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TABLE OF CONTENTS<br/><br/>PREFACE <br/><br/>PART 1 LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION<br/><br/>CHAPTER 1 THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC REASONING<br/><br/>§1.1 Fundamental Concepts<br/>§1.2 Value, Utility, Efficiency<br/>§1.3 The Realism of the Economist's Assumptions<br/>§1.4 Irrationality and Hyperrationality; Herein of Behavioral Economics and Game Theory<br/>§1.5 Two Approaches to Economics<br/>Suggested Readings<br/>Problems<br/><br/>CHAPTER 2 THE ECONOMIC APPROACITH TO LAW<br/><br/>§2.1 History <br/>§2.2 Positive and Normative Economic Analysis of Law<br/>§2.3 The Continental Approach <br/>§2.4 Criticisms of the Economic Approach to Law <br/>Suggested Readings <br/><br/>PART II THE COMMON LAW <br/><br/>CHAPTER 3 PROPERTY <br/><br/>§3.1 The Economic Thcory of Property Rights: Static and Dynamic Aspects <br/>§3.2 Problems in the Creation and Enforcement of Property Rights <br/>§3.3 Property Rights in Law and in Economics: Broadcast Frequencies and Airwave Auctions <br/>§3.4 Rights to Future Use <br/>§3.5 Incompatible Uses; the Coase Theorem Revisited <br/>§3.6 Trespass and Eminent Domain <br/>§3.7 Nuisance <br/>§3.8 Solving the Problem of Incompatible Land Uses Through Merger and Restrictive Covenants <br/>§3.9 injunctions Versus Damages as Methods of Enforcing Property Rights <br/>§3.10 Divided Ownership-Estates in Land <br/>§3.11 Problems in the Transfer of Property Rights <br/>§3.12 Possession <br/>§3.13 Distributive Effects of Property Right Assignments <br/>§3.14 Public Lands <br/>Suggested Readings<br/>Problems <br/><br/>CÍJAPTER 4 CONTRACT RIGHTS AND REMEDIES <br/><br/>§4.1 The Process of Exchange and the Economic Roles of Contract Law <br/>§4.2 Consideration <br/>§4.3 Problems of Formation; Herein of Mutual Assent and Unilateral Contracts <br/>§4.4 Mutual Mistake <br/>§4.5 Contracts as lnsurance-Impossibility and Related Doctrines <br/>§4.6 Insurance Contracts <br/>§4.7 Fraud <br/>§4.8 Agency Law <br/>§4.9 Duress, Form Contracts, Bargaining Power, and Unconscionability <br/>§4.10 Fundamental Principies of Contract Damages <br/>§4.11 Consequential Damages <br/>§4.12 Penalties, Punitive Damages, Liquidated Damages, Forfeitures, and No-Modification Ruies <br/>§4.13 Specific Performance <br/>§4.14 Self-Heip, Contract Conditions, and Substantial Performance <br/>§4.15 ImpIied Contracts <br/>§4.16 The Option Theory of Contract Law Versus the Morai Theory <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 5 FAMILY LAW AND SEX LAW<br/> <br/>§5.1 The Theory of Household Production <br/>§5.2 Formation and Dissolution of Marriage <br/>§5.3 Consequences of Dissolution <br/>§5.4 The Legal Protection of Children <br/>§5.5 Surrogate Motherhood <br/>§5.6 Law and Popuiation <br/>§5.7 Why Regulate Sexual Behavior? <br/>§5.8 Homosexual Marriage <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 6 TORT LAW <br/><br/>§6.1 The Economics of Accidents and the Learned Hand Formula of Liability for Negligence <br/>§6.2 The Reasonable-Person Standard <br/>§6.3 Custom as a Defense <br/>§6.4 Victim Fault: Contributory and Comparative Negligence, Assumption of Risk, and Duties to Trespassers <br/>§6.5 Strict Liability <br/>§6.6 Products Liability <br/>§6.7 Causation and Foreseeability <br/>§6.8 Joint Tona, Contribution, Indemnity; Herein of Respondeat Superior and Sexual Harassinent <br/>§6.9 Rescue: Liability Versus Restitution <br/>§6.10 The Function of Tort Damages <br/>§6.11 Damages for Loss ofEarning Capacity <br/>§6.12 Damages for Pain and Suffering, the Problem of Valuing Human Life, and the Risk of Overcompensation <br/>§6.13 The Coilateral Benefits (Coilateral Source) Rifle <br/>§6.14 Negligence with Liability Insurance and