Annual proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute: (Registro n. 2787)
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Campo fixo de controle local | 190617s2006 us gr 000 0 eng u |
020 ## - ISBN | |
ISBN | 1578232120 |
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Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
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Localização na estante | 341.3787 A615 |
Cutter | A615 |
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Título principal | Annual proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute: |
Subtítulo | International Antitrust Law & Policy: 2006/ |
260 ## - Editora | |
Cidade | Nova Iorque, Estados Unidos: |
Editora | Juris Publishing, |
Data | 2006. |
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Número de páginas | 660 p. |
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Conteúdo | Foreword<br/><br/>Summary Table of Contents <br/>Table of Contents<br/>Welcome and Opening Remarks<br/><br/>Chapter 1 <br/>BRAZILIAN COMPETITION POLICY SYSTEM by Elizabeth Farina <br/><br/>I. Introduction <br/>II. Benefits of Antitrust Enforcement, Measurement and Justification of Antitrust Structure in a Developing Country <br/>III. Judicial Review <br/>IV. Independency and Relationship Between the Competition Authority Government <br/><br/>Chapter 2 <br/>THE POLICY OF COMMITMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW: FIRST STEPS AND FIRST UPDATE ON TI III FRENCH CASE by Bruno Lasserre <br/><br/>I. Introduction <br/>II The Appearance of a New Market Regulation Instrument: The Commitments Procedure <br/>A. Commitments: Continued Moves to Modernize Competition Law<br/>B. Commitments: The Need to Adapt the National Procedural Framework<br/>III. Adoption of the New Instrument: A Successful Start<br/>A. A Clearly Attractive Procedure<br/>B. A Promising Procedure <br/><br/><br/>Chapter 3 <br/>ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES by Philip Lowe <br/><br/>I. Cartels <br/>II. Sector Inquiries <br/>III. Article 82 - Abuse of Dominance <br/>IV. Bringing Down State Barriers <br/>A. Competition Screening <br/>B. Professions <br/>V. Enforcement Action Against State Measures <br/>A. Article 10, in Conjunction with Article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty <br/>B. Article 86 of the EC Treaty <br/>VI. Private Enforcement <br/>VII. Conclusion <br/><br/>Chapter 4 <br/>ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES ROUNDTABLE <br/><br/>Paul Victor, Presider <br/>Hon. Thomas 0. Barnett <br/>Ulf Doge <br/>Elizabeth Maria Mercier Querido Farina <br/>Mario Monti <br/>Bruno Lasserre <br/>Philip Lowe <br/>Hon. Deborah Platt Majoras <br/>Panel Discussion <br/><br/>Chapter 5 <br/>STANDARDS OF PROOF AND STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EU COMPETITION LAW by Hubert Legal <br/> <br/><br/>Chapter 6 <br/>STANDARDS OF PROOF AND STANDARDS OP JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EC MERGER LAW by Tony Reeves and Ninette Dodoo <br/><br/>I. Introduction <br/>II. The Distinction Between Standard of Proof and Standard of Review <br/>III. Standard of Proof <br/>A. General Principles <br/>B. Standard of Proof in Merger Cases <br/>IV. Standard of Review <br/>A. Appeal/Judicial Review <br/>B. Errors of Law <br/>C. Errors of Fact <br/>D. Error of Appreciation <br/>E. The Impact of Tetra Laval <br/>V. Conclusion <br/><br/>Chapter 7 <br/>STANDARDS OF PROOF AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: A U.S. PERSPECTIVE by Richard M. Steuer <br/><br/>I. Introduction <br/>II. Standard of Proof <br/>A. Criminal or Civil <br/>B. Court or Agency <br/>C. Stage of Proceeding <br/>D. Nature of Offense <br/>III. Standard of Review <br/>A. Criminal or Civil <br/>B. Court or Agency <br/>C. Stage of Proceeding <br/>D. Nature of Offense <br/>IV. Conclusion <br/><br/>Chapter 8 <br/>STANDARDS OF PROOF AND STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EC COMPETITION LAW ROUNDTABLE <br/><br/>Tony Reeves, Presider <br/>Hubert Legal <br/>Theofanis Christoforou <br/>Richard M. Steuer <br/>Panel Discussion <br/><br/>Chapter 9 <br/>OBSERVATIONS ON NEGOTIATING GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST SETTLEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES by James R. Atwood <br/><br/>I. The Interplay of U.S. Government Settlements and Private Treble Damage Litigation <br/>A. Criminal Investigations <br/>B. Civil Investigations <br/>II. Some Issues Unique to Investigations of International or Foreign Conduct <br/><br/>Chapter 10 <br/>PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMMISSION COMMITMENT DECISIONS: A STEEP CLIMB NOT A GENTLE STROLL by John Davies and Manish Das <br/><br/>I. Introduction <br/>II. The Releviince of Direct Effect <br/>III. Should Commitment Decisions be Capable of Direct Effect? <br/>A. The Binding Nature of Commitment Decisions <br/>B. The Principle of Effectiveness ("Effet Utile") <br/>C. Does a Commitment Decision Create Rights in Favour of Third Parties? <br/>D. Are Commitments Unconditional and Sufficiently Precise? <br/>E. Conclusion and Direct Effect <br/>F. Can Article 10 EC Treaty Help <br/>G. Procedural Problems <br/>IV. Conclusion <br/><br/>Chapter 11 <br/>SETTLEMENT OF COMPETITION CONDUCT VIOLATIONS AT THE UNITED STATES ANTITRUST AGENCIES AND AT THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION - SOME OBSERVATIONS <br/>by Daniel P. Ducore <br/><br/>I. Settling Cases at the United States Federal Trade Commission <br/>II. Conduct Remedies for Competition Violations <br/>Ill. Procedures for Settling Competition Violations <br/>IV. Remedies for Violations of FTC Orders <br/>V. U.S. Settlements and European Commission Commitments <br/>VI. Two Recent EC Settlements <br/>VII. Fines, Criminal Penalties, and Other Monetary Relief <br/>VIII. Some Implications of Settling With the Enforcement Agencies <br/><br/>Chapter 12 <br/>SOME ELEMENTS TO ENHANCE DAMAGES - ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN ARTICLES 81 AND 82 EC <br/>by Dr. Sven Norberg <br/><br/>I. Introduction <br/>II. Issues Addressed in this Paper <br/>A. General <br/>B. Fault Requirement <br/>C. The Passing-on Defence and the Indirect Purchaser <br/>D. Recent Amendments to the Swedish Competition Act <br/>E. Protection of Consumer Interests <br/>III. Some Conclusions <br/> <br/>Chapter 13 <br/>COMMITMENT DECISIONS AND SETTLEMENTS WITH ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES AND PRIVATE PARTIES UNDER EUROPEAN ANTITRUST LAW <br/>by John Temple Lang <br/><br/>I. Introduction <br/>Part I <br/>A. Undertakings in Pre-Regulation 1/2003 Cases <br/>B. Conditions in Decisions Under Article 81(3) <br/><br/>Part II <br/>A. Regulation 1/2003 on Commitment Decisions <br/>B. The Commission's Practice on Commitment Decisions So Far <br/>C. The Commission's Principal Commitment Cases Publicly Known So Far <br/><br/>Part III <br/>A. Companies' Reasons for Offering Commitments <br/>B. The Commission's Reasons for Considering Commitments <br/><br/>Part IV <br/>A. Procedure: The Statement of "Concerns" <br/>B. The Parties' Access to the Commission's File When Commitments Are Envisaged <br/>C. Publication of Proposed Commitments <br/>D. The Rights of Third Parties <br/>E. Safeguards within the Commission <br/>F. Decision for Limited Periods <br/>G. Commitments in Multiparty Cases <br/>H. Commitments and Leniency Applications <br/>I. Can an Offer of a Commitment Be Withdrawn? <br/><br/>Part V<br/>A. Terms of Commitments <br/>B. Legal Consequences of Commitment Decisions: Conduct within the Scope of the Commitment <br/>C. Legal Consequences of Commitment Decisions: Does the Commission Have to conclude that the Company Will Be Doing Nothing Illegal If It Fulfills its Commitments? <br/>D. Enforcement of Commitment Decisions <br/>E. Commitments in Specific Situations: Article 81 Cases <br/>F. Commitments in Article 82 Cases - Pricing <br/>G. Commitments - Price Squeezes <br/>H. Commitments - High Technology Industries <br/>I. Commitments in Regulated Industries <br/>J. Commitments Instead of Interim Measures <br/>K. Structural and Behavioural Commitments <br/>L Informal Commitments After Reg. 1/2003 <br/><br/>Part VI <br/>A. Judicial Review of Commitment Decisions 296 <br/>B. Interim Measures When a Commitment Decision Is Challenged 297 <br/>After