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Table of Contents<br/><br/>PREFACE<br/>WESTLAW OVERVIEW<br/><br/>PART I. FOUNDATIONS: POLICY AND MEASUREMENT<br/><br/>Chapter 1. The Basic Economics of Antitrust <br/>1.1 Price Theory: Economic Behavior and Perfect Competition <br/>1.1a.The Perfectly Competitive Market<br/>1.1b.Behavior of the Competitive Firm <br/>1.2 Monopoly<br/>1.2a. Price and Output of the Protected Monopolist <br/>1.2b. Monopsony; Output Effects; Policy Implications<br/>1.2c. De Facto Monopolies in Real World Markets <br/>1.3 Antitrust Policy and the Social Cost of Monopoly<br/>1.3a.Monopoly as a Status; Monopolization as a Process<br/>1.3b.The Deadweight Loss Caused by Monopoly<br/>1.3c.The Social Cost of Monopoly: Rent-Seeking<br/>1.3d.The Social Cost of Monopoly: Lost Competitor Investment<br/>1.4Industrial Organization Theory and Economies of Scale<br/>1.4.The General Case of Economies of Scale<br/>1.4b.Persistent Scale Economies, Natural Monopoly, Franchise Bidding and Contestability<br/>1.5 Less-Than-Perfect Competition<br/>1.5a.Product Differentiation<br/>1.5b.Price Discrimination<br/>1.5c.Oligopoly <br/>1.5d.Transaction Costs<br/>1.5e.Less-Than-Perfect Competition and "Second Best" <br/>1.6 Barriers to Entry <br/>1.7 The Troubled Life of the Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm <br/><br/>Chapter 2.History and Ideology in Antitrust Policy <br/> <br/>2.1 The Development of American Antitrust Policy<br/>2.1a. The Goals of the Sherman Act: Efficiency and Interest Group Explanations <br/>2.1b. The Common Law and the Federal Antitrust Laws<br/>2.1c. A Thumbnail History of Federal Antitrust Policy<br/>2.2 On the Role of Economics in Antitrust<br/>2.2a. Antitrust and Economics Before 1960<br/>2.2b. The Chicago School and its Aftermath<br/>2.2c. Skepticism; Competitor v. Consumer Suits; Private v. Public Suits <br/>2.2d.Politics and Democratic Policy<br/>2.2e. Antitrust Policy in the Wake of the Chicago School <br/>2.3 On the Need for Economics in Antitrust<br/>2.3a.The Domain of Antitrust Economics<br/>2.3b.The Substance of Antitrust Economics<br/>2.3c.The Meaning of "Efficiency" and "Consumer Welfare" in Antitrust Economics<br/><br/>Chapter 3. Market Power and Market Definition <br/> <br/>3.1 Introduction<br/>3.1a.Market Power Technically Defined<br/>3. 1b.Market Share as a Surrogate for Market Power<br/>3.1c.Market Share as More Than a Surrogate; Independent Relevance of Market Share<br/>3.1d.The Relevant Antitrust Market <br/>3.2 Estimating the Relevant Market<br/>3.2a.Size of Hypothesized Price Increase<br/>3.2b.The "Profit-Maximizing" Increase<br/>3.2c.Broader and Narrower Markets; General Irrelevance of Submarkets <br/>3.3 The Product Market; General Considerations<br/>3.3a.Markets and Brands; "Lock-in"<br/>3.3a1.Single Brand Ordinarily Not a Relevant Market; Kodak<br/>3.3a2.Lower Court Decisions Limiting Kodak<br/>3.3a3.Contract "Lock-in;" Franchisor Brand as Market<br/>3.3b.Substitutes v. Complements; Cluster Markets<br/>3.3b1.Relevant Market Consists of Substitutes <br/>3.3b2.The Limited Rationale for Finding "Cluster" Markets <br/>3.4"Cross-Elasticity of Demand:" The "Cellophane" Fallacy and Its Consequences<br/>3.4a.Cross-Price Elasticities and Their Meaning<br/>3.4b.Cross-Elasticity of Demand in the du Pont (Cellophane) Case<br/>3.4c.Correcting for the "Cellophane" Fallacy<br/>3.5 Supply Elasticities; Foreign Imports<br/>3.5a.Foreign lmports and the Alcoa Case<br/>3.5b.Other Decisions Addressing (or Failing to Address) Supply Issues<br/>3.5c.Accounting for Elasticity of Supply: Market Inclusion or Low Barriers to Entry<br/>3.6 The Geographic Market<br/>3.6a.Shipped Goods; Minimum Geographic Market<br/>3.6b.Stationary Goods and Services<br/>3.6c.Price Movements and Shipping Patterns<br/>3.6c1.Price Movements Generally; Asymmetry<br/>3.6c2.The Elzinga-Hogarty Test<br/>3.6d.Trade Area; Non-competition Covenants<br/>3.6e.Price Discrimination <br/>3.7 Computation and Interpretation of Market Shares<br/>3.7a.Revenue v. Units<br/>3.7b.Output v. Capacity<br/>3.7c.Product Durability and Power<br/>3.7d.Interpreting Market Share Data; Questions of Fact or Law <br/>3.8 Market Definition in the Justice Department Merger Guidelines<br/>3.8a.Product Market Delineation in the Guidelines<br/>3.8b.Geographic Markets Under the Guidelines<br/>3.8c.Significance of Price Discrimination<br/>3.8d.Calculation of Market Shares<br/>3.8e.The "Cellophane" Fallacy in the Merger Guidelines<br/>3.8f. Conclusion; The Guidelines as a Policy Statement<br/>3.9 Alternative Methods of Establishing Market Power<br/>3.9a.Measuring Residual Demand Directly<br/>3.9b.Persistent Price Discrimination<br/>3.9b1.Price Discrimination and Intellectual Property<br/>3.9b2.Price Discrimination and Market Definition<br/>3.9c.Persistent Monopoly Profits<br/>3.9c1.Monopoly Profits v. Accounting Profits<br/>3.9c2.Absence of High Accounting Profits<br/>3.9c3.The Problem of "Rents"<br/>3.9d.Market Power and Intellectual Property<br/><br/>PART II THE SUBSTANCE OF ANTITRUST <br/><br/>Chapter 4.Antitrust Policy Toward Collusion and Oligopoly<br/><br/>4.1 Introduction: The Basic Economics of Price Fixing<br/>4.1a.The (Virtual) Universality of Cartel Cheating<br/>4.1a1.Divergence Between Cartel and Single Firm Profit Maximization<br/>4.1a2.Cartel Cheating Strategies<br/>4.1a3.Detecting and Punishing Cheating<br/>4.1b.Competitive Fringe Firms<br/>4.1c.Internal Efficiencies of the Cartel<br/>4.1d.Cartels of Buyers <br/>4.2 Oligopoly, Cooperative and Non-cooperative<br/>4.2a. Non-cooperative Cournot Oligopoly<br/>4.2b. Cooperative v. Non-cooperative Oligopoly Strategies <br/>4.3 The Social Cost of Collusion <br/>4.4 Antitrust Policy Toward Oligopoly and Tacit Coilusion <br/>4.4a.Attacking Oligopoly; The Turner-Posner Debate<br/>4.4b. Identifying Tacit Collusion and Facilitators; Policy Options<br/>4.5 Proving a Price or Output "Agreement" From Indirect or Circumstantial Evidence <br/>4.6 Reaching Oligopoly Behavior on Weaker Agreement Evidence<br/>4.6a. Introduction; Incomplete Agreements<br/>4.6b. Challenging Facilitators Established by Agreement<br/>4.6c. "Unilateral" Facilitators; Basing-Point Pricing Schemes<br/>4.6d.Other Facilitators; § 5 of Federal Trade Cominission Act<br/>4.6e.Conclusion: Summary Judgment in Conspiracy Cases<br/>4.7 Intraenterprise Conspiracy<br/><br/>Chapter 5. Joint Ventures of Competitors, Concerted Refusais, Patent Licensing, and the Rule of Reason <br/>5.1 Introduction: Naked and Ancillary Agreements Among Competitors <br/>5.1a. Distinguishing Naked From Ancillary Restraints; Question of Law <br/>5.1b. Why Multilateral Activity Deserves Closer Antitrust Scrutiny<br/>5.1c. Partial Condemnation; Less Restrictive Alternatives Joint Ventures as Market Facilitat <br/>5.2a.Joint Ventures: An Overview<br/>5.2a1.Potential Harms and Benefits<br/>5.2a2.The Two Sides of the Exclusivity Problem<br/>5.2b.Ventures Facilitating R & D, Advertising and Promotion; Ancillary Market Divisions<br/>5.2b1.Joint Ventures and Free Rider Problems<br/>5.2b2.National Cooperative Research Act <br/>5.2b3.Ancillary and Naked Agreements Pertaining to Advertising<br/>5.2b4.Ancillary Market Divisions and Noncompetition Agreements <br/>5.2c.Transactional Efficiencies Justifying Joint Venture Price Setting<br/>5.2d.The Relation Between Joint Venture Analysis and Merger Analysis<br/>5.3 Competitor Exchanges of Price or Output Information; Posting Agreements <br/>5.3a.Industry-Wide Dissemination of Price and Output Information <br/>5.3b.Direct Competitor Exchange of Price Information <br/>5.3c.Agreements to Post, or to Post and Adhere Concerted Refusals to Deal <br/>5.4a.Harms and Benefits; Appropriate Antitrust Standard<br/>5.4a1.A Rule of Reason, With a Few Exceptions<br/>5.4a2.Special Treatment for the Learned Professions<br/>5.4b.Efficient Joint Ventures and Refusals to