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Contents<br/>Preface to the Sixth Edition <br/>Preface to the Fifth Edition <br/>Preface to the Fourth Edition <br/>Preface to the First Edition <br/><br/>Chapter 1.The Setting for Antitrust Analysis <br/>100 Prologue <br/>101 Organization; cavcat <br/>102 Bibliographic note <br/>Antitrust Study, Generally <br/>103 Economic power <br/>104 The antitrust laws: <br/>(a) Nature of the statutes <br/>(b) Legislative history; congressional role<br/>105 Economic theory, uncertainty, and the judicial role <br/>1 A.The Role of Competition: Analytic Model and Useful Tendency <br/>The Value of Perfect Competition <br/>106 Perfect competition defined <br/>107 Competition and efficiency <br/>108 The dynamic adjustment process <br/>109 Consumer decisions as the basis for market choice: <br/>(a) Consumer preferences weighted by wealth <br/>(b) Consumer choice "mistaken" <br/>110 Competition unhelpful or limited: <br/>(a) Externalities <br/>(b) Public goods <br/>(c) Economies of scale <br/>(d) Additional imperfections <br/>111 The value of perfect competition and the role of antitrust policy <br/>Perfect and Imperfect Competition Compared <br/>112 Price and output decisions: <br/>(a) Monopoly <br/>(b) Perfect competition compared <br/>(c) Oligopoly <br/>113 Allocative efficiency <br/>1114 Barriers to entry <br/>115 Cost minimization <br/>116 Promotion and product differentiation: <br/>(a) Product identification <br/>(b) Product differentiation <br/>117 Other values of competition: <br/>(a) Income distribution <br/>(b) The distribution of opportunities<br/>(c) The control of unchecked power<br/>(d) Fairness in economic behavior <br/>(e) Economic stabilization <br/>Possible Grounds for Deemphasizing Competition <br/>118 The example of public restraints <br/>119 Economies of scale: <br/>(a) Efficiency and firm sue <br/>(b) Data <br/>(c) Implications <br/>120 Invention and innovation: <br/>(a) The argument <br/>(b) Size <br/>(c) Concentration <br/>(d) Synthesis <br/>112 Adjustment pains <br/>122 Social responsibility <br/>123 Countervailing power <br/>124 The theory of second best <br/>Workable Competition <br/>125 The problem <br/>126 Criteria <br/>127 Summary<br/>1B.Enacting the Antitrust Laws <br/>128 Common-law background: <br/>(a) Middleman offenses <br/>(b) Monopoly <br/>(c) Restraints of trade <br/>(d) Conspiracy <br/>(e) Limiting corporate powers <br/>129 Political background: <br/>(a) Reform sentiment <br/>(b) Political manifestations <br/>130 Enactment of the Sherman Act: legislative history and contemporary political understanding: <br/>(a) Relationship of Sherman Act and common Iaw <br/>(b) Senator Sherman <br/>(c) H.Thorelli <br/>(d) R. Hofstadter <br/>(e) Antitrust policy goals in light of legislative history <br/>131 Sherman Act: procedure and early cases: <br/>(a) Procedure <br/>(b) Early cases <br/>132 The 1914 legislation <br/>133 Later statutes and guidelines <br/>1C.Procedures for Enforcing the Antitrust Laws <br/>134 Sanctions generally<br/>Criminal Punishment<br/>135 Which statutes?<br/>136 Frequency: governrnent practice <br/>137 Appropriateness of criminal taw <br/>138 Differentiating antitrust offenses according to remedy? <br/>(a) Statutory language <br/>(h) Criminal offense distinguished<br/>(c) Behavioral prerequisite for damages <br/>(d) Denying some private equity actions <br/>Equitable Relief <br/>139 Proceeding in equity <br/>140 Private suits in equity <br/>141 Consent decrees: <br/>(a) Nature and significance <br/>(b) Modification <br/>(c) Third-party interests<br/>(d) Judicial role <br/>142 Cease and desist orders: <br/>(a) ETC jurisdiction<br/>(b) ETC