A Course in Microeconomic Theory/ (Registro n. 1557)
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| Campo fixo de controle local | 190617s1990 -us gr 000 0 eng u |
| 020 ## - ISBN | |
| ISBN | 691042640 |
| 040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
| Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
| 090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
| Localização na estante | 338.5 K92CM |
| 100 10 - Autor | |
| Autor | KREPS, David M. |
| 245 12 - Titulo Principal | |
| Título principal | A Course in Microeconomic Theory/ |
| 260 ## - Editora | |
| Cidade | Estados Unidos: |
| Editora | Princeton University Press, |
| Data | 1990. |
| 300 ## - Descrição Física | |
| Número de páginas | 839 p. |
| 505 ## - Conteúdo | |
| Conteúdo | contents<br/>preface<br/><br/>chapter one: An overview <br/>1.1. The basic categories: Actors, behavior, institutions, and equilibrium <br/>1.2. The purpose of microeconomic theory<br/>1.3. Scope, detail, emphasis, and complexity<br/>1.4. A précis of the piot<br/><br/>part I: Individual and social choice<br/>chapter two: The theory of consumer choice<br/>and demand<br/>Prologue to part I<br/>2.1. Preferences and choices<br/>2.2. Marshallian demand without derivatives<br/>2.3. Marshallian demand with derivatives <br/>2.4. Aggregate demand<br/>2.5. Bibliographic notes<br/>2.6. Problems <br/>chapter three: Choice under uncertainty<br/>3.1. Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility <br/>3.2. On utility for money<br/>3.3. Applications to market demand<br/>3.4. States of nature and subjective probability <br/>3.5. Problems with these modeis <br/>3.6. Normative applications of the theory <br/>3.7. Bibliographic notes <br/>3.8. Problems <br/>chapter four: Dynamic choice <br/>4.1. Optimal dynarnic strategies <br/>4.2. Menus and meals <br/>4.3. Bibliographic notes and discussion<br/>4.4. Problems <br/>chapter five: Social choice and efficiency<br/>5.1. The problem <br/>5.2. Pareto efficiency and optimality: Definitions <br/>5.3. Benevolent social dictators and social welfare functionals <br/>5.4. Characterizing efficient social outcomes <br/>5.5. Social choice rules and ArroWs possibility theorem <br/>5.6. Bibliographic notes <br/>5.7. Problems <br/><br/>part II: The price mechanisin<br/>chapter six: Pure exchange and<br/>general equilibrium <br/>Prologue to part II <br/>6.1. Pure exchange and price equilibrium <br/>6.2. Why (not) believe in Walrasian equilibrium?<br/>6.3. The efficiency of a general equilibrium <br/>6.4. Existence and the number of equilibria <br/>6.5. Time, uncertainty, and general equilibrium <br/>6.6. Bibliographic notes <br/>6.7. Problem<br/>chapter seven: The neoclassical firm <br/>7.1. Models of the flrm's technological capabffities <br/>7.2. The profit function <br/>7.3. Conditional factor demands and cost functions<br/>7.4. From profit or cost functions to technology sets<br/>7.5. Cost functions and -runs <br/>7.6. Bibliographic notes 259 7.7. Frobiems <br/>chapter eight: The competitive firm and<br/>perfect competition <br/>8.1. A perfectly competitive market <br/>8.2. Perfect competition and -runs <br/>8.3. What's wrong with partial equilibrium analysis? <br/>8.4. General equilibrium with ftrms <br/>8.5. Bibliographic notes <br/>8.6. Problems <br/>chapter nine: Monopoly <br/>9.1. The standard theory<br/>9.2. Maintaining monopoly<br/>9.3. Multigood monopoly<br/>9.4. Nonlinear pricing <br/>9.5. Monopoly power?