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Acknowledgements <br/>Introduction Andrew N. Kleit <br/><br/>PART I MONOPOLIZATION <br/><br/>1. Harold Demsetz (1974), 'Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly', in Harvey J. Goldschmid, H. Michael Mann and J. Fred Weston (eds), Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 164-84 <br/><br/>2. Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), 'On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits', American Economic Review, 73 (1), March, 82-97 <br/><br/>PART II MERGERS <br/><br/>3. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), 'Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare TmOeoffs', American Economic Review, 58 (1), March, 18-36 <br/>4. Kenneth G. Elzinga and Thomas F. Hogarty (1973), 'Thc Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits', Antitrust Bulletin, XVIII (1), Spring, 45-81 <br/>5. Robert D. Willig (1991), 'Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Microeconomics), 281-312, references <br/>6. Barry C. Harris and Joseph J. Simons (1989), 'Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary?', Research in Law and Economics, 12, 207-26 134 <br/>7. Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1988), 'Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 6 (3), 283-300 154 <br/>8. Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb (1994), 'The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 10 (2), October, 407-26 172 <br/><br/>PART III COLLUSION <br/>9. George J. Stigler (1964), 'A Theory of Oligopoly', Journal of Political Economy, 72 (I), February, 44-61 <br/>10. George A. Hay and Daniel Kelley (1974), 'An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies', Journal of Law and Economics, 17 (1), April, 13-38 <br/>11. Thomas E. Cooper (1986), 'Most•Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion', Rand Journal of Economics. 17 (3). Autumn, 377-88 <br/><br/>PART IV VERTICAL RESTRAINTS <br/><br/>12. Lester G. Telser (1960), 'Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?', Journal of Law and Economics, III, October. 86-105 <br/>13. Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988). 'Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms', Journal of Law and Economics, XXXI (2), October. 265-97 <br/><br/>PART V PREDATORY PRICING <br/><br/>14. John S. McGee (1958). 'Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ.) Case', Journal of Law and Economics, 1.October, 137-69 <br/>15. Robert H. Bock (1978), Injury to Competition: The Law's Basic Theories', in The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself. Chapter 7. New York: The Free Press, 134-60, notes <br/>16. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1982), 'Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence', Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (2). August, 280-312 <br/><br/>PART VI EXCLUSIONARY BEHAVIOR <br/><br/>17. Steven C. Salop and David T. Schefftnan (1987), 'Cost-Raising Strategies', Journal of Industrial Economics, XXXVI (1). September, 19-34 <br/>18. Timothy J. Brennan (1988), 'Understanding "Raising Rivals' I Costs-, Antitrust Bulletin, XXXIII, Spring, 95-113 <br/>19. Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990), 'Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure', American Economic Review, 80 (I), March, 127-42 <br/>20. David Rciffcn (1992), 'Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment', American Economic Review, 82 (3), June. 694-7 <br/>21. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), 'Contracts as a Barrier to Entry', American Economic Review, 77 (3). June. 388-401 <br/>22. David A. Butz and Andrew N. Kleit (2001), 'Are Vertical Restraints Pro- or Anticompetitive? Lewins from Interstate Circuit , Journal of Law and Economics, XLIV (1), April. 131-59 <br/><br/>PART VII NETWORK EXTERNALITIES <br/><br/>23. Michael L. Kalz and Carl Shapiro (1985), 'Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility', American Economic Review, 75 (3), June, 424-40 <br/>24. Paul A. David (1985), 'Clio and the Economics of QWERTY', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 75 (2), May, 332-7 <br/>25. S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis (1990), "the Fable of the Keys', Journal of Low and Economics, XXXIII (I ), April, 1-25 <br/><br/>PART VIII ANTITRUST, REGULATION, AND BUREAUCRACY <br/><br/>26. William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover (1985), 'Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVIII (2), May, 247-45 <br/>27. Timothy J. Brennan (1995), 'Is the Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Applicable Today?', Antitrust Bulletin, XL, Fall, 455-82 <br/>28. Malcolm B. Coate, Richard S. Higgins and Fred S. McChesney (1990), 'Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges', Journal of Law and Economics. XXXIII (2). October, 463-82 602 <br/>29. Malcolm B. Coate, Andrew N. Kleit and Rene Bustamante (1995), 'Fight. Fold or Settle?: Modelling the Reaction to FTC Merger Challenges', economic Inquiry, XXXIII (4). October, 537-51 <br/><br/> |
