Competition Law and Policy in Latin America: (Registro n. 2792)
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| Campo fixo de controle local | 191119b2017 ne |||gr|||| 00| 0 eng u |
| 020 ## - ISBN | |
| ISBN | 9789041160478 |
| 040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
| Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
| 090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
| Localização na estante | 341.3787 C737 |
| Cutter | C737 |
| 245 10 - Titulo Principal | |
| Título principal | Competition Law and Policy in Latin America: |
| Subtítulo | Recent Develpments/ |
| 260 ## - Editora | |
| Cidade | Holanda: |
| Editora | Wolters Kluwer, |
| Data | 2017. |
| 300 ## - Descrição Física | |
| Número de páginas | 374 p. |
| 505 ## - Conteúdo | |
| Conteúdo | Table of Contents<br/>Editor and Contributors <br/>Foreword <br/>António Comes<br/>Presentation <br/>Vinícius Marques de Carvalho<br/><br/>PART I<br/>Institutional Setups and Advocacy Efforts<br/><br/>CHAPTER I<br/>New Competition Policy in Mexico<br/>Carlos Mena Labarthe <br/>§1.01 Introduction <br/>§1.02 Overview of the Evolution of Competition Law in Mexico <br/>[A] First Competition Provisions <br/>[B] First Competition Law. The Real Emergence of a Competition Law <br/>[C] The Strengthening of Competition Law<br/>[1] Public Opinion as a Factor for Change<br/>[2] Relevant Cases <br/>[D] Transformation Factors That Became Amendments <br/>[1] The 2006 Legal Reform <br/>[2] The 2011 Legal Reform <br/>§1.03 Paradigm Shift in Competition Law <br/>[A] Political Context of the 2013 Constitutional Reform <br/>[B] The 2013 Constitutional Reform <br/>[1] Incremental Powers <br/>[2] Institutional Design of Checks and Balances<br/>[a] Autonomy Between the Investigative and the <br/>Decision-Making Authorities <br/>[b] More Accountability Obligations <br/>[c] Creation of Specialized Courts <br/>[C] The New Federal Law of Economic Competition<br/>§1.04 Chailenges and a New Competition Framework <br/>[A] Institutional Arrangements <br/>[B] Fight Against Carteis<br/>[C] Coordination with the IFT <br/>[D] Application of the New Powers of COFECE to Conduct Market Investigations <br/>[E] Market Studies <br/>[F] Mergers <br/>[G] Advocacy <br/>§1.05 Conclusion <br/><br/>CHAPTER 2<br/>New Competition Policy in Argentina<br/>Julidn Peiia <br/>§2.01 Introduction <br/>§2.02 Background <br/>§2.03 New Developments <br/>§2.04 Conclusions <br/><br/>CHAPTER 3<br/>New Competition Policy in Paraguay<br/>Cynthia Andino <br/>§3.01 Introduction <br/>§3.02 Legal Framework <br/>[A] Law No. 4956 (Competition Law) <br/>[B] Rules to Law No. 4956 <br/>§3.03 Illegal Conducts Established in Law No. 4956 <br/>[A] Anticompetitive Agreements <br/>[B] Abuse of Dominant Position <br/>[C] Merger Control <br/>§3.04 Relevant Conducts Not Classified in the Competition Law <br/>[A] Unfair Competition <br/>[B] State Aid <br/>§3.05 CONACOM: Paraguayan Competition Authority<br/>[A] CONACOM's Powers<br/>[B] Board of Qualifications <br/>§3.06 Procedure to Investigate and Punish Iliegal Acts Defined in Law No. 4956 <br/>[A] Anticompetitive Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Position<br/>Procedure<br/>[B] Concentrations and Merger Contro<br/>[C] The Administrative Sanctioning Procedure <br/>§3.07 Conclusions<br/>§3.08 Recommendations <br/>Bibliography <br/><br/>CHAPTER 4<br/>Antitrust Compliance Programs - The Brazilian Experience<br/>Marcela Mattiuzzo <br/>§4.01 Introduction <br/>§4.02 Compliance Programs in the Brazilian Context <br/>[A] The Rise of Antitrust Compliance in Brazil – Enforcement by the New BCDS <br/>[B] Antitrust and Anticorruption <br/>[C] The Current Status of the Regulation <br/>[11 Case Law - HSBC/Bradesco <br/>§4.03 Antitrust Compliance in Other Latin American