Theory Of Incentives In Procurement And Regulation/ (Registro n. 2150)
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| 007 - Campo Fixo - Descrição Física | |
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| Campo fixo de controle local | 190617s1993 -us gr 000 0 eng u |
| 020 ## - ISBN | |
| ISBN | 262121743 |
| 040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
| Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
| 090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
| Localização na estante | 338.8 L163t |
| Cutter | L163t |
| 100 1# - Autor | |
| Autor | LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques |
| 245 10 - Titulo Principal | |
| Título principal | Theory Of Incentives In Procurement And Regulation/ |
| 260 ## - Editora | |
| Cidade | Estados Unidos: |
| Editora | The MIT Press, |
| Data | 1993. |
| 300 ## - Descrição Física | |
| Número de páginas | 705 p. |
| 505 ## - Conteúdo | |
| Conteúdo | he Regulatory Environment and Institutions <br/>1.1 Regulatory Constraints <br/>1.2 Regulatory lnstruments and Incentive Schemes <br/>1.3 Simple versus Informationally Demanding Regulatory RuIe <br/>1.4 Procurement versus Regulation <br/><br/>2 Commonly Used Incentive Schemes <br/>;ç………..~ 2.1 Procurement Contracts <br/>2.2 Regulatory Incentive Schemes in the Absence of Government Transfers <br/><br/>3 Received Theory and the Agenda for The New Regulatory Economics <br/>3.1 Marginal Cost Pricing <br/>3.2 Peak-Load Pricing <br/>3.3 Marginal or Average Cost Pricing? <br/>3.4 Balanced Budget and the Ra,nsey-Boiteux Model of Cost-of-Service Regulation <br/>3.5 Input Choices <br/>3.6 The Agenda of the New Regulatory Economics <br/><br/>4 Methodology and Overview of the Book <br/>4.1 The Controlled Experiment <br/>4.2 Overview of the Book <br/>References <br/><br/>1 PRICE AND RATE-OF-RETURN REGULATION<br/>1 COST-REIMBURSEMENT RULFS <br/>1.1 Some Backgrounds <br/>1.2 The Model <br/>1.3 The Two-Type Case <br/>1.4 Continuum of Types <br/>1.4.1 Decentralization through a Menu of Linear Contracts <br/>1.4.2 Parameters of the Incentive Scheme and Performance <br/>1.4.3 Additive Note and Linear Contracts <br/>1.4.4 The Two-Type Case and Nonlinearity of Optimal Contracts <br/>1.4.5 Shutdown of the Firm<br/>1.4.6 Compensation Caps and Cost Ceilings<br/>The Main Economic ConcIusions<br/>Implementation: Relevance and Informational <br/>Requirement of Menus <br/>Using Yardstick "Competilion" to Reduce Informational Asymmetries <br/>1.8 Adding Investment to the Model <br/>1.8.1 Contractible Investment <br/>1.8.2 Noncontractible Investment <br/>1.8.3 Private Information on the Desirability of <br/>1.8.4 Investment: Rale of Return on Investment, Incentives, and the Averch-Johnson Model <br/>1.9 Investment under Noncommitment<br/>1.9.1 Reni Extraction Generating Underinvestment <br/>1.9.2 Four Mechanisms Mitigating the Underinvestment <br/>Effect <br/>Mullipcnod Relationship under Commitment: False <br/>Dynamics <br/>Risk Aversion <br/>Bibliographic Notes <br/>Appendix’s <br/>References <br/><br/>2 PRICING BY A SINGLE-PRODUCF FIRM WITH AND WITHOUT BUDGET BALANCE <br/>Some