Free enterprise and economic organization:

por Schwartz, Louis B.
[ Livros ]
Autores adicionais: Flynn, John J. ; Autor | First, Harry ; Autor
Série: University Casebook Series Motivo da edição:6.ed. Publicado por : The Foundation Press, (Nova York:) Detalhes físicos: 1174 p. ISBN:0882771205.
Assunto(s): Antitruste
Ano: 1983 Tipo de Material: Livros
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pago
PREFACE
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
TABLE OF STATUTES
TABLE OF CASES

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO ANTITRUST LEGISLATION
ANTECEDENTS
Statutory Text
The Statute of Monopolies
Notes and Queries
(1) Royal Monopolies
(2) Common Law of Restraint of Trade; Birth of the "Rule of Reason" for "Ancillary" Restraints
(3) World-wide Ancillary Restraints and Fictional Justifications
(4) Presumption of Validity; Divisibility of Iliegal Restraint to Preserve the Legal Portion
Thoreili, The Federal Antitrust Policy—Origination of an A merican Tradition 51-53 (1955)
B. BASIC ANTITRUST LEGISLATION
Statutory Text
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
Clayton Act Provisions as to Suits by Persons Injured
Federal Trade Commission Act, Antitrust Jurisdiction of the Commission
Notes
(1) Bibilography
(2) Relation Between Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act: Restraining and Monopolizing Trade
(3) "Rule of Reason" and "Per Se" Iliegality
(4) Jurisdictional Scope of the Antitrust Laws
(5) Public Enforcement by the Department of Justice
(6) Public Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission
(7) Private Enforcement
(8) The Relation Between Government Litigation, Consent Judgments, and Private Recovery of Damages
(9) Antitrust in Other Countries
(10) Regulatory Alternatives
C. IDEOLOGY, ECONOMTCS, AND TITE GOALS OF ANTITRUST
Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Poliey—Organization of an American Tradifion
Bork, The Antitrust Po radox
Notes
(1) Our Point of View
(2) What You Need to Know About Economic Theory
(3) Douhts About Received Economic Theory as a Guide to Antitrust Policy
(4) Beyond Economics
D. SOME ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN ANTITRUST LAWYERING
Counseling in Anticipation of Antitrust Prosecution
Notes and Queries
(1) Document Destruction and Litigation Risks
(2) Litigation Tactics for the Defense
(3) Compliance Programs; Antitrust Counsel as Educator
(4) Litigation Tactics for the Private Plaintiff
(5) Sanctions for Attorney Abuse in the Litigation Process
(6) Problem
MARKET STRUCTURE

CHAPTER 2. MONOPOLY, OLIGOPOLY, AND
CONCENTRATION
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF SIZE OF FIRM AND CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER
1. MEASURING CONCENTRATION
Structure-Performance Relationship and Antitrust Polici,
Escerpt from F. M. Scherer, Industrial Concentration and the Market System
Notes and Queries
(1) Conflicting Views on the Trend and Extent of Concentration

Cumulative Share of Corporate Manufacturing Assets Held by 1,000 Largest Corporations
(2) Other Measures of Concentration and Competitiveness
(3) Significance of Corporate Size in Comparison with the Size of Governmental Units
2. CONCENTRATION, SIZE AND EFFICIENCY
John M. Elair, Economic Concentration: Structure, Behavior and Public Policy
F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performace
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF SIZE OF FIRM AND CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POwER—Continued
Notes
Pago
(1) Efficiency Effects of Firm Size and Concentration
(2) Economic Cost of Concentration
(3) Concentration and Innovation
(4) Bain, Barriers to New Competition 110-112 (1956) 76
(5) Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness
(6) Business Performance as an Issue in Antitrust Cases
(7) Voluntary Decentralization of Large Firms to Avoid Diseconomies of Excessive Size
3. FACTORS OTHER THAN PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY AFFECTING THE RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF LARGE AND SMALL FIRMS
Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, Excerpt from an article by Corwin Edwards in Biness Concentration and Price Policy
Notes
(1) Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955)
(2) Slichter, Big Business: When Is It Too Big?
