Contents
1 Introduction
A useful trade-off
The merger process in practice
Deflning the relevant market
Merger investigation
Using merger simulation in the investigation
stage
The book

1 Theory

2 Quantity Competition
Mergers between Cournot
competitors
Mergers under non-Cournot
conjectures
Leaders and foliowers
Generalizing demand
Sunmiary

3 Price Competition
Mergers between sellers of
differentiated products
Mergers under spatial competition
Suminary
Appendix to Chapter 3

4 Other Strateglc Variables
Multi-brand flrrns
Quantity competition
Price competition
Welfare
Research and deveiopment
Independent firms

R&D joint ventures
Monopolies
Welfare
Summary
Appendix to Chapter 4

5 Producers of Complements
Components produced by
monopolists
Competition in the production of ali components
Competition in the production of some components
Summary

6 Efficiencies
Re-allocatixig production
Constant marginal costs
Increasing marginal costs
Synergies
Bargaining power
Summary
Appendix to Chapter 6

7 Entry and Exit
Entry and homogeneous products
Entry and differentiated products
Exit
Failing firms
Summary

8 Merger Games
Noncooperative games
The possibility of fuil monopolization
Merger waves
Non-Cournot conjectures
Associations
Cooperative games
Stability
Summary
II Policy

9 Policy Implications
The antitrust authorities'
objective
Externa! Welfare
Consumer surpius
Information a.symmetry between flrms and the antitrust authority
The decision horizon for antitrust authorities
Sequential mergers
Alternative mergers
Implications of the use of the Hill
Summary

10 Merger Simulation
Homogeneous products and
quantity competition
Constant marginal costs
Increasing marginal costs
Differentiated products and price competition

PCAIDS
PCAIDS with nests
Antitrust LOGIT (ALM)
Summary
Appendix to Chapter 10

11 Merger Cases
The 2003 CIN/Ibercoat
concentration
The relevant market
The concentration levei before and after the
operation
Merger simulation
Hypothetical concentration in the food retailing industry
Introduction
The price effects of an increase in market
concentration
Conclusions
Bibliography