in AKZO <br/>(vii) The AKZO Test and the reform of Article 82 <br/>(viii) Predatory Pricing where Dominance and Abuse are on Different Markets <br/>(ix) Cross-Subsidies, Incremental Costs, and Multi-Product Firms <br/>(x) Recoupment <br/>(xi) Predatory Pricing in New Economy Markets <br/>(xii) The Digital Undertaking <br/>(xiii) Limit Pricing <br/>(xiv) Transformation Costs and Trice' or Margin' Squeezing <br/>B.Selective Low Pricing <br/>C.The Meeting Competition Defence <br/>D.Exclusive Dealing (Single Branding) Contracts <br/>(i) General <br/>E.Discount and Rebate Schemes <br/>(i) General <br/>(ii) Quantity (Volume) Discounts and Loyalty Rebates <br/>(iii) The Cases <br/>F.Reform of the Law on Single Branding Discounts and Rebates <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)Single Branding and the Discussion Paper <br/>(iii)Rebates and the Discussion Paper: Unconditional and Conditional Rebates <br/>G.Comparison with US Law on Discounts and Rebates under <br/>Section 2 of the Sherman Act <br/>H.Tying <br/>(i)General<br/>(ii)Commercial Reasons for Tying <br/>(iii)Single or Distinct Products <br/>(iv)Lack of Customer Choice <br/>(v)The Case Law <br/>(vi)Mixed Bundling <br/>(vii) Technological Tying and the Microsoft Case <br/>(viii) The Discussion Paper Proposals Refusals to Supply <br/>A. General <br/>B. The Commercial Solvents Case: refusal to Supply in Order to <br/>Exclude Competitors from Ancillary Markets <br/>C. Refusal to Supply in Response to an Attack on the Dominant Undertaking's Commercial lnterests <br/>D.The Refusal to Supply Spare Parts<br/>E.Refusal to Supply and the 'Essential Facilities' Concept <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)Access to Facilities and Resources <br/>(iii)The Development of the 'Essential Facilities' Doctrine in EC Law <br/>(iv)The European Night Services Case <br/>(v)The Oscar Bronner case <br/>(vi)Refusal to Supply in the Financial lndustry <br/>F.Refusal to Supply and Intellectual Property Rights <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)The Car Parts Cases <br/>(iii)The Magill Case <br/>(iv)The Ladbroke Case <br/>(v)The IMS Case <br/>G.Interoperability <br/>H.The Essential Facilities Doctrine in US Law <br/>1. Refusal to Supply in the Discussion Paper Other Exclusionary Practices <br/>A.General <br/>B.The Acquisition of lntellectual Property Rights <br/>C.The Misuse of lntellectual Property Rights or other Regulatory Procedures <br/>D. Pursuit of legal Proceedings, Vexatious Litigation, and Enforcing Legal Rights <br/>E. Vertical and Horizontal Integration <br/>F. Strategic Entry Deterrence and Raising Rivais' Costs Exploitative Abuses <br/>A. Unfairly High or Low Pricing <br/>(i) Unfairly High Prices <br/>(ii) Low Prices on the Buying Side <br/>B.Discrimination Contrary to Article 82(c) <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)The Application of Article 82(c) to Discounts and Rebates <br/>(iii)Article 82(c) and the Transport Sector <br/>(iv)Article 82(c) and Statutory Monopolists <br/>(v)Geographical Price Discrimination <br/>(vi)Delivered Pricing <br/>(vii)Competitive Disadvantage and Article 82(c) <br/>C.Imposing Unfair Trading Conditions and Entering into Restrictive Agreements <br/>D. Inefficiency <br/>10. Export Bans and other Conduct Hindering Inter-Member State Trade <br/>11. Abuse and Collective Dominance <br/>12. Conclusions <br/>13. Further Reading<br/> <br/>8. COMPETITION, THE STATE, AND PUBLIC UNDERTAKINGS: ARTICLE 86 <br/>Central Issues <br/>2.Introduction <br/>A.General <br/>B.The Limits of Competition