Accident Insurance, <br/>No-Fault Automobile Accident Compensatiõn, and Capping Medical-Maipractice Judgments <br/>§6.15 Intentional Torts <br/>§6.16 Defamation <br/>§6.17 Successor Liability <br/>§6.18 Immunities <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 7 CRIMINAL LAW <br/><br/>§7.1 The Economic Nature and Function of Criminal Law <br/>§7.2 Optimal Criminal Sanctions <br/>§7.3 Preventing Crime: Multiple-Offender Laws, Attempt and Conspiracy, Aiding and Ahetting, Recidivism, Entrapment <br/>§7.4 Pardons <br/>§7.5 Criminal Intent <br/>§7.6 Hate Crimes <br/>§7.7 Recklessness, Negligence, and Strict Liability <br/>§7.8 The Defense of Necessity (Compulsion) <br/>§7.9 Precautioris by Victims; Herein of Provocation and Gun Control <br/>§7.10 The Economics of Organized Crime <br/>§7.11 The "War on Drugs" <br/>§7.12 Criminal Punjshment ofTerrorists <br/>§7.13 Crime Waves <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/> <br/>CHAPTER 8 THE COMMON LAW, LEGAL HJSTORY, AND JURISPRUDENCE <br/><br/>§8.1 The Implicit Economic Logic of the Common Law<br/>§8.2 Economic Torts <br/>§8.3 The Common Law, Economic Growth, and Legal History <br/>§8.4 Common Law as Custom: Hayek's Chailenge to the Economic Analysis of the Common Law <br/>§8.5 Primitive Law <br/>§8.6 Law and Modernization <br/>§8.7 The Rule of Law <br/>§8.8 Law and Social Norms <br/>§8.9 The Moral Content of the Common Law<br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>PART III PUBLIC REGULA TION OF THE MARKET <br/><br/>CHAPTER 9 THE TIIEORY OF MONOPOLY <br/><br/>§9.1 The Monopolist's Price and Output <br/>§9.2 Effect of Changes in Cost or Demand on the Monopoly Price <br/>§9.3 Efficiency Consequences of Monopoly: Deadweight Loss and Rent-Seeking <br/>§9.4 Other Economic Objections to Monopoly; Herein of Innovation and Cost Minimization<br/>§9.5 Price Discrimination <br/>§9.6 Two Impediments to Monopolizing (Besides Entiy): Competition for the Market and Durability <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 10 THE ANTITRUST LAWS <br/><br/>§10.1 Cartels and the Sherman Act <br/>§10.2 Tacit Coilusion <br/>§10.3 Problerns With Economic Evidence <br/>§10.4 Resale Price Maintenance <br/>§10.5 Mergers That Create Monopolies or Oligopolies <br/>§10.6 Market or Monopoly Power <br/>§10.7 Market Defiriition and Market Shares <br/>§10.8 Potential Competition <br/>§10.9 Predation <br/>§10.10 Foreclosure, Tie-Ins and Bundling, and Barriers to Entry <br/>§10.11 Antitrust and the "New Economy" <br/>§10.12 Boycotts; Herein of Monopsony <br/>§10.13 Is There Benign Monopsony? <br/>§10.14 Antitrust Damages <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 11 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY <br/><br/>§11.1 Are Patents Property? <br/>§11.2 Patents and Irmovation <br/>§11.3 Trade Secrecy <br/>§11.4 Privacy <br/>§11.5 Copyright <br/>§11.6 The Open-Source Movement <br/>§11.7 Trademarks <br/>§11.8 Patent Agreements, the BMI-ASCAP Blanket Licenses, and the Intersection Between Antitrust and Inteliectual Property <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 12 THE REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION <br/><br/>§12.1The Special Treatrnent of Labor Carteis <br/>§12.2 The Economic Logic of the National Labor Relauons Act <br/>§12.3 The Employee Free Choice Act <br/>§12.4 Unions and Productivity <br/>§12.5 Employment at Will <br/>§12.6 Labor-Market Failure: The Case of Judicial Law Clerks <br/>§12.7 Labor and Antitrust Law <br/>§12.8 Minimum Wage and Related "Worker-Protective" Legislation <br/>§12.9 Mandated Benefits <br/>§12.10 Employment Discrimination on Grounds of Race, Sex, Age, and Disability <br/>§12.11 Federal Pension Law <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems<br/><br/>CHAPTER 13 PUBLIC