The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC/ (Registro n. 1825)
| 006 - Campo Fixo - Material Adicional | |
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| 007 - Campo Fixo - Descrição Física | |
| fixed length control field | ta |
| 008 - Campo de Tamanho Fixo | |
| Campo fixo de controle local | 190617s2006 enk gr 000 0 eng u |
| 020 ## - ISBN | |
| ISBN | 9781841135021 |
| 040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
| Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
| 090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
| Localização na estante | 341.378 O25l |
| Cutter | O25l |
| 100 10 - Autor | |
| Autor | O'DONAHUE, Robert |
| 245 14 - Titulo Principal | |
| Título principal | The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC/ |
| 260 ## - Editora | |
| Cidade | Oxford, Inglaterra: |
| Editora | Hart Publishing, |
| Data | 2006. |
| 300 ## - Descrição Física | |
| Número de páginas | 782 p. |
| 505 ## - Conteúdo | |
| Conteúdo | TABLE OF CONTENTS<br/><br/>Foreword<br/>Authors preface<br/>Table of cases <br/>Table of legislation<br/><br/>1.INTRODUCTION, SCOPE OF APPLICATION, AND BASIC FRAMEWORK<br/>1.1 INTRODUCTION<br/>1.2 HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND MODERNISATION OF ARTICLE 82 EC <br/>1.2.1 The Historical Context Of Article 82 EC<br/>1.2.2 Development Of Article 82 EC<br/>12 1.2.3 The Modernisation Of Article 82 EC<br/>1.3 ENTITIES AND ACTIVITIES BOUND BY ARTICLE 82 EC<br/>1.3.1 The Definition Of An Undertaking<br/>1.3.1.1 Generally<br/>1.3.1.2 Public bodies as undertakings<br/>1.3.1.3 Sporting and cultural activities<br/>1.3.2 State Action Defence <br/>1.3.3 Parent Liability For A Subsidiary's Actions Under Article 82 EC<br/>1.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLE 82 EC AND OTHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS <br/>1.4.1 Article 82 EC And General Principles of Community Law <br/>1.4.2 The Relationship Between Article 82 EC And Article 81 EC <br/>1.4.3 Article 82 EC And Merger Control Laws <br/>1.4.4 Article 82 EC And The Rules On State Action <br/>1.4.5 Article 82 EC And Regulation<br/>1.4.6 Article 82 EC And National Abuse Of Dominance Laws <br/>1.4.7 Article 82 EC And Arbitration <br/>1.5 THE BASIC PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK <br/>1.5.1 Cooperation Within The Network Of Competition Authorities<br/>1.5.2 Cooperation Between The Commission And National Courts<br/>1.5.3 Guidance Letters <br/>1.5.4 Methods Of Bringing Article 82 EC Claims<br/>1.5.5 The Conduct Of Commission Proceedings<br/>1.5.6 Sector Inquiries<br/><br/>2. MARKET DEFINITION<br/>2.1 INTRODUCTION<br/>2.2 PRODUCT MARKET DEFINITION: BASIC CONCEPTS<br/>2.2.1 Demand-Side Substitution<br/>2.2.2 Supply-Side Substitution <br/>2.2.3 Chains of Substitution <br/>2.3 RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKETS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE <br/>2.3.1 Hypothetical Monopolist Test: Overview <br/>2.3.2 Assessing Demand-Side Substitution Under The HMT<br/>2.3.2.1 Quantitative techniques<br/>2.3.2.2 Qualitative evidence<br/>2.3.2.3 Other sources of evidence <br/>2.3.3 Assessing Supply-Side Substitution Under The HMT <br/>2.4 GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION<br/>2.4.1 Key Concepts <br/>2.4.2 Defining Geographic Markets In Practice<br/>2.5 SELECTED ISSUES ON MARKET DEFINITION<br/>2.5.1 Impact Of Price Discrimination On Market Definition<br/>2.5.2 Market Definition In Tying And Bundling Cases <br/>2.5.3 Aftermarkets<br/>2.5.4 Market Definition In Two-Sided Industries<br/><br/>3. DOMINANCE<br/>3.1 INTRODUCTION <br/>3.2 SINGLE FIRM DOMINANCE<br/>3.2.1 Basic Approach<br/>3.2.2 The Starting Point: Market Shares<br/>3.2.3 Barriers To