Law <br/>C.Some Concepts <br/>(i)Services of General Economic lnterest <br/>(ii)Services of General lnterest <br/>(iii)Public Services<br/>(iv)Universal Service <br/>3.Article 10 <br/>4.Article 86 <br/>A.The Objectives of Article 86 <br/>B.The Format of Article 86 <br/>(i)Article 86(1): Prohibition Addressed to Member States <br/>(ii)Article 86(2): Provision Addressed to Undertakings Providing for Limited lmmunity from the Treaty Rules <br/>(iii)Article 86(3): Policing and Legislative Powers of the Commission <br/>C.Article 86(1) <br/>(i)Definitions <br/>(ii)Measures which are Forbidden by Article 86(1) <br/>(iii) Summary of the Measures which Make Abuse Unavoidable or Create a Situation in which the Undertaking is Led to Abuse its Dominant Position <br/>D.Article 86(2) <br/>(i)The Purpose of Article 86(2) <br/>(ii)Undertakings having the Character of a Revenue Producing Monopoly <br/>(iii)Undertakings Entrusted with the Operation of Services of General Economic Interest <br/>(iv) No Effect on Trade Contrary to the lnterests of the Community <br/>E.The Direct Effect of Article 86(1) and (2) <br/>(i)Article 86(1) <br/>(ii)Article 86(2) <br/>F.Article 86(3) <br/>(1)The Ambit of the Provision <br/>(ii)Decisions <br/>(iii)Directives <br/>5.Services of General Economic lnterest and State Aids <br/>6.Services of General (Economic) lnterest and Political and Legal Developments <br/>A.Article l6EC <br/>(i)The Background to Article 16 <br/>(ii)Article 16 and its Place in the Treaty <br/>(iii)The Interpretation and Meaning of Article 16 <br/>B.Article 36 of the Charter <br/>C.The Commission's 2000 Communication on Services of General lnterest <br/>D.The Commission's Green Paper of 2003 <br/>E.The Commission's White Paper of 2004 and Subsequent Developments <br/>7.Conclusion <br/>8.Further Reading <br/><br/>9. DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS <br/>1.Central Issues <br/>2.Introduction <br/>A.General <br/>B.Methods of Distribution <br/>(i)Factors Affecting Choice <br/>(ii)Vertical Integration <br/>(iii)Agency <br/>(iv)Distribution through Independent Distributors <br/>C.Competition Rules and Distribution <br/>(i)The Impact of the Competition Rules on Methods of Distribution <br/>(ii)Vertical Integration <br/>(iii)Agency <br/>(iv)Distribution Agreements <br/>3.The Community Approach—An Overview <br/>A.The Background: Single Market Project and Restrictions on Economic Freedom <br/>B.Criticisms of this Approach <br/>C.The New More Economic Approach: The Block Exemption and Reform <br/>D.Methodology <br/>Distribution Agreements and Article 81 (1) of the Treaty <br/>A. General <br/>B. Object or Effect the Prevention, Restriction, or Distortion Of Competition <br/>(i)The Object or Effect <br/>(ii)Vertical Agreements which have as their Object the Prevention, Restriction, or Distortion of Competition <br/>(iii)Agreements which have as their Effect the Prevention, Restriction, or Distortion of Competition <br/>Article 81 (3) <br/>A.General <br/>B.The Old Block Exemptions <br/>C.The Verticals Regulation—Regulation 2790/1999 <br/>(i)The Background <br/>(ii)The Recitals <br/>(iii)Article 1—Definitions <br/>(iv)Article 2—The Main Exemption <br/>(v)Article 3—The Market Share Cap <br/>(vi)Article 4—Hard-Core Restrictions <br/>(vii) Article 5—Severable, Non-Exempted Obligations <br/>(viii) Article 6—Withdrawal of the Block Exemption by the Commission <br/>(ix)Article 7—Withdrawal of the Block Exemption by a National Competition Authority (NCA) <br/>(x) Article 8—Regulations to Deal with Networks of Agreements <br/>(xi)Articles 9. 