UTIUTY AND COMMON CARRIER REGULATION<br/> <br/>§13.1 Natural Monopoly <br/>§13.2 Control of Profita and the Problem of Reasonable Return <br/>§13.3 Other Problems Caused by Attempting to Limit a Regulated Firm's Profits <br/>§13.4 Incentive Regulation <br/>§13.5 Regulation of Rate Structure and of Entry <br/>§13.6 Pay Television <br/>§13.7 Taxation by Regulation (Interna! Subsidization or Cross-Subsidjzatjon) <br/><br/><br/>§13.8 The Demand for Regulation <br/>§13.9 The Deregulation Movement; Privatization <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 14 THE CH0IcE BETWEEN REGULATION AND COMMON LAW<br/><br/>§14.1 Optimal Regulation <br/>§14.2 Consumer Fraud Revisited <br/>§14.3 Mandated Disclosure <br/>§14.4 Alternatives to Disclosure: The Case of Trans Fats <br/>§14.5 Safety and Health <br/>§14.6 Regulation of Poliution<br/>§14.7 Traffic Congestion <br/>§14.8 Mandatory Container Deposits <br/>§14.9 Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Regulatory Tool <br/>§14.10 The Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Case of Global Warming <br/>§14.11 Cable Television: Problems of Copyright and Local Monopoly <br/>§14.12 Selling Highways <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems<br/> <br/>PART IV THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS<br/><br/>AND FINANCIAL MARKETS <br/><br/>CHAPTER 15 CORPORATIONS, SECURED AND UNSECURED FINANCING, <br/>BANKRUPTCY <br/><br/>§15.1 The Nature of the Firm <br/>§15.2 The Different Kinds of Firm <br/>§15.3 The Corporation as a Standard Contract <br/>§15.4 Corporate Debt and Secured Debt <br/>§15.5 Corporate Bankruptcy <br/>§156 Personal Bankruptcy <br/>§15.7 Piercing the Corporate Veil <br/>§15.8 The Separation of Ownership and Control <br/>§15.9 The Transfer of Corporate Control <br/>§15.10 Corporate Squeeze-Outs and the Competition in Laxity <br/>§15.11 The Compensation Issue <br/>§15.12 Insider Trading and the Problem of Entrepreneurial Reward <br/>§15.13 Corporate Scandals <br/>§15.14 Managerial Discretion and the Corporation's Social Responsibilities <br/>§15.15 Corporate Criminality <br/>§15.16 The Closely Held Corporation <br/>§15.17 Public Utility Regulation Revisited <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/><br/>CHAPTER 16 FINANCIAL MARKETS<br/><br/>§16.1 Portfolio Design <br/>§16.2 Diversification, Leverage, and the Debt-Equity Ratio <br/>§16.3 Why Do Corporations Buy Insurance? <br/>§16.4 Stock Picking and the Efficient-Markets Hypothesis <br/>§16.5 The Chalienge of Behavioral Finance<br/>§16.6 A Deeper Chalienge <br/>§16.7 Implications of Finance Theory for Regulated Monopoly <br/>§16.8 ESOPs Revisited: The Problem of Underdiversification <br/>§16.9 Trust lnvestment Law and Index Funds <br/>§16.10 Social Investing by Trustees <br/>§16.11 The Regulation of the Securities Markets <br/>§16.12 Compensation Revisited: The Case of the Mutual Fund Fees <br/>§16.13 Why Regulate Banks? <br/>§16.14 The Crash of '08 <br/>§16.15 The Nirvana Fallacy and Darwinian Economics <br/>§16.16 Are Bankers Greedy? <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problerns <br/><br/>PART V LA W AM) THE DISTRJBLJTION OF INCOME<br/>AND WEALTH <br/><br/>CHAPTER 17 INc0ME INEQUALITIES, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, AND POVERTY<br/><br/>§17.1 The Measurement of lnequality <br/>§17.2 Is lnequality Inefficient? <br/>§17.3 Growing Inequality: Causes and Consequences <br/>§17.4 The Contract Theory of Distributivejustice, and lis Application to Social Security <br/>§17.5 Social Mobility<br/>§17.6 The Costs of Povertv and the Limitations of Private Charity <br/>§17.7 Unrestricted Cash Transfers Versus Benefits iii Kind <br/>§17.8 Wealth Redistribution by Liability Rules: The Case of Housing Code Enforcement <br/>§17.9 Open-Ended Benefits in Kind <br/>§17.10 The Entitlements Quandary <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 18 TAXATION <br/><br/>§18.1 Taxatjon and Efficiency <br/>§18.2 Conscription <br/>§18.3 Excise Taxes <br/>§18.4 Real Estate Taxes <br/>§18.5 Corporate Income Taxation <br/>§18.6 Income Taxes Versus Consumption Taxes <br/>§18.7 Value-Added Tax <br/>§18.8 The Definition of Income <br/>§18.9 Income Tax Deductions <br/>§18.10 The Special Treatment of Capital Gains <br/>§18.11 The Progressive Principie <br/>§18.12 Tax Subsidies <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 19 THE TRANSMISSION OF WEALTH AT DEATH <br/><br/>§19.1 Death (and Gift) Taxes <br/>§19.2 Selfish Heirs: The Case of the Murdering Heir <br/>§19.3 The Dead Hand and the Cy Pres Doctrine<br/>§19.4 The Incentives of Charitable Foundations <br/>§19.5 Bequests for Purposes <br/>§19.6 Conditions in Private Trusts; Herein of the Spendthrift Trust <br/>§19.7 The Widow's Share <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>PART VI THE LEGAL PROCESS <br/><br/>CHAPTER 20 THE MARKET, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM, AND THE LEGISLA TIVE PROCESS AS METHODS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION <br/><br/>§20.1 Legal and Market Aliocation Compared; Inquisitorial and Adversarial Legal Systems Compared <br/>§20.2 Judicial and Legislative Aliocation Compared <br/>§20.3 The Economic Theory of Legislation <br/>§20.4 Statutory Interpretation in a World of Interest Groiip Politics<br/>§20.5 he Independentjudiciary and Interest Group Politics <br/>§20.6 What Do Judges Maximize? <br/>§20.7 The Economic Theory of Democracy <br/>§20.8 Democracy, Elected Judges, and Judicial Term Limits <br/>§20.9 An Antitrust Approach to Democracy <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 21 THE PROCESS OF LEGAL RULEMAKING <br/><br/>§21.1 The Body of Precedents as a Capital Stock <br/>§21.2 Production of Precedents<br/>§21.3 Statutory Production; Rules Versus Standards <br/>§21.4 Stare Decisis <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 22 CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE <br/><br/>§22.1 The Economic Goals of Procedure <br/>§22.2 The Costs of Error in Civil Cases <br/>§22.3 Anticipatory Adjudication; Herein of Preliminary Injunctions, Declaratory Judgments, and Advisory Opinions <br/>§22.4 SummaryJudgment and Mouons to Dismiss <br/>§22.5 The Decision Whether to Settle or Go to Trial <br/>§22.6 How Rules of Procedure Affect Senlement <br/>§22.7 The Decision to Settle and the Evolution of the Common Law <br/>§22.8 Mediation as an Aid te Settlement <br/>§22.9 Liability Rules Revisited <br/>§22.10 Plea Bargaining, the Reform of Criminal Procedure,and the Futility Thesis <br/>§22.11 Expenditures on Litigation and the Quest for Efficient Procedure <br/>§22.12 Access te Legal Remedies-Contingent Fees, Class Actions, and Indemnity of Legal Fees <br/>§22.13 Rule 68 and One-Way Indemnity <br/>§22.14 Resjudicata and Coilateral Estoppel <br/>§22.15 Court Delay and Caseload Crises <br/>§22.16 Jurors and Arbitrators <br/>§22.17 Optimal Adjudication: The Case of Contract <br/>§22.18 Appeals <br/>§22.19 Choice of Law<br/>§22.20 The Economics of the Legal Profession <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 23 EVIDENCE<br/><br/>§23.1 Evidence as Search and as Error Minimization <br/>§23.2 The Adversarial and Inquisitorial Modeis Further Compared <br/>§23.3 Trial byJury Revisited <br/>§23.4 Burden of Proof <br/>§23.5 Harmless Error <br/>§23.6 Rule 403's Balancing Test <br/>§23.7 Character Evidence <br/>§23.8 Privilege <br/>§23.9 Expert Wimesses <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/><br/>CHAPTER 24 LÁ ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRA TIVE