Background <br/>The Model <br/>2.2.1 Description <br/>2.2.2 Full Information <br/>The Two.Type Case <br/>Continuom of Types <br/>Delegation of Pricing to the Firm <br/>2.5.1 An Introduction to Price Taxes <br/>2.5.2 Using Historical Data to Construct the Price Tax <br/>Two-Part Tariffs in the Absence of Government Transfer<br/>2.6.1The Optimal Two-Part Tariff <br/>2.6.2 Optimal Cost-of-Service Regulation <br/>Linear Pricing in the Absence of Government Transfer <br/>2.7.1 Optimal Linear Prices as Sliding Seale Plan <br/>2.7.2 Relationship to Monopoly Pricing and Price Caps <br/>2.8 Concluding Remarks <br/>Bibliographic Notes <br/>References <br/><br/>3 PRICING AND INCENTIVES IN A MULTIPRODUCT FIRM <br/>3.1 Some Background <br/>3.2 Optimal Regulation <br/>3.2.1 The Model <br/>3.2.2 The Optimal Regulatory Allocation <br/>3.2.3 Linearity of Cost-Reimbursement Rules <br/>3.3 Third.Degree Peice Discrimination <br/>3.3.1 Ramsey Pricing <br/>3.3.2 Peak-Load Pricing <br/>3.4 Second-Degree Price Discrimination <br/>3.4.1 Fully Nonlinear Pricing <br/>3.4.2 Two-Part Tariffs <br/>3.5 Veriliable Quality <br/>3.5.1 A Procurement Example <br/>3.5.2 A Regulation Example <br/>3.6 The Incentive-Pricing Dichotomy <br/>3.6.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions <br/>3.6.2 Example of Non dichotomy <br/>3.6.3 The Incentive-Pricing Dichotomy in the Absence of Government Transfer <br/>3.7 Multidimensional Effort and Characteristics <br/>3.7.1 Effort Allocation: The Shared.Fixed-Cost Model<br/>3.7.2 Multidimensional Type <br/>3.7.3 Effort Allocation: The Shared-Marginal-Cost Model <br/>3.8 Is Subcost Observation Useful? <br/>3.8.1 One Dimensional Type <br/>3.8.2 Multidimensional Type <br/>3.9 General Equilibrium Analysis: Foundations of the Shadow Cost of Public Funds and Taxation by Regulation <br/>3.9.1 Motivation <br/>3.9.2 An Imperfect Income Taxation Model <br/>3.10 Concluding Remarks <br/>Bibliographic Notes <br/>Appendix’s <br/>References <br/><br/>4 REGULATION OF QUALITY <br/>4.1 Some background <br/>4.2 The Model with a Search Good <br/>4.11 Incentives to Provide Quality <br/>4.12 incentives for Quality and Cost Reduction <br/>4.3 Optimal Regulation under Asymmetric Information <br/>4.4 Implementation of the Optimal Regulatory Mechanism <br/>4.5 Concern for Quality and the Power of Incentive Schemes <br/>4.6 Reputation incentives for an Experience Good <br/>4.7 Concluding Remarks <br/>Bibliographic Notes <br/>Appendixes <br/>References <br/><br/>5 COMPETITIVE RAMSEY FORMULAS AND ACCESS PRICING <br/>5.1 Some Background <br/>5.2 Pricing and Competition <br/>5.2.1 Regulated Competition <br/>5.2.2 Unregulated Competitive Fnnge <br/>5.2.3 Unregulated Competition with Distorted Pricing <br/>5.3 Access Pricing: Pricing in the Absence of Incentive Correction <br/>5.4 Access Pricing and Incentives <br/>5.4.1 Common Network <br/>5.4.2 Network Expansion <br/>5.5 Concluding Remarks <br/>Bibliographic Notes <br/>Appendixes <br/>References <br/><br/>6 BYPASS AND CREAM SKIMMING <br/>6.1 Some background <br/>6.2 The Model <br/>6.3 Optimal Pricing Rules and Optimal Incentive Schemes <br/>6.4 Bypass and