10, and 11 —Market Share, Turnover, Transitional Provisions, and Connected Undertakings <br/>(xii) Article 12—The Old Block Exemptions <br/>(xiii) Article 13 —Commencement and Expiry <br/>D.The Motor Vehicle Distribution Block Exemption <br/>E.Article 81(3)—Individual Assessment <br/>(i)Introduction <br/>(ii)Hard-Core Restraints <br/>(iii)Non-Compete Provisions and Other Restraints Subcontracting Agreements <br/>7.Article 82 and Distribution <br/>8.Conclusions and the Future <br/>9.Further Reading <br/><br/>10. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS <br/>Central Issues <br/>2.Introduction <br/>A.General <br/>B.Types of intellectual Property Rights <br/>(i)The Nature of intellectual Property Rights <br/>(ii)Patents <br/>(iii)Trade Marks <br/>(iv)Copyright <br/>(v)Designs <br/>(vi)Know-How <br/>(vii)Miscellaneous <br/>C.The Relationship between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law <br/>D.Relevant Provisions of the EC Treaty other than the Competition Articles <br/>E.The Case Law of the Court: Existence, Exercise, and the Exhaustion of Rights <br/>3.Exploiting intellectual Property Rights by Licensing <br/>A.General <br/>B.Commercial Considerations in Licenses <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)Royalties <br/>(iii)Territorial Restrictions on Production: Exclusive and Sole Licences <br/>(iv)Sales Restrictions <br/>(v)Field of Use Restrictions <br/>(vi)Tying and Bundling <br/>(vii) Non-Compete Obligations <br/>(viii) No-Challenge Clauses <br/>(ix)lmprovements <br/>C.Development of Competition Policy towards Licensing of lntellectual Property Rights<br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)The Evolution of the Commission's Policy towards Licensing Agreements <br/>(iii)Exclusivity and Territorial Restrictions in the Case Law of the Court <br/>(iv)Non-Territorial Restraints <br/>(v)The Block Exemptions on Patent Licensing and Know-How Licensing Prior to 1 May 2004 <br/>D.The Adoption of the TTBER and the Technology Transfer Guidelines <br/>(i)The Commission's Review Process and the Adoption of the New Measures <br/>(ii)Methodology <br/>(iii)General Principles: Application of Article 81 to Intellectual Property Rights <br/>(iv)Points of General Importance in the Application of Article 81 to Technology Transfer Agreements <br/>4.Regulation 772/2004, the Technology Transfer Block Exemption <br/>A.General <br/>B.The Scheme of the TTBER <br/>C.Principal Features of the TTBER <br/>D.Scope of the TTBER <br/>(i)Agreements to which the TTBER May Apply <br/>(ii)Relationship with other Block Exemptions <br/>E.Safe Harbour: The Market Share Thresholds <br/>(i)The Market Share Thresholds <br/>(ii)Market Definition <br/>(iii)Market Shares <br/>(iv)The Distinction between Competitors and Non-Competitors (Competing and Non-Competing Undertakings) <br/>(v)Non-Competitors which Subsequently become Competitors <br/>F.Hard-Core Restrictions <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)Agreements between Competing Undertakings <br/>(iii)Agreements between Non-Competing Undertakings <br/>G.Excluded Restrictions <br/>(i)lntroduction <br/>(ii)lmprovements <br/>(iii)No Challenge Clauses <br/>(iv)Limitations on Technology Exploitation or R & D <br/>H.Withdrawal and Disapplication of the Block Exemption <br/>(i)Withdrawal <br/>ii)Disapplication<br/>1.Duration of the Exemption <br/>The Application of Article 81 to Agreements Failing <br/>Outside the TTBER <br/>A.General Principles <br/>(i)Technology Transfer Agreements Outside the TTBER <br/>(ii)No Presumption