The Political Economy of Institutions / (Registro n. 2673)

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020 ## - ISBN
ISBN 1843766655
040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação
Fonte de catalogação BR-BrCADE
090 ## - Número de Chamada
Localização na estante 330.1 P769
Cutter P769
245 14 - Titulo Principal
Título principal The Political Economy of Institutions /
260 ## - Editora
Cidade Cheltenham, Inglaterra:
Editora Edward Elgar,
Data 2004.
300 ## - Descrição Física
Número de páginas 666 p.
490 ## - Indicação de Série
Série The International Library of the New Institucional Economics,
Volume 6.
505 ## - Conteúdo
Conteúdo Contents<br/>Acknowledgements <br/>General Introduction Claude Ménard <br/>Introduction Claude Ménard <br/><br/>PART 1 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL NORMS<br/>1.Douglass C. North (1990), 'A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2 (4), 355-66 <br/><br/>2. Randail L. Calvert (1998), 'Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions', in Explaining Social Institutions, Ann Arbor, Ml: University of Michigan Press, 57-94, references <br/><br/>3. Terry M. Moe (1990), 'Political Institutions: The Negleced Side of the Story', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6, Special Issue, 213-53 <br/><br/>4.Barry R. Weingast (1995), 'The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11 (1), <br/>April, 1-31 <br/><br/>5.Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall (1988), 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1), 132-63<br/><br/>6. Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. Munger (1986), 'Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented', American Political Science Review, 80(1), March, 89-106 <br/><br/>7. Avner Greif (1994), 'Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies', Journal of Political Economy, 102 (5), <br/>October, 912-50<br/><br/>8. Stanley L. Engerman (1997), 'Cultural Values, Ideological Beliefs, and Changing Labor Institutions: Notes on Their Interactions', iii John N. Drobak and John V.C. Nye (eds), The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics, Chapter V, San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 95-119<br/><br/>9. Jon Elster (1989), 'Social Norms and Economic Theory', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3 (4), Fall, 99-117 <br/><br/>PART II THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF A MARKET ECONOMY <br/>10. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1989), 'Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England', Journal of Economic History, XLIX (4), December, 803-32 <br/><br/>11. Barry R. Weingast (1993), 'Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,(1), March, 286-311 <br/><br/>12. Peter Murreli and Mancur Olson (1991), 'The Devolution of Centrally Planned Economies', Journal of Compara tive Economics, 15 (2), June, 239-65 <br/><br/>13. Michael McFaul (1999), 'Lessons from Russia's Protracted Transition from Communist Rule', Political Science Quarterly, (1), Spring, 103-30 <br/><br/>14. Pranab K. Bardhan (2000), 'Understanding Underdevelopment: Challenges for Institutional Economics From the Point of View of Poor Countries', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 156 (1), March, 216-35<br/><br/>15. Ross Levine (1997), 'Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda', Journal of Economic Literature, XXXV (2), June, 688-726 <br/><br/>16. Philip Keefer and Stephen Knack (1997), 'Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of an Institutional Explanation', Economic lnquiry, XXXV (3), July, 590-602 <br/><br/>PART III LONG RUN PERSPECTIVES <br/>17. Avner Greif (1998), 'Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 88 (2), May, 80-84<br/><br/>18. Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1990), 'The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs', Economics and Politics, 2 (1), March, 1-23 <br/><br/>19. Lee J. Alston and Joseph P. Ferrie (1993), 'Paternalism in Agricultural Labor Contracts in the U.S. South: Implications for the Growth of the Welfare State', Arnerican Economic Review, 83 (4), <br/>September, 852-76 <br/><br/>20. Stanley L. Engerman, Stephen H. Haber and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (2000), 'Inequality, Institutions and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies', in Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations: Perspectives from New Institutional Economics, Chapter 11, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 108-34<br/><br/>21. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2001), 'The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation', Ainerican Economic Review, 91 (5), December,1369-401 <br/><br/>22. Douglass C. North (1997), 'Transaction Costs Through Time', in Claude Ménard (ed), Transaction Cost Economics: Recent Developinents, Chapter 6, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA,<br/>USA: Edward Elgar, 149-60 <br/><br/>Name Index <br/><br/><br/>
700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal
9 (RLIN) 782
Nome pessoa MENARD, Claude
Relação Editor
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