Deal<br/>5.4b1.Closed-Membersbip and Other Traditional Joint Venture<br/>5.4b2.Open-Membership Ventures; Positive Network Externalities <br/>5.4c.Standard Setting and Rule Enforcement in Private Entrepreneurial and Professional Associations<br/>5.4d.Agreements Involving Non-Competitors <br/>5.4e.Expressive and Noncommercial Boycotts <br/>5.5 Agreements Governing the Licensing and Use of Patents and Other Intellectual Property<br/>5.5a. Introduction; Basic Issues<br/>5.5b. The Scope of the Patent Misuse Doctrine<br/>5.5c.Patent Licensing<br/>5.5c1.Price Fixing; Output Restrictions; Royalty Rates; Exclusivity <br/>5.5c2.Horizontal Territorial and Other Market Division Agreements<br/>5.5c3.Package Licenses<br/>5.5c4.Patent Pools<br/>5.5c5.Grantbacks <br/>5.5d.Agreements Concerning Intellectual Property Other Than Patents <br/>5.6 Characterization and Evaluation: The Per Se Rule and the Rule of Reason <br/>5.6a. The Supreme Court and the Per Se Rule <br/>5.6b. The Exaggerated Distinction Between Rule of Reason and Per Se Treatment<br/>5.6c. Identifring Anticompetitive Conduct: A Tentative Road Map<br/>5.6d. The Truncated Rule of Reason <br/>5.6e. The Burden of Proof <br/><br/>Chapter 6.Exclusionary Practices and the Dominant Firm: The Basic Doctrine Of Monopolization and Attempt <br/><br/>6.1The Monopolization Offense <br/>6.2 Monopoly Power and Illegal Monopolization<br/>6.2a.Monopolization's Market Power Requirement<br/>6.2b.The Relation Between Market Power and Market Share <br/>6.3 Conduct Requirements—Is Bad Conduct Necessary<br/>6.4 Identifying Monopolizing Conduct<br/>6.4a. Exclusionary Conduct Defined<br/>6.4b.Private and Government Suits Distinguished<br/>6.4c.Intent<br/>6.5 The Offense of Attempt to Monopolize<br/>6.5a.The Attempt Law's Specific Intent Requirement<br/>6.5b."Dangerous Probability of Success" <br/>6.5b1.The "Dangerous Probabiity" Requirement as a Screening Device <br/>6.5b2.Dangerous Probability and Market Power<br/>6.6 Conspiracy to Monopolize<br/><br/>Chapter 7.Exclusionary Practices in Monopolization and Attempt Cases <br/><br/>7.1 Introduction<br/>7.2 Merger and Monopoly <br/>7.3 Output Expansion; Strategic Capacity Construction<br/>7.4 Price Discrimination; Leasing Practices<br/>7.5 Unilateral Refusals to Deal 1: General Doctrine<br/>7.5a. Refusals Directed at Competitors<br/>7.5b. Scope of Duty to Deal<br/>7.6 Unilateral Refusal to Deal II: Vertical Integration, Price Squeezes, Tying and Exclusive Dealing<br/>7.6a.Kodak and Its Mtermath<br/>7.6a1."Lock-in" Requires Initial Purchase and Subsequent Change of Policy<br/>7.6a2."Average" Customer Must Be Poorly Informed; or Price Discrimination Must Be Possible<br/>7.6a3.Summary: Taking Advantage of Market Imperfections Not Within.2's Purview<br/>7.6b.The Price or Supply "Squeeze;" Vertical Integration<br/>7.6c.Tying and Exclusive Dealing—Technical Requirements Not Met<br/>7.6d.Use of Vertical Refusals by Private Antitrust Plaintiffs<br/>7.6e.Legitimate Business Purpose <br/>7.6f. Unilateral Refusal by Nonmonopolist <br/>7.7 Refusal to Deal III: The "Essential Facility" Doctrine<br/>7.7a. What Is a Qualifying "EssentialFacility"<br/>7.7b.The Extent of the Duty to Deal<br/>7.7c.Reasonableness of Refusal to Deal<br/>7.7d.Essential Facility Doctrine Inconsistent With General Antitrust Goals<br/>7.7d1.Forced Sharing Requires Price Administration<br/>7.7d2.Forced Sharing Undercuts Incentives to Develop Alternative Sources of Supply <br/>7.8 "Predatory" Product Design and Development; Failure to Predisclose; Altered Complementary Products<br/>7.8a.Predatory Product or Process Innovation<br/>7.8b.Failure to Predisclose New Technology<br/>7.8c.Microsoft: Unnecessarily Harmful Redesigns and Licensing Requirements <br/>7.8d.Strategic Entry Deterrence; Predatory Advertising, Excessive Product Differentiation<br/>7.9 The Troublesome "Leverage" Theory; Nonmonopolistic Advantage in Second Market<br/>7.10 Raising Rivais' Costs (RRC)<br/>7.10a.The