An Introduction To Game theory/ (Registro n. 1849)
| 006 - Campo Fixo - Material Adicional | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | a|||||r|||| 00| 0 |
| 007 - Campo Fixo - Descrição Física | |
| fixed length control field | ta |
| 008 - Campo de Tamanho Fixo | |
| Campo fixo de controle local | 190617s2004 enk gr 000 0 eng u |
| 020 ## - ISBN | |
| ISBN | 195128958 |
| 040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
| Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
| 090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
| Localização na estante | 330.1543 O81i |
| Cutter | O81i |
| 100 10 - Autor | |
| Autor | OSBORNE, Martin J. |
| 245 13 - Titulo Principal | |
| Título principal | An Introduction To Game theory/ |
| 260 ## - Editora | |
| Cidade | Nova Iorque, Estados Unidos: |
| Data | 2004. |
| 300 ## - Descrição Física | |
| Número de páginas | 533 p. |
| 505 ## - Conteúdo | |
| Conteúdo | Contents<br/>Preface <br/><br/>Introduction <br/>1.1 What is game theory? <br/>An outline ofthe history of game theory <br/>John von Neumann <br/>1.2 The theory of rational choice <br/>1.3 Coming attractions: interacting decision-makers <br/>Notes<br/>I Games with Perfect Information <br/><br/>2 Nash Equilibrium: Theory <br/>2,1 Strategic games <br/>2.2 Example: the Prisoner's Dilemma <br/>2.3 Example: Bach orStravinsky? <br/>2.4 Example: Matching Pennies <br/>2.5 Example: the Stag Hunt <br/>2.6 Nash equilibrium <br/>John F. Nash, Jr. <br/>Studying Nash equilibrium experimentally <br/>2.7 Examples of Nash equilibrium <br/>Experimental evidence on the Prisoner's Dilemma<br/>Focal points <br/>2.8 Best response functions <br/>2.9 Dominated actions <br/>2.10 Equilibrium in a single population: symmetric games and symmetric equilibria <br/>Notes <br/><br/>3 Nash Equilibrium: lllustrations <br/>3.1 Cournot's model ofoligopoly <br/>3.2 Bertrand's model ofoligopoly <br/>Cournot, Bertrand, and Nash: some historical notes <br/>3.3 Electoral competition <br/>3.4 The Warof Attrition <br/>3.5 Auctions <br/>Auctions from Babylonia to eBay <br/>3.6 Accident law <br/>Notes <br/><br/>4 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium<br/>4.1 introduction <br/>Some evidence on expected payoff functions <br/>4.2 Strategic games in which players may randomize <br/>4.3 Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium <br/>4.4 Dominated actions <br/>4.5 Pure equilibria when randomization is allowed <br/>4.6 Illustration: expert diagnosis <br/>4.7 Equilibrium in a single population <br/>4.8 Illustration: reporting a crime <br/>Reporting a crime: social psychology and game theory <br/>4.9 The formation of players' beliefs <br/>4.10 Extension: finding all mixed strategy Nash equilibria <br/>4.11 Extension: games in which each player has a continuum of actions <br/>4.12 Appendix: representing preferences by expected payoffs <br/>Notes <br/><br/>5 Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory <br/>5.1 Extensive games with perfect information <br/>5.2 Strategies and outcomes <br/>5.3 Nash equilibrium <br/>5.4 Subgame perfect equilibrium <br/>5.5 Finding subgame perfect equilibria of finite horizon games: backward induction <br/>Ticktacktoe, chess, and related games<br/>Notes <br/><br/>6 Extensive Games with Perfect Information: lllustrations <br/>6.1 The ultimatum game, the hold up game, and agenda control <br/>Experiments on the ultimatum game <br/>6.2 Stackeiberg's model of duopoly <br/>6.3 Buying votes <br/>6.4 A race <br/>Notes <br/><br/>7 Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Extensions and Discussion <br/>7.1 Allowing for simultaneous moves <br/>More experimental evidence on sub game perfect equilibrium <br/>7.2 Ilustration: entry into a monopolized industry <br/>7.3 IIustration: electora competition with strategic voters <br/>7.4 Ilustration: committee decision-making <br/>7.5 Ilustration: exit from a declining industry <br/>7.6 Allowing for exogenous uncertainty <br/>7.7 Discussion: subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction <br/>Experimental evidence on the centipede game<br/>Notes <br/><br/>8 Coalitional Games and the Core <br/>8.1 Coalitional games <br/>8.2 The core <br/>8.3 Ilustration: ownership and the distribution of wealth <br/>8.4 Ilustration: exchanging