4. NON-ECONOMIC VALUES AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCENTRATION
Notes and Queries
(1) Multinational Corporations
(2) Quality of Life; Racial Discrimination; Integrity of the Individual
(3) Governmental Deference to the Large Firm
(4) Political Power, Corruption and Corporate Size
(5) Queries
(6) Savings Under Capitalism and Communism
B. MONOPOLY IJNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
1. SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE OF MONOPOLIZATION
United States v. Aluminum. Co. of A nierica
Notes and Queries
(A) Defining the Relevant Product Market
(1) Queries
(2) Substitute Products and "Cross-Elasticity"
(3) Delineating "Submarkets"
(4) Some Examples of Product Market Definitions
(5) Non-market Determination of Monopoly or Attempt to Monopolize
(6) Structural-Behavioral and Short-Term/Long-Term
Distinctions in Monopolization Litigation
(7) Monopolizing One's Own Goods?
B. MONOPOLY UNDER THE SUERMAN AcT—Continued
(B) Defining the Relevant Geographic Market
(1) United States v. Yellow Cab Co
(2) Defining Relevant Geographic Market by Examin-
ing the Defendant's Behavior and Intent
(C) ldentifying the Presence of Monopoly Power
(D) Monopoly Power Plus Equals Unlawful Monopolization
(1) Conduct Tests, Defenses, Burdens of Proof
(2) A Sliding Scale of Conduct Evidence?
(3) Problem—"No-Conduct" Monopolization
Otter Toil Power Co. United States
Notes and Queries
Use of Monopoly Power in One Market to Injure
Competition in Another Market
(2) Pricing Practices as na Exercise of Monopoly
Power From One Market to Another—Predatory Pricing
(3) Predatory Costing
(4) Beyond Cost/Price Relations: The"Human
Animus" Test of "Predation"
(5) Oligopolistic Advertising as na Instrument of
Monopoly: Remedy?
(6) Intent to Monopolize; Pursuit of a "Natural Monopoly"
(7) Monopoly by Interna! Expansion?
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eatman Kodak Co.
Notes and Queries
Willful Maintenance of Monopoly Power v. Supe-
rior Product, Business Acumen or Historical Accident
(2) Innovation by a Monopolist: Competitive or Monopolistic?
(3) The Significance of Developing Monopolization
Doctrine in Private Treble Damage Litigation
2. ATTEMPT TO MONOPOLIZE
Photovest Corp. v Fotomat Corp.
Notes and Queries
(1)The Ninth Circuit Approach to Attempts to Monopolize
(2) The Ninth Circuit Aftermath of Lessig
(3) Distinguishing Aggressive Competition,"Unfair Competition," and Attempts to Monopolize
(4) Legislating a Definition of Atternpt to Monopolize
Proposed Competition Protection Act
3.COMBLNING OR CONSPIRING TO MONOPOLIZE
A merican Tobacco Co. v. United States
B. MONOPOLY UNDER THE SHERMAN Ac'r—Continued
Notes and Queries
Page
(1)Monopoly by Consensus
(2) Evolving Combination and Conspiracy to Monopolize Theories
United States v. Consolida ted Laundries Corp.
Notes and Queries
(1) The Relevance of Relevant Markets and Size of Market Share in Combinations or Conspiracies
to Monopolize
4. REMEDIES
United States v. Aluminuni Co. of Arnerica (Hand, J.)
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Knox, J.)
Notes and Queries
(1) Queries
(2) Alcoa Sequeis
(3) Other Divestiture Cases
(4) Injunctions Simulating Divestiture
(5) Remedies and the "Big Case"
(6) Divestiture in Regulated Industries
(7) Modification of Antitrust Decrees
(8) Foreign Law Remedies for Excessive Concentration
Green, Moore & Wassersteh,. The Closed Enterprise System 199
Notes and Queries
(1) The Cost and Cornplexity of Structural Remedies
(2) The Iffect of the Antitrust Laws in Encouraging Large Combinations, Excerpt from Arnold, The F'olklore of Capitai'ism (1937)
(3) Query
(4) The Effect of the "Big Case" on Lawyers—A Comment

CHAPTER 3. MERGERS AND OTHER INTEGRATIONS
INTRODUCTION
United States r. Caiu mbia Steel Co.
Notes and Queries
(1) Queries
(2) "Production Fiexibility" vs. Actual Patterns of Trade
Statutory Text
Section 7 of the Clayton Act as Amended
A. INTRODUCTION—Continued
Notes and Queries
Page
(1) How Does Section 7 Attempt to Remedy, the Weaknesses of the Sherman Act in Relation to Mergers?