Entry And Expansion <br/>3.2.3.1 Definition of barriers to entry<br/>3.2.3.2 Characteristics inherent in the relevant Market<br/>3.2.3.3 Characteristics specific to the allegedly dominant Firm<br/>3.2.3.4 Conduct of the allegedly dominant firm <br/>3.2.4 Countervailing Buyer Power<br/>3.2.5 Evidence Of Actual Competition On The Relevant Market<br/>3.2.6 Conclusion<br/>3.3 COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE<br/>3.3.1 Introduction<br/>3.3.2 The Economics Of Collective Dominance<br/>3.3.2.1 Firms have the incentive to avoid competing <br/>3.3.2.2 Reaching and maintaining a tacit agreement is feasible <br/>3.3.2.3 Conclusion <br/>3.3.3 Legal Principies Governing Collective Dominance<br/>3.3.3.1 Evolution <br/>3.3.3.2 Establishing collective dominance under Article 82 EC<br/>3.3.3 Selected Issues On Collective Dominance<br/>3.4 DOMINANT BUYERS <br/>3.5 "SUPERDOMINANCE" <br/>3.6 COMPARING DOMINANCE UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC AND OTHER COMMUNITY LEGISLATION<br/>3.7 SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE COMMON MARKET<br/><br/>4. THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF AN ABUSE <br/>4.1 INTRODUCTION <br/>4.2 THE ECONOMICS OF ABUSIVE UNILATERAL CONDUCT<br/>4.2.1 Evolution Of Economic Thinking On Unilateral Conduct<br/>4.2.2 Designing Economically Optimal Rules For Unilateral Conduct <br/>4.2.3 Recent Advances In Defining Exclusionary Conduct<br/>4.2.3.1 The profit sacrifice test and its close relations<br/>4.2.3.2 Equally efficient competitor test <br/>4.2.3.3 Consumer welfare test <br/>4.3 THE CATEGORIES OF ABUSE UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC <br/>4.3.1 Exploitative Abuses (Article 82(a)) <br/>4.3.2 Exclusionary Abuses (Article 82(b))<br/>4.3.3 Discriminatory Abuses (Article 82(c)) <br/>4.3.4 Tying Abuses (Article 82(d))<br/>4.3.5 Leveraging Abuses<br/>4.3.6 The List Of Abuses In Article 82 EC: lIlustrative Or Exhaustive<br/>4.4 ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC <br/>4.4.1 The Need For Causation Between Dominance And The Abuse <br/>4.4.2 The Standard For Anticompetitive Effects Under Article 82 EC<br/>4.4.3 Identifying Actual Or Likely Anticompetitive Effects <br/>4.4.4 Harm To Consumers Under The Four Clauses Of Article 82 EC<br/>4.4.5 The Role Of Intent Evidence<br/>4.5 OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION<br/><br/>5. PREDATORY PRICING <br/>5.1 INTRODUCTION <br/>5.2 THE ECONOMICS OF PREDATORY PRICING<br/>5.2.1 Basic Cost Definitions<br/>5.2.2 Strategic Considerations <br/>5.3 THE BASIC RULES ON BELOW-COST PRICE CUTTING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC <br/>5.3.1 Pricing Below AVC<br/>5.3.2 Pricing Above AVC/AAC But Below ATC<br/>5.4 SPECIFIC ISSUES WITH BELOW-COST PRICING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC<br/>5.4.1 Recoupment <br/>5.4.2 Dealing With Joint And Common Costs<br/>5.4.3 Cross-Subsidies <br/>5.4.4 Situations Involving High Fixed And Low Variable Costs <br/>5.4.5 Situations In Which A Product Incurs Inevitable Start-Up Losses<br/>5.5 EXCLUSIONARY ABOVE-COST PRICE CUTS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC<br/>5.6 OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION<br/>5.6.1 Introduction<br/>5.6.2 Meeting Competition<br/>5.6.3 Short-Term Promotional Offers <br/>5.6.4 Market-Expanding Efficiencies <br/>5.6.5 Loss-Leading And "Follow On" Revenues<br/>5.6.6 Excess Capacity And Loss-Minimising<br/>5.6.7 Miscellaneous Defences <br/><br/>6. MARGIN SQUEEZE <br/>6.1 INTRODUCTION <br/>6.2 THE ECONOMICS OF MARGIN SQUEEZE <br/>6.2.1 Types Of Margin Squeeze<br/>6.2.2 Basic Economic Conditions For A Margin Squeeze <br/>6.2.3 Anticompetitive Motivation For A Margin Squeeze<br/>6.3 BASIC LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR A MARGIN SQUEEZE<br/>6.