proceedings <br/>(c) ETC remedial powers <br/>(d) Judicial review <br/>(e) Rulemaking <br/>(f) Intragovernmental coordination<br/>Private Actions <br/>143 Treble damages: <br/>(a) Generally <br/>(b) Proving damages <br/>(c) Joint and several liability; contribution <br/>144 Standing and related doctrines: an introduction<br/>145 Standing and limitations concerning the directness of injury:<br/>(a) Introduction <br/>(b) Passing on and consumer recoveries<br/>(c) Employees <br/>(d) Derived injuries<br/>(e) Other business or property questions <br/>(f) Clayton Act §7 violations <br/>(g) Parens patriae <br/>(h) Equity suits compared <br/>146 Antitrust injury: <br/>(a) Introduction; relationship of antitrust injury doctrine to standing <br/>(b) Brunswick <br/>(c) Cargill<br/>(d) Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) <br/>147 Class actions <br/>148 Plaintiff participation in defendant's antitrust violation <br/>149 Unclean hands in nonantitrust suit Preparing and Trying Antitrust Cases <br/>150 Venue and jurisdiction <br/>151 Investigations and discovery <br/>152 Pleadings; summary judgment <br/>153 Jury trial <br/>154 The big case <br/>155 Appeals <br/>Repose <br/>156 Advisory opinions and clearances <br/>157 Statütes of limitation<br/>(a) Private suits: generally <br/>(b) Government suit tolls statute of limitation <br/>(c) Government suits <br/>158 Res judicata<br/>(a) Merger and bar <br/>(b) Collateral estoppel <br/>(c) Government judgments and private suits<br/>(d) Res judicata and state law <br/>1D. The Reach of the Antifrust Laws <br/>159.Introduction <br/>Exemptions<br/>160.Regulated industries<br/>(a)Background<br/>(b) "Public interest" mandate to regulators <br/>(c) Primary jurisdiction and pervasive regulation <br/>(d) Where regulation is less pervasive <br/>161 Labor unions <br/>162 Other exermptions<br/>(a) Agricultural organizations <br/>(b) Bank mergers <br/>(c) Professional sports <br/>State Law and State Action <br/>163 State law: primacy, invalidity, or accommodation<br/>(a) Generally <br/>(b) Express primacy for state law <br/>(c) Invalid state laws <br/>164 Preemption by the antitrust laws<br/>(a) State antitrust laws <br/>(b) State laws limiting competition<br/>165 Antitrust irnmunitv for state action<br/>(a) Initial development<br/>(b) Adequate supervision and clearly articulated purpose to displace competition<br/>(c) Compulsion <br/>(d) Immunity of governrnent bodies <br/>(e) Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 <br/>(f) Distinguishing private from governmental action <br/>Interstate commerce <br/>166 Sherman Act <br/>167 Clayton Act; FFC Act <br/>Foreign Commerce <br/>168 Extraterritorial reach<br/>(a) Statutory development <br/>(b) Comity <br/>(c) Act of state <br/>(d) Sovereign immunity <br/>(e) Extraterritoriality and other jurisdictions' competition laws <br/>169 Restraints affecting exports <br/>1E.The Patent System <br/>170 Prologue: <br/>(a) Relevance of patent laws to antitrust <br/>(b) Introduction to patents <br/>(c) Trade secret and copyright protections <br/>Premises of the Patent System <br/>171 Rationale <br/>172 Costs of a patent system <br/>173 Patents as incentives <br/>(a) Generally <br/>(b) Need for protection <br/>(c) Nonpatent incentives <br/>(d) Development incentives<br/>Operation of the Patent System <br/>174 Patentability<br/>(a) Patentable subject matter <br/>(b) Conditions of patentabiity <br/>175 Standard of invention <br/>176 Obtaining a patent <br/>177 Patent validity<br/>Remedies <br/>178 Patent misuse doctrine <br/>179 Antitrust remedies <br/><br/>Chapter 2. Horizontal Restraints: Collaboration Among Competitors <br/>200 Prologue <br/>2A.Development