Microeconomic Theory/ (Registro n. 1682)
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| 007 - Campo Fixo - Descrição Física | |
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| Campo fixo de controle local | 190617s1995 -us gr 000 0 eng u |
| 020 ## - ISBN | |
| ISBN | 9780195073409 |
| 040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
| Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
| 090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
| Localização na estante | 338.5 M394m |
| Cutter | M394m |
| 100 10 - Autor | |
| Autor | MAS-COLELL, Andreu |
| 245 10 - Titulo Principal | |
| Título principal | Microeconomic Theory/ |
| 260 ## - Editora | |
| Cidade | Estados Unidos: |
| Editora | Oxford University Press, |
| Data | 1995. |
| 300 ## - Descrição Física | |
| Número de páginas | 981 p. |
| 505 ## - Conteúdo | |
| Conteúdo | Contents<br/>Preface<br/><br/>PART ONE: INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING <br/>Chapter 1. Preference and Choice <br/>1.A Introduction <br/>1.B Preference Relations <br/>1.0 Choice Rules <br/>1.D The Relationship between Preference Relations and Choice Rules <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 2. Consumer Choice <br/>2.A Introduction <br/>2.B Commodities <br/>2.0 The Consumption Set <br/>2.D Competitive Budgets <br/>21 Demand Functions and Comparative Statics <br/>2.F The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and the Law of Demand <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 3. Classical Demand Theory <br/>3.A Introduction <br/>3.B Preference Relations: Basic Properties <br/>3.0 Preference and Utility <br/>3.D The Utility Maximization Problem <br/>31 The Expenditure Minimization Problem <br/>3.F Duality: A Mathematical Introduction <br/>3.0 Relationships between Demand, Indirect Utility, and Expenditure Functions <br/>3.H Integrability <br/>3.1 Welfare Evaluation of Economic Changes <br/>3.J The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference <br/>Appendix A: Continuity and Differentiability Properties of Walrasian Demand <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 4. Aggregate Demand <br/>4.A Introduction <br/>4.B Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Wealth <br/>4.0 Aggregate Demand and the Weak Axiom <br/>4.D Aggregate Demand and the Existence of a Representative Consumer <br/>Appendix A: Regu!arizing Effects of Aggregation <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 5. Production <br/>5.A Introduction <br/>5.B Production Sets <br/>5.0 Profit Maximization and Cost Minimization <br/>5.D The Geometry of Cost and Supply in the Single-Output Case <br/>5.E Aggregation<br/>5.F Efficient Production <br/>5.0 Remarks on the Objectives of the Firm <br/>Appendix A: The Linear Activity Model <br/>Exercises<br/>Chapter 6. Choice Under Uncertainty <br/>6.A Introduction <br/>6.B Expected Utility Theory <br/>6.0 Money Lotteries and Risk Aversion <br/>6.D Comparison of Payoff Distributions in Terms of Return and Risk <br/>6.E State-dependent Utility <br/>6.F Subjective Probability Theory <br/>Exercises <br/><br/>PART TWO: GAME THEORY <br/>Chapter 7. Basic Elements of Noncooperative Games <br/>7.A Introduction <br/>7.B What Is a Game? <br/>7.0 The Extensive Form Representation of a Game <br/>7.D Strategies and the Norma! Form Representation of a Game <br/>7.E Randomized Choices <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 8. Simultaneous-Move Games <br/>8.A Introduction <br/>8.B Dominant and Dominated Strategies <br/>8.0 Rationalizable Strategies <br/>8.D Nash Equilibrium <br/>8.E Games of Incomplete Information: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium <br/>8.F The Possibility of Mistakes: Trembling-Hand Perfection <br/>Appendix A: Existence of Nash Equilibrium <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 9. Dynamic Games <br/>9.A Introduction <br/>9.B Sequential Rationality, Backward Induction, and Subgame Perfection <br/>9.0 Beliefs and Sequential Rationality <br/>9.D Reasonable Beliefs and Forward Induction <br/>Appendix A: Finite and Infinite Horizon Bilateral Bargaining <br/>Appendix B: Extensive Form Trembling-Hand Perfect Nash Equilibrium <br/>Exercises <br/><br/>PART THREE: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND MARKET FAILURE <br/>Chapter 10. Competitive Markets <br/>10.A Introduction <br/>10.B Pareto Optimality and Competitive Equilibria <br/>10.0 Partial Equilibrium Competitive Analysis<br/>10.D The Fundamental Welfare Theorems in a Partial Equilibrium Context <br/>10.E Welfare Analysis in the Partial Equilibrium Model <br/>10.F Free-Entry and Long-Run Competitive Equilibria <br/>10.G Concluding Remarks on Partial Equilibrium Analysis <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 11. Externalities and Public Goods<br/>11.A Introduction <br/>1 1.B A Simple Bilateral Externality <br/>11.0 Public Goods <br/>11.13 Multilateral Externalities <br/>11.E Private Information and Second-Best Solutions <br/>Appendix A: Nonconvexities and the Theory of Externalities <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 12. Market Power <br/>12.A Introduction <br/>12.B Monopoly Pricing <br/>12.0 Static Modeis of Oligopoly <br/>12.13 Repeated Interaction <br/>12.E Entry <br/>12.F The Competitive Limit <br/>12.G Strategic Precommitments to Affect Future Competition <br/>Appendix A: Infinitely Repeated Games and the Folk Theorem <br/>Appendix 13: Strategic Entry Deterrence and Accommodation <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 13. Adverse Selection, Signaling, and Screening <br/>13.A Introduction <br/>13.B Informational Asymmetries and Adverse Selection <br/>13.0 Signaling <br/>13.D Screening <br/>Appendix A: Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signaling Games <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 14. The Principal-Agent Problem <br/>14.A Introduction <br/>14.B Hidden Actions (Moral Hazard) <br/>14.0 Hidden Information (and Monopolistic Screening) <br/>14.13 Hidden Actions and Hidden Information: Hybrid Modeis <br/>Appendix A: Multiple Effort Leveis in the Hidden Action Model <br/>Appendix B: A Formal Solution of the Principal-Agent Problern with Hidden Information <br/>Exercises<br/><br/>PART FOUR: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM <br/>Chapter 15. General Equilibrium Theory: Some Examples <br/>15.A Introduction <br/>15.B Pure Exchange: The Edgeworth Box <br/>15.0 The One-Consumer, One-Producer Economy <br/>15.D The 2 x 2 Production Model <br/>15.E General Versus Partial Equilibrium Theory <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 16. Equilibrium and Its Basic Welfare Properties <br/>16.A Introduction <br/>16.8 The Basic Model and Definitions <br/>16.0 The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics <br/>16.D The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics <br/>16.E Pareto Optimality and Social Welfare Optima <br/>16.F First-Order Conditions for Pareto Optimality <br/>16.G Some Applications <br/>Appendix A: Technical Properties of the Set of Feasible Allocations <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 17. The Positive Theory of Equilibrium <br/>17.A Introduction <br/>17.13 Equilibrium: Definitions and Basic Equations <br/>17.0 Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium <br/>17.D Local Uniqueness and the Index Theorem <br/>17.E Anything Goes: The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem <br/>17.F Uniqueness of Equilibria <br/>17.G Comparative Statics Analysis <br/>17.H Tâtonnement Stability <br/>17.1 Large Economies and Nonconvexities <br/>Appendix A: Characterizing Equilibrium through Weifare Equations <br/>Appendix B: A General Approach to the Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium <br/>Exercises<br/>Chapter 18. Some Foundations for Competitive Equilibria <br/>18.A Introduction <br/>18.B Core and Equilibria <br/>18.0 Noncooperative Foundations of Walrasian Equilibria <br/>18.D The Limits to Redistribution <br/>18.E Equilibrium and the Marginal Productivity Principie <br/>Appendix A: Cooperative Game Theory <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 19. General Equilibrium Under Uncertainty <br/>19.A Introduction <br/>19.B A Market Economy with Contingent Commodities: Description <br/>19.0 Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium <br/>19.D Sequential Trade <br/>19.E Asset Markets <br/>19.F Incomplete Markets <br/>19.G Firm Behavior in General Equilibrium Modeis Under Uncertainty <br/>19.H Imperfect Information <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 20. Equilibrium and Time <br/>20.A Introduction <br/>20.B Intertemporal Utility <br/>20.0 Intertemporal Production and Efficiency <br/>20.D Equilibrium: The One-Consumer Case <br/>20.E Stationary Paths, Interest Rates, and Golden Rules <br/>20.F Dynamics <br/>20.G Equilibrium: Several Consumers <br/>20.H Overlapping Generations <br/>20.1 Remarks on Nonequilibrium Dynamics: Tâtonnement and Learning <br/>Exercises <br/><br/>PART FIVE: WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INCENTIVES <br/>Chapter 21. Social Choice Theory <br/>21.A Introduction <br/>21.B A Special Case: Social Preferences over Two Alternatives <br/>21.0 The General Case: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem <br/>21.D Some Possibility Results: Restricted Domains <br/>21.E Social Choice Functions <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 22. Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic Bargaining <br/>22.A Introduction <br/>22.13 Utility Possibility Sets <br/>22.0 Social Welfare Functions and Social Optima <br/>22.13 Invariance Properties of Social Welfare Functions <br/>221 The Axiomatic Bargaining Approach <br/>22.F Coalitional Bargaining: The Shapley Value <br/>Exercises <br/>Chapter 23. Incentives and Mechanism Design <br/>23.A Introduction <br/>23.B The Mechanism Design Problem <br/>23.0 Dominant Strategy Implementation <br/>23.D Bayesian Implementation <br/>23.E Participation Constraints <br/>23.F Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms <br/>Appendix A: Implementation and Multiple Equilibria <br/>Appendix B: Implementation in Environments with Complete Information <br/>Exercises <br/><br/>MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX <br/>M.A Matrix Notation for Derivatives <br/>M.B Homogeneous Functions and Euler's Formula <br/>M.0 Concave and Quasiconcave Functions <br/>M.D Matrices: Negative (Semi)Definiteness and Other Properties <br/>M.E The Implicit Function Theorem <br/>M.F Continuous Functions and Compact Sets <br/>M.G Convex Sets and Separating Hyperplanes <br/>M.H Correspondences <br/>MJ Fixed Point Theorems <br/>M.J Unconstrained Maximization <br/>M.K Constrained Maximization <br/>M.L The Envelope Theorem <br/>M.M Linear Programming <br/>M.N Dynamic Programmmg <br/>Index <br/><br/><br/> |
| 700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal | |
| Nome pessoa | WHINSTON, Michael D. |
| Relação | Autor |
| 9 (RLIN) | 616 |
| 700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 861 |
| Nome pessoa | GREEN, Jerry |
| Relação | Autor |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
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| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-07-01 | Compra | 30175 | 338.5 M394m | 2019-0196 | 1 | 2019-07-01 | Livros |