(2) Acquisition of Non-capital Assets
(3) Interlocking Directorates and Other Affiliations 214 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States
Notes and Queries
(1) The Analytica! Process in Section 7 Cases
(2) Product and Geographic Markets
(3) Post-Brown Shoe Developments
B. HORIZONTAL MERGER
United States v. Philíuleiphia N(ltiWI(1i Bunk
Notes and Queries
(1) Regulation of Bank Mergers and Acquisitions
(2) Future Shock in the Banking Industry
( T,,it'd State.' o. General Dii1u oi /( Cor/)oration
Notes and Queries
(1) Avoiding the Failing Company Defense
(2) A Chrysier-Ford Merger?
(3) Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
C. VERTICAL INTEGRATION
B:ro:wn Shoe Co. v. United States
Notes and Queries
(1) Prior and Subsequent Vertical Merger Decisions
(2) What's Wro.ng With Vertical Mergers.?
(3) The Efficiency Defense
(4) Protect Competitors?
(5) Special Problems of Vertical Integration in Particular Industries
D. GEOGRAPHIC MARKET EXTENSION MERGERS
(Tnited Sti'ites v. Fulstaj fBrewin..g Corporation
Notes and Queries
(1) More Poetry Than Analysis?
(2) 'øregon City Feels a Difference as Outsiders Move in"
(3) Joint Ventures and Potential Competition
L5,ití'd Sio tE? 1'. M(l nh/(f B(10C01J)Oi'U tiøi. Inc.
Notes and Queries
Queries
(2) Avoiding Potential Competition Doctrines Through "Supply-Side Substitutability"?
(3) Does Section 7 Reach Mergers Which Eliminate Future Cornpetition?
(4) Marine Bancorporat.ion and Geographic Market Definition
E. PRODUCT MARKET EXTENSION AND CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
Federal Trade Commission v Procter e Gamble Co
E. PRODUCT MARKET EXTENSION AND CONGLOMERATE MERGERS—Continued
Note
(01)Giant Among the Pygmies
Federal Trade Cornmission v. Conolidated Foods Corp.
The Death of Section 7?
Notes and Questions
(1) Conflicting Views on Conglomerate Acquisitions
(2) Special Industry Problems—Publishing
(3) The "M & A" Business
(4) Buchwald on Merger Policy
(5) Reform Proposais
(6) West German Merger Wave
F. REMEDIES IN MERGER CASES
Notes and Queries
(1) Divestiture and Hardship
(2) Financial Consequences of the duPont Divestiture
(3) Treble Damage Sequel to duPont
PRICING, PRODUCTION, AND MARKETING

CHAPTER 4. AGREEMENTS AMONG COMPETITORS A.INTRODUCTION
Notes and Queries
(1) Antitrust Goals and Horizontal Price Fixing
(2) Horizontal Price Fixing: Ideology vs. Reality
(3) Per Se "Rules": Substantive Rules or Evidentiary Presumptions
(4) Constitutional Constraints on Price Regulation -
B. PER SE AND RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS OF HORIZONTAL PRICE FIxING
1. THE ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States
Notes and Queries
(1) "Rule of Reason" Analysis
(2) Further Queries
(3) Substituting Official for Unofficial Price-Fixing 353 Uinfed States v. Socony- Vacuwm Gil C'o.
Notes and Queries
(1)The Process of Characterizing Conduct as Per Se Iliegal
(2)Protecting Competition Versus Protection of a Competitive Process
(3) Circumventing a Per Se Prohibition on Price Fixing—The Case of the 0i1 Industry
(A) Conservation and Producer-State Control of National Energy Policy
(B) State Control of National Energy Policy; Defense?-
B. PER SE AND RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS: OF HORIZONTAL PRICE
FIXING—Continued
(C) "Voluntary" Restriction of OU Imports for Conservation and National Defense; Import Quotas
(D) The OPEC Governmental Cartel
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society
Notes and Queries
(1) The Rationales for Per Se Rules: Queries
(2) Maximum Price Fixing
(3) Price Stabilization
(4) Containment of Medical Costs, Third Party Payment, and Antitrust Policy
2. IDENTIFYING THE CONDUCT
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. GBS, Inc.
Notes and Queries
(1)Ambiguous Price Fixing—How Per Se Is the Per Se Rule?
(2) Indirect Price Fixing
(3) When Is a Fixed Price Not Price Fixing?
(4) Cooperative Price Advertising by Small Retailers
(5) Coliective Action Against lilegal Price Discrimination
(6) Agricultural Cooperatives
(7) Queries
3.SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE AND BURDENS OF PROOF
United States v. Gontainer Gorp.
United States v. United Shites Gypsuni Go.
