| Conteúdo |
Contents<br/>Acknowledgements<br/>General Introduction Claude Ménard Introduction Claude Ménard<br/><br/>PART I NATURE AND LIMITS OF CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS<br/>1. Oliver E. Williamson (1985), 'Assessing Contract', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1 (1), 177-208<br/><br/>2. Jean Tirole (1999), 'Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?', Econometrica, 67 (4), July, 741-81<br/><br/>3. Victor P. Goldberg (1976), 'Regulation and Administered Contracts', Beil Journal of Economics, 7 (2), Autumn, 426-48 <br/><br/>4. Benjamin Klein (1980), 'Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 70 (2), May, 356-62 <br/><br/>5. Oliver E. Williarnson (1983), 'Credible Conimitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange', American Economic Review, 73 (4), September, 519-40 <br/><br/>6. Arthur L. Stinchcombe (1990), 'Orgamzing Information Outside the Firm: Contracts as Hierarchical Documents', in Information and Organizations, Chapter 6, Berkeley, Los Angeles, CA and Oxford: University of California Press, 194-239, references <br/><br/>7. Yoram Ben-Porath (1980), 'The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange', Population and Development Review, 6(1), March, 1-30 <br/><br/>8. Stewart Macaulay (1963), 'Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study', American Sociological Review, 28 (1), February, 55-67 <br/><br/>PART II CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTRACTS<br/>9. Paul L. Joskow (1987), 'Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coa! Markets', American Economic Review, 77 (1), March, 168-85<br/><br/>10. Scott E. Masten and Keith J. Crocker (1985), 'EfficientAdaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas', American Economic Review, 75 (5), December, 1083-93 <br/><br/>11. J. Harold Mulherin (1986), 'Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (1), Spring, 105-17 <br/><br/>12. Victor P. Goldberg and John R. Erickson (1987), 'Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke', Journal of Law and Economics, XXX (2), October, 369-98<br/><br/>13. Thomas M. Palay (1984), 'Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting', Journal of Legal Studies, XIII (2), June, 265-87 <br/><br/>14. Keith J. Crocker and Kenneth J. Reynolds (1993), 'The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement', RAND Journal of Economics, 24 (1), Spring, 126-46 <br/><br/>15. Stéphane Saussier (2000), 'Transaction Costs and Contractual Incompleteness: The Case of Électricité de France', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 42 (2), June, 189-206 <br/><br/>16. Mary M. Shirley and Lixin Colin Xu (1998), 'Information, Incentives, and Commitment: An Empirical Analysis of Contracts Between Government and State Enterprises', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 14 (2), October, 358-78 <br/><br/>PART III ENFORCEMENT ISSUE<br/>17. Avner Greif (1993), 'Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition', American Economic Review, LXXXIII (3), June, 525-48 <br/><br/>18. Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler (1981), 'The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance', Journal of Political Economy, 89 (4), 615-41 <br/><br/>19. Thomas M. Palay (1985), 'Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the Role of Informal Agreements', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1 (1), 155-75 <br/><br/>20. Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast (1994), Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild', Journal ofPolirical Economy, 102 (4), 745-76 <br/><br/>21. Alan Schwartz (1992), 'Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies', Journal Legal Studies, XXI, June, 271-318 <br/><br/>22. Gary D. Libecap and Steven N. Wiggins (1985), 'The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Field Unitization', Journal of Political Economy, 93 (4), 690-714 <br/><br/>23. Benjamin Klein (1996), 'Why Hold-Ups Occur: The SeIf-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships', Economic Inquiry, XXXIV (3), July, 444-63 <br/><br/>Name Index <br/><br/><br/> |
