Brazilian Competition Law: (Registro n. 1416)
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Campo fixo de controle local | 190617s2013 us gr 000 0 eng u |
020 ## - ISBN | |
ISBN | 9789041141422 |
040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
Localização na estante | 341.3787 G112b |
Cutter | G112b |
100 10 - Autor | |
Autor | GABAN, Eduardo Molan |
245 10 - Titulo Principal | |
Título principal | Brazilian Competition Law: |
Subtítulo | A Practioner's Guide / |
260 ## - Editora | |
Cidade | Estados Unidos: |
Editora | Kluwer Law International, |
Data | 2013. |
300 ## - Descrição Física | |
Número de páginas | 439 p. |
505 ## - Conteúdo | |
Conteúdo | Table of Contents<br/>About the Authors <br/>Foreword <br/>Acknowledgments <br/>List of Abbreviations <br/>Introduction<br/><br/>PART 1<br/>Brazilian Competition Policy: History, Basis, and Focus<br/><br/>CHAPTER 1<br/>Brief History of the Brazilian Competition Law and Policy <br/>§1.01 Formation of Competition Rules in Brazil <br/>§1.02 Relationship between the Disciplines of Conduct and that of Structures <br/>§1.03 Control of Conducts in the Legal and in the Economic Theories <br/>[A] The Harvard School and the Chicago School <br/>[B] Brief Comments on the Freiburg School <br/>[C] Distinction between Per Se Rule and Rule of Reason and Comments on Exemption Practices and Authorizations <br/>§1.04 Social Welfare and Antitrust Violation <br/><br/>CHAPTER 2 <br/>The Methodology for the Antitrust Analysis <br/>§2.01 Relevant Market<br/>§2.02 Market Share and Market Power<br/>§2.03 Likelihood for Market Power Exercise<br/>[A] Barriers to Entry <br/>[B] Rivairy <br/>[C] Economic Efficiencies <br/><br/>CHAPTER 3 <br/>Control of Structures (Merger Control) <br/>§3.01 Legal Provisions <br/>[A] Penalties for Violations to Merger Control Provisions <br/>[l] GunJumping <br/>§3.02 Economic Group according to Case Law and Regulation <br/>§3.03 Concentration Acts <br/>§3.04 Thresholds, Filing Forms, Procedures, and Decisions<br/>[A] Thresholds<br/>[B] Merger Filmg Forms and Special Conditions<br/>[1] Transactions Involving a Public Offering<br/>[2] Preliminary Clearance and Tacit Approval <br/>[C] Procedures <br/>[D] Remedies According to the Case Law <br/>[1] Veto (Rejection)<br/>[2] Partial Approval (Partial Clearance) <br/>[3] Full Approval (Clearance) <br/>[4] Concentration Control Agreement (ACC) <br/>[5] Theories and Arguments for Approvals <br/>[a] Failing Firm and Failing Division <br/>[b] Declining Markets <br/>[c] Compensatory Power <br/><br/>CHAPTER 4<br/>Control of Behaviours (Antitrust Violations) <br/>§4.01 The Legal Provisions <br/>[A] Penalties for Antitrust Violations <br/>§4.02 Liabi!ity under the Antitrust Law <br/>§4.03 Abuse of Dominant Position <br/>[A] Abusive or Excessive Pricing <br/>[B] Discrimination <br/>[C] Raising Rivals Costs <br/>[1] Sham Litigation <br/>[2] Creating Difficu!ties for Riva!s <br/>[D] Predatory Pricing <br/>[E] Promotional Policies <br/>[F] Tying <br/>[C] Exclusive Dealing <br/>[H] Bonus, Rebates, and Loyalty Programmes <br/>[1] Price-Squeeze and Margin-Squeeze (or Profit-Squeeze) <br/>[J] Refusal to Deal <br/>[K] Resale Price Fixing and Resale Price Maintenance <br/>§4.04 Agreements among Competitors <br/>[A] Restrictive Agreements: Cartels <br/>[1] Concepts and Types <br/>[2] Cartel as Criminal and Administrative Offences <br/>[3] Conditions for Cartel's Success (from Players' Logic Perspective) <br/>[4] Appreciation of Evidence (from Antitrust Authorities' Perspective) <br/>[5] Market Power Assessment <br/>[6] Price Leadership <br/>[7] Parallelism of Conduct <br/>[8] International Cartels <br/>[9] International Hard Core Cartels <br/>[10] Formation and Identification <br/>[B] Collaboration among Competitors <br/>[1] The EU and the US Experiences in the Brazilian Context <br/>[21] Information