Pedigree and Judicial Developmentof RRC<br/>7.10b.Pre-emption of Markets or Customers as RRC<br/>7.11 Abuse of Patents or Other Intellectual Property<br/>7.11a.Waiker Process: "Obtaining" Patent by Fraud<br/>7.11b. Enforcement of Patent Known to Be Invalid or Unenforceable; Noerr Issues <br/>7.11c.Accumulation; Nonuse<br/>7.11d.Refusal to License, Simple and Conditional<br/>7.11d1.Absolute Refusal to License<br/>7.11d2.Conditional Refusals to License <br/>7.12 Abuse of Government Process<br/>7.13 Business Torts as Antitrust Violations <br/>7.14 Conduct Requirements in Attempt Cases<br/><br/>Chapter 8.Predatory and Other Exclusionary Pricing<br/><br/>8.1 Introduction <br/>8.2 When Is a Price Predatory? The Areeda-Turner Test<br/>8.3 Predatory Pricing: Application and Criticism of the Areeda-Turner Test<br/>8.3a. The Average Variable Cost (AVC) Surrogate<br/>8.3b. The Problem of Long-Run, Strategic Behavior; "Predatory" Prices Above Cost; Multiple-Benefit Predation<br/>8.3b1. Limit Pricing and Strategic Entry Deterrence<br/>8.3b2. Multiple-Benefit Predation<br/>8.3c. AVC Measured as Average Avoidable Cost; Opportunity Cost <br/>8.4 Structural Issues: When Is Predatory Pricing Plausible<br/>8.4a. The Predator's Market Position<br/>8.4b.Barriers to Entry<br/>8.4c.Excess Capacity<br/>8.4d.Disposition of Productive Assets<br/>8.4e.Should Competitor Predatory Pricing Suits Be Abolished? <br/>8.5 Judicial Adaption of the Areeda-Turner Test: Price/Cost Relationships and Intent <br/>8.5a. Price/Cost Relationships<br/>8.5b. Intent <br/>8.6 Judicial Adaption of Areeda-Turner: Identifying Relevant Costs; Multi-product Firms; Customer-Specific Pricing<br/>8.7 Judicial Adaption of Areeda-Turner: Structural Issues<br/>8.8 Predatory Pricing and the Robinson-Patman Act <br/>8.9 Miscellaneous Exclusionary Pricing Problems <br/>8.9a. Package Pricing <br/>8.9b. Quantity and Market Share Discounts, Bundled and Unbundled <br/>8.9c.Slotting Allowances and Related Pricing Incentives Paid to Retailers<br/>8.9d.Predatory Buying: Price Protection Provisions as Exclusionary Devices <br/><br/>Chapter 9.Vertical Integration and Vertical Mergers<br/><br/>9.1 Introduction<br/>9.2 The Economics of Vertical Integration<br/>9.2a. The lmplications of Coase's Work<br/>9.2b. Cost Savings, Technological and Transactional<br/>9.2c. Efficient Vertical Integration and the Monopolist; Eliminating Double Maginalization<br/>9.3 Plausible Anticompetitive Consequences of Vertical Integration<br/>9.3a. Strategic Control of lnputs<br/>9.3b. Price Discrimination<br/>9.3c.Foreclosure and Entry Barriers<br/>9.3d.Vertical Integration by Price Regulated Firms<br/>9.3e.Vertical Integration and Cartels <br/>9.4Vertical Mergers and Antitrust Law <br/>9.5Vertical Mergers and the Antitrust Division Merger Guidelines<br/>9.5a.Increased Barriers to Entry<br/>9.5b.Vertical Mergers That Facilitate Collusion<br/>9.5c.Avoidance of Rate Regulation <br/><br/>Chapter 10. Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, Exclusive Dealing and the Franchise Contract <br/><br/>10.1 Introduction: The Judicial Test for Tie-Ins<br/>10.2 Tying Arrangements and Consumer Welfare <br/>10.3 Market Power and Per Se Unlawful Ties; Sherman v. Clayton Act Tests<br/>10.3a.The Rationale and Development of Tying's Market Power Requirement<br/>10.3b.Tying Arrangements in Imperfectly Competitive Markets; Locked-In Customers<br/>10.3c.Intellectual Property and the Presumption of Market Power<br/>10.3d."Uniqueness" and Tjbiquity as Market Power<br/>10.3e.Separate Sherman and Clayton Act Tests? Federal Trade Commission Act <br/>10.3f.The Rationale for Per Se Illegal Tie-Ins <br/>10.4 When Are Products Tied Together<br/>10.4a.Coercion by Contract, Condition, or Understanding<br/>10.4b.Proof of a Relevant Tying "Agreement;" Uncommunicated Conditions<br/>10.4c.Package Discounts<br/>10.4d.Coercion by Package Design; Technological Ties <br/>10.5 The Requirement of Separate Tying