Notes and Queries
(1) The Difference Between Defining What Is Per Se Unlawful and Proving It
(2) The Standard of Proof in Post-Gypsum Criminal Cases
4. DEFENSES? JUSTIFICATIONS? EXCUSES?
National Society of Prqtissionai Engineer United States
Notes and Queries
(1) The Rule of Reason as a Vehicle for Examining Justifications or Excuses for Otherwise Per Se Unlawful Conduct
(2) Unique Characteristics of the Business Justifying Rule of Reason Analysis
(3) Rethinking the Per Se—Rule of Reason Distinction
C. DivisioN OF MARKET
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc
Notes and Queries
(1) The Analytical Process in Horizontal Division of Market Cases
(2) Division of Markets—Horizontal or Vertical?
(3) Ancillary Restraints and Arrangements to Ailocate Particular Markets or Business Among Participating Firms
(4) Injunctions Against Market Allocating Arrangements
(5) Relief in Topco; a Pyrrhic Victory?
D. "CONTRACT", "COMBINATION", "CONSPIRACY": THE REQUIRED MULTIPLICITY AND CONSENSUS
1. PRICE LEADERSHIP, PARALLEL ACTION
Price Leadership, Excerpt from Handier, A Study of the Construction and Enfbrcernent of the Federal Antitrust Laws
Notes
Proof of Contract, Combination, or Conspiracy
and Economic Theories of Oligopoly Pricing
Other Factors Justifying a Finding of "Contract",
"Combination" or "Conspiracy"
Solutions to the Problem of Oligopolistic Paraliel Actión
1."Conscious Paraliel Action" Equated With "Agreement"
2."Facilitating Devices" TriggeringEnforcement Discretion
3.Counteracting the Consequences of the "Unprovable" Conspiracy
4.Tax Incentives to Encourage Price Competition in Oligopolistic Industries
5.Public Exposure of Oligopoly Pricing Decisions to Discourage Excessive Prices
6.Use of Section 2 Combination and Conspiracy to
Monopolize Theories
Notes and Queries
(1) Implying Agreement From Parallel Business Behavior and the Adequacy of Remedies
(2) Presidents and Prices
L(3) Informal Requirement of Notice of Price Increases
(4) Pitfalls of Informality
(5) The Decline of "Jawboning" and Advent of "Reagonomics"
(6) Queries
D. "C0NTRACT", "COMBINATION". "CONSPIRACY": THE REQUIRED MULTIPLICITY AND C0NSENsUS—Continued
2. JOINT ENTERPRISE AND INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY
Note
Joint Pricing in Securities Underwriting
Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy
Notes and Queries
(1)When Is a "Person" Not a "Person" for Purposes
of Antitrust Contract, Combination and Con-
spiracy Analysis?
Parent-Subsidiary and Subsidiary-Subsidiary Con-
spiracies
Alternative Methods for Analyzing Intra-En
terprise Conspiracy Cases
Implying Understandings With Outsiders
(5) The Corporation as a Combination Exempted
From the Antitrust Laws by State Action;
Federal Incorporation?
(6)Query
E.TRADE AssoclATIoNs
1.INTRODUCTION
Background and Scope of Operations
Notes and Queries
(1) Other Practices of Trade Associations of Antitrust Significance
(2) The Status of Professional Associations Under the Antitrust Laws
2.DATA COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION
Am.erican Column & Lumber Co. v. United Stutes
Queries
Mapie Floo'ring Mfrs. Ass 'n v. United States
Notes and Queries
Trade Association Data Coliection and Dissemination After Container Corp. and Gypsum
(2)Characteristics of the Industry and the Effect of an Exchange of Information
(3) Decrees Limiting Exchange of Information
(4) Information Exchange and Game Theory
(5) Business Advisory Committees
(6) Foreign Law Alternatives for Regulating Trade Associations
3.DELIVERED PRICING
Federal Trade Gomm ission v. Gement J,,titute
Notes and Queries
(1) Queries
(2) The Controversy Over F.T.C. Regulation of Delivered Pricing
F. ALTERNATIVE A:PROACHES FOR REGULATING HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS
Treaty of Rome (1957)—European Economic Community
Treaty of Paris (1951
European Coal & Steel Community -- 522 The United Nations Resolution on Equitable Principies and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (1980)
Notes and Queries
(1) "Crisis arte1s"
(2) Queries
(3) Adoption of the U.N. Resolution and Its Implications
(4) The Antitrust Laws of Nation States

CHAPTER 5. COLLECTIVE ACTION: BOYCOTTS
AND JOINT VENTURES
Bocorrs
Fashion Originators' Guild of A merica nFederal Trade Gommission
Notes and Queries
(1) What Is Bad About a Boycott?