of lllegality <br/>(iii)The Second Safe Harbour <br/>(iv)The Approach to the Analysis of Individual Agreements <br/>(v)Relevant Factors <br/>B.The Application of theTTBER and the Guidelines to Specific Provisions <br/>(i)Provisions not Generally Restrictive of Article 81 (1) <br/>(ii)Royalty Obligations <br/>(iii)Exclusive and Sole Licences <br/>(iv)Sales Restrictions <br/>(v)Output Restrictions <br/>(vi)Field of Use Restrictions <br/>(vii)Captive Use Pestrictions <br/>(viii) Tying and Bundling <br/>(ix)Non-Compete Obligations <br/>(x)No-Challenge Clauses <br/>(xi)lmprovement <br/>(xii) Settlement and Non-Assertion Agreements <br/>C.Technology Poois <br/>Trade Mark Licences <br/>A.General <br/>B.The Catnpari Decision <br/>C.The Moosehead/Whitbread Decision <br/>D.The Current Position <br/>Trade Mark Delimitation Agreements <br/>Copyright Licences other than Software Licences <br/>A.General <br/>B.Performance Copyright <br/>Software Licences and Interoperability <br/>The Application of Article 82 to Intellectual Property Rights <br/>Conclusions <br/>Further Reading<br/> <br/>11. CARTELS AND OLIGOPOLY <br/>1.Central Issues <br/>2.Introduction <br/>A.Cartels and Oligopoly <br/>B.Explicit and Tacit Collusion <br/>(1)Cartels and Tacit Collusion <br/>(ii)Tacit Collusion, Coordinated Effects and an Oligopolistic Market <br/>(iii)Unilateral (or Non-Coordinated) Effects <br/>C.Competition Law and Collusion (Explicit and Tacit) <br/>3.Cartels <br/>A.Introduction <br/>B.Scope of Article 81 <br/>(i)Article 81(1) <br/>(ii)Establishing a Breach of Article 81(l) <br/>(iii)Article 81(3) <br/>C.Price Fixing, Restrictions on Output, Market Sharing, and Collusive Tendering <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)Article 81 (1) <br/>(iii)Article 81(3) <br/>D.Restrictions on Non-Price Trading Conditions, Advertising, and Promotion and Promotion and Information Sharing Agreements <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)Restrictions on Non-Price Trading Conditions <br/>(iii)Restrictions on Advertising and Promotion <br/>(iv)Information Sharing Agreements <br/>4.Oligopoly <br/>A.Oligopoly and Article 81 <br/>(i)The Oligopoly Problem <br/>(ii)Tacit Collusion and Concerted Practices <br/>(iii)Concerted Practices and Unilateral Price Announcements in Advance <br/>B.Oligopoly and Article 82 <br/>(i)'One or More Undertakings' <br/>(ii)Abuse of a Collective Dominant Position <br/>(iii)Remedies and Fines <br/>(iv)Conclusions <br/>C. Alternative Methods for Dealing with Oligopolistic Markets under EC Law <br/>(i) Merger Regulation <br/>(ii) Sector Inquiries<br/>(iii) Cartels and Other Agreements <br/>5. Conclusions <br/>6.Further Reading <br/><br/>12. MERGERS <br/>Central Issues <br/>2.Introduction <br/>A.What is a Merger? <br/>B.The Purposes of Merger Control <br/>(i)The Motives for, and Advantages of, a Merger <br/>(ii)The Adverse Consequence of Mergers <br/>C.The History of the European Merger Control <br/>(i)The Initial Lacuna <br/>(ii)The Drive for Merger Control at the Community Level <br/>(iii)The Catalyst for the ECMR <br/>(iv)The Original EC Merger Control Regulation—Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 <br/>(v)The 1996 Green Paper and Council Regulation (EC) 1310197<br/>(vi)The 2001 Green Paper<br/>(vii) The Current Merger Control Regulation, Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 <br/>(viii) The Future <br/>D.Scheme of the ECMR <br/>3.Jurisdiction <br/>A.Concentrations <br/>(i)Definition <br/>(ii)Joint Ventures <br/>(iii)Article 3(5) <br/>(iv)Abandonment of a Concentration <br/>B.Community Dimension <br/>(i)A Bright Line jurisdictional Test <br/>(ii)Article 1(2) <br/>(iii)The 1996 Green Paper <br/>(iv)Article 1(3) of the ECMR <br/>(v)Review of the Thresholds<br/>(vi)Concentrations, Undertakings Concerried, and ]Calculation of Turnover <br/>C.Concentrations with a Community Dimension: A One-Stop Shop? <br/>(1)Exclusive Competence of the Commission under the ECMR <br/>(ii)Case Allocation <br/>(iii)Article 9—Distinct Markets <br/>(iv)Article 4(4) Request for Referral to a National Competition Authority <br/>(v)Article 21 (4)--Legitimate lnterests <br/>(vi)Article 296 of the EC Treaty—Essential Interests of Security <br/>(vii)Breach of Article 21 <br/>D.Concentrations without a Community Dimension <br/>(i)National Law Applies<br/>(ii)Joint Ventures <br/>(iii)Article 22, Referrals to the Commission <br/>(iv)Article 4(5), Request for a Referral to the Commission <br/>E.A Residual Role for Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty <br/>(i)The Relevance of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty <br/>(ii)Application in the National Courts <br/>(iii)The Commission and National Competition Authorities Procedure <br/>A.Notification <br/>B.Pre-Notification Reasoned Submissions <br/>(i)Background <br/>(ii)Article 4(4), Request for Referral to a National Competition Authority <br/>(iii)Article 4(5), Request for a Referral to the Commission <br/>(iv)Notice on Case Aliocation <br/>(v)Review <br/>C.Suspension <br/>D.Phase 1 Investigation <br/>(i)Article 6(1)(a) <br/>(ii)Article 6(1)(b) <br/>(iii)Article 6(1)(c) <br/>(iv)Article 10(6) <br/>E.Phasell <br/>F.Conduct of Merger lnvestigations <br/>Substantive Appraisal of Concentrations under the EC Merger Regulation <br/>A.Background <br/>B.Reform and the New Substantive Test <br/>C.Burden and Standard of Proof and Counterfactual <br/>D.A Significant lmpediment to Effective Competition, in Particular by the Creation or Strengthening of a Dominant Position <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)Market Deflnition <br/>(iii)Competitive Assessment of Horizontal Mergers <br/>(iv)Countervailing Buyer Power <br/>(v)Entry Analysis and Barriers to Entry <br/>(vi)Efflciencies <br/>(vii) The Failing Firm Defence or Rescue Mergers<br/>(viii) Competitive Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers <br/>(ix)Industrial, Social, and other Policy <br/>E.Article 2(4), (5),JointVentures <br/>F.Restrictions Directly Related and Necessary to the Concentration <br/>G.Commitments or Remedies <br/>(i)Legal Basis and Time Periods <br/>(ii)The Commission's Notice on Remedies Acceptable under the ECMR <br/>(iii)Types of Commitments <br/>(iv)Structural Remedies: Divestiture <br/>(v)Other Remedies: Access Remedies, Behavioural Commitments and 'Remedy Packages' <br/>(vi)Other Cases <br/>(vii) Breach of a Condition or Obligations <br/>6.ECMR Statistics <br/>7.Appeals <br/>8.International Issues <br/>A.The Long Arm of the ECMR <br/>B.Reciprocity <br/>9.Conclusions <br/>10.Further Reading <br/><br/>13. JOINT VENTURES AND OTHER BENEFICIAL HORIZONTAL ARRANGEMENTS <br/>1.Central Issues <br/>2.Introduction <br/>3.Joint Ventures <br/>A.What is a joint Venture? <br/>B.Competition Concerns in Respect of joint Ventures <br/>C.Joint Ventures and the Merger Regulation <br/>D.The Commission's Approach to the Assessment of Joint Ventures under Article 81 before 2000 <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)The Development of the Commission's Policy towards the Application of Article 81 to Joint Ventures <br/>(iii) The 1993 Notice on