and Tied Products<br/>10.5a.Introduction; Basic Competitive Market Test<br/>10.5b."New" Products<br/>10.5c.Complete and Partial Substitutes as Separate Products<br/>10.5d.Intellectual Property and Labor as Separate Products<br/>10.5e.Efficiency—"Economies of Joint Provision" <br/>10.6 Competitive Effects<br/>10.6a.The Leverage Theory: Using Tie-Ins to Turn One Monopoly Into Two;Tipping<br/>10.6b.Entry Barriers, Foreclosure, and Collusion <br/>10.6b1.Entry Barriers and Tying Arrangements<br/>10.6b2.Foreclosure; Market Share<br/>10.6b3.Tie-Ins and Collusion <br/>10.6c.Evasion of Rate Regulation <br/>10.6d.Predatory Pricing and Other Attempts to Monopolize<br/>10.6e.Tie-Ins as Price Discrimination and Metering Devices; Franchise Agreements<br/>10.7 Tie-ins and Efficiency: Toward a General Rule of Reason <br/>10.7a.Efficiencies and Tying Law's ldiosyncratic Per Se Rule <br/>10.7b.Distribution Economies; Full-Line Forcing and Unwanted Tied Products; Lack of Consumer injury <br/>10.7c.Conclusion: Moving Tying Law Toward a Rule of Reason<br/>10.8 Reciprocity<br/>10.9 Exclusive Dealing<br/>10.9a.Anticompetitive Foreclosure and Its Variations<br/>10.9a1.The Foreclosure Theory of Exclusive Dealing<br/>10.9a2.Raising Rivals' Costs<br/>10.9a3. Defining Markets to Measure Vertical Foreclosure <br/>10.9b.Exclusive Dealing as a Cartel Facilitator<br/>10.9c.The Difference Between Exclusive Dealing and Tying<br/>10.9d.Efficiency Explanations and Defenses for Exclusive Dealing <br/>10.9e.The Legal Standard for Exclusive Dealing Contracts <br/><br/>Chapter 11.Intrabrand Restraints on Distribution<br/><br/>11.1 Introduction<br/>11.2 Perceived Competitive Threats of Minimum RPM and Vertical Territorial Restraints <br/>11.2a.Introduction<br/>11.2b.Vertical Restraints as Collusion Facilitators; Powerful Individual Dealers<br/>11.2b1.Dealer Power; Policy Implications<br/>11.2b2. Manufacturer Collusion and Vertical Restraints<br/>11.2c.Foreclosure Effects<br/>11.2d.Price Discrimination<br/>11.2e.Other Theories<br/>11.3 Vertical Restraints and Efficiency<br/>11.3a.The Free-Rider Problem<br/>11.3a1. The Economics of Vertical Restraints to Combat Free Riding<br/>11.3a2. The Domain and Efficiency of Vertical Restraints to Combat Free Riding<br/>11.3b.Variations on the Free-Rider Problem and Alternative Explanations<br/>11.3b1. Purchase of Preferred Distribution Services; Shelf Space; Quality Certification<br/>11.3b2.Facilitating Resale Density<br/>11.3b3.Facilitating Supplier Entry<br/>11.3b4. Protection of Dealer Margins; Enforcement of Distribution Contracts<br/>11.3c.Vertical Restraints and Efficiency Reconsidered<br/>11.4The Agreement Requirement in Vertical Restraints Cases<br/>11.4a.Agreements—Horizontal and Vertical, Price and Nonprice <br/>11.4b.The Colgate Doctrine <br/>11.4c.The Rehabilitation of Colgate; Dealer Terminations<br/>11.4d.The Agreement Requirement and Antitrust Policy Respecting Vertical Restraints; Restraints Initiated by Powerful Dealers<br/>11.5 Resale Price Maintenance in the Courts: The Per Se Rule and Its Exceptions<br/>11.5a.The Common Law and the Rule in Dr. Miles<br/>11.5b.The Meaning of "Resale"—Consignment Exception<br/>11.5c.Maximum RPM<br/>11.5d.The Difference Between Price and Non-Price Agreements<br/>11.5e.Per Se Rule Against RPM; Summary <br/>11.6 Vertical Nonprice Restraints and the Rule of Reason<br/>11.6a.Balancing "Intrabrand" and "Interbrand" Competition<br/>11.6b.Sylvauia's lmpactin the LowerCourts<br/>11.6c.Boycott Claims <br/>11.6d.Exclusive Dealerships, Sole Outlets, and Refusals to Deal<br/>11.6e.Dual Distribution <br/>11.7 Conclusion: A Rule of Reason for Distribution Restraints<br/>11.7a.General Policy Concerns<br/>11.7b.General Efficiency of Vertical Integration Not Decisive<br/>11.7c.Rejected Approaches<br/>11.7d.Rule of Reason lnquiry Summarized <br/><br/>Chapter 12.Mergers of Competitors <br/> <br/>12.1 Introduction: Federal Merger Policy and