(2) Two Cases
(3) Boycotts Adopted for Noncommercial Objectives
(4) Boycotts to Fight Inflation
(5) Boycotts and the First Amendment
Srnith v. Pro Footbail, Inc.
Notes and Queries
Queries
(2) Industry Self-Regulation With Unobjectionable Purposes but Anticompetitive Potential Effects 549
(3) Industry Self-Regulation in the Field of Public I-Iealth and Morality
(4) Sherman Act Pressures for Due Process in Industry Self-Regulation
(5) Proof of Agreement
(6) Proposed Approach for Evaluating the Legality of Boycotts
B. JOINT VENTURES
A.sociated Press v. United States
Notes and Queries
(1) Queries
(2) Access to Pooled Facilities
(3) Coilective Boycott or Individual Refusal to Deal
(4) Research Joint Ventures
Citizen Publi,hi?.g Co. v. United States
B. J0INT VENTURES—Continued
Notes and Queries
(1) Queries
(2) Legislative Response to Citiien Publishing
(3) Other Legjslative Joint Ventures
(4) International Joint Ventures
(5) Spill-Over Effects of Joint Ventures
(6) Joint Venturers in Particular Industries—Automo-Biles

CHAPTER 6. VERTICAL MARKET RESTRAINTS;
FRANCHISING
A. INTRODUCTION
B. VERTICAL PRICE FIXING
1. ECONOMIC SIGNWICANCE AND THE "FAIR TRADE" MOVEMENT 590
Notes
(1) RPM and Poljtjcal Corruption
(2) RPM and National Defense
(3) RPM and Religion
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE UIWER THE ANTITRUST LAWS 598 Uiiited StOes t'. Parke, Dui'is & Co.
Notes and Queries
(1) Justice Holmes, Vertical Price Fixing, The Public Interest and Price Cutting "Knaves"-
(2) Queries
(3) Inadequately Enforced "Suggested" Resale Price as a Deceptive Trade Practice
Albrecht r. Herald Co.
Notes and Queries
(1) Implying "Agreement" Because of Coercion
(2) The Per Se Iliegality of Vertical Maximum Price Fixing
(3) Queries
C. VERTICAl, RESTRAINTS ON TERRITORIES, CLASSES OF CUSTOMERS AM-) LUCATION
L'ii tinentul TV, Inc. i'. GTE Sylvania, Inc.
Notes and Queries
1) The Court's Assumptions and Methodology of Anaylsis in Sylvania
(2) Ninth Circuit Opinions in Continental T.V.
(3) Sylvania, The "Rule of Reason" and Post-Sylvania Litigation
(4) "Horizontal" or "Vertical"? Syivania's Implications foi' Dual Distribution
(5) Sylvania's Implications for Vertical Price Fixing 663
(6) Sylvania and Boycott Principies in Enforcement of Vertical Market Restraints
D.EXCLUSIVE DEALING
Section 3 of the Clayton Act of 1914
Notes
(1) Lease or Saie; Agency
(2) Goods or Other Com modities
(3) Condition, Agreement or Understanding Not to
Use or Deal; "Practical Effect"
Standard Gil Co. of C'aiijbrnia v. Uited States
Notes and Queries
(1) Effect on Competition; Rule of Reason or Per Se
(2) Tampa Eiectric and a Structuralist Approach to
Exclusive Dealing
(3) "Quantitative Substantiality" v. "Qualitative Sub-
stantiality"
(4) Exclusive Dealing Under the Sherman Act
(5) Exclusive Dealing in Regulated Industries; Ad-
ministrative Review
(6) Broadcast Station Affiliations With Networks;
Option Time
(7) Option Time in Television Broadcasting, Excerpt
from Barrow, Antitrust and Regulated In-
dustry: Promoting Competition in Broadcasting 685
Kintner, The A ?itttHm y (t Rce,p,?,cit!/
E. TYING ARRANGEMENTS
1. JNTRODUCTION
F. M. Scherer
P,orrnancc
2. IDENTIFYING A TYING ARRANGEMENT AND THE DEGREE OF
PER SE ILLEGALITY
Foi'tner Enterprises, Inc.i'.(Jmted States Steei Corp.
(Fortner 1)
Forfner Enterpri.es, Inc.