Cream Skimming <br/>6.5 Some Further Considerations about Bypass: Redistribution and Budget Constraint <br/>6.6 Concluding Remarks <br/>Bibliographic Notes <br/>Appendixes <br/>References <br/><br/>III BIDDING FOR NATURAL MONOPOLY<br/><br/>7 AUCTIONING INCENTIVE CONTRACIS <br/>7.1 Some Background <br/>7.2 The Model <br/>7.3 The Optimal Bayesian Auction in the Two-Firm, Two-Type Case <br/>7.4 The Optimal Bayesian Auction in the Continuum Case <br/>7.4.1 The Firm's Bidding Behavior<br/>7.4.2 The Optimal Auction <br/>7.5 Implementation by a Dominant Strategy Auction <br/>7.5.1 Reduction in Transfer <br/>7.5.2 Equivalent Dominant Strategy Auction <br/>7.5.3 On the Revelation Principle in an Auction <br/>7.6 Optimality on Linear Contracts <br/>7.7 Auctions in Regulation <br/>7.8 Concluding Remarks <br/>Bibliographic Notes <br/>Appendixes <br/>References <br/><br/>8 REPEATED AUCTIONS OF INCENTIVE CONTRACTS INVESTMENT, AND BIDDING PARITY <br/>8.1 Some Background <br/>8.2 The Model <br/>8.3 Optimal Regulation under Asymmetric Information <br/>8.4 Learning by Doing <br/>8.5 Assessment of this Model <br/>8.6 Transferable Investment <br/>8.7 Concluding Remarks <br/>Bibliographic Notes <br/>Appendixes <br/>References <br/>THE DYNAM1S OF REGULATION<br/><br/>9 DYNAMICS WITHOUT COMMITMENT AND THE RATCHET EFFECT <br/>9.1 Some Background <br/>9.2 The Model <br/>9.3 Ratcheting and Pooling in the Continuum Case <br/>9.4 The Two-Type Case <br/>9.4.1 Characterization of Finite First-Period Menus That Induce the Upper Sound on Welfare <br/>9.4.2 Preliminary Analysis: Two-Contract Menus <br/>9.4.3 Comparative Statics of the Optimal Contract as an Example <br/>9.4.4 General Results <br/>9.5 Concluding Remarks <br/>Bibliographic Notes <br/>Appendixes <br/>References <br/><br/>10 COMMITMENT AND RENEGOTIATION <br/>10.1 Some Background <br/>10.2 The Model <br/>10.2.1 The Commitment Framework <br/>10.2.2 The Renegotiation Game <br/>Renegotiation-Proof Second-Period Contracts <br/>Characterization of the Optimal Contract <br/>How Much Pooling? <br/>Continuum of Types <br/>Commitment, Renegotiation, and Nun commitment <br/>Bibliographic Notes <br/>Appendixes <br/>References <br/><br/>V THE POLITICS OF REGULATION<br/>11 REGULATORY CAPTURE <br/>11.1 Some Background <br/>11.2 The Model <br/>11.2.1 The Fites <br/>11.2.2 The Agency <br/>11.2.3 Congress <br/>11.2.4 Consumer Groups <br/>11.3 Collusion-Free Regulation <br/>11.3.1 Full Information <br/>11.3.2 Asymmetric Information <br/>11.4 Producer Protection <br/>11.5 Multiple Interest Group <br/>11.6 Shutdown of the Regulated Firm <br/>11.7 A Political Theory of Cross-subsidization <br/>11.8 Concluding Remarks <br/>Bibliographic Notes <br/>Appendixes <br/>References <br/><br/>12 COST PADDING, ALJDITING, AND COLLUSION<br/>12.1 Some Background <br/>12.2 The Benchmark (No Cost Padding, No Auditing) <br/>12.3 Audit of Cost Padding <br/>12.3.1 Benevolent Audit o! Cost Padding <br/>12.3.2 Collusion in Auditing <br/>12.4 Monitoring o! Effort <br/>12.4.1 Benevolent Monitoring o! Effort <br/>12.4.2 Collusion in Monitoring o! Effort <br/>Bibliographic Notes <br/>Appendix <br/>References <br/><br/>13 CARTELIZATION BY REGULATION <br/>13.1 Some Background <br/>13.2 The Model <br/>13.3 Benevolent Agency and Incomplete Information about the incumbent's Technology <br/>13.4 Cartelization <br/>13.5 Pro and Anticompetition Agencies <br/>13.5.1 Summary of the Argument <br/>13.5.2 Agency.Entrant and Agency-Customer Collusion and Entry <br/>Appendixes <br/>References <br/><br/>14 AUCTION DESIGN AND FAVORITISM<br/>14.1 Some Background <br/>14.2 The Model <br/>14.3 Optimal Auction with a Benevolent Agency <br/>14.4 Collusion and Sofi Information <br/>14.4.1 Description of Collusion <br/>14.4.2 Soft Information <br/>14.4.3 Indirect Bid Rigging <br/>14.5 Asymmetric Collusion and Hard Information <br/>14.6 Symmetric Collusion and Hard Information <br/>14.7003 Concluding Remarks <br/>Appendixes <br/>References <br/><br/>VI REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS<br/><br/>15 REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS HEARINGS, AND INTEREST GROUP MONITORING <br/>15.1 Welfare Foundations of Institutions <br/>15.2 The Model <br/>15.2.1 Components <br/>15.2.2 Benevolent Agency Benchmark <br/>15.2.3 Collusive Agency <br/>15.3 The Solution <br/>15.3.1 Average Cost Pricing <br/>15.3.2 Marginal Cost Pricing <br/>15.3.3 Optimal Institutions <br/>15.3.4 Subsidies for Intervener Program <br/>15.3.5 Alternative Technologies <br/>15.3.6 Standards of Judicial Review <br/>15.4 Choice of Watchdog <br/>15.5 Concluding Remarks <br/>Appendixes <br/>References <br/><br/>16 COMMITMENT AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY <br/>16.1 Some Background <br/>16.2 Short-lived Regulators and the Optimal Constitution <br/>16.2.1 The Model <br/>16.2.2 Commitment <br/>16.2.3 Noncommitment <br/>16.2.4 Optimal Constitution <br/>16.3 Short- lived Regulators and Complete Contracting <br/>16.3.1 Investment Induced <br/>16.3.2 No lnvestment <br/>16.4 EIections Career Concrrns, and Commitment <br/>16.4.1 Commitment Constitution <br/>16.4.2 Noncommitment Constitution <br/>16.4.3 Flexibility.on.Commitment Constitution <br/>16.4.4 Campaign Contributions <br/>16.5 Concluding Remarks <br/>Bibliographic Notes <br/>References <br/><br/>17 PRIVATIZATION AND INCENTIVES <br/>17.1 Some Background <br/>17.1.1 Public Enterprise, Private Regulated Firm, and Unregulated Firm <br/>17.1.2 Conventional Wisdom about Privatizations <br/>17.1.3 Residual Rights Considerations <br/>17.2 The Model <br/>17.2.1 Public Ownership <br/>17.2.2 The Regulated Private Firm <br/>17.3 Optimal Regulation with Public Ownership <br/>17.4 Optimal Regulation of a Private Firm <br/>17.4.1 Differentiable Equilibrium <br/>17.4.2 Nondifferentiable Equilibria <br/>17.5 Comparison of Ownership Structures <br/>17.6 Concluding Remarks <br/>Bibliographic Notes <br/>Appendixes <br/>References <br/><br/>CONCLUSION <br/>REVIEW EXERCISES <br/>INDEX <br/> |
| 700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 788 |
| Nome pessoa | TIROLE, Jean |
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| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-07-02 | Compra | 30215 | 338.8 L163t | 2019-0217 | 1 | 2019-07-02 | Livros |