of the Rule of Reason and the Per Se <br/>Illegality of Price Fixing <br/>201 Anticompetitive effect of cartels: <br/>(a) The cartel problem <br/>(b) Cheating in carteis <br/>(c) Cartel justifications <br/>(d) Preventing cut throat competition <br/>(e) Preserving needed capacity <br/>(f) Reducing uncertainty <br/>(g) Financing desirable activities <br/>(h) Countervailing power <br/>(i) Assessment <br/>Sherman Act 1 <br/>202 Trans-Missouri <br/>Addyston Pipe & Steel <br/>203 Joint Traffic <br/>204 Standard Oil <br/>205 <br/>Chicago Board of Trade <br/>206 <br/>Trenton Potteries <br/>207 <br/>208 Appalachian Coals <br/>Socony-Vacuum Oil <br/>209 <br/>210 <br/>211 <br/>212 Per se rules: <br/>(a) Rationale <br/>(b) Meaning: scope of inquiry <br/>(c) Meaning: coverage of category <br/>2B. Modern Applications: Determining Which Restraints Are Reasonable <br/>213 Introduction <br/>214 Cartel variations: <br/>(a) Allocating markets <br/>(b) Other limits on price competition <br/>Top co Associates <br/>215 <br/>216 Palmer <br/>Broadcast Music ('BMJ) <br/>217 <br/>Maricopa County Medical Society <br/>218 <br/>National Sociely of Professional Engineers <br/>219 <br/>220 <br/>National Collegiate Athletic Association (NGAA)<br/>221 <br/>California Dental <br/>222 <br/>223 Joint ventures - introduction <br/>224 Goverrment health care enforcement policy statements<br/>225 <br/>226 National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993 <br/>227 <br/>228 Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors <br/>229<br/>2C. When Does an Agreement Exist? <br/>230 Introduction <br/>Oligopoly theory<br/>231 The oligopoly or shared monopoly problem<br/>232 Oligopoly—basic model and theory<br/>(a) Simple case <br/>(b) Elements of successful oligopoly <br/>(c) Cartels compared <br/>(d) Relevance of number of firms <br/>(e) Oligopoly pricing in the absence of cooperative behavior <br/>233 Factors affecting Iikelihood of oligopolistic coordination: <br/>(a) Introduction <br/>(b) Divergent interests <br/>(c) Available channels of verbal and nonverbal communication <br/>(d) Price comparability of products <br/>(e) Nonprice competition <br/>234 Factors affecting the potential gains from successful coordination, express or tacit<br/>(a) Fringe expansion <br/>(b) Substitute products or new entry <br/>235 Evidence on oligopoly pricing in the economy<br/>(a) Measuring economic performance and concentration <br/>(b) The empirical evidence on concentration and oligopoly pricing <br/>Tacit and inferred Express Agreements <br/>236 What constitutes an agreement? <br/>237 Eastern States <br/>Interstate Circuit <br/>Theatre Enterprises<br/>American Tobacco <br/>238 <br/>239 <br/>240 The object of courts' inquiry: <br/>(a) What issue? <br/>(b) Indications of express collusion <br/>(c) Motivation and acts against self-interest <br/>(d) Poor economic performance <br/>(e) Summary <br/>241 Matsushita Electric <br/>Intra enterprise Conspircy <br/>242 Introduction <br/>Copperweld <br/>243 <br/>1244 Additional intraenterprise conspiracy issues <br/>2D.Facilitating Practices <br/>245 Introduction <br/>246 <br/>247 Data dissemination <br/>American Column & Lumber <br/>Maple Flooring <br/>248 <br/>249 Historical notes on information exchange <br/>Container Gorp. <br/>250 <br/>251 <br/>252 General Motors <br/>253 Basing point pricing <br/>(a) Description <br/>(b) Economic effects <br/>(c) Collusion or competition?