<br/>9.6. Bibliographic notes<br/>9.7. Problems<br/>chapter ten: Imperfect competition<br/>10.1. The classic modeis of duopoly<br/>10.2. Bibliographic notes and discussion<br/>10.3. Problems <br/><br/>part III: Noncooperative game theory<br/>chapter eleven: Modeling competitive<br/>situations<br/>Prologue to part III<br/>11.1. Carnes in extensive form: An example<br/>11.2. Carnes in extensive form: Formalities<br/>11.3. Carnes m normal or stategic form <br/>11.4. Mixed strategies and Kuhn's theorem<br/>11.5. Bibliographic notes <br/>11.6. Problems <br/>chapter twelve: Solution concepts<br/>for noncooperative games <br/>12.1. Opening remarks <br/>12.2. Dominance and iterated dominance for normal form games <br/>12.3. Backwards induction in games of complete and perfect information <br/>12.4. Nash equilibrium <br/>12.5. Equilibria in mixed strategies <br/>12.6. Why might there be an obvious way to play a given game? <br/>12.7. Refinements of Nash equilibrium <br/>12.7.1. Weak dominance <br/>12.7.2. Subgame perfection (and iterated<br/>weak dominance)<br/>12.7.3. Sequential equilibrium <br/>12.7.4.Restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs<br/>12.7.5. Trembling-hand <br/>Perfection<br/>12.7.6. Proper equilibria and stable sets of equilibria <br/>12.8. Reprise: Classic duopoly<br/>12.9. Bibliographic notes <br/>12.10. Problems<br/>chapter thirteen: Incomplete information<br/>and irrationality<br/>13.1. Games of incomplete information <br/>13.2. An application: Entry deterrence <br/>13.3. Modeling irrationality <br/>13.4. More on refinements: Complete theories <br/>13.5. Bibliographic notes <br/>13.6. Problems <br/>chapter fourteen: Repeated play:<br/>Cooperation and reputation<br/>14.1. The prisoners' dilemma <br/>14.2. Repeating games can yield cooperation: The folk theorem<br/>14.3. Noisy observables <br/>14.4. Implicit coilusion in oligopoly <br/>14.5. Reputation <br/>14.6. Reputation redux: Incomplete information <br/>14.7. Bibliographic notes <br/>14.8. Problems <br/>chapter fifteen: Bilateral bargaining <br/>15.1. Simultaneous offers and indeterminancy <br/>15.2. Focal equffibria <br/>15.3. Rubinstein's model <br/>15.4. The experimental evidence about alternating offers <br/>15.5. Modeis with incomplete information<br/>15.6. Bibliographic notes<br/>15.7. Problems <br/><br/>part IV: Topics in information economics<br/>chapter sixteen: Moral hazard and incentives<br/>Prologue to part IV <br/>16.1. Introduction<br/>16.2. Effort incentives: A simple example<br/>16.3. Finitely many actions and outcomes <br/>16.4. Continuous actions: The first-order approach <br/>16.5. Bibliographic notes and variations<br/>16.6. Problems <br/>chapter seventeen: Adverse selection<br/>and market signaling <br/>17.1. Akeriof's model of lemons<br/>17.2. Signaling qualit<br/>17.3. Signaling and game theory<br/>17.4. Bibliographic notes and discussion <br/>17.5. Problems <br/>chapter eighteen: The revelation principie<br/>and mechanism design <br/>18.1. Optimal contracts designed for a single party<br/>18.2. Optimal contracts for interacting parties<br/>18.3. The pivot mechanism<br/>18.4. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem <br/>18.5. Bibliographic notes <br/>18.6. Problems <br/><br/>part V: Firms and transactions<br/>chapter rnneteen: Theories of the firm<br/>19.1. The flrm as a profit-maximizing entity <br/>19.2. The firm as a maxiniizing entity <br/>19.3. The flrm as a behavioral entity <br/>19.4. Firms in the category of markets <br/>19.5. Bibliographic notes <br/>19.6. Problems <br/>chapter twenty: Transaction cost economics<br/>and the firm <br/>20.1. Transaction cost economics and firms <br/>20.2. Mathematical modeis of transaction cost economics<br/>20.3. Bibliographic notes <br/>postscript <br/>appendix one: Constrained optimization<br/>A1.1. A recipe for solving problems<br/>A1.2. The recipe at work: An example <br/>A1.3. Intuition <br/>A1.4. Bibliographic notes <br/>A1.5. Problems <br/>appendix two: Dynamic programniing <br/>A2.1. An example with a finite horizon<br/>A2.2. Finite horizon dynamic programming<br/>A2.3. An example with an infinite horizon <br/>A2.4. Stationary Markov decision problems<br/>A2.5. Bibliographic notes and discussion<br/>A2.6. Problems <br/>addendum to the second and<br/>subsequent printings<br/>index <br/><br/><br/> |
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| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-07-01 | Compra | 30173 | 338.5 K92CM | 2019-0194 | 1 | 2019-07-01 |