the Commitment Decision: Changed Circumstances, and Amending and Terminating Commitments 298 <br/>D. What Assurance has the Company that the Commission Will Not Change Its Mind/ 299 <br/>E. Judicial Review of a Commission Refusal to Accept a Commitment 300 <br/><br/>Part VII <br/>A. Article 10 EC and the duties of National Antitrust Authorities and Courts under Commitment Decisions: Conduct after the Decision <br/>B. Arbitration <br/>C. Commitment Decisions by National Antitrust Authorities <br/>D. The European Economic Arena <br/>E. The Territorial Scope of National Commitment Decisions <br/>F. Commitment Decisions Based Only on National Law <br/>G. Some National Legislation on Commitment Decisions <br/>H. Some National Commitment Cases <br/>I. Commission Commitment Cases and U.S. Civil Consent Decrees Involving the Same Parties <br/><br/>Part VIII<br/>A. Settlement of Private Actions <br/>B. Tactics and Aims of Plaintiffs in Settlements <br/>C. Tactics for Defendants in Settlements <br/>D. Consequences of Commitments for Existing Contracts <br/><br/>Part IX <br/>A. Some Concerns about Commitment Decisions Procedures <br/>B. Possible Safeguards <br/>C. Suggestions for Companies and for the Commission <br/>D. Conclusion: A Popular Invention <br/><br/><br/>Chapter 14 <br/>THE FRENCH APPROACH TO SETTLEMENTS IN ANTITRUST PROCEDURES by Dither Theophile<br/> <br/>I. Introduction <br/>II. The Negotiated Settlement (Article L.464-2 III) <br/>A. Two Conditions for a Negotiated Settlement <br/>B. Procedural Aspects <br/>C. Calculation of the Fine <br/><br/>III. The commitment Procedure (Article L.464-2 I) <br/>A. A Flexible Approach <br/>B. Procedural Aspects <br/><br/>IV. First lesson to be Drawn From the French Practice <br/>A. Comparison of Commitment Decisions and Negotiated Settlement Decisions <br/>B. French Settlements Proceedings in Light of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 <br/><br/>V. Conclusion <br/><br/>Chapter 15 <br/>SETTLEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT CIVIL PROCEEDINGS AND PRIVATE ACTIONS ROUNDTABLE <br/><br/>John Davies, Presider <br/>James It Atwood <br/>Daniel P. Ducore <br/>Sven Norberg <br/>John Temple Lang <br/>Dither Théophile <br/>Panel Discussion <br/><br/>Chapter 16 <br/>TACKLING EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES TO AVOID EXPLOITATION OF MARKET POWER: SOME PREI MINARY THOUGHTS ON THE POLICY REVIEW OF ARTICLE 82 <br/>by Neelie Kroes <br/><br/>I. Article 82 <br/>II. Dominance <br/>HI. The Concept of Abuse <br/>IV. Price Based Abuses <br/>V. Article 82 and Intellectual Property Rights <br/>VI. Efficiencies <br/>VII. Concluding Remarks <br/><br/>Chapter 17 <br/>JUDICIAL REMEDIES UNDER EC COMPETITION LAW: COMPLEX ISSUES ARISING FROM THE "MODERNISATION" PROCESS by Damien Geradin and Nicolas Petit <br/><br/>I. Introduction 393 <br/>II. Acts That Can Be Challenged within the Context of EC Competition Law Post-Modernisation <br/>A. Establishing Whether an Act Is Challengeable within the Meaning of Article 230 EC <br/>B. Acts Open to Challenge within the Field of Competition Law Post-Modemisation <br/><br/>III. Those Having the "Quality to Act" in Annulment <br/>A. Decisions Where Applicant Is Not the Addressee <br/>B. Acts of a General Nature <br/><br/>IV. The Modalities of an Annulment Action <br/>A. Lodging and Appeal <br/>B. The Content of an Appeal <br/><br/>V. Judicial Actions Parallel and Subsequent to Article 230 Proceedings <br/>A. Increased Parallel Appeals Where the Community Courts Have Full Jurisdiction <br/>B. Appeals for Indemnity <br/><br/>VI. The Effectiveness of an Annulment Action <br/>A. Intensity of Judicial Review <br/>B. The Expedience of Judicial Review <br/>C. The Alternatives to the Current System of Judicial Review <br/><br/>VII. Conclusion <br/><br/>Chapter 18 <br/>COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN SWEDEN AND IN THE EU - PRESENT TRENDS by Christer A. Holm <br/><br/>I. Criminalization of Competition Law <br/>A. History of Criminalization Rules in Sweden <br/>B. Criminalization - The Proposed Model <br/>C. Answers to the Proposal <br/>D. EC Legal Aspects <br/>E. Conclusion <br/><br/>II. Other