the Assessment of Cooperative Joint Ventures <br/>(iv)The Application of Article 81 (1) and (3) to Joint Ventures after 1993: Some Examples <br/>Research and Development Agreements, Specialization <br/>Agreements, and the 1985 Block Exemptions <br/>A.General <br/>B.Specialization Agreements <br/>C.Research and Development Agreements <br/>The Assessment of Horizontal Cooperation Agreements in the Light of the Commission Guidelines and of Block Exemptions 2658/2000 and 2659/2000 <br/>A.General <br/>B.The Policy of the Horizontal Guidelines <br/>C.Research and Development Agreements <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)Market Definition and Market Shares <br/>(iii)Substantive Assessment According to the Guidelines <br/>(iv)The Block Exemption Regulation on R&D Agreements, Regulation 2659/2000 <br/>D.Production Agreements<br/>(i)The Guidelines <br/>(ii)The Block Exemption Regulation on Specialization Agreements, Regulation 2658/2000 <br/>E.Purchasing Agreements <br/>F.Commercialization Agreements <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)The Joint Selling of Football Rights <br/>G.Standardization Agreements <br/>H.Environmental Agreements <br/>1.Agreements in Particular Sectors <br/>Conclusions <br/>Further Reading<br/><br/>14. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT BY THE COMMISSION AND THE NATIONAL COMPETITION AUTHORITIES OF THE ANTITRUST PROVISIONS <br/>1.Central Issues <br/>2.Introduction <br/>3.The OId Enforcement Regime Set Up by Regulation 17 <br/>4.Modernization <br/>A.The Reasons for Modernization <br/>B.The Proposals in the White Paper <br/>C.The Modernization Package <br/>(i)Regulation 1/2003, the New lmplementing Regulation and the Modernization Notices <br/>(ii)Regulation 1/2003 <br/>(iii)Regulation 773/2004 <br/>(iv)The Modernization Notices <br/>5.The European Competition Network <br/>6.Enforcement by the Commission <br/>A.General <br/>(i)The Broad Powers of the Commission <br/>(ii)Findings of lnapplicability and Guidance Letters <br/>(iii)The Initiation of Proceedings <br/>B.Fact-Finding by the Commission <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)Article 18 Requests for Information <br/>(iii)Article 20 Inspections <br/>(iv)Inspectioris on Private Premises under Article 21 <br/>(v)The Power to Take Statements <br/>(vi)The Right not to Incriminate Oneself <br/>(vii)Legal Privilege <br/>C.The Second Stage of the Procedure <br/>(i)General: The Right to be Heard <br/>(ii)The Statement of Objections <br/>(iii)The Hearing Officer <br/>(iv)Access to the File <br/>(v)The Oral Hearing <br/>D.Commission Decisions <br/>(1)General <br/>(ii)Final Decisions <br/>(iii)Procedural Decisions <br/>(iv)Interim Measures <br/>E.Fines and Periodic Penalty Payments <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)Fines for Procedural lnfringements <br/>(iii)Periodic Penalty Payments <br/>(iv)Fines for Substantive lnfringements <br/>F.Informal Settlements <br/>(i)General <br/>G.Sector inquiries <br/>Proceedings before the Court of justice <br/>A.Judicial Review <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)Article 230 EC <br/>(iii)Locus Standi—Who can bring an Action? <br/>(iv)Which Acts can be Challenged? <br/>(v)The Grounds of Review <br/>(vi)The Effects of Annulment<br/>(vii)Appeals against Penalties: Article 229 EC <br/>(viii) Appeals from the Court of First Instance to the Court of justice <br/>(ix)Interim Measures by the Court under Article 242 EC <br/>B.Actions for Damages under Article 288 EC <br/>Enforcement by the National Competition Authorities