<br/>(d) Legal issues<br/>Cement Institute<br/>254 <br/>255 <br/>256 Remedies for basing point pricing<br/>257 duPont<br/>2E. Concerted Refusals to Deal <br/>258 Introduction<br/>259 Early cases:<br/>(a) Eastern States<br/>(b) Gemeni Manufacturers<br/>(c) Motion picture cases<br/>(d) McCann<br/>Fashion Originators' Guild (FOGA) <br/>260 <br/>261 <br/>Kior's <br/>262 <br/>263 <br/>(a) American Medical<br/>(b) Molinas<br/>264<br/>Associated Press<br/>265<br/>266<br/>Northwest Wholesale Stationers<br/>267<br/>268<br/>Indiana Federation of Dentists<br/>269<br/>270 NYNEX<br/>271 Additional varieties of concerted refusals to deal <br/>272 Summary<br/>2F. Influencing Government Action <br/>273 Introduction <br/>Noerr Motor Freight<br/>274<br/>Calfornia Motor Transport<br/>275<br/>Professional Real Estale<br/>276<br/>Omni Outdoor Advertising<br/>277<br/>Indian Head<br/>278<br/>279 National Organization for Women (NOW)<br/>Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (SCTL4)<br/>280<br/>2G. Intellectual Property Licensing and Settlements<br/>281 Introduction<br/>Price-Restricted Licenses and the IF-Antitrust Tension Generally General Electric<br/>282 The IP-antitrust conflict:<br/>(a) Is there a conflict?<br/>(b) Formalistic resolutions<br/>(c) Resolving the conflict<br/>283 Use, assignment, or licensing<br/>284 Price and related restrictions in IP licenses:<br/>(a) Reasons for refusing to license without a price restriction <br/>(b) Output limitations <br/>(c) Territorial limitations <br/>(d) Exclusive licenses <br/>(e) IP licenses and vertical restraints <br/>285 Suppression; compulsory licensing<br/>(a) Nonuse explained<br/>(b) Precedent <br/>(c) De facto compulsory licensing <br/>(d) Compulsory licensing <br/>286 <br/>287 <br/>288 Post-GE developments:<br/>(a) Does GE survive? <br/>(b) Unpatented product or non manufacturing patentee <br/>(c) Multiple patents <br/>(d) Multiple licenses <br/>Use Restrictions <br/>289 Introduction <br/>290 Price discrimination, patent exploitation, and use restrictions<br/>(a) Discrimination's nature and prerequisites<br/>(b) Discrimination's consequences<br/>(c) Discrimination and patent exploitation <br/>(d) Use restrictions and discrirninatory royalties <br/>291 The legality of use restrictions: <br/>(a) Genera/Talking Pictures <br/>(b) Limiting use of purchased patented product <br/>292 <br/>IP Settlements <br/>293 The problem: <br/>(a) Private benefits of IP settlement <br/>(b) Social benefits of settlement <br/>294 The legality of IP settlments <br/>295 <br/><br/>Chapter 3.Monopoly <br/>300 Prologue <br/>Sherman Act §2 <br/>301 Useful definitions <br/>SA.Monopolization <br/>The Distinction Between Monopoly and Monopolization <br/>302 The bad conduct element <br/>303 Early landmarks <br/>(a) Standard Oil <br/>(b) American Tobacco <br/>(c) American Can <br/>(d) United States Steel<br/>304<br/>Aluminurn (Alcoa) <br/>305 <br/>306 <br/>1307 Remedies in Alcoa <br/>308 <br/>309 American Tobacco <br/>Leverage and the Single Monopoly Profit Theorem <br/>310 Is leverage an act of monopolization ora way to enjoy monopoly profits? <br/>Griffith <br/>311 <br/>Refining the Notion of Exclusionary Behavior <br/>United Shoe <br/>312 The monopolization test: Grinmell <br/>313 <br/>314 <br/>315 <br/>316 <br/>317 <br/>318 <br/>319 <br/>320 <br/>321 Microsoft remedies <br/>Legislative Deconcentration <br/>322 Deconcentration: no-fault monopoly and oligopoly<br/>(a) S. 2614<br/>(b) S.1167 <br/>(c) Rationale <br/>323 Oligopoly and single-firm monopoly compared <br/>324 Sherman Act §2 coverage <br/>Vertical integration and Dealing with Competitors <br/>325 Vertical integration in brief: <br/>(a) Overview <br/>(b) A second monopoly? Or is it only price discrimination? <br/>(c) Avoiding successive monopoly <br/>(d) Avoiding inefficient input substitudon <br/>(e) Long-run effects on market structure and performance <br/>(f) Summary <br/>326 