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CONTENTS<br/><br/>Preface <br/>List of Contributors<br/>Table of Cases<br/>Table of Legislation <br/><br/>PART I THE NATURE OF RETAIL COMPETITION<br/> <br/>1. Private Labels — What Drives them Forward? <br/>A. The Growth of Private Labels<br/>B. The Study — What Drives Private Label Success?<br/>By category<br/>By country<br/>C. Results and Recommendations — At Country Level<br/>Retail environment<br/>Economy <br/>Culture <br/>Summary — country level<br/>D. Results and Recommendations — Category Level Globally <br/>Advertising intensity <br/>Value for money <br/>Brand trust <br/>Innovation intensity <br/>Packaging <br/>Quality <br/>E. Results and Recommendations — Category Level Locally <br/>Country variance <br/>Category performance <br/>E Counter Strategies in Action — A Case Study <br/>G. The Other Two C's — Consumer and Customer <br/>H. Conclusions and Recommendations <br/><br/>2. The Business Model for Manufacturers' Brands <br/>A. Introduction <br/>B. Definition of a Brand<br/>C. Components of the Marketing Mix <br/>Product <br/>Promotion <br/>Place <br/>Price <br/>D. The Business Model of a Brand <br/>The financial structure of brands <br/>The relationship between growth and distribution <br/>E. The Structure of Modern Retail Distribution <br/>Distributor power <br/>F The Effect of Private Label on Manufacturer Brands: Case Studies <br/>G. The Case Study of Laundry Products in Spain <br/>Laundry market trends <br/>The source of private label growth <br/>The brands' response <br/>The case of WIPP <br/>H. The Case of Cat Food Products in Germany <br/>Wet cat food market trends <br/>Reasons for the reduction in Whiskas' market share <br/>The spiral of decline<br/>I. Conclusion <br/><br/>3. Bargaining between Retailers and their Suppliers<br/>A. Introduction <br/>B. Upstream Monopoly: The Case of a Branded Product <br/>C. Private Label Goods: Two Case Studies <br/>Milk <br/>Carbonated soft drinks <br/>D. Competition Upstream: The Case of Private Label Suppliers <br/>Example: application to the milk market <br/>E. Buyer Power <br/>F. Waterbed Effects <br/>G. Investment Incentives<br/>Endogenous technology choice<br/>H. Strategic Interaction between Branded Goods and Private Labels <br/>I. Conclusions<br/><br/>PART II MARKET POWER AND THE ABUSE OF DOMINANCE<br/><br/>4. Market Power in Consumer Goods Industries<br/>A. Overview <br/>Organization of the chapter <br/>B. The Competitive Process and Market Power Some eartier work that recognized vertical competition's role in market power <br/>C. The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines <br/>D. Measuring the Three Sources of Market Power <br/>E. The Competition between Leading National Brands and Private Labels <br/>The insights of Braithwaite and the remarkable scope of Borden's contributions <br/>Some recent developments <br/>Three industry structures in which leading national brands and private labels compete <br/>The British grocery industry <br/>F. The Lynch Model <br/>G. Conclusion <br/><br/>5. Private Labels and Branded Goods: Consumers' 'Horrors' and 'Heroes'<br/>A. Introduction <br/>B. Brands Versus Private Labels <br/>C. Brand 'Horrors 'and' Heroes' <br/>Nature of brands <br/>Brand' horrors' <br/>The blob' <br/>'The giant octopus'<br/>The virus'<br/>Brand 'heroes' <br/>'The protector' <br/>'The pioneer' <br/>'The equalizer' <br/>D. Private Label 'Horrors' and 'Heroes' <br/>Nature of private label <br/>Private label 'horrors' <br/>'The blood sucker' <br/>'The flesh eater' <br/>'The body snatcher' <br/>Private label 'heroes' <br/>'The underdog' <br/>The adventurer' <br/>'The revolutionary' <br/>E. Competition between Brands and Private Labels in the UK <br/>F. Conclusion <br/><br/>6. Private Labels and Article 82 EC<br/>A. Legal and Business Perceptions of Article 82 <br/>B. In the Light of Consumers Welfare', Could or Should Article 82 be Enforced against the Private Label Offers<br/>by Companies with Market Power? <br/>C. Potential Issues Arising under Article 82 from a Business-to-Business Perspective <br/>D. Conclusions <br/><br/>PART III VERTICAL RESTRAINTS<br/><br/>7. Private Labels, Dual Distribution, and Vertical Restraints — An Analysis of the Competitive Effects<br/>A. Introduction <br/>B. Why are Vertical Restraints Treated Less Harshly than Horizontal Restraints? <br/>C. Harm to Interbrand versus lntrabrand Competition <br/>D. Limits on the Sale of the Private Label <br/>A commitment not to hold a private label <br/>Financial incentives to sell less of the private label <br/>Limitation of shelf space devoted to the private label <br/>Commitment to a minimum price or maximum quantity of the private label <br/>Territorial division with regard to the private label <br/>E. Vertical Restraints Not Concerned With the Private Label <br/>Resale price maintenance and exclusive territories <br/>Non-compete clauses <br/>Exclusive distribution <br/>Most