(Tnited States Steel Corp
('Fortner II)
Notes and Queries
(1) The Goals of Antitrust Policy Impinged by Tying Arrangements
(2) (A) Involuntary Ties and Two Separate Products 719 (B) Voluntary Ties and Two Separate Products
(3) Proving Sufficient Economic Power
(A) Power in the Tying Product
(B) Proving Market Foreclosure—The Relevance of Relevant Market Analysis
(C) The Relevance of Power and Exclusionary Effect to the Antitrust Goals Impinged by Tying Arrangenients
(D) Further Queries
E. TYING ARRANGEMENTS—COntinUed
(4) A Not Insubstantial Amount of Commerce
(5) Defenses or Justifications for a Tying Arrangement
(6) Constructing a Rational Frarnework for Analyzing Tying Arrangements
(7) Problem
3. TYING, TRADEMARKS, AND FRANCHISING
Siegel v. Chick€n De!iqh. t, Inc.
Notes and Queries
(1) Trademark as the Tying Product
(2) Presumption of Power in Tying to a Patent, Copyright or Trademark
(3) The Lanham Act and Trademarks
Príncipe v. McDonald Corp.
Notes and Queries
(1) Queries
(2) Tying and Franchise Packaging
(3) Tie-Ins Under Section 5 of the F.T.C. Act
(4)"Fuli-Line Forcing"; Excessive Sales Pressure on
Franchisee by Multi-Line Firms as Tie-In Under
Section 5: Atlantic Refining Co. v. F.T.C.
(5) Who Is "Injured" by the Restraint; St.anding of
the Franchisor to Sue
(6) Tying in Regulated Industries
(7) Tying to the Bel! System's Telephone Monopoly;
Scope of the Lawful Monopoly
F.SELECTION AND TERMINATION O? DEALERS
1.ITRODUCTION
2.ANTITRUST LIMITATIUNS IIPON DEALER SELECTION AND TERMI-
NATIUN
American Motor In, hic. v. Holiduy Inns, Inc.
Notes and Queries
(1) Queries
(2) Regulating Dealer Selection by Antitrust Policy 771 Buttle v. Lubrizolrp
Co.
Notes and Queries
(1) Dealer Terminations and "Vertical Boycotts"
(2) Sufficiency of the Evidence to Prove Dealer Termination Unlawful-
(3) Dealer Terinination WithoutompIaints From Competitors
(4) Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy and Dealer Termination
F. SELECTION AND TERMINATION OF DEALERS—Continued
3. STATUTORY AND OTHER REGULATION OF DEALER TERMINATIONS AND NONRENEWALS
a. Federal Legislation
Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act
Notes and Queries
(1) Background
(2) Constitutionality
(3) Good Faith
(4) Generalized Dealer Security
(5) Queries
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act of 1978
Notes and Queries
(1) Comparison With Auto Dealer Act
(2) Distinguishing Between Terminations and Nonrenewais
(3) Litigation Under the Petroleum Marketing Act
b. State Legislation and Regulation

CHAPTER 7. JUDICIALLY CREATED DEFENSES
AND EXEMPTIONS
A. INTRODIJCTION
B. PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND IMPLIED EXEMPTION
Notes and Queries
(1) Deregulation and Narrowing the Doctrines of Implied Immunity and Primary Jurisdiction
(2) Query
C. THE STATE ACTION or "PARKER \• Buw DUCTIUNE
1. ANTICOMPETITIVE STATE REGULATION Caifornia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass 'n v. Midcal
A Iv win.0 in, Inc.
Notes and Queries
(1) State Supervision
(2) "Clear" Articulation and "Affirmative" Expression of State Policy
(3) F.T.C. Rulemaking and State Action
(4) Harrnonizing Federal Antitrust and Valid State Regulation
2. ANTI-COMPET.ITIVE MUNICIPAL REGULATION AND ATIVITY 820 Gom munity Gomm.unicutions Co., Inc. v. Gity of Boulder 820
Notes and Queries
(1) Dual Federalism: A Limitation on Municipal Regulation
(2) Preemption v. Implied Exemption: Shifting the Presumption of Validity or Violation
(3) The Reincarnation of Substantive Due Process?
D. FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSES AND THE "NOERR-PENNINGTON" D0cTRINE
Gahfornia Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited
Notes and Queries
(1) "Sham" vs. "Non-Sham" Activity Influencing Government
(2) Commerciai Govern mental Activity—An Exception to Noerr-Pennington?
