Table of Contents
About the Authors
Foreword
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
Introduction

PART 1
Brazilian Competition Policy: History, Basis, and Focus

CHAPTER 1
Brief History of the Brazilian Competition Law and Policy
§1.01 Formation of Competition Rules in Brazil
§1.02 Relationship between the Disciplines of Conduct and that of Structures
§1.03 Control of Conducts in the Legal and in the Economic Theories
[A] The Harvard School and the Chicago School
[B] Brief Comments on the Freiburg School
[C] Distinction between Per Se Rule and Rule of Reason and Comments on Exemption Practices and Authorizations
§1.04 Social Welfare and Antitrust Violation

CHAPTER 2
The Methodology for the Antitrust Analysis
§2.01 Relevant Market
§2.02 Market Share and Market Power
§2.03 Likelihood for Market Power Exercise
[A] Barriers to Entry
[B] Rivairy
[C] Economic Efficiencies

CHAPTER 3
Control of Structures (Merger Control)
§3.01 Legal Provisions
[A] Penalties for Violations to Merger Control Provisions
[l] GunJumping
§3.02 Economic Group according to Case Law and Regulation
§3.03 Concentration Acts
§3.04 Thresholds, Filing Forms, Procedures, and Decisions
[A] Thresholds
[B] Merger Filmg Forms and Special Conditions
[1] Transactions Involving a Public Offering
[2] Preliminary Clearance and Tacit Approval
[C] Procedures
[D] Remedies According to the Case Law
[1] Veto (Rejection)
[2] Partial Approval (Partial Clearance)
[3] Full Approval (Clearance)
[4] Concentration Control Agreement (ACC)
[5] Theories and Arguments for Approvals
[a] Failing Firm and Failing Division
[b] Declining Markets
[c] Compensatory Power

CHAPTER 4
Control of Behaviours (Antitrust Violations)
§4.01 The Legal Provisions
[A] Penalties for Antitrust Violations
§4.02 Liabi!ity under the Antitrust Law
§4.03 Abuse of Dominant Position
[A] Abusive or Excessive Pricing
[B] Discrimination
[C] Raising Rivals Costs
[1] Sham Litigation
[2] Creating Difficu!ties for Riva!s
[D] Predatory Pricing
[E] Promotional Policies
[F] Tying
[C] Exclusive Dealing
[H] Bonus, Rebates, and Loyalty Programmes
[1] Price-Squeeze and Margin-Squeeze (or Profit-Squeeze)
[J] Refusal to Deal
[K] Resale Price Fixing and Resale Price Maintenance
§4.04 Agreements among Competitors
[A] Restrictive Agreements: Cartels
[1] Concepts and Types
[2] Cartel as Criminal and Administrative Offences
[3] Conditions for Cartel's Success (from Players' Logic Perspective)
[4] Appreciation of Evidence (from Antitrust Authorities' Perspective)
[5] Market Power Assessment
[6] Price Leadership
[7] Parallelism of Conduct
[8] International Cartels
[9] International Hard Core Cartels
[10] Formation and Identification
[B] Collaboration among Competitors
[1] The EU and the US Experiences in the Brazilian Context
[21] Information Exchange
[3] Research and Development
[4] General Commercial Conditions
[5] Concluding Remarks

PART II
Global Competition Policy

CHAPTER 5
Multilateral and International Plans
§5.01 OECD
[A] A Few Considerations about Soft Laws
[B] OECD Recommendations
§5.02 UNCTAD
[A] UNCTAD and Competition
§5.03 WTO
[A] Competition in the WTO
[B] Proposals of Action
§5.04 International Competition Network (ICN)
[A] The ICN and Cartels

CHAPTER 6
Bilateral, Regional and National Scopes
§6.01 Cooperation Agreements
[A] Positive Comity and Negative Comity
§6.02 Introduction to Competition in MERCOSUR
Table of Contents
§6.03 Current Scenario of the Policy against Hard Core Carteis in Brazil
[A] The Brazilian Experience with Cooperation
[1] Investigation of the Lysine Cartel
[2] Investigation of the Vitamins Cartel
[3] Investigation of the Alleged Toilet Paper Cartel: A National Case with International Cooperation
[4] Investigation into a Suspect Air Compressors Cartel
PART III
New Tools, Trends, and Chalienges

CHAPTER 7
Tools and Incentives Available for Evidence/Proof Coliection
§7.01 Leniency Agreements
[A] Requirements in Brazil
[B] Other Implications
§7.02 Cease and Desist Agreement (TCC)
§7.03 Inspection

CHAPTER 8
Private Damages
§8.01 The US and EU Experiences in the Brazilian Context
§8.02 The Brazilian Private Damages System
§8.03 First Cases

CHAPTER 9
Competition and Intellectual Property (IP)
§9.01 Brief Overview
§9.02 The Case Anfape versus Volkswagen Do Brasil et ai. (Auto Parts Case)
§9.03 Competition and IP under a Comparative Approach (Brazil, US, and EU)
§9.04 Influence of the International Case Law
[A] EU Case Law
[1] Volvo versus Erik Veng (1988)
[2] BMW Nederland BV versus Ronald Karel Deenik (1997)
[3] Fiat versus ISAM (2000)
[4] RTE & ITP versus Commission: The Magili Case (1995)
[5] IMS Health versus NDC Health (2001)
[6] Microsoft Corp. versus Commission of the European
Communities (2007)
Table of Contents
[B] US Case Law
[1] Eastman Kodak co. versus Image Tech. Svcs. (1992)
§9.05 Safety Zones under a Comparative Approach (Brazil, US, and EU)
Concluding Remarks

PART IV
Case Studies
Introduction
Air Compressors (Investigation)
Bus Routes
Cable TV
Cement and Concrete (Investigation)
Civil Air Transportation
Fuel Retailers
Goiânia State
Santa Catarina State
Table of Cases of Fuel Retailers
Hydrogen Peroxides
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)
Federal District and Territories
Goiás State
Marine Hoses (Investigation)
Meat Companies
Medical and Industrial Gas
Discussion in Courts
Medical Services
Alagoas
Brasilia
Santos
Table of Cases of Medical Services
Medicine / Drugs
Non-brand (Generic) Medicine
Discussion in Courts
Paradigm
Vitamius
Petrobras' lnternational Public Bid
Private Securities
Rubble
Steel
Deformed Steel Bars
Plane Steel
Toilet Paper
Table of Contents
Bibliographic References
Table of Cases
Index