Otter Tail Power <br/>327 Berkfy Photo <br/>Aspen Skiing <br/>328 <br/>329 <br/>330 AT&T divestiture <br/>Trinko <br/>331 <br/>332 <br/>Predatory Picing <br/>Barry Wright <br/>333 <br/>334 <br/>Brooke Group <br/>335<br/>AMR Corp<br/>336<br/>337 <br/>Patent Accumulation<br/>338 Patent accumulation: development and acquisition <br/>339 The authorides ou accumulation <br/>340 <br/>341 <br/>313.Monopoly Power <br/>342 Introduction<br/>343 Monopoly and market power: <br/>(a) Defining monopoly in terms of market power <br/>(b) The price of monopoly <br/>(c) Market power as power over price <br/>(d) Market power and the goals of the antitrust laws <br/>344 Ways of measuring market power: <br/>(a) Introduction <br/>(b) Difficulty of direct measurement <br/>(c) Unexploited power <br/>(d) Prospective power <br/>(e) Power inferred from conduct <br/>345 Determinants of market power: <br/>(a) Buyer responsiveness determines seller's power <br/>(b) Price at which buvers' alternatives are assessed <br/>(c) High margins under monopolistic competition <br/>346 Market definition, the relevant market, and market share<br/>(a) The market definition concept <br/>(b) Market share and market power<br/>(c) Group power <br/>347 More about product market definition: <br/>(a) Differentiated products, different brands <br/>(b) Physically different products <br/>(c) Elasticity versus cross-elasticity <br/>348 Geographic market definition <br/>349 Competitors, supply substitution, and entry: <br/>(a) Expansion by immediate competitors <br/>(b) Supply substitution <br/>(c) Entry <br/>350 Summary of market power: unavoidable approximations <br/>351 Market definition and measurement under 1992 govemment merger guidelines <br/>Horizontal Merger Guidelines <br/>352 Determining the relevant market and monopoly power in practice <br/>Aluminum (Alcoa) <br/>353 <br/>354 <br/>du Pont (Gellophane) <br/>355 du Pont's profits <br/>356 <br/>357 <br/>358 <br/>Microsoft <br/>359 <br/>360 <br/>3C. Attempt to Monopolize <br/>361 <br/>Lorain journal <br/>362 <br/>363 <br/>364 American Airlines <br/>Spectrum Sorts <br/>365 <br/><br/>Chapter 4. Vertical Restraints <br/>400 Prologue <br/>4A.Restricted Distribution <br/>401 Introduction <br/>Vertical Price Fixing <br/>402 Introduction <br/>403 Low dealer markups can increase sales and manufacturer profits <br/>404 RPM as an instrument of a dealer cartel <br/>405 Higher markups from RPM could purchase better distribution: <br/>(a) High markups may buy dealer salesmanship and marketing <br/>(b) Absent RPM, free riding could limit dealer efforts <br/>(c) Markups may purchase market penetration <br/>406 Should RPM be deemed legal ifit increases a manufacturer's output? <br/>407 RPM could facilitate price coordination among manufacturers <br/>408 RPM could facilitate the unilateral exercise of manufacturer market power <br/>D,Miles <br/>409 <br/>410 Fair trade laws <br/>411 Maximum vertical price fixing: Albrecht <br/>Khan <br/>412 <br/>Sole Outlets; Territorial and Customer Limitations <br/>413 Territorial limitations generally: <br/>(a) Forms and degrees of limitations <br/>(b) Motivations <br/>Packard Motor Car <br/>414 <br/>415 Customer limitations<br/>(a) Controlling resellers<br/>(b) Allocating customers among dealers<br/>(c) Reserving customers to the manufacturer <br/>GTE Sylvania <br/>416 <br/>417 <br/>418 <br/>Agency and Similar Relationships <br/>419 Agency and partial vertical integration <br/>420 <br/>Refusal to Deal and Vertical Agreement <br/>421 The vertical agreement puzzle<br/>Colgate <br/>422 <br/>423 Parke Davis <br/>Monsanto <br/>424 <br/>Business Electronics <br/>425 <br/>4B.Tying Arrangernents <br/>426 