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARGIN SQUEEZE AND OTHERABUSES<br/>6.4.1 Margin Squeeze And Excessive Pricing<br/>6.4.2 Margin Squeeze And "Pure" Predatory Pricing<br/>6.4.3 Margin Squeeze And Cross Subsidies <br/>6.4.4 Margin Squeeze And Refusal To Deal Under Article 82 EC <br/>6.5 DIFFICULTIES WITH IDENTIFYING AN ANTICOMPETITIVE MARGIN SQUEEZE IN PRACTICE<br/>6.6 DISCRIMINATORY MARGIN SQUEEZES AND RELATED STRATEGIES<br/>6.6.1 Problem Stated <br/>6.6.2 Examples of Discrimination By A Vertically Integrated Dominant Firm<br/>6.7 CONFLICTS BETWEEN REGULATION AND COMPETITION LAW IN MARGIN SQUEEZE CASES<br/><br/>7. EXCLUSIVE DEALING, LOYALTY DISCOUNTS, AND RELATED PRACTICES<br/>7.1 INTRODUCTION <br/>7.2 EXCLUSIVE DEALING<br/>7.2.1 Economics of Exclusive Dealing <br/>7.2.2 Exclusive Dealing Under Article 82 EC <br/>7.2.2.1 Evolution of the decisional practice and case law<br/>7.2.2.2 Assessing exclusive dealing under Article 82 EC<br/>7.2.3 Practices Failing Short Of Outright Exclusivity<br/>7.3 LOYALTY DISCOUNTS<br/>7.3.1 Economics of Loyalty Discounts <br/>7.3.2 Assessment of Loyalty Discounts Under Article 82 EC<br/>7.3.2.1 Treatment of loyalty discounts under the case law <br/>7.3.2.2 Factors that affect the economic effects of loyalty discounts<br/>7.3.2.3 Alternative proposals for the assessment of loyalty discounts<br/>7.3.3 Objective Justification<br/>7.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION<br/><br/>8. REFUSAL TO DEAL<br/>8.1 INTRODUCTION <br/>8.2 THE ECONOMICS OF REFUSAL TO DEAL<br/>8.2.1 IPRights <br/>8.2.2 Physical Property<br/>8.3 THE DUTY TO DEAL WITH COMPETITORS<br/>8.3.1 Evolution Of The Decisional Practice And Case Law<br/>8.3.2 The Legal Conditions For A Duty To Deal With Rivals Under Article 82 EC <br/>8.3.2.1 First contracts or licences<br/>8.3.2.2 How many contracts must be concluded by the dominant firm<br/>8.3.2.3 Terminating a course of dealing <br/>8.3.2.4 Relevance of the source and perceived value of the property right <br/>8.4 DUTY TO DEAL WITH CUSTOMERS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC <br/>8.4.1 The Duty To Supply Inputs To Customers<br/>8.4.2 Refusals To Deal Arising At The Levei Of Distribution Of Resale <br/>8.4.3 Refusal To Deal And Parailel Trade<br/><br/>9.TYING AND BUNDLING <br/>9.1.INTRODUCTION <br/>9.2 THE ECONOMICS OF TYING AND BUNDLING<br/>9.2.1 Efficiency Motivations<br/>9.2.2 Possible Anticompetitive Motivations <br/>9.2.3 Empirical Evidence <br/>9.2.4 Conclusions <br/>9.3 THE APPROACH TO TYING AND BUNDLING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC<br/>9.3.1 Contractual Tying <br/>9.3.2 Technological Tying<br/>9.3.3 Microsoft<br/>9.3.4 Mixed Bundling<br/>9.3.4.1 Overview <br/>9.3.4.2 The legal treatment of mixed bundling <br/>9.3.5 Tying In Aftermarkets <br/>9.3.6 Classifying the overall approach to tying under Article 82 EC<br/>9.4 SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO TYING<br/>9.5 CONCLUSIONS <br/><br/>10. EXCLUSIONARY NON-PRICE ABUSES <br/>10.1 INTRODUCTION <br/>10.2 EXAMPLES OF EXCLUSIONARY NON-PRICE ABUSES <br/>10.2.1 Predatory Design Changes/Product Introduction<br/>10.2.2 Vexatious Litigation <br/>10.2.3 Use And Abuse Of Regulatory Or Government Procedures<br/>10.2.4 Abuses In Standard-Setting Organisations <br/>10.2.5 Abusive Acquisition Or Accumulation Of IPRs<br/>10.2.6 Miscellaneous Practices<br/><br/>11. ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION <br/>11.1 INTRODUCTION<br/>11.2 THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION <br/>11.2.1 Conditions For Price Discrimination<br/>11.2.2 Welfare Effects Of Price Discrimination <br/>11.2.3 Conclusion <br/>11.3 LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION <br/>11.3.1 Equivalent Transactions <br/>11.3.2 Dissimilar Conditions <br/>11.3.3 Competitive Disadvantage<br/>11.4 SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 82(C)<br/>11.4.1 Pure Secondary-Line Discrimination<br/>11.4.2 Nationality Discrimination<br/>11.4.3 Discrimination lntended To Partition National Markets<br/>11.4.4 Most-Favoured Company Clauses <br/>11.4.5 Discriminatory Supplies In Times Of Shortage <br/>11.5 OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION<br/>11.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION <br/><br/>12. EXCESSIVE PRICES <br/>12.1 INTRODUCTION <br/>12.2 THE ECONOMICS OF EXCESSIVE PRICES<br/>12.3 THE LEGAL TEST(S) FOR EXCESSIVE PRICES<br/>12.4 DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH TO EXCESSIVE PRICES UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC<br/>12.5 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO EXCESSIVE PRICING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC <br/>12.6 CONCLUSION <br/>13.OTHER EXPLOITATIVE ABUSES <br/>13.1 INTRODUCTION <br/>13.2 ABUSE OF MONOPSONY PURCHASING POWER<br/>13.2.1 Basic Economics Of Monopsony Power <br/>13.2.2 Conditions For A Possible Abuse <br/>13.3 UNFAIR AND EXPLOITATIVE CONTRACT TERMS <br/>13.3.1 Reasons For A Limited Case Law <br/>13.3.2 Legal Test For Abusive And Unfair Contract Terms<br/>13.3.3 Conclusion<br/><br/>14. EFFECT ON TRADE<br/>14.1 INTRODUCTION <br/>14.2 BASIC LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR EFFECT ON TRADE<br/>14.3 SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF THE EFFECT ON TRADE CONCEPT<br/>14.3.1 Abuses Covering Several Member States <br/>14.3.2 Abuses Covering A Single Member State<br/>14.3.3 Abuses Covering Only A Part Of A Member State<br/>14.3.4 Abuses Concerning Trade Outside The EU <br/><br/>15. REMEDIES <br/>15.1 INTRODUCTION <br/>15.2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING REMEDIES<br/>15.2.1 Objectives Of Remedies <br/>15.2.2 Remedies Must Be Effective <br/>15.2.3 Remedies Must Be Proportionate <br/>15.3 PRINCIPAL TYPES OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS<br/>15.3.1 Interim Measures <br/>15.3.2 Commitment Decisions<br/>15.3.2.1 Overview <br/>15.3.2.2 Commitment decision procedure<br/>15.3.2.3 Legal effect of commitment decisions<br/>15.3.3 Undertakings<br/>15.3.4 Final Infringement Decisions<br/>15.4 PRINICIPAL TYPES OF REMEDIES <br/>15.4.1 Fines <br/>15.4.2 Behavioural Remedies<br/>15.4.2.1 Exclusionary pricing abuses<br/>15.4.2.2 Remedies for excessive pricing <br/>15,4.2.3 Remedies in discrimination cases<br/>15.4.2.4 Compulsory dealing remedies<br/>15.4.2.5 Remedies in tying cases <br/>15.4.3 Structural Remedies<br/>15.4.3.1 Introduction and overview <br/>15.4.3.2 Conditions for ordering a structural remedy <br/>15.4.3.3 Case study: Microsoft <br/>15.5 PRIVATE LITIGATION AND REMEDIES<br/>15.5.1 Introduction<br/>15.5.2 Goals Of Private Enforcement <br/>15.5.3 Legal Basis For Private Enforcement <br/>15.5.4 Obstacles To Effective Private Enforcement <br/>15.5.5 Conclusion<br/>Index<br/> |
| 700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 1129 |
| Nome pessoa | PADILLA, Jorge Atilano |
| Relação | Autor |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
| Classificação | Empréstimo | Locação permanente | Locação corrente | Data de aquisição | Forma de aquisição | Patrimônio | Número completo de chamada | Código de barras | Número do exemplar | Data de inserção do exemplar | Tipo de item no Koha |
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| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-08-19 | Compra | 30828 | 341.378 O25l | 2019-0517 | 1 | 2019-08-19 | Livros |