CONTENTS
List of Contributors
Introduction
PART I INTRODUCTION AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
1. Rationales for Antitrust: Economics and Other Bases
DANIEL A. CRANE
2. Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences
KEITH N. HYLTON
3. Economic Analysis ofAntitrust Exemptions
PETER CARSTENSEN
4. Healthcare Provider and Payer Markets
CORY S. CAPPS AND DAVID DRANOVE
5. International Antitrust Institutions
OLIVER BUDZINSKI
6. Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective
FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MICHAEL REKSULAK, AND WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II
7. Antitrust Settlements
DANIEL L. RUBINFELD
8. The Economics of Antitrust Class Actions
ROGER D. BLAIR AND CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE
9. Behavioral Economics and Antitrust
MARK ARMSTRONG AND STEFFEN HUCK
10. Experimental Economics in Antitrust
WIELAND MÜLLER AND HANS-THEO NORMAN
11 Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis
WILLIAM H. PAGE
12. Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the European Union: Standing and Antitrust Injury
JEFFREY L. HARRISON
13. Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process
AARON EDLIN AND JOSEPH FARRELL
PART II MONOPOLY: STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
14. Monopoly and Dominant Firms: Antitrust Economics and Policy Approaches
LAWRENCE J. WHITE
15. Market Definition
Louis KAPLOW
16. Bilateral Monopoly: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Policy
ROGER D. BLAIR AND CHRISTINA DEPASQUALE
17. Antitrust, the Internet, and the Economics of Networks
DANIEL E SPULBER AND CHRISTOPHER S. YOO
18. The Antitrust Analysis of Multisided Platform Businesses
DAVID S. EVANS AND RICHARD SCHMALENSEE
PART III MERGERS
19. Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement
HOWARD SHELANSKI
20. Unilateral Effects
BRYAN KEATING AND ROBERT D. WILLIG
21. Coordinated Effects: Evolution of Practice and Theory
JITH JAYARATNE AND JANUSZ ORDOVER
22. Buyer Power in Merger Review
DENNIS W. CARLTON, MARY COLEMAN, AND MARK ISRAEL
23. Vertical Mergers
MICHAEL A. SALINGER
Index
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