Introduction and variations <br/>427 Business reasons for tying: <br/>(a) Monopoly in the tied product <br/>(b) More "efficient" pricing of tyng product. <br/>(c) Price discrimination <br/>(d) Disguising price <br/>(e) Cost savings <br/>(f) Quality control or improvement <br/>(g) Summary <br/>428 Development in patent cases<br/>(a) Motion Picture Patents <br/>(b) Later elaboration <br/>(c) Tying by patentees and the antitrust laws <br/>429 Tying under the Clayton Act <br/>Clayton Act §3<br/>International Salt<br/>430<br/>Vorthern Pacfic Railwat<br/>431<br/>432 Coercion to purchase related products <br/>433 Voluntary ties:<br/>(a) Unrestrained choice<br/>(b) Preferential price <br/>434 United States v. Loew 's<br/>435<br/>436<br/>437 Mandatory package licensing of patents:<br/>(a) Patentee's reasons<br/>(b) General rule<br/>(c) Related patents<br/>(d) ldentifying a mandatory package<br/>438 Patent royalty base:<br/>(a) Duration of payments<br/>(b) Sale price of unpatented products<br/>439 International Business Machines<br/>Jerrold Electronics<br/>440 <br/>441 <br/>442 <br/>443 Fortner Enterprises<br/>444 <br/>445 Coping with noninjurious fies<br/>Jeffeison Parish Hospital <br/>446 <br/>Microsoft <br/>447 <br/>Eastman Kodak <br/>448 <br/>4C.Exclusive Dealing <br/>449 Introduction<br/>450 Objects of exclusive dealing:<br/>(a) Preempting outlets<br/>(b) Assured markets or prices for sellers and buyers<br/>(c) Promoting dealer loyalty and investment<br/>(d) Other cost savings<br/>Standard Oil (Standard Stations) <br/>451 <br/>452 <br/>453 Motion Picture Advertising Service<br/>454 <br/>455 Tampa Eletric<br/>456 <br/>457 <br/>458 <br/>Barry wright <br/>459 <br/><br/>Chapter 5. Mergers: Horizontal, Vertical, and Conglomerate<br/>500 Prologue<br/>5A.Concentration Levels and Merger Motivations <br/>501 The extent of concentration <br/>502 Merger motives: <br/>(a) Anticompetitive reasons <br/>(b) Easier expansion or enny <br/>(c) Operating efficiencies and scale economies <br/>(d) Financial gains without new efficiencies <br/>(e) Financial gains with new efficiencies <br/>(f) Management goals <br/>(g) Substituting better management <br/>(h) Defensive mergers <br/>(i) The net reckoning <br/>5B. Introduction to Merger Law <br/>503 Early Sherman Act cases: <br/>(a) Northern Securities <br/>(b) Union Pacific <br/>(c) United States Steel <br/>(d) Columbia Steel <br/>Clayton Act §7 <br/>504 Legislative history of amended §7<br/>(a) Brown Shoe <br/>(b) D. Bok <br/>505 Market definition; multiple rnarkets involved<br/>(a) lmportance monopoly and merger compared <br/>(b) Multiple rnarkets <br/>506 Modern merger practice and premerger notification <br/>5C.Horizontal Mergers <br/>507 <br/>Brown Shoe <br/>508 <br/>509 <br/>Philadelphia National Bank <br/>510 <br/>511 <br/>512 <br/>513 <br/>514 Continental Can <br/>515 Von Grocery<br/>516 Reduced antagonism to mergers <br/>General Dynamics <br/>517 <br/>518 The failing company defense <br/>319 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: introduction <br/>Horizontal Merger Guidelines <br/>520 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: basic operation <br/>Stapks <br/>521 <br/>522 <br/>523 <br/>524 Uses of the Philadelphia Bank holding<br/>525 Merger simulation <br/>526 Recent investigations and settlements <br/>527 Hospital mergers <br/>528 Tenel Health Gare <br/>529 <br/>Butterworth <br/>530 <br/>531 <br/>532 <br/>533 Efflciencies:<br/>(a) Introduction<br/>(b) Economies of scale or of production allocation<br/>(c) Economies outside the horizontal context<br/>(d) Financing efficiencies<br/>(e) Acquiring efficiencies through contract, not merger<br/>534 <br/>535 <br/>536 <br/>537 Interlocking directorates<br/>5D. Vertical Mergers <br/>538 Early development:<br/>(a) Sherman Act cases<br/>(b) du Pont (General Motors)<br/>Brown Shoe <br/>539 <br/>540 Vertical mergers under 1984 government guidelines:<br/>(a) Entry barriers raised<br/>(b) Vertical mergers facilitating coliusion<br/>(c) Evasion of rate regulation<br/>(d) Efficiencies<br/>(e) Applications of the Guidelines to vertical rnergers<br/>541 <br/>542 <br/>5E.Conglomerate Mergers <br/>543 The conglomerate problem<br/>Procter & Gamble (Clowx) <br/>544 <br/>545 Eliminating potential competition:<br/>(a) Generally<br/>(b) The relationship between present and potential future competition<br/>(c) Potential competition and joint ventures<br/>546 Subsequent potential competition decisions:<br/>(a) The toehold doctrine<br/>(b) Bendix<br/>(c) Falstaff Brewing<br/>(d) Marine Bancoiporation<br/>547 Predation, pricing discipline, and the powerfull firm:<br/>(a) Predation <br/>(b) Pricing discipline or leadership<br/>548 Conglomerate mergers under 1984 government guidelines<br/>549 <br/>550 Reciprocity: <br/>(a) Generally<br/>(b) Purposes<br/>(c) Relevant questions<br/>(d) Agreements<br/>(e) Mergers<br/>Consolidated Food <br/>551 <br/>552 International Telephone & Telegraph:<br/>(a) Claims concerning Grinnell's dominance and the competitive advantages it would gain through the merger<br/>(b) The economic concentration claim<br/>(c) The settlements<br/>553 <br/>554 Recent conglomerate mergers and government enforcement<br/><br/>Chapter 6. Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act<br/>600 Prologue<br/>Robinson-Patman Act §2(a) and §2(b)<br/>601 General requirements of 2(a)<br/>602 The development of §2:<br/>(a) The original provision<br/>(b) Background of the 1936 legislation<br/>6A. Primary-Line Injury ¶ 603<br/>604 Utah Pie<br/>605 Brooke Group<br/>6B. Secondary-Line Injury<br/>Morton Salt<br/>606<br/>607<br/>Texaco<br/>608<br/>609<br/>610 Borden<br/>611<br/>6C. Afirmative Defenses Under §2(a) and §2(b) Cost Justfication<br/>612 Introduction:<br/>(a) Scope of defense; burden of proof<br/>(b) The relevant costs<br/>Borden <br/>613<br/>Meeting Competition in Good Faith<br/>614 Introduction<br/>615 Good faith and knowledge of rivals' prices<br/>(a) A.E. Staley Man ufacturing<br/>(b) United States Gypsum<br/>(c) Great Atlantic & Pacfic Tea (A&P)<br/>616<br/>617 Good faith and pricing systems:<br/>(a) A.E. Stanley Manufacturing<br/>(b) - Falis City Industries 1(i18<br/>619 <br/>6D. Supplementary Provisions<br/>Buyer Liability <br/>620 Congressional concern with buyers <br/>621 Aulomatic Canteen<br/>Great Atlantic & Pricfic Tea (A &P)<br/>622<br/>Brokerage<br/>Robinson-Patman Act §2(c)<br/>623 The brokerage prohibition:<br/>(a) Statutory purpose as stated by the Supreme Court<br/>(b) Requirements for violation and availability of defenses <br/>(c) When brokerage is "for services rendered" <br/>(d) Identifying "a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu there of" <br/>(e) Application to commercial bribery <br/>(f) Buyer liabilitv <br/>Discriminatory Allowances or Services <br/>Robinson-Patrnan Act §2(d) and §2(e) <br/>624 The prohibition on discriminatory allowances or services: <br/>(a) The statutory concern <br/>(h) Requirements for violation and availability of defenses <br/>(c) When is an allowance or service "available on proportionally equal terms"? <br/>(d) The competing customer requirement <br/>(e) Distinguishing price discrimination from promotional allowances<br/>(f) Buyer liability <br/>Appendix. Selected Statutes <br/>ShermanAct <br/>Clayton Ad <br/>Federal Trade Commission Ad <br/>Table of Gases <br/>Index <br/> |