the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines<br/>12.1a.The Continuing Importance of Market Structure to Merger Analysis <br/>12.1b.The Basic Concerns of Merger Policy: Collusion, Oligopoly and Offsetting Efficiencies<br/>12.1c.Mergers and Exclusionary Practices; Predatory Pricing; Private Challenges <br/>12.2 Efficiency and Merger Policy<br/>12.2a.The Dubious Legacy of the Warren Era<br/>12.2b.Assessing the Efficiency Effects of Horizontal Mergers<br/>12.2b1.The Welfare "Tradeoff" Model<br/>12.2b2.Must Efficiencies be "Passed On<br/>12.2b3. Efficiencies Must be "Merger-Specific" and "Extraordinary"<br/>12.2b4. Problems of Identification and Measurement<br/>12.2b5. Benefit and Threat in Different Markets<br/>12.3 Estimating Anticompetitive Consequences 1: Mergers Facilitating Unilateral Price Increases<br/>12.3a.Introduction<br/>12.3b.Merger to Monopoly<br/>12.3c.Dominant Firm's Acquisition of Nascent Rival<br/>12.3d.Unilateral Effects in Product Differentiated Markets<br/>12.4Estimating Anticompetitive Consequences II: Mergers Facilitating Coordinated Interaction<br/>12.4a.Measuring Market Concentration: The CR4 and the Herfindahl<br/>12.4a1.The Four-Firm Concentration Ratio (CR4)<br/>12.4a2.The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)<br/>12.4b.Market Share Thresholds Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines; Actual Government Practice <br/>12.4c.Factors Affecting the Significance of Concentration and Market Share Measures<br/>12.4d.How Should Concentration Count? Philadelphia Bank <br/>12.5 The Significance of Product Differentiation<br/>12.5a.Product Differentiation as Undermining Collusion<br/>12.5b.Product Differentiation: When Is a Merger Horizontal? <br/>12.6 Barriers to Entry in Merger Cases<br/>12.6a.The Appropriate Definition of Entry Barriers for Merger Policy<br/>12.6b.What Constitutes an Entry Barrier<br/>12.6b1. Economies of Scale<br/>12.6b2. Risk and Size of lnvestment; Sunk Costs <br/>12.6b3. Advertising, Promotion, and Customer Loyaity <br/>12.6b4. Product Differentiation <br/>12.6b5.Government Entry Restrictions<br/>12.6c.Evidence Required to Prove Entry Barriers or Their Absence<br/>12.6d.Entry Barrier Analysis Under the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines<br/>12.7 Other Factors Affecting the Competitive Consequences of Mergers<br/>12.7a.Sophistication and Power of Trading Partners<br/>12.7b.Adequacy of Irreplaceable Raw Materials<br/>12.7c.Excess Capacity<br/>12.7d.Marketing and Sales Methods<br/>12.7e.History of Collusion or Facilitating Practices<br/>12.7f."Trends" Towards Concentration<br/>12.7g.Aggressiveness of Acquired Firm <br/>12.8 Observed Anticompetitive Behavior <br/>12.9 The "Failing Company" Defense and Related Factors Affecting Firm Viability <br/>12.10 Partial Acquisitions and Acquisitions "Solely for Investment<br/>12.11Interlocking Corporate Directors or Officers <br/><br/>Chapter 13.Conglomerate Mergers <br/><br/>13.1 Introduction: Competition and Conglomerate Mergers <br/>13.2 Conglomerate Mergers and Efficiency <br/>13.3 Perceived Dangers to Competition<br/>13.3a.Reciprocity<br/>13.3b.Leverage and Tie-Ins<br/>13.3c.Strategic Pricing and Entry Deterrence <br/>13.4 Mergers of Potential Competitors<br/>13.4a.The Perceived Potential Entrant Doctrine<br/>13.4b."Actual" Potential Entrant Doctrine <br/>13.5 Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Division Guidelines<br/><br/>Chapter 14. Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act <br/><br/>14.1 Introduction: Price Discrimination <br/>14.2 Price Discrimination and Competition<br/>14.3 Price Discriminatin and the Monopolist: Perfect Price Discrimination <br/>14.4 Imperfect Price Discrimination <br/>14.5 Price Discrimination and Antitrust Policy<br/>14.5a. The Social Cost of Price Discrimination<br/>14.5b. The Social Cost of Preventing Price Discrimination in Concentrated Markets <br/>14.6 The Robinson-Patman Act and Price Discrimination <br/>14.6a.General Interpretation<br/>14.6a1. Legislative History and Effectiveness in Achieving Goals<br/>14.6a2. The Robinson-Patman Act's Theory of Competitive Injury<br/>14.6b.The Meaning of Price "Discrimination" Under the Act<br/>14.6c.Primary- and Secondary-Line Violations<br/>14.6d.Technical Requirements<br/>14.6e.Violations by Buyers <br/>14.6f.Afirmative Defenses<br/>14.6f1."Cost Justification" Defense<br/>14.6f2."Meeting Competition" Defense <br/><br/>Chapter 15. Public Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws<br/><br/>15.1 Public Enforcement Generaily; The Antitrust Division<br/>15.1a. Criminal Enforcement<br/>15.1b. Civil Enforcement<br/>15.2The Federal Trade Commission<br/>15.3 The Process ofPremerger Notification <br/>15.4 "Quasi-Public" Enforcement: The States' Attorneys General <br/><br/>Chapter 16. Private Enforcement<br/><br/>16.1 Introduction: § 4 of the Clayton Act <br/>16.2 Permjssible Plaintiffs—Mo Should Enforce the Antitrust Laws9 <br/>16.3 Antitrust's Special Requirement of Competitive Injury<br/>16.3a."Antitrust Injury"; Private Merger Chalienges <br/>16.3a1. Mergers Alleged to Facilitate Exclusionary Practices<br/>16.3a2. Takeover Targets as Antitrust Plaintiffs<br/>16.3a3.Consumer Plaintiffs<br/>16.3b."Antitrust Injury" Beyond 7; Per Se Violations<br/>16.3c.Causation, Injury-in-fact, Antitrust Injury Distinguished<br/>16.3d.Antitrust Injury and Damages Claims <br/>16.3e.Injunctive Relief<br/>16.3f.Plaintiffs Unaffected by Injury to Competition; Pleading Requirements <br/>16.4 Statutory and Judicial Rules Limiting Antitrust Standing<br/>16.4a."Business or Property"<br/>16.4b.Market Relationships; "Direct Injury" and "Target Area" Tests<br/>16.4b1."Direct Injury"<br/>16.4b2."Target Area"<br/>16.4b3. Supreme Court Attempts at a More Useful Alternative<br/>16.4c.The Preferred Position of Consumers and Competitors <br/>16.5 Special Problems of Antitrust Standing<br/>16.5a.The Unestablished Business as Antitrust Plaintiff<br/>16.5b.Employees<br/>16.5c.Derivative Injuries and "Duplicative Recovery"<br/>16.5d.Second Best Plaintiffs<br/>16.5e.Pari Delicto; Declaratory Judgment Actions <br/>16.6 The Indirect Purchaser Rule<br/>16.6a.Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick<br/>16.6b.Exceptions to the Illinois Brick Rule<br/>16.6b1.Pre-existing Contracts<br/>16.6b2.Injunction Suits<br/>16.6b3.Cases Involving Vertical Agreements or Control<br/>16.6c.Monopsony; Buyers' Cartels<br/>16.6d. Policy Implications of the Indirect Purchaser Rule; State Indirect Purchaser Statutes<br/>16.6e.The Umbrella Plaintiff<br/>16.7 The Antitrust Statute of Limitation <br/>16.8 Disposition of lssues; Summary Judgment; Expert Testimony; Tag along Suits<br/>16.8a.Jury Trial<br/>16.8b.Summary Judgment<br/>16.8c.Judicial Control of Expert Testimony<br/>16.8d.Tag along Suits; Offensive Collateral Estoppel<br/>16.9 Equitable Relief <br/>16.10Compulsory Arbitration <br/><br/>Chapter 17.Damages <br/><br/>17.1Antitrust Damages Actions and Social Welfare<br/>17.1a.Introduction: The Role of Efficiency in Damages Theory<br/>17.1b.Deterrence and Damages<br/>17.1c.Using Damages to Minimize the Social Cost of Antitrust Violations<br/>17.2 The Optimal Deterrence Model for Antitrust Damages<br/>17.2a.Victim's Losses v. Violator's Gains<br/>17.2b.Optimal Damages for Overcharge Injuries<br/>17.2c.Optimal Damages for Exclusionary Practices<br/>17.2d.The Optimal Deterrence Model in Litigation <br/>17.3 The Rationale for Treble Damages<br/>17.4 How Accurately Must Damages Be Measured? <br/>17.5 Measuring Damages for Overcharge Injuries<br/>17.5a.Introduction; Basic Conceptual Problems<br/>17.5b.Methods of Measurement: "Yardstick" and "Before-and-After"<br/>17.5b1.Yardstick Method<br/>17.5b2.Before-and-After Method <br/>17.6 Damages for Exclusionary Practices<br/>17.6a.When Are Damages Due2<br/>17.6b.Damages for Lost Sales and Market Share<br/>17.6b1.Before-and-After Method<br/>17.6b2.Yardstick