The Theory of Incentives: (Registro n. 1668)
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| 007 - Campo Fixo - Descrição Física | |
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| 008 - Campo de Tamanho Fixo | |
| Campo fixo de controle local | 190617s1947 -uk gr 000 0 eng u |
| 020 ## - ISBN | |
| ISBN | 691091838 |
| 040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
| Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
| 090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
| Localização na estante | 338.9 L163t |
| Cutter | L163t |
| 100 1# - Autor | |
| Autor | LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques |
| 245 14 - Titulo Principal | |
| Título principal | The Theory of Incentives: |
| Subtítulo | The Principal-Agent Model/ |
| 260 ## - Editora | |
| Cidade | Oxford, Inglaterra: |
| Editora | Princeton University, |
| Data | 1947. |
| 300 ## - Descrição Física | |
| Número de páginas | 421 p. |
| 505 ## - Conteúdo | |
| Conteúdo | Contents<br/>Foreword<br/>Introduction<br/><br/>1 Incentives in Economic Thought<br/>1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture<br/>1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management<br/>1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Groves: The Free-Rider Problem<br/>1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting<br/>1.5 Léon Wairas and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies<br/>1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance<br/>1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives<br/>1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination<br/>1.9 Incentives in Planned Economies<br/>1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design <br/>1.11 Auctions<br/><br/>2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off<br/>2.1 The Basic Model<br/>2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract<br/>2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts<br/>2.4 Information Rents<br/>2.5 The Optimization Program of the Principal<br/>2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off<br/>2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information<br/>2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing<br/>2.9 The Revelation Principie<br/>2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent<br/>2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints<br/>2.12 Commitment<br/>2.13 Stochastic Mcc hanisms <br/>2.14 Informative Signais to Improve Contracting <br/>2.15 Contract Theory at Work<br/>Appendix<br/><br/>3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection <br/>3.1 More than Two Types<br/>3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information<br/>3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and Countervailing Incentives<br/>3.4 Random Participation Constraint<br/>3.5 Limited Liability<br/>3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification<br/>3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off<br/>Appendices<br/><br/>4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs<br/>4.1 The Model<br/>4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation<br/>4.3 The Trade-Off Between Limited Liabiiity Rent Extraction and Efficiency<br/>4.4 The Trade-Off Between Insurance and Efficiency<br/>4.5 More than Two Leveis of Performance<br/>4.6 Informative Signais to Improve Contracting<br/>4.7 Moral Hazard and the Theoiy of the Firm<br/>4.8 Contract Theory at Work<br/>4.9 Commitment Under Moral Hazard <br/>Appendices<br/><br/>5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with<br/>Moral Hazard <br/>5.1 More than Two Leveis of Effort<br/>5.2 The Multitask Incentive Probiem<br/>5.3 Nonseparability of the Utility Function<br/>5.4 Redistribution and Moral Hazard<br/>Appendices<br/><br/>6 Nonverifiability<br/>6.1 No Contract at Date O and Ex Post Bargaining<br/>6.2 Incentive Compatible Contract<br/>6.3 Nash Implementation<br/>6.4 Subgame-Perfect Implementation <br/>6.5 Risk Aversion <br/>6.6 Conciuding Remarks<br/><br/>7 Mixed Modeis <br/>7.1 Adverse Selection Foliowed by Morai Hazard<br/>7.2 Morai Hazard Foliowed by Adverse Seiection<br/>7.3 Morai Hazard Foliowed by Nonverifiability<br/><br/>8 Dynamics under Fuli Commitment<br/>8.1 Repeated Adverse Selection<br/>8.2 Repeated Moral Hazard<br/>8.3 Constraints on Transfers: The Role of Implicit Incentives<br/><br/>9 Limits and Extensions<br/>9.1 lnformed Principal <br/>9.2 Limits to Enforcement<br/>9.3 Dynamics and Limited Commitment<br/>9.4 The Hold-Up Problem<br/>9.5 Limits to the Complexity of Contracts <br/>9.6 Limits in the Action Space <br/>9.7 Limits to Rational Behavior<br/>9.8 Endogenous Information Structures <br/><br/>References<br/>Author Index<br/>Subject Index<br/><br/><br/> |
| 700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 887 |
| Nome pessoa | MARTIMORT, David |
| Relação | Autor |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
| Classificação | Empréstimo | Locação permanente | Locação corrente | Data de aquisição | Forma de aquisição | Patrimônio | Número completo de chamada | Código de barras | Número do exemplar | Data de inserção do exemplar | Tipo de item no Koha |
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| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-07-03 | Compra | 30211 | 338.9 L163t | 2019-0223 | 1 | 2019-07-03 | Livros | ||
| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-11-21 | Compra | 30212 | 338.9 L163t | 2019-1557 | 2 | 2019-11-21 | Livros | ||
| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-11-21 | Compra | 30213 | 338.9 L163t | 2019-1558 | 3 | 2019-11-21 | Livros |