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Contents<br/>Acknowledgements<br/>Introduction <br/>Francine Lafontaine<br/><br/>PART I AGENCY THEORY AND FRANCHISING<br/>1. Richard E. Caves and William F. Murphy II (1976), 'Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets', Southern Economic Journal, (4), April, 572-86 <br/><br/>2. Paul H. Rubin (1978), 'The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract', Journal of Law and Economics, XXI (1), April, 223-33 <br/><br/>3. G. Frank Mathewson and Ralph A. Winter (1985), 'The Economics of Franchise Contracts', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVIII (3), October, 503-26 <br/><br/>4. James A. Brickley and Fredenck H. Dark (1987), 'The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising', Journal of Financial Economics, 18, 401-20 <br/><br/>5. Francine Lafontaine (1992), 'Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results', RAND Journal of Economics, 23 (2), Summer,263-83<br/><br/>6. Andrea Shepard (1993), 'Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing', RAND Journal of Economics, 24 (1), Spring, 58-77<br/><br/>7. Sugato Bhattacharyya and Francine Lafontaine (1995), 'Double-sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts', RAND Journal of Economics, 26(4), Winter, 761-81 <br/><br/>8. Nancy A. Lutz (1995), 'Ownership Rights and Incentives in Franchising', Journal of Corporate Finance, 2 (1-2), October, 103-31 <br/><br/>9. Francine Lafontaine and Sugato Bhattacharyya (1995), 'The Role of Risk in Franchising', Journal of Corporate Finance, 2 (1-2), October, 39-74 <br/><br/>10. Asher A. Blass and Dennis W. Carlton (2001), 'The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and the Cost of Laws that Limit that Choice', Journal of Law and Economics, XLIV (2, <br/>Part 1), October, 511-24 <br/><br/>11. Francine Lafontaine and Kathryn L. Shaw (2005), 'Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising', RAND Journal of Economics, 36 (1), Spring, 131-50 <br/><br/>PART II SELF-ENFORCEMENT AND FRANCHISING<br/>12. Benjamin Klein (1980), 'Transaction Cost Deterniinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 70 (2), May, 356-62 <br/><br/>13. James A. Bricldey, Frederick H. Dark and Michael S. Weisbach (1991), 'The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws', Journal of Law and Economics, XXXIV (1), April, 101-32 <br/><br/>14. Patrick J. Kaufmann and Francine Lafontaine (1994), 'Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for McDonald's Franchisees', Journal of Law and Economics, XXXVII (2),<br/>October, 417-53 <br/><br/>15. Benjamin Klein (1995), 'The Economics of Franchise Contracts', Journal of Corporate Finance, 2 (1-2), October, 9-37<br/> <br/>PART III MULTI-TASKING AND COMPLEMENTARITIES<br/>16. Margaret E. Siade (1996), 'Multitask Agency and Contract Choice: An Empirical Exploration', International Economic Review, 37 (2), May, 465-86 <br/><br/>17. Francine Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade (1996), 'Retail Contracting and Costly Monitoring: Theory and Evidence', European Economic Review, 40, 923-32 <br/><br/>18. Jeffrey L. Bradach (1997), 'Using the Plural Form in the Management of Restaurant Chains', Administrative Science Quarterly, 42 (2), June, 276-303 <br/><br/>19. James A. Brickley (1999), 'Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising', Journal of Law and Economics, XLII (2), October, 745-74 <br/><br/>20. Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud (2002), 'Residual Claims and Self-enforcement as Incentive Mechanisms in Franchise Contracts: Substitutes or Complements?', in Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant (eds), The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications, Chapter 18, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 315-36, references <br/><br/>PART IV FRANCHISING AND OUTLET-LEVEL OUTCOMES<br/>21. John P. Shelton (1967), 'Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency": Comment', American Economic Review, 57 (5), December, 1252-8 <br/><br/>22. John M. Barron and John R. Umbeck (1984), 'The Effects of Different Contractual Arrangements: The Case of Retail Gasoline Markets', Journal ofLaw and Economics, XXVII (2), October, 313-28 <br/><br/>23. Richard L. Smith II (1982), 'Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution', Journal Of Law and Economics, XXV (1), April, 125-57 <br/><br/>24. Alan B. Krueger (1991), 'Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination ofFranchising in the Fast Food Industry', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (1), February, 75-101 <br/><br/>25. Margaret E. Siade (1998), 'Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?', Econornic Journal, 108 (448), May, 565-602 <br/><br/>26. Steven C. Michael (2000), 'The Effect of Organizational Form on Quality: The Case of Franchising'. Journal of Econornic Behavior and Organization, 43, 295-318 <br/><br/>Name Index <br/><br/><br/> |