within the <br/>European Competition Network <br/>A.General <br/>B.Division of Work <br/>(i)Case Allocation—which Authority is Well Placed to deal with a Case? <br/>(ii)Transfer of information <br/>(iii)Leniency Applications <br/>C.Consistent Application of Articles 81 and 82 <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)Mechanism of Cooperation <br/>D.EC and National Competition Law <br/>The Relationship between EC and National Competition Law Sanctions against Individuals <br/>Complaints <br/>A.General <br/>B.Where to Complain <br/>C.Standing <br/>D.The Procedure<br/>E.The Obligations of the Commission <br/>F.Rejection of the Complaint <br/>(i)introduction <br/>(ii)The Community interest <br/>(iii)Allegations not Substantiated <br/>(iv)investigation by Another Competition Authority <br/>(v)The Commission is Obliged to make a Formal Rejection of the Complaint <br/>G.Acting on a Complaint <br/>H.Judicial Review Proceedings <br/>(i)An Omission to Act <br/>(ii)Review of Acts <br/>1.Complaints and the Merger Regulation <br/>12. Conclusions <br/>13. Further Reading <br/><br/>15. PROCEEDINGS IN THE NATIONAL COURTS <br/>1.Central Issues <br/>2.introduction <br/>A.General <br/>B.Direct Effect and the Principle of National Procedural Autonomy <br/>C.A Paucity of Antitrust Litigation in Europe <br/>D.Reguiation 1/2003, the 2005 Green Paper and Encouragement of Private Actions <br/>E.Uniform and Concurrent Application ofArticles 81 and 82 <br/>(i)Cooperation between the Commission and Nationai Courts <br/> (ii)judgments Contrary to Decisions of the Commission <br/>F.Conclusion <br/>3.The Enforceability of Agreements lnfringing Articles 81 or 82 <br/>A.Article 81 <br/>(i)The Sanction of Nuility <br/>(ii)Severance <br/>(iii)Nuility and lIlegality <br/>(iv)Transient Nullity <br/>B.Article 82 <br/>(i)Void and Unenforceable? <br/>(ii)Severance <br/>(iii)Illegality <br/>C.Conclusions <br/>4.Remedies: Damages Actions and Injunctions <br/>A.Damages <br/>(i)A Community Right to Damages <br/>(ii)Damages Claims in the English Courts <br/>(iii)Damages Claims in Other Member States <br/>(iv)Damages Claims in the US <br/>(v)Conclusions and Issues Raised in the Green Paper <br/>B.Interim Injunctions <br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)A Community Right to an Injunction <br/>(iii)The Position in English Law <br/>5.Conclusions <br/>6.Further Reading <br/><br/>16. EXTRATERRITORIALITY, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, AND GLOBALIZATION <br/>1.Central Issues <br/>2.Introduction <br/>3.The Position in US Law <br/>A.General <br/>B.The Effects Doctrine <br/>C.Enforcement and the Reactions of Other States <br/>D.Foreign Plaintiffs in US Courts <br/>E.Discovery in US Courts <br/>F.The Effects Doctrine and Foreign Conduct Affecting Exports <br/>4.International Law <br/>5.The Position in EC Law <br/>A.General <br/>B.The vyestuffs Case <br/>C.The Woodpulp Case <br/>D.The Merger Regulation <br/>(i)The Terms of the Merger Regulation <br/>(ii)The Gencor Case <br/>(iii)The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Case <br/>(iv)The GE/Honeywetl Case <br/>6.International Cooperation <br/>A.General <br/>B.Bilateral Agreements <br/>(i)The EC-US Cooperation Agreement <br/>(ii) Other Cooperation Agreements <br/>C. Multilateral Cooperation <br/>(i) General<br/>(ii) UNCTAD and the OECD <br/>(iii) The WTO <br/>(iv) The International Competition Network <br/>(v) A Global Competition Law Regime?<br/>7. Conclusions <br/>8.Further Reading <br/>Addendum on the Council meeting of june 2007 <br/>Index <br/> |