Signs of the Greater Impact of EC Competition Law in Sweden <br/>A. Right to Claim Damages <br/>B. Class Action <br/>C. Inspections in Private Homes and Other Premises <br/>D. Arbitration <br/>E. AstraZeneca and Article 82 <br/><br/>Chapter 19 TOWARDS A "SMART" ARTICLE 82 by Trevor Soames <br/><br/>I. Introduction <br/>II. The Great Reform Project <br/>III. Implications for Article 82 <br/>IV. Review of Article 82 <br/>V. Guidelines <br/>VI. Conclusion <br/><br/>Chapter 20 <br/>EC COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT LAW AND POLICY ROUNDTABLE <br/><br/>Trevor Soames, Presider <br/>Neelie Kroes <br/>Damien Geradin <br/>Christer A. Holm <br/>Panel Discussion <br/><br/>Chapter 21 <br/>PUBLIC OR PRIVATE PROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES? IF PRIVATE, FIXED TERM CONCESSIONS OR FULL PRIVATIZATION? <br/>by Alberto Heimler <br/><br/>I. Introduction <br/>II Concessions or Public Provision? <br/>A. Public Versus Private Provision of Public Services <br/>III. Fixed Tam Auctions, Privatization and Efficiency <br/>IV. Concessions, Auctions and Renegotiations: Some Practical Experience <br/>A. Aggressive Bidding <br/>B. Faulty Contract Design <br/>C. Government Failure to Honor Contract Clause <br/>D. Defective Regulation <br/>V. Auctions or Beauty Contests? <br/>VI. Public Services and Competition <br/>VII. Conclusions <br/><br/>Chapter 22 PRIVATIZATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE by Hal Moore and Sarah Ward <br/><br/>I. Concessions <br/>II. Water War: Cochabamba, Bolivia <br/>A. Background <br/>B. Terms of the Contract <br/>C. Life Under the Concession <br/>D. Regulatory Response <br/>E. Epilogue <br/><br/>III. Manila <br/>A. Background <br/>B. Terms of the Contract <br/>C. Life Under the Concession <br/>D. Regulatory Response <br/>E. Epilogue <br/><br/>IV. Buenos Aires <br/>A. Background <br/>B. Terms of the Contract <br/>C. Life Under the Concession <br/>D. Regulatory Response <br/>E. Epilogue <br/>V. Conclusion <br/><br/>Chapter 23 <br/>PRIVATIZATIONS/CONCESSIONS AND COMPETMON POLICY ROUNDTABLE <br/><br/>Merit E. Janow, Presider <br/>Alberto Heimler <br/>Frederic Jenny <br/>Harold F. Moore <br/>Panel Discussion <br/><br/><br/>Chapter 24 COMPETITION POLICY, ECONOMICS, AND ECONOMISTS: ARE WE EXPECTING TOO MUCH? <br/>by Andrew I. Cavil <br/><br/>I. Introduction <br/>II. What Are the Sources of Economic Wisdom for Antitrust Law and Policy, and How Do They Gain Access to Antitrust Law? <br/>A. The Institutions of Antitrust Law and Policy <br/>B. Access Points for Economic Ideas Common to Agencies and Courts <br/>C. Access Points for Economic Ideas Unique to Agencies and Courts <br/><br/>III. What Filters or Institutional Checks and Balances Are in Place to Ensure that Parties, Courts and Agencies Get the Economics "Right"? <br/>A. Checks and Balances on Economic Ideas Before Courts and Antitrust Agencies <br/>B. The Daubert Decision and Its Implications for Antitrust <br/><br/>IV. What Lessons Does the U.S. Experience Offer for Those Who Would Similarly Seek to Translate Economic Ideas into Competition Policy' <br/>A. The Dauber? Paradox: Can Courts Demand Too Much of Economics and Economists? <br/>B. Can the Economic Analysis of Commentators and Courts Exceed Their Own Expertise? <br/>V. Conclusion <br/><br/>Chapter 25 <br/>MAKING ECONOMICS MORE USEFUL IN COMPETITION CASES: PROCEDURAL RULES GOVERNING EXPERT OPINIONS by Gregory J. Werden <br/><br/>I. Introduction <br/>II. Reports by Economic Experts <br/>III. Qualifications <br/>IV. Reliability <br/>V. "Fit" <br/>VI. Other Procedures for Making Economics More Useful <br/>VII. Lessons for Competition Authorities <br/><br/>Chapter 26 <br/>ECONOMIC EXPERTS BEFORE AUTHORITIES AND COURTS ROUNDTABLE <br/><br/>Frederic Jenny, Presider <br/>Andrew I. Cavil <br/>Derek Ridyard <br/>Lars-Hendrick Roeller <br/>Gregory Werden <br/>Panel Discussion |
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Nome pessoa | HAWK, Barry E. |
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Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-11-19 | Doação | 30973 | 341.3787 A615 | 2019-1470 | 1 | 2019-11-19 | Livros |