Contents
List of figures page
Lisi oftables
Preface
1 Prelirninaries
1.1 Competition law in the EC
1.2 Related topics
1.3 Some basic game-theoretic concepts
1.4 EC competition policy: 'normal' or 'active' competition
1.5 The logic of the book
1 Explicit coilusio
2 Four are few and sã are inanv
2.1 The model
2.2 Stage 3: the supply decision subgame
2.3 Stage 2: the cartel bargaining subgame
2.4 Stage 1: the participation decision subgame
3 Cartel laws are good for business
3.1 The model
3.2 Stage 3: the (non-coliusive) supply subgame
3.3 Stage 2: the cartel bargaining subgame
3.4 Stage 1: Lhe entry subgames
4 Cartel enforceineni
4.1 Cartel enforcement with imperfect information
4.2 Cartel enforcement with incomplete information
4.3 Cartels in public procurement markets

II Tacit collusion
5 Information sharing arnong oligopolisis
5.1 Cournot—Nash equilibrium with uncertain demand and
homogeneous goods
5.2 Acquisition and transmission ofinformation
5.3 Differentiated goods
5.4 Uncertainty about costs
5.5 Facilitating practices
6 Repeaied games with coilusive oulcornes
6.1 Friedman's balanced temptation equilibrium
6.2 The 'FoIk Theorem'
6.3 The great salt duopoly
7 Price leadership and conscious parallelism
7.1 Static games without uncertainty
7.2 Static games with uncertainty
7.3 A repeated game
7.4 Price parallelism and coliusive practices
7.5 The basing point system in the ECSC
8 C'ollusion detection
8.1 Information requirements of coliusion detection
8.2 A simple Cournot model with seasonal adjustments
8.3 The wood pulp case
8.4 The IC! Solvay case
111 Semicoilusion
9 Excess capacity and coilusion
9.1 The concept of semicoflusion
9.2 Excess capacity and carteis in an historical perspective
9.3 A non-cooperative price-setting game with givdn capacities
9.4 Cartel negotiation with given capacities
9.5 Non-cooperative capacity choices with explicit coilusion
9.6 Coilusion detection
9.7 Non-cooperative capacity choices with tacit coilusion
10 Goliusion in R&D
10.1 The basic model
10.2 The results
10.3 Overinvestment in R&D and collusion
IV Predatory pricing
11 Predation in iheorv
11.1 Why predatory pricing is rare and unimportant
11.2 The chain store paradox or the impossihility of predation
11.3 The lack ofcommon knowledge can generate predation
11.4 Reputation and predation
11.5 Nash equilibria and predation
11.6 Geographical price discrimination and predation
11.7 Necessary conditions for predatory pricing
12 Evidence on predation
12.1 Experimental evidence
12.2 Antitrust litigation
12.3 The historical record
12.4 The bus war: a modelling approach
13 Antitrusi iniplications
13.1 Rules
13.2 Informational requirements
13.3 The AKZO decision
References
Index