Contents
1 Static Games of Complete Information
1.1 Basic Theory: Normal-Form Carnes and Nash Equilibrium
1.1.A Normal-Form Representation of Games.
1.1.B Iterated Elirnination of Strictly Dominated Strategies
1.1.C Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibrium
1.2 Applications
1.2.A Cournot Model of Duopoly
1.2.B Bertrand Model of Duopoly
1.2.C Final-Offer Arbitration
1.2.D The Problem of the Comrnons
1.3 Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibrium
1.3.A Mixed Strategies
1.3.B Existence of Nash Equilibrium
1.4 Further Reading
1.5 Problerns
1.6 References

2 Dynamic Games of Complete Information
2.1 Dynarnic Carnes of Complete and Perfect Information
2.1.A Theory: Backwards Induction
2.1.B Stackelberg Model of Duopoly
2.1.0 Wages and Ernployment in a Unionized Firm
2.1.1 Sequential Bargaining
2.2 Two-Stage Games of Complete but Irnperfect Information
2.2.A Theory: Subgame Perfection .
2.2.B Bank Runs
2.2.CTariffs and Irnperfect International Competition
2.2.D Tournarnents
2.3 Repeated Games
2.3.A Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games
2.3.B Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games
2.3.C Coliusion between Cournot Duopoiists .
2.3.D Efficiency Wages
2.31 Time-Consistent Monetary Policy
2.4 Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information
2.4.A Extensive-Form Representation of Carnes
2.4.B Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
2.5 Further Reading
2.6 Problerns
2.7 References

3 Static Carnes of Incomplete Information
3.1 Theory: Static Bayesian Carnes and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
3.1.A An Example: Cournot Competition under Asyrnmetric Information
3.1.B Normal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Carnes
3.1.C Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
3.2 Applications
3.2.A Mixed Strategies Revisited
3.2.B An Auction
3.2.C A Double Auction
3.3 The Revelation Principie
3.4 Further Reading
3.5 Problems
3.6 References

4 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
4.1 Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibriurn
4.2 Signaling Games
4.2.A Perfect Bayesian Equilibriurn in Signaling Games
4.2.B Job-Market Signaling
4.2.C Corporate Investment and Capital Structure
4.2.D Monetary Policy
4.3 Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
4.3.A Cheap-Talk Games
4.3.B Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
4.3.C Reputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
4.4 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
4.5 Further Reading
4.6 Problems
4.7 References
Index