homogeneous houses <br/>8.5 Ilustration: exchanging heterogeneous houses<br/>8.6 Ilustration: voting <br/>8.7 Ilustration: matching <br/>Matching doctors with hospitals <br/>8.8 Discussion: other solution concepts <br/>Notes <br/>II Games with Imperfect Information <br/><br/>9 Bayesian Games <br/>9.1 Motivational examples <br/>9.2 General definitions <br/>9.3 Two examples concerning information <br/>9.4 lllustration: Cournot's duopoly game with imperfect information <br/>9.5 lllustration: providing a public good <br/>9.6 lllustration: auctions <br/>Auctions of the radio spectrum<br/>9.7 lllustration: juries <br/>9.8 Appendix: auctions with an arbitrary distribution of valuations <br/>Notes <br/><br/>10 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information <br/>10.1 Extensive games with imperfect information <br/>10.2 Strategies <br/>10.3 Nash equilibrium <br/>10.4 Beliefs and sequential equilibrium <br/>10.5 Signaling games <br/>10.6 lllustration: conspicuous expenditure as a signal of quality <br/>10.7 lllustration: education as a signal of ability <br/>10.8 lllustration: strategic information transmission <br/>10.9 Ilustration: agenda control with imperfect information <br/>Notes <br/>III Variants and Extensions <br/><br/>11 Strictly Competitive Games and Maxminimization <br/>11.1 Maxminimization <br/>11.2 Maxminimization and Nash equilibrium <br/>11.3 Strictly competitive games <br/>11.4 Maxminimization and Nash equilibrium in strictly competitive games <br/>Maxminimization: some history <br/>Empirical tests: experiments, tennis, and soccer <br/>Notes <br/><br/>12 Rationalizability <br/>12.1 Rationalizability <br/>12.2 Iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions<br/>12.3 Iterated elimination of weakly dominated actions<br/>12.4 Dominance solvability <br/>Notes <br/><br/>13 Evolutionary Equilibrium <br/>13.1 Monomorphic pure strategy equilibrium <br/>Evolutionary game theory: some history <br/>13.2 Mixed strategies and polymorphic equilibrium <br/>13.3 Asymmetric contests <br/>Side-blotched lizards <br/>Explaining the outcomes of contests in nature <br/>13.4 Variation on a theme: sibling behavior <br/>13.5 Variation on a theme: the nesting behavior of wasps <br/>13.6 Variation on a theme: the evolution of the sex ratio <br/>Notes <br/><br/>14 Repeated Games: The Prisoner's Dilemma <br/>14.1 The main idea <br/>14.2 Preferences <br/>14.3 Repeated games <br/>14.4 Finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma <br/>14.5 Infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma <br/>14.6 Strategies in an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma <br/>14.7 Some Nash equilibria of an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma <br/>14.8 Nash equilibrium payoffs of an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma <br/>Experimental evidence <br/>14.9 Subgame perfect equilibria and the one-deviation property <br/>Axelrod's tournaments <br/>14.10 Some subgame perfect equilibria of an infinitely repeated<br/>Prisoner's Dilemma <br/>Reciprocal altruism among sticklebacks <br/>14.11 Subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma <br/>Medieval trade fairs <br/>14.12 Concluding remarks <br/>Notes <br/><br/>15 Repeated Games: General Results <br/>15.1 Nash equilibria of general infinitely repeated games <br/>15.2 Subgame perfect equilibria of general infinitely repeated games <br/>15.3 Finitely repeated games <br/>15.4 Variation on a theme: imperfect observability <br/>Notes <br/><br/>16 Bargaining <br/>16.1 Bargaining as an extensive game <br/>16.2 lllustration: trade in a market <br/>16.3 Nash's axiomatic model <br/>16.4 Relation between strategic and axiomatic models <br/>Notes <br/><br/>17 Appendix: Mathematics <br/>17.1 Numbers <br/>17.2 Sets <br/>17.3 Functions <br/>17.4 Profiles <br/>17.5 Sequences <br/>17.6 Probability <br/>17.7 Proofs <br/>References<br/>Index |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
| Classificação | Empréstimo | Locação permanente | Locação corrente | Data de aquisição | Patrimônio | Número completo de chamada | Código de barras | Número do exemplar | Data de inserção do exemplar | Tipo de item no Koha |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-06-26 | 30118 | 330.1543 O81i | 2019-0132 | 1 | 2019-06-26 | Livros |