Countries <br/>[A] Chile <br/>[B] Mexico <br/>§4.04 Final remarks <br/><br/>CHAPTER 5<br/>The Dissemination of the Competition Culture in Brazil: The Role Played by Civil Associations<br/>Eduardo Caminati Anders & Guilherme Teno Castilho Missali <br/>§5.01 Introduction <br/>§5.02 Antitrust Compliance Initiatives: A Brief Outline <br/>§5.03 Perceptions of the Competition Law in Brazil and Chailenges Ahead <br/>§5.04 Case analysis: an example of civil association (IBRAC) <br/>§5.05 Conclusions<br/><br/>CHAPTER 6<br/>Trends and Developments in Competition Advocacy in Latin America<br/>Manha Martínez Licetti, Lucia Viliarán & Tanja Goodwin <br/>§6.01 Introduction <br/>§6.02 Why Advocacy Efforts Are Relevant in the Context of Latin America <br/>§6.03 What is the Status of Competition Advocacy in Latin America? <br/>§6.04 What Lies Behind the Successful Advocacy Initiatives in Latin America? <br/>[A] Mexico <br/>[B] Peru <br/>[C] Colombia <br/>[D] El Salvador <br/>[E] Other Advocacy Strategies Conducted by Competition Agencies <br/>§6.05 What Lessons Can Be Drawn from Recent Advocacy in Latin <br/>America and the Useful Activities for the Future? <br/><br/>CHAPTER 7<br/>Pro-competitive Regulatory Assessment in Latin America<br/>Ania Thiemann, James Mancini & Rosana Aragón Plaza <br/>§7.01 Introduction <br/>§7.02 Why Are Pro-competitive Regulatory Frameworks Good for <br/>Latin American Economies? <br/>[A] Competition is Beneficial to Consumers <br/>[B] Competition Enhances Productivity <br/>[C] Regulatory Restrictions on Competition Harm Growth <br/>[D] Latin America Faces a High Regulatory Burden <br/>§7.03 What Is Competition Assessment of Regulations? <br/>§7.04 Recent Experience of Competition Assessment in Latiu America <br/>[A] Assessments That Found Limitations to the Number or Range of Suppliers <br/>[B] Assessments That Found Limitations to the Ability of Suppliers to Compete <br/>[C] Assessments That Found Limitations to Incentives of Suppliers to Compete <br/>[D] Assessments That Found Limitations to the Choices and Information Available to Consumers <br/>§7.05 Emerging Opportunities for Competition Assessment in Latin America <br/>[A] Ex post Assessment <br/>[B] Digital Economy Innovations <br/>§7.06 Conclusion <br/><br/>PART II<br/>Enforcement Experiences: Anticompetitive Practices and Merger Contral<br/><br/>CHAPTER 8<br/>Bid Rigging in Public Procurement in Colombia: Evolution and Chailenges<br/>Germdn Enrique Bacca Medina <br/>§8.01 Introduction <br/>§8.02 Bid Rigging in Public Procurement Evolution in Colombia <br/>[A] Brief Historical Review Prior to Law 1340 of 2009 <br/>[B] Modernization of the Colombian Regime and Change in <br/>the Strategy Against Bid Rigging in Public Procurement <br/>[C] Most Relevant Cases Foliowing Law 1340 of 2009 <br/>[1] COMSAT INTERNATIONAL (2010) Case <br/>[2] INPEC (2012) Case <br/>[3] RAPISCAN (2012) Case <br/>[4] VALME (2013) Case <br/>[5] CORMAGDALENA (2013) Case <br/>[6] NULE BIENESTARINA GROUP (2013) Case <br/>[7] NULE HOGARES (2013) Case <br/>[8] IDIPRON (2013) Case <br/>[9] PAVIGAS (2014) Case <br/>[10] VIGILANCIA (2015) Case <br/>§8.03 Conclusions <br/><br/>CHAPTER 9<br/>Predatory Pricing Policy for Latin American Emerging Economies<br/>Pablo Márquez <br/>§9.01 Introduction <br/>§9.02 lhe Economics of Price Predation<br/>[A] Exclusionary Pricing and Abusive Pricing Policy <br/>[B] Market Power, Exclusionary Behavior and Price Predation <br/>§9.03 Mainstream Standards for Predatory Pricing <br/>[A] Per Se Legal Below Cost Selling <br/>[B] Per Se lilegal Price Predation <br/>[1] Below Marginal Cost Predation <br/>[2] Below Average Variable Cost Predation <br/>[3] Above-Cost Predation <br/>§9.04 Predatory Pricing in Latin America <br/>[A] Illegal Per Se Predatory Pricing <br/>[B] Rule-of-Reason Approach to Predatory Pricing <br/>§9.05 A Rule for Predatory Pricing Enforcement in Latin American Emerging Economies <br/>[A] Justification for a Different Approach to Price Predation in Emerging Latin American Economies <br/>[1] An Effect-Based Price Predation Standard for <br/>Emerging Economies <br/>[a] Dominance <br/>[b] Pro-competitive effects <br/>[c] Profits Sacrifice <br/>[2] Administrability of a Below and Above-Cost Predation Standard<br/> [a] Below and Above-Cost Predation in Latin American<br/>Emerging Economies <br/>§9.06 Conclusions<br/><br/>CHAPTER 10<br/>Bid Rigging in Ecuador<br/>David A. Sperber <br/>§10.01 Introduction <br/>§10.02 Legal Framework <br/>[A] Public Procurement Legislation <br/>[B] Competition Legislation<br/>[C] Anticompetitive Agreements <br/>[D] Public Procurement and Competition Law <br/>§10.03 An Overview of International Bid Rigging Cases <br/>[A] United States of America: Multiple Listing Service, Inc. <br/>[B] United Kingdom: Cirrus and Others <br/>[C] Australia: Marine Hoses <br/>§10.04 Ecuador Bid Rigging Cases <br/>[A] TUBOS Case (Ministry of Industry and Productivity) <br/>[B] CRONIX Case (Superintendence of Control of Market Power) <br/>§10.05 Conclusions<br/><br/>CHAPTER 11<br/>The Case of Automotive Market in a Special Customs Area of Argentina<br/>Alejandro Lucero & Fabidn Pettigrew <br/>§11.01 Introduction <br/>§11.02 The Special Customs Area Created by Law 19.640 and the Automotive Regime <br/>§11.03 The Investigation Carried Out by the CNDC <br/>[A] The Legal Frame of the Investigation <br/>[B] The Fine <br/>[C] The Judgment of the Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Comodoro Rivadavia <br/><br/>CHAPTER 12<br/>Exchanges of Information in Competition Law: The Chilean (Incipient) Experience<br/>Javier Tapia & Vanessa Facuse <br/>§12.01 Introduction <br/>§12.02 The Institutional and Substantive Framework <br/>[A] The Institutional Framework <br/>[B] The Main Substantive Provisions <br/> [C] The Concept of Agreement in Chilean Competition La<br/>§ 12.03 Exchanges of Information as Support for Cartel Behavior <br/>[A] Exchanges of Information on Quantity <br/>[B] Exchanges of Information on Prices <br/>[C] Multimarket Contacts <br/>§ 12.04 "Residual" Exchanges of Information <br/>[A] Market Structures and Characteristics of the Information <br/>[B] General Guidance by Chilean Authorities <br/>§12.05 Suniming Up <br/><br/>CHAPTER 13<br/>Ten Years Fighting Carteis: The Case of El Salvador<br/>Aldo Henrique Cd.der Camilot <br/><br/>CHAPTER 14<br/>The Use of lndirect Evidences in the Fight Against Cartels in Brazil<br/>Paulo Bumier da Silveira & Pablo Reja Sánchez <br/>§ 14.01 Introduction <br/>§ 14.02 Types of Bid-Rigging <br/>§ 14.03 Cartel of Solar 1-leaters in Brazil <br/>§ 14.04 Internationa! Trend <br/>§14.05 Final Remarks <br/><br/>CHAPTER 15 <br/>Shareholders' Damage Claims Against Company Directors for <br/>Antitrust Violations? The Japanese Experience and Possible Lessons <br/>to Brazil and Latin America <br/>A manda A thayde <br/>§ 15.01 Introduction <br/>§ 15.02 The Japanese Experience on Shareholder Derivative Actions Against <br/>Officers and Directors in the Antitrust Context <br/>§15.03 Are Shareholder Derivative Suits Against Officers and Directors <br/>for Antitrust Violations a Possible Reality in Brazil? <br/>§15.04 Conclusion <br/><br/>CHAPTER 16<br/>The Relation Between Antitrust and Inteliectual Property Law on CADE's Case Law<br/>Ana Frazão & Angelo Gamba Praia de Carvalho <br/>§16.01 Introduction <br/>§16.02 The Complex Relation Between IP Rights and Antitrust Law <br/>§16.03 Legitimacy of Antitrust Intervention over IP rights: The ANFAPE Case <br/>§16.04 CADE's View on Standard-Essential Patents and License Agreements <br/>§16.05 Sham Litigation and Inteliectual Property <br/>§16.06 Final Remarks <br/><br/>CHAPTER 17<br/>Merger Control in Mexico: Development and Outlook<br/>Francisco Javier Núiiez Melgoza <br/>§17.01 General Overview <br/>§ 17.02 Evolution of the Regulatory Framework, 1993-2014 <br/>[A] Merger Control in the 1993 FLEC <br/>[B] Changes to the FLEC in 2006 <br/>[C] Changes to the FLEC in 2011 <br/>[D] The Current Legal Framework <br/>§17.03 Brief Review of Some Relevant Cases <br/>[A] Mexicana/Aeromexico <br/>[B] Coca-Cola/Jugos dei Valie <br/>[C] Mexichem <br/>[D] Televisa/GSF Telecom Holdings <br/>[E] Nestle/Pfizer <br/>[F] Cinemex/Cinemark <br/>[G] Comex/Sherwin Williams <br/>§17.04 Conciusions <br/><br/>PART III<br/>International Cooperation <br/><br/>CHAPTER 18<br/>Regional Coordination in Cartel Investigations: The Liquid Oxygen Case<br/>PierreHorna <br/>§18.01 introduction <br/>§ 18.02 Reviewing the Facts of Liquid Oxygen Cartel Cases in Panama (2001), <br/>Argentina (2005), Chile (2007), Peru, Brazil and Colombia (2010) and Mexico (2011)<br/>§18.03 Reviewing Cooperation Agreements in Some of the Jurisdictions of the Liquid Oxygen Cartel Cases: Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru <br/>§ 18.04 Chalienges in Strengthening Cooperation in Cartel Cases for the Selected Jurisdictions <br/>[A] Low Leveis of Cooperation Between Competition Agencies <br/>[B] Prohibition to Exchange lnformation in Open Cartel Investigations <br/>[C] Modest Developments in Implementing Leniency Programs in the Seven Jurisdictions, with the Exception of Brazil and Chile <br/>[D] Proper Recognition of the Evidence Cathered Abroad <br/>§18.05 Some Recommendations to improve Coordination Between Cartel <br/>Enforcers in Latin America <br/>[A] lmproving the Levei of Cooperation and Coordination Between <br/>Agencies <br/>§18.06 Steps Towards Effective Exchange of Information in Paraliei investigations <br/>§18.07 lmproving the Request of Evidence Abroad and Recognition: <br/>Estabiishing Ideas for a Victim of an International/Regional <br/>Cartel to Claim Private/Civil Damages Locally <br/>§18.08 Final Remarks <br/>Bibliography <br/><br/>CHAPTER 19<br/>The Defense of Competition in Mercosur<br/>Eugênia Cristina Nilsen Ribeiro Barza & Marcelo Cesar Guimarães <br/>§19.01 Introduction <br/>§ 19.02 The Treaty of Asunclón and the Provisional Regulation of Competition Law<br/>§ 19.03 The Protocol for the Defense of Competition of MERCOSUR (Fortaleza Protocol) <br/>§ 19.04 New Directions for the MERCOSUR Antitrust Policy <br/>[A] The Antecedents <br/>[B] ThAgreement for the Defense of Competition of MERCOSUR <br/>[C] A Review of the Agreement for the Defense of Competition of MERCOSUR and the Chalienges of Cooperation Within the Bloc <br/>§19.05 Conclusion <br/>Bibliography <br/><br/>CHAPTER 20 <br/>Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for Competition Policy <br/>Marta. Martínez Licetti, Graciela Miralies Murciego & Guilherme de Aguiar Falco <br/>§20.01 Introduction <br/>§20.02 The Competition Chapter <br/>§20.03 The SOE Chapter <br/>§20.04 Vertical Dimension of Competition-Related Commitments <br/>§20.05 Final Remarks <br/>Index <br/><br/> |
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| Nome pessoa | SILVEIRA, Paulo Burnier |
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| Classificação | Empréstimo | Locação permanente | Locação corrente | Data de aquisição | Forma de aquisição | Patrimônio | Número completo de chamada | Código de barras | Número do exemplar | Data de inserção do exemplar | Tipo de item no Koha |
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| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-11-19 | Doação | 31002 | 341.3787 C737 | 2019-1475 | 1 | 2019-11-19 | Livros |