PROCESS <br/><br/>§24.1 Public Versus Private Law Enforcement: The Tradeoffs <br/>§24.2 Public Versus Private Enforcement: Positive Implications <br/>§24.3 Case Selection by Public Agencies <br/>§24.4Reguiation by Courts Versus Regulation by Administrative Agencies <br/>§24.5 Overlapping Agencies <br/>§24.6 Regulatory Capture <br/>§24.7 The Structure of the Administrative Agency <br/>§24.8 The Behavior of Administrative Agencies <br/>§24.9 Agency Costs in Public Agencies <br/>§24.10 Judicial Review of Agency Decisions<br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>PART VII THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM <br/><br/>CHAPTER 25 THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE C0NSTITUT0N <br/><br/>§25.1 The Economics of Constitutionalism: An Introduction<br/>§25.2 The Separation of Powers <br/>§25.3 The Protection of Rights <br/>§25.4 The Scope of Constitutional Rights: The Case of Terrorism <br/>§25.5 Rationality Review <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problem <br/><br/>CHAPTER 26 ECONOMJC DUE PROCESS<br/><br/>§26.1 Liberty of Contract as a Constitutional Principie <br/>§26.2 Economic Due Process Revived: The Poor as a Constitutionaily Protected Class <br/>§26.3 The Due Process Rights of Consumers and Public Employees <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Probiems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 27 THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM <br/><br/>§27.1 The Aliocation of Responsibilities Between the Federal Government and the States §27.2 Responding to Emergencies: Katrina (or Sandy) and Terrorism <br/>§27.3 Federal Courts and Federal Law Enforcement <br/>§27.4 State Taxation: Excise Taxes <br/>§27.5 State Taxation: Real Estate and Corporate Income Taxes <br/>§27.6 Other Limitations on State Reguiation of Interstate Commerce <br/>§27.7 Due Process Limitations on Personal Jurisdiction <br/>§27.8 Interbasin Water Transfers <br/>§27.9 Exporting Poverty <br/>§27.10 Conflict of Laws, and Poilution, Revisited <br/>§27.11 The Commerce Power <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 28 RACIAL DISCRIMINATI0N <br/><br/>§28.1 The Taste for Discrimination <br/>§28.2 School Segregation <br/>§28.3 The Requirement of State Action<br/>§28.4 Antidiscrimination Laws <br/>§28.5 Reverse Discrimination <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 29 THE PROTECTION OF FREE MARKETS IN IDEAS AND RELIGION <br/><br/>§29.1 The Economic Basis of Freedom of Speech 955<br/>§29.2 The Scope of the Protected Activity: tncitement, Threats, Defaination, Obscenity, and Flag Burning <br/>§29.3 Prior Restraints, Viewpoint Restrictions, and Foruins Law <br/>§29.4 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Free Speech: The Categorícal Approach <br/>§29.5 The Regulation of Broadcasting <br/>§29.6 False Advertising and the Relation Between Political and Econornic Rights <br/>§29.7 Subsidizing Speech <br/>§29.8 The Economics of Religious Freedom <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>CHAPTER 30 SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND INTERROGATIONS <br/><br/>§30.1 The Right of Privacy Revisited <br/>§30.2 Fourth Amendment Rernedies <br/>§30.3 The Puzzle of Selflncrimjnatjon and Coerced Confessions <br/>Suggested Readings <br/>Problems <br/><br/>PART VIII COMPARA TIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW <br/><br/>CHAPTER 31 COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW<br/><br/>§31.1 Comparative Law <br/>§31.2 Treaties and Other International Agreements <br/>§31.3 Dumping and the Free-Trade Question <br/>§31.4 Foreign Direct Investment <br/>§31.5 The Alien Tort Statute <br/>§31.6 Forum Selection Clauses <br/>Suggested Readings<br/>Problems <br/>INDEX<br/><br/><br/> |