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Contents<br/>Acknowledgements<br/>Introduction Jean-Jacques Laffont<br/><br/>PART 1 FOUNDATIONS<br/><br/>1.Adam Smith (1776), 'Of the Discouragement ofAgriculture in the Ancient State of Europe after Lhe Fali of Lhe Roman Empire', in An <br/>Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book 3: Of the Different Progress of Opulence in Different Nations, Chapter II, 1-8, reset <br/><br/>2.Chester I. Barnard (1938/1968), 'The Economy of Incentives', in The Functions of the Executive, Part III, Chapter XI, Cambridge, <br/>Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 139-60 <br/><br/>3.Kenneth J. Arrow (1963), 'Uncertainty and Lhe Welfare Economics of Medical Care', American Economic Review, LIII (5), December, 941-73 <br/><br/>4.Mark V. Pauly (1968), 'The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment', American Economic Review, 58 (3, Part 1), June, 531-7 <br/><br/>5.Richard Zeckhauser (1970), 'Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff between Risk Spreading and Appropriate Incentives', <br/>Journal of Economic Theory, 2, 10-26 <br/><br/>6.Michael Spence and Richard Zeckhauser (1971), 'Insurance, Information, and Individual Action', American Economic Review, <br/>Papers and Proceedings, LXI (2), May, 380-87 <br/><br/>7.Stephen A. Ross (1973), 'The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem', American Economic Review, Papers and <br/>Proceedings, 63 (2), May, 134-9 <br/><br/>PART II MORAL HAZARD<br/><br/>8. J.A. Mirrlees (1999), 'The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part 1', Review of Economic Studies, 3-21 <br/><br/>9. Bengt Holmstrom (1979), 'Moral Hazard and Observability', Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1), Spring, 74-91 <br/><br/>10. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1983), 'An Analysis of the Principal-agent Problem', Econometrica, 51(1), January, 7-45 <br/><br/>11. lan Jewitt (1988), 'Justifying Lhe First-order Approach to Principal-agent Problems', Econometrica, 56 (5), September, 1177-90 <br/><br/>12. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1991), 'Multitask PrincipalAgent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, Special Issue, 24-52 <br/><br/>13. William P. Rogerson (1985), 'Repeated Moral Hazard', Econometrica, 53 (1), January, 69-76 <br/><br/>PART III ADVERSE SELECTION<br/><br/>14. J.A. Mirrlees (1971), 'An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVIII, 175-208 <br/><br/>15. Michael Mussa and Sherwin Rosen (1978), 'Monopoly and Product Quality', Journal o! Economic Theory, 18, 301-17 <br/><br/>16. Joseph E. Stiglitz (1977), 'Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market', Review o! Economic Studies, XLIV (3, No. 138), October, 407-30<br/><br/>17. David P. Baron and Roger B. Myerson (1982), 'Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs', Econometrica, 50 (4), July, 911-30 <br/><br/>18. David P. Baron and David Besanko (1984), 'Regulation, Asyrnmetric <br/>Information, and Auditing', Rand Journal o! Economics, 15 (4), <br/>Winter, 447-70<br/><br/>19. Roger Guesnerie and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1984), 'A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-agent Problems with an Application <br/>to the Control of a Self-managed Firm', Journal of Public Economics, 25 (3), December, 329-69 <br/><br/>20. David P. Baron and David Besanko (1984), 'Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship', Information Economics <br/>and Policy, 1 (3), 267-302 <br/><br/>21. Douglas Gale and Martin Hellwig (1985), 'Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem', Review o! Economic <br/>Studies, LII, 647-63 <br/><br/>22. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1986), 'Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms', Journal ofPolitical Economy, 94 <br/>(3, Part 1), June, 614-41 <br/><br/>23.Tracy R. Lewis and David E.M. Sappington (1989), 'Countervailing Incentives in Agency Problems', Journal of Economic Theory, 49 <br/>(2), December, 294-313 <br/><br/>24. Michael H. Riordan and David E.M. Sappington (1988), 'Optimal Contracts with Public ex post Information', Journal o! Economic <br/>Theory, 45 (1), June, 189-99 <br/><br/>PART IV ADVANCED TOPICS<br/><br/>25. Eric Maskin (1999), 'Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality', Review of Economic Studies, 66, 23-38 <br/><br/>26. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), 'Subgame Perfect Implementation', Econometrica, 56 (5), September, 1191-220 <br/><br/>27.Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1986), 'Incentive Theory with Data Compression', in Walter P. Heiler, Ross M. Starr and <br/>David A. Starrett (eds), Uncertainty, Information, and Communication: Essays in Honor o! Kenneth J. Arrow, Volume III, Chapter 10, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 239-53 <br/><br/>28.Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1986), 'Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design', Review o! Economic Studies, <br/>LIII (3, No. 174), July, 447-56 <br/><br/>29.Jacques Crémer, Fahad Khalil and Jean-Charles Rochet (1998), 'Contracta and Productive Information Gathering', Games and <br/>Economic Behavior, 25, 174-93 <br/><br/>30. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1987), 'Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives', <br/>Econometrica, 55 (2), March, 303-28 <br/><br/>31. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole (1990), 'The Principal-agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private <br/>Values', Econometrica, 58 (2), March, 379-409 <br/><br/>32. Mark Armstrong and Jean-Charles Rochet (1999), 'Multi-dimensional Screening: A User's Guide', European Economic Review, 43, 959-79 <br/><br/>Name Index <br/><br/><br/> |