favoured customer clauses <br/>Price matching <br/>F. Dual Distribution <br/>Restraints eliminating or restricting interbrand competition <br/>Minimum resale price maintenance <br/>Exclusive territories <br/>Restraints limiting the supplier's entry or operation in the retail market <br/>Non-compete obligations <br/>Exclusive distribution <br/>Most favoured customer clause <br/>Price matching <br/>G. Implications of the Economic Analysis With Regard to the EC Block Exemption Regulation <br/>Private labels <br/>Dual distribution <br/>H. Conclusion <br/><br/>8. The Vertical/Horizontal Dichotomy in Competition Law: Some Reflections with Regard to Dual Distribution and Private Labels<br/>A. Introduction <br/>B. Genealogy of the Vertical/Horizontal Dichotomy: Unpacking the Dominant Story <br/>C. A Heterodox Perspective on the Vertical/Horizontal Dichotomy <br/>The 'new' economics of vertical relations <br/>The emergence of hybrid (horizontal/vertical) commercial practices: dual distribution and private labels as so illustration <br/>Dual distribution <br/>Private labels <br/>D. The Futile Quest for the Vertical or Horizontal Dimension of the Supplier/ Retailer Relationship <br/>Dual distribution in US antitrust law <br/>Dual distribution in EC competition law <br/>E. Conclusion <br/><br/>PART IV IN-STORE COMPETITION, PRICING, MARKETING, AND ADVERTISING<br/><br/>9. Retailer and Private Labels: Asymmetry of lnformation, In-store Competition and the Control of Shelf Space<br/>A. Introduction: The Evolving Role of Retailing, a Network Analogy? <br/>B. The Customer Role <br/>Relative economic dependence <br/>Access to confidential information, asymmetry of information: a head start for private labels <br/>C. Owner of Shelf Space and Gatekeeper Role <br/>Access to consumers; alternative channels as an 'escape'? <br/>EU vertical merger guidelines: inpur foreclosure <br/>Incentives to foreclose and to mimic brands <br/>D. Retailers' Control of Shelf Space and In-Store<br/>Positioning of Brands and Private Labels <br/>Growth of private labels as the expense of brands, increased choice? <br/>Innovation and private labels: 'asymmetric' access to Market/consumers <br/>What about 'must-stocks'? <br/>Advertising of brands: a barrier to private labels, or brands catching up? <br/>E. The Private Label/Retailer Business Model, Choice and In-Store Competition <br/>The (verrically-integrared) private label/retailer business model <br/>Shopper trips <br/>Two types of choice: range of one brand versus range of different brands <br/>Imagine a vertically-in regra ted (private label-only) world: once more the network parallel Branded firms' mergers<br/>F. Is the Answer: Branded Manufacturers to Engage in Private Label Production? <br/>Manufacturing own labels <br/>New emerging business model: collaborative differentiation <br/>G. Retailers Set Consumer Prices of All Products <br/>Risks of private label/retailer strategic pricing behaviour <br/>Why brands are affected by (extremely) low pricing <br/>The US Leegin case: resale price mainrenance now subject to rule-of-reason <br/>How about Europe? <br/>H. Conclusion <br/><br/>10. Misleading Packaging, Copycats, and Look-alikes: Ais Unfair Commercial Practice?<br/>A. Introduction <br/>B. The Major Functions of Trade Marks and Brands <br/>C. Unfair Competition Law and Passing Off <br/>D. The EU Unfair Commercia! Practices Directive — An Overview <br/>E. Copycats and Look-Alikes under the Directive <br/>E. A Critical Assessment <br/><br/>11. Private Labels, Product Variety and Price Competition — Lessons from the German Grocery Sector<br/>A. Introduction <br/>B. On the Proliferation of Private Labels: The Study <br/>C. Legislation and German Federal Court Ruling as a 'Motor' for the Growing Market Power of Retailers <br/>Federal Court ruling paving the way for anti-competitive business practices by the retail trade <br/>D. On the Proliferarion of Private Labels in the German Grocery Sector <br/>E. Discussion of the Consequences of Private Labels in the <br/>Scientific Literature and Derivation of Hypotheses <br/>Variety ofproducts <br/>Prices <br/>Market volume <br/>F. Empirical Results Regarding the Welfare Eflects of the<br/>Proliferation of Private Labels <br/>Decreasing variety of products <br/>Rising prices <br/>Decreasing market volume<br/>G. Conclusion <br/><br/>12. Advertising, Promotional Campaigns, and Private Labels<br/>A. Introduction <br/>B. The Roles of Advertising and Promotion <br/>C. Advertising and Promotion by Retailers <br/>D. Possible Effects on Competition <br/>Informarion flow <br/>Exchange of information between undertakings <br/>Brand awareness and loyalty <br/>Barriers to expansion and entry <br/>Advertising, retail profit margins, and price <br/>E. Advertising, Promotion, and Private Labels <br/>Profit margins, market transparency and price <br/>Barriers to entry and foreclosure effects <br/>Marker share, brand loyalty and outlet reputation <br/>In-store promotional activity Access to data <br/>E. Conclusions<br/><br/>PART V RETAIL CONSOLIDATION AND THE USE OF REMEDIES<br/><br/>13. Retail Consolidation: The Implications of Mergers and Buying Alliances<br/>A. Introduction<br/>B. Retail Mergers: Typical Competition Considerations Leading cases in brief Core principles <br/>C. Retail Buying Alliances: Typical Considerations <br/>D. Consolidation Issues: Cumulative Effects <br/>E. Some Recurrent Themes <br/>F. Conclusion<br/><br/>14. Retail Competition: The Use of Ex-ante and Ex-post Remedies<br/>A. Ex-Ante Remedies — Merger Control <br/>Consolidation in the supermarket sector <br/>Remedies in merger control <br/>Supermarker consolidation — appraisal and remedies <br/>The European Commission experience <br/>Kesko <br/>Rewe <br/>Carrefour/Promodes <br/>Member Stares' experience <br/>The United Kingdom <br/>Germany <br/>Portugal <br/>Spain <br/>Switzerland <br/>B. Ex-Ante Remedies — Market Investigations <br/>The 2000 supermarkets investigation <br/>Effectiveness of the remedy? <br/>The 2006 groceries investigation <br/>Aftermath of 2006 investigation <br/>C. Ex-Post Remedies — Article 81/Chapter I<br/>Supermarkets, anti-competitive agreements, and concerted practices<br/>Buying groups <br/>Exchange of information <br/>Price-coordination<br/>D. Ex-Post Remedies — Dominance and Economic Dependence <br/>E. Conclusion <br/><br/>PART VI PRIVATE LABELS — THE US EXPERIENCE<br/><br/>15. United States Competition Law Policy — The Private Label Experience<br/>A. Introduction <br/>B. Private Label Issues in US Merger Review <br/>Introduction <br/>An overview of merger analysis <br/>Market definition and concentration <br/>Anti-competitive effects <br/>New entry <br/>The role of private label products in merger analysis <br/>Differentiated product markets <br/>Private label products excluded from the relevant market<br/>Private label products included in the relevant market <br/>Potential impact of private label brands in the relevant market <br/>Repositioning <br/>C. Private Label Issues under the Robinson-Patman Act <br/>The history and organization of the Robinson-Patman Act <br/>Genesis of the legislation <br/>Provisions of the Act <br/>Private labels under the Robinson-Patman Act <br/>The 'like grade and quality' requirement <br/>Application of 'like grade and quality' to private label <br/>Pricing of private label products <br/>D. Conclusion<br/><br/>PART VII CONSUMER WELFARE AND ENFORCEMENT STANDARD<br/><br/>16. The 'Consumer Welfare' Standard as a Form of Substantive Protection for Consumers under European Competition Law<br/>A. Introduction <br/>Background <br/>Aim and layour <br/>B. Competition, Private Labels, and the Welfare of Consumers <br/>Competition and the welfare of consumers <br/>Private labels and consumer welfare <br/>C. Consumer Welfare as an Objective of European Competition Law <br/>'Tradirional' objectives of European competition law <br/>Protection of free market integration <br/>Protection of economic freedom <br/>The ascendancy of consumer-orientated objectives <br/>The Commission's concern for consumers <br/>Soft law promotion of consumer welfare <br/>D. The Consumer Welfare Standard in Practice <br/>Restrictive agreements <br/>Unilateral behaviour <br/>Merger control <br/>E. Conclusion <br/><br/>17. Welfare Objective and Enforcement Standard in Competition Law<br/>A. Introduction <br/>B. Positive Analysis: The Status Quo between Fragmentation and Convergence <br/>Overview of possible objectives of competition law <br/>The position in the European Union <br/>The position in the United States <br/>The position in other jurisdictions <br/>C. The Need for a Unifying Principle <br/>The problem <br/>The protection of the 'competitive process' <br/>Consumer choice <br/>Total or consumer welfare <br/>D. Normative Analysis <br/>Preliminary conclusions and premises of the further inquiry<br/>Total welfare <br/>Consumer welfare <br/>Definition of the consumer welfare objective <br/>Income redistribution <br/>Imperfections in corporate governance <br/>Enforcement efficiency and institutional capability arguments<br/>E. Consumer Harm as Effective Standard to Achieve a Total Welfare <br/>Objective <br/>From the objective to the enforcement standard <br/>Self-selection, information asymmetry, and lobbying <br/>Optimal objective and optimal standard <br/>SeIf-selection <br/>Asymmetric information <br/>System-level models <br/>Lobbying <br/>Consumer welfare as optimal standard to achieve total welfare maximization? <br/>Total welfare, effective competition, and consumer harm as the founded modes of the enforcement standard <br/>The key elements of the standard <br/>The focus on price, output, and innovation <br/>Two potential objections to the proposed standard <br/>F. Application of the Proposed Standard to the Assessment of the Competitive Effects of Own Label Products <br/>G. Conclusion <br/><br/>Index <br/><br/><br/> |
