Game Theory And The Law/

por BAIRD, Douglas G.
[ Livros ]
Autores adicionais: GERTNER, Robert H. ; Autor | PICKER, Randal C. ; Autor
Publicado por : Harvard University Press, (Massachusetts, Estados Unidos:) Detalhes físicos: 330 p. ISBN:674341198. Ano: 1994 Tipo de Material: Livros
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Preface
Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior
Bibliographic Notes

1 Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game
The Normal Form Game
Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes
The Nash Equilibrium
Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior
Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance
Collective Action Problerns and the Two-by-Two Game
The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria
Summary
Bibliographic Notes

2 Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game
The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction
A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment
Subgame Perfection
Summary
Bibliographic Notes

3 Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation
Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept
Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result
Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling
Observable Information, Norrns, and the Problem of Renegotiation
Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation
Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate
Summary
Bibliographic Notes

4 Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information
Signaling and Screening
Modeling Nonverifiable Information
Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules
Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules
Screening and the Role of Legal Rules
Summary
Bibliographic Notes

5 Reputation and Repeated Games
Backwards Induction and Its Limits
Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems
Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation
Summary
Bibliographic Notes

6 Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models
Collective Action and the Role of Law
Embedded Games
Understanding the Structure of Large Carnes
Collective Action and Private Information
Collective Action Problems in Sequential Dedsionrnaking
Herd Behavior
Summary
Bibliographic Notes

7 Noncooperative Bargaining
Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade
Legal Rules as Exit Options
Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations
Coliective Bargaining and Exit Options Summary
Bibliographic Notes

8 Bargaining and Information
Basic Models of the Litigation Process
Modeling Separate Triais for Liability and Damages
Information and Selection Bias
Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law

Notes
References
Glossary
Index


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