Method<br/>17.6b3.Lost Market Share<br/>17.6c.Damages and Disaggregation<br/>17.6d.Terminated Dealers and Firms Driven From Business<br/>17.6e.Damages for Precluded Entry<br/>17.7 Contribution; Joint and Several Liability <br/><br/>Chapter 18. Antitrust and the Process of Democratic Government <br/><br/>18.1 Regulation, Rent-Seeking and Antitrust Immunity<br/>18.1a.Introduction<br/>18.1b.Regulatory Intervention and the Right to Seek It-<br/>18.1c.The General Irrelevance of Regulatory Capture<br/>18.1d.Noerr Protects the Process, not the Result <br/>18.2 The Scope of Antitrust's Petitioning Immunity<br/>18.2a.Petitions for Legislative or Executive Action Generally<br/>18.2b.Petitions to Governments Acting as Market Participants<br/>18.2c.Petitions for Adjudicative Action <br/>18.3 The "Sham" Exception in Legislative and Adjudicative Contexts<br/>18.3a.Use of Abusive Methods; False Information<br/>18.3b.Baselessness in the Adjudicative Setting; Successful Claims<br/>18.3c.Single or Repetitive Claims <br/>18.3d.Threat to Sue; Ex Parte Statements<br/>18.3e.Petitions for Invalid Legislation and Administrative Rules <br/>18.4 The Relation Between Unprotected Petitioning and the Substantive Offense <br/>18.5 Corruption of Private Decision Making Bodies <br/><br/>Chapter 19.Antitrust and Federal Regulatory Policy <br/><br/>19.1 Antitrust and Regulation in a Federal System<br/>19.2 Regulation, Deregulation and Antitrust Policy<br/>19.2a.The Scope of Regulation and the Domain of Antitrust<br/>19.2b.The Rationales for Deregulation<br/>19.2b1. Expanded Confidence in Competition and Markets<br/>19.2b2. Public Choice: Decreased Confidence in the Regulatory Process <br/>19.3 The Role of Antitrust in the Regulated Market<br/>19.3a.Express or Implied Repeal<br/>19.3b. The Relation Between Federal Regulation and Antitrust Jurisdiction: Two Views<br/>19.3c.Requisite Regulatory Oversight; "State Action" Compared<br/>19.4 Procedure in areas of Divided Authority; Primary Jurisdiction<br/>19.5 Market Power Offenses in Regulated Markets<br/>19.6 Antitrust Damages Actions and Regulated Rates: The Keogh Doctrine<br/>19.7 Particular Exemptions<br/>19.7a.Miscellaneous Express Exemptions<br/>19.7b.Antitrust and Federal Labor Policy<br/>19.7c.The McCarran-Ferguson Act and the Ensurance Exemption<br/>19.7c1."Business of lnsurance"<br/>19.7c2."Regulated by State Law"<br/>19.7c3 Acts of Boycott, Coercion or Intimidation <br/>19.7c4.Continuing Vitality of McCarran-Ferguson <br/><br/>Chapter 20.Antitrust Federalism and the "State Action" Doctrine<br/>Sec. <br/>20.1 Introduction; Premption<br/>20.2 Federalism and the Policy of the "State Action" Doctrine<br/>20.2a.The Historical Basis of the "State Action" Doctrine<br/>20.2b. Conflicts Between Federal Antitrust and State Regulation; Alternative Solutions <br/>20.3 Basic Qualifications for Exemption <br/>20.4 Authorization<br/>20.5 Active Supervision<br/>20.5a.When Is Supervision Required?<br/>20.5b.What Kind of Supervision Is Required?<br/>20.5c.Who Must Supervise? <br/>20.6 The Special Problem of Municipal Antitrust Liability <br/>20.7 The Relationship Between Petitions to the Government and the "State Action" Doctrine<br/>20.8 The Relation Between State and Federal Antitrust Law <br/><br/>Chapter 21.The Reach of the Federal Antitrust Laws<br/><br/>21.1 Local Activities: Federal Antitrust and Interstate Commerce<br/>21.1a.The Sherman Act's Jurisdictional Reach<br/>21.1b.Jurisdictional Reach of Other Antitrust Provisions<br/>21.2 Antitrust's Global Reach<br/>21.2a.Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Basic Doctrine<br/>21.2b.Prudential Constraints on Extraterritorial Reach<br/>21.2c.The Act of State Doctrine<br/>21.2d.Foreign Sovereign Compulsion; Petitions to Foreign Governments<br/>21.2e.Foreign Sovereign Immunity <br/>21.3 Judicial Jurisdiction and Antitrust <br/><br/>APPENDIX: WESTLAW<br/>TABLE OF CASES <br/>TABLE OF STATUTES<br/>INDEX<br/> |