Exchange <br/>[3] Research and Development <br/>[4] General Commercial Conditions <br/>[5] Concluding Remarks <br/><br/>PART II<br/>Global Competition Policy <br/><br/>CHAPTER 5 <br/>Multilateral and International Plans <br/>§5.01 OECD <br/>[A] A Few Considerations about Soft Laws <br/>[B] OECD Recommendations <br/>§5.02 UNCTAD <br/>[A] UNCTAD and Competition <br/>§5.03 WTO<br/>[A] Competition in the WTO <br/>[B] Proposals of Action <br/>§5.04 International Competition Network (ICN)<br/>[A] The ICN and Cartels <br/><br/>CHAPTER 6<br/>Bilateral, Regional and National Scopes <br/>§6.01 Cooperation Agreements <br/>[A] Positive Comity and Negative Comity <br/>§6.02 Introduction to Competition in MERCOSUR <br/>Table of Contents<br/>§6.03 Current Scenario of the Policy against Hard Core Carteis in Brazil <br/>[A] The Brazilian Experience with Cooperation <br/>[1] Investigation of the Lysine Cartel <br/>[2] Investigation of the Vitamins Cartel <br/>[3] Investigation of the Alleged Toilet Paper Cartel: A National Case with International Cooperation <br/>[4] Investigation into a Suspect Air Compressors Cartel <br/>PART III<br/>New Tools, Trends, and Chalienges <br/><br/>CHAPTER 7<br/>Tools and Incentives Available for Evidence/Proof Coliection <br/>§7.01 Leniency Agreements <br/>[A] Requirements in Brazil <br/>[B] Other Implications <br/>§7.02 Cease and Desist Agreement (TCC) <br/>§7.03 Inspection <br/><br/>CHAPTER 8<br/>Private Damages <br/>§8.01 The US and EU Experiences in the Brazilian Context <br/>§8.02 The Brazilian Private Damages System <br/>§8.03 First Cases <br/><br/>CHAPTER 9 <br/>Competition and Intellectual Property (IP) <br/>§9.01 Brief Overview <br/>§9.02 The Case Anfape versus Volkswagen Do Brasil et ai. (Auto Parts Case) <br/>§9.03 Competition and IP under a Comparative Approach (Brazil, US, and EU) <br/>§9.04 Influence of the International Case Law <br/>[A] EU Case Law <br/>[1] Volvo versus Erik Veng (1988) <br/>[2] BMW Nederland BV versus Ronald Karel Deenik (1997) <br/>[3] Fiat versus ISAM (2000) <br/>[4] RTE & ITP versus Commission: The Magili Case (1995) <br/>[5] IMS Health versus NDC Health (2001) <br/>[6] Microsoft Corp. versus Commission of the European <br/>Communities (2007) <br/>Table of Contents<br/>[B] US Case Law <br/>[1] Eastman Kodak co. versus Image Tech. Svcs. (1992) <br/>§9.05 Safety Zones under a Comparative Approach (Brazil, US, and EU) <br/>Concluding Remarks <br/><br/>PART IV<br/>Case Studies<br/>Introduction <br/>Air Compressors (Investigation) <br/>Bus Routes<br/>Cable TV <br/>Cement and Concrete (Investigation) <br/>Civil Air Transportation <br/>Fuel Retailers <br/>Goiânia State <br/>Santa Catarina State <br/>Table of Cases of Fuel Retailers <br/>Hydrogen Peroxides <br/>Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) <br/>Federal District and Territories <br/>Goiás State <br/>Marine Hoses (Investigation) <br/>Meat Companies <br/>Medical and Industrial Gas <br/>Discussion in Courts <br/>Medical Services <br/>Alagoas <br/>Brasilia <br/>Santos <br/>Table of Cases of Medical Services <br/>Medicine / Drugs <br/>Non-brand (Generic) Medicine <br/>Discussion in Courts <br/>Paradigm <br/>Vitamius <br/>Petrobras' lnternational Public Bid <br/>Private Securities <br/>Rubble <br/>Steel <br/>Deformed Steel Bars <br/>Plane Steel <br/>Toilet Paper <br/>Table of Contents<br/>Bibliographic References <br/>Table of Cases <br/>Index <br/><br/> |
700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal | |
Nome pessoa | Domingues, Juliana Oliveira |
Relação | Autora |
9 (RLIN) | 1516 |
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Tipo de Material | Livros |
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Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2019-10-01 | Compra | 31286 | 341.3787 G112b | 2019-1055 | 1 | 2019-10-01 | Livros |