(3) The Interrelation of the State Action Doctrine and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
E. INTERNATIONAL TRADE
1. AN OVERVIEW
Atwood, Internittional A iififi'u t Issues in the C'ourts and Congress
Notes and Queries
(1) Factors Influencing the Exercise of Court Authority Under the Antitrust Laws to Regulate Restraints in Foreign Commerce
(2) The Webb Pomerene Act—U.S. Law Sanctioning Export Carteis
(3) Antidurnping Legislation—Applying Anti-Price Discrimination Legislation to Imports
(4) The Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Extraterritorial Restraints and the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
2. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRrNE
Notes and Queries
(1) The Rationale of the Act of State Doctrine
(2) Identifying "Acts" as Acts of State
(3) Applicabiiity of Doctrine When the Act of a State Violates International Law
(4) The Sovereign Compulsion Defense
(5) Sovereign Irnmunities Defense and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

CHAPTER 8. PRICE DISCRIMINATION
(A)INTRODUCTION; LEGISLATIVE TEXTS
Section 2 of the Clayton Act as Amended by the RobinsonPatman Act of 1936
Notes and Queries
(1) Bibiiography
(2) Jurisdictional Seope
(3) Discrimination in Price; Saie Requirement
(4) Com modities
(5) Comparable Units—"Like Grade and Quaiity"
(6) Brokerage Allowances
(7) Selier's Discriminatory Payments and Services to Buyers
(8) Enforcement
B. COMPETITIVE INJURY; BUYER LIABILITY
1. PRIMARY-LINE INJURY
Utah Pie Co. r. Continental Baking Co.
Notes and Queries
(1) Interplay With the Sherman Act
(2) Phillips, Price Discrimination and the Large Firm: Hobson's Choice in the Pectin Industry 889
(3) Queries
2 SECONDARY-LINE INJURY
Federal Trade Com missiou e. Morfoi' Sult Co.
Notes and Queries
(1) Discounts Based on Aggregate Annual Purchases
(2) Secondary-Line Injury to Competition
(3) Private Darnages for Secondary-Line Injury
(4) Funetional Discounts
(5) Cooperative Purchasing
(6) Breadth of Cease and Desist Orders
3. BUYER LIAB.ILITY
Great A tian fie & Pacfic Teu Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Com ni issiou
Notes and Queries
(1) Prior Cases
(2) Queries
(3) Use of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
C. DEFENSES
1. MEETING COM.PETITION
Stuiuiord OH Co. i,. Federal Trade Com inission
Notes and Queries
(1) Verification of Competing Offer
(2) "Good Faith" Meeting an Iliegal Price or System 922
(3) "Like Grade and Quality" in Meeting Competitive Price
(4) 'Aggressive" Meeting of Competition
(5) Supplier's Discriminatory Concessions to Some Dealers to Enable Them to Meet Their Competition
(6) Aftermath of Sun Ou
2. COST JUTSTIFICATION
United Stutes e. BHrdeu Co.
Notes
1 Averaging Cõst Savings for Multi-Product "Line'
Quantity Limits Proviso
THE LEGAL MONOPOLIES

CHAPTER 9. PATENT AND COPYRIGHT
A.INTRODUCT1ON; LEGISLATIVE TEXTS
Statutory Framework of the Patent System
Notes and Queries
(1) Bibliography
(2) Novelty and Priority
(3) Utility
(4) Non-obviousness
(5) Duration of Patent Protection
(6) Specification; Doctrine of Equivalents
(7) Comparison to Copyrights
(8) Design Patents
Diamond v. Chakrabarty
Notes and Queries
(1) Queries
(2) Patenting New Technology—Computer Programs
(3) Deferring to Congress—Copyright and Cable Television
(4) Patent Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(5) Patentability of Medicines
(6) Patents and University Research
Why Have Patents? Machiup, An Econornic Review of the
Patent System
Notes and Queries
(1) The Innovation Process
(2) Ford and the Automobile Patent Pool
(3) The "Lone Inventor"
(4) Corporate Invention
(5) Patents as Incentive for Investments
B.THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PATENT AND ANTITRUST POLICIES
1.THE DECISION TO LICENSE
Notes and Queries
(1) Suppression of Inventions
(2) Queries
(3) Compulsory Licensing
2. PRICE CONTROL AND DIVISION OF MARKETS
Notes and Queries
(1) Ancillary Price Control
(2) Queries
(3) Distinction Between Assignrnent and License
Aduvis t'. Burke
General Taiking Pictures v. Western Electric Co.
B. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PATENT AND ANTITRUST PoLiciEs —Continued
Notes and Queries
Page
(1) Queries
(2) Post-Sale Distribution Restrictions
(3) Comparisons to Copyright
(4) Licensee Dominance of Licensing
3. TYJNG AND OTUER "EXTENSIONS" OF THE LEGAL MONOPOLY 998 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.
Dawson Chein ical Co. ','. Ro/ o' & Huu,s Co1001
Notes and Queries
(1) Queries
(2) Grant-Backs
(3) Abuses of the Process—Fraud on the Patent Office
Zen'ith Radio Corp. ?'. Hazeltine Research,
Notes and Queries
(1) Nondiminishing Royalty After Expiration of Some Patents in Package
(2) Discriminatory Royalty Rates
(3) Coercive Bargaining as an Attempt to Monopolize1017
(4) Comparison to Copyright Block Booking and Blanket Licensing
4. PATENT EXCHANGES: POOLS AND CROSS-LICENSING
The Gkus Container Patent Pool
HartJord-E?np?re Co. «. Ui,,ted Stak,s
Notes and Queries
(1)Interchange of Patent Rights
(2) Research Joint Ventures
(3) Research Joint Ventures—Specific Industry Examples
(4) Patent Exchanges to Settle Litigation; Settling
Patent Office interferences
(5) Royalty Free Licensing Ordered
(6) Relief Against Market Division
(7) Coliective Enforcement of Foreign Patents hy
American Firms to Exclude American Competitor From Foreign Market
(8) Licensing of Government-Owned Patents
(9) Comparison to Copyright—Compulsory Licenses
C. THE. CONFLICT BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE POLICIES
Sears, Roebnek & Co.v. Stiffel Co
Lear, Inc.v.Adkin.s
Kewanee Oil Company v Bicron Corporation
C. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FEDERAL. AND STATE PoLiciEs —Continued
Notes and Queries
(1)Queries
(2) Simulation as Lawful Competition
(3) Enforcement of Contract for Royalties
(4) Comparison to Copyright

CHAPTER 10. MARKET RESTRAINTS AND
THE LABOR EXEMPTION
INTRODUCTION AND LEGISLATIVE TEXTS
Labor Provisions of the Clayton Act of 1914
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932
Notes
(1) Restricting Reguiation of Unions by Antitrust Injunctions
(2) Federal Legislation Affirmatively Regulating Labor-Management Relations
B. THE SCOPE OF THE LABOR EXEMPTION
Alien Bradiey Co. v. Local Union No. J. Internationai Brotherhood ofElectrical Workers
Notes and Queries
(1) Apex, Hutcheson and Alien Bradiey—The Pre-1965 Trilogy Defining the Boundaries of the Labor Exemption
(2) Union Antitrust Suits Claiming Empioyer Activity Falis Outside the Exemption
(3) Union "Standing" in Antitrust Controversies Over Union Organization and Wage Leveis
(4) Industry-Wide Bargaining and the Labor Exemption
Role of the ILGWU in Stabilizing the Women's Garment Industry
United Mine Workers of Ame'rica v. Pennington
Notes and Queries
(1) Kinks in the Line Demarking the Labor Exemption
(2) Multi-Employer or Industry-Wide Bargaining
Local Union No. 189, A ,nalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.
B. THE SCOPE OF THE LABOR EXEMPTION—Continued
Notes and Queries
Page
(1)Queries
(2) Price Control Justified to Protect Union Wages?
(3) Labor Panei Hits Milk Price Wars
(4) Worker Censorship
(5) Labor Law Limits on Job Protection
(6) State Law and Preemption
(7) Entrepreneurs' Unions
(8) The Labor Union in Business: Probierns of Vertical Integration
(9) Queries
Gonnell Construction Co., Inc. v. Piumbers and Stea.?nfitters Local Union No. 100
Notes and Queries
(1) The Distinction Between the Statutory and NonStatutory Labor Exemption
(2) Using the Statutory Exemption—The Union as a Buyers' Cartel
(3) The Conflict Between Antitrust and Labor Law Remedies
(4) Labor-Antitrust Litigation and "Primary Jurisdiction"
C. DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE ANTITRUST STANDARD TO BE APPLIED TO NON-EXEMPT ACTIVITY
Larry V. Muko, inc. v. Southwestern Pennsylvania Building & Construction Trades Council (Muko II)
Notes and Queries
(1) Manipulating Antitrust Standards of Per Se IIlegality as a Device for Reconsidering the Question of Exemption
(2) Varying the Antitrust Standard of Proof in NonExempt Labor Restraints of Trade
1165 (8) Picketing, The First Amendment and Antitrus
Index


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