A Course in Game Theory/ (Registro n. 1850)
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| 007 - Campo Fixo - Descrição Física | |
| fixed length control field | ta |
| 008 - Campo de Tamanho Fixo | |
| Campo fixo de controle local | 190617s1994 enk gr 000 0 eng u |
| 020 ## - ISBN | |
| ISBN | 9780262650403 |
| 040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
| Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
| 090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
| Localização na estante | 330.1543 O81c |
| Cutter | O81c |
| 100 10 - Autor | |
| Autor | OSBORNE, Martin J. |
| 245 12 - Titulo Principal | |
| Título principal | A Course in Game Theory/ |
| 260 ## - Editora | |
| Cidade | Londres, Inglaterra: |
| Editora | The Mit Press, |
| Data | 1994. |
| 300 ## - Descrição Física | |
| Número de páginas | 362 p. |
| 505 ## - Conteúdo | |
| Conteúdo | Contents<br/>Preface<br/><br/>Introduction <br/><br/>1.1 Game Theory <br/>1.2 Games and Solutions <br/>1.3 Game Theory and the Theory of Competitive Equilibrium<br/>1.4 Rational Behavior <br/>1.5 The Steady State and Deductive Interpretations <br/>1.6 Bounded Rationality <br/>1.7 Terminology and Notation <br/>Notes <br/><br/>I Strategic Games <br/>2 Nash Equilibrium <br/>2.1 Strategic Games <br/>2.2 Nash Equilibrium <br/>2.3 Examples <br/>2.4 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium <br/>2.5 Strictly Competitive Games <br/>2.6 Bayesian Games: Strategic Games with Imperfect<br/>Information <br/>Notes <br/>3 Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium<br/>3.1 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 31<br/>3.2 Interpretations of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium<br/>3.3 Correlated Equilibrium<br/>3.4 Evolutionary Equilibrium<br/>Notes<br/>4 R.ationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions<br/>4.1 Rationalizability <br/>4.2 Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions<br/>4.3 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Actions<br/>Notes<br/>5 Knowledge and Equilibrium <br/>5.1 A Model of Knowledge<br/>5.2 Common Knowledge<br/>5.3 Can People Agree to Disagree? <br/>5.4 Knowledge and Solution Concepts<br/>5.5 The Electronic Mail Game <br/>Notes <br/><br/>II Extensive Games with Perfect Information <br/>6 Extensive Games with Perfect Information <br/>6.1 Extensive Games with Perfect Information <br/>6.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium <br/>6.3 Two Extensions of the Definition of a Game<br/>6.4 The Interpretation of a Strategy <br/>6.5 Two Notable Finite Horizon Games <br/>6.6 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies <br/>Notes <br/>7 Bargaining Games <br/>7.1 Bargaining and Game Theory <br/>7.2 A Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers <br/>7.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium <br/>7.4 Variations and Extensions <br/>Notes <br/>8 Repeated Games<br/>8.1 The Basic Idea <br/>8.2 Infinitely Repeated Games vs. Finitely Repeated Games <br/>8.3 Infinitely Repeated Games: Definitions <br/>8.4 Strategies as Machines <br/>8.5 Trigger Strategies: Nash Folk Theorems <br/>8.6 Punishing for a Limited Length of Time: A Perfect Folk<br/>Theorem for the Limit of Means Criterion <br/>8.7 Punishing the Punisher: A Perfect FoIk Theorem for the<br/>Overtaking Criterion <br/>8.8 Rewarding Players Who Punish: A Perfect Folk Theorem for<br/>the Discounting Criterion <br/>8.9 The Structure of Subgame Perfect Equilibria Under the<br/>Discounting Criterion <br/>8.10 Finitely Repeated Games <br/>Notes <br/>9 Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games <br/>9.1 Introduction <br/>9.2 Complexity and the Machine Game <br/>9.3 The Structure of the Equilibria of a Machine Game<br/>9.4 The Case of Lexicographic Preferences <br/>Notes <br/>10 Implementation Theory <br/>10.1 Introduction <br/>10.2 The Implementation Problem <br/>10.3 Implementation in Dominant Strategies <br/>10.4 Nash Implementation <br/>10.5 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Implementation <br/>Notes <br/><br/>III Extensive Games with Imperfect Information <br/>11 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information <br/>11.1 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information<br/>11.2 Principies for the Equivalence of Extensive Games<br/>11.3 Framing Effects and the Equivalence of Extensive<br/>Games <br/>11.4 Mixed and Behavioral Strategies <br/>11.5 Nash Equilibrium <br/>Notes <br/>12 Sequential Equilibrium <br/>12.1 Strategies and Beliefs <br/>12.2 Sequential Equilibrium <br/>12.3 Games with Observable Actions: Perfect Bayesian<br/>Equilibrium <br/>12.4 Refinements of Sequential Equilibrium <br/>12.5 Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium <br/>Notes <br/>IV Coalitional Games <br/>13 The Core <br/>13.1 Coalitional Games with Transferable Payoff <br/>13.2 The Core <br/>13.3 Nonemptiness of the Core <br/>13.4 Markets with Transferable Payoff <br/>13.5 Coalitional Games without Transferable Payoff <br/>13.6 Exchange Economies <br/>Notes <br/>14 Stable Sets, the Bargaining Set, and the Shapley Value <br/>14.1 Two Approaches <br/>14.2 The Stabie Sets of von Neumann and Morgenstern <br/>14.3 The Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleoius <br/>14.4 The Shapley Value <br/>Notes <br/>15 The Nash Solution <br/>15.1 Bargaining Problems <br/>15.2 The Nash Solution: Definition and Characterization <br/>15.3 An Axiomatic Definition <br/>15.4 The Nash Solution and the Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers <br/>15.5 An Exact Implementation of the Nash Solution <br/>Notes <br/>List of Results <br/>References <br/>Index <br/><br/><br/> |
| 700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 794 |
| Nome pessoa | RUBINSTEIN, Ariel |
| Relação | Autor |
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| Tipo de Material | Livros |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
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| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-06-26 | 30115 | 330.1543 O81c | 2019-0131 | 1 | 2019-06-26 | Livros | ||
| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-10-30 | 30117 | 330.1543 O